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THE WORKS
OF
HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT.

THE WORKS

OF

HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT.

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HISTORY OF MEXICO.

CHAPTER I.

EUROPE IN THE EARLY PART OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

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AT the opening of the nineteenth century Europe was in a state of unusual commotion. There had come from Corsica to Paris a bow-legged, olive-cheeked little man who had set the rulers of the earth and their wise men by the ears. They were exceedingly frightened, and knew not what to do. For this personage had set at work several hundred thousands of their subjects killing each other; to what purpose, it puzzled them to say, unless it was to show how to make dupes and donkeys of them all—only donkeys are too sensible beasts to cut and mangle and murder each other in such a wholesale manner at the instigation of any one.

Louis XVI. was guillotined in 1793. His predecessor, after a life of debauchery with his Pompadours and Dubarrys, and under the intellectual libertinism of Voltaire and Rousseau, had died leaving a debt of four thousand millions of livres. After that was the *tiers état*, followed by the storming of the Bastile

midst mobs and bloody revolution. Paper money was made. Hereditary titles were discontinued. Church property was seized. Christianity was abolished—though reëstablished before 1801—and reason was enthroned. The constitution was changed, and a species of bastard republicanism propagated. As the head of Louis Capet rolled upon the scaffold, insulted royalty rose throughout Europe. But France was still mad, and it was not until Robespierre was brought beneath the guillotine that the reign of terror was ended. And thus was opened the way for Napoleon Bonaparte.

Taking the popular side in the revolution, and with the aid of his matchless military genius, Napoleon was general of the army at the age of twenty-five. In 1796 he drove back the Austrians and conquered Italy. Venice fell the following year, and the cisalpine republic was formed out of the Milanese and Mantuan states. Egypt was attempted in 1798, but Nelson was in the Mediterranean and prevented the loss of India to Great Britain. The following year the First Consul's proposals of peace to England were decidedly rejected by George III. Austria's turn came again in 1800, and in 1801 the northern kingdoms were united in a league against England. In 1802 France regained her islands in the West Indies lost by Louis XV. to the English. The *Code Napoléon* was formed. Notwithstanding the peace of Amiens, in 1803, Great Britain was pricked into fresh outbreaks. Made emperor of France and king of Italy in 1804, Napoleon, who was so sadly disturbing the time-honored balances of power, now found united against him, England, Russia, Austria, and Sweden. The game of 1805 was played off Trafalgar and at Austerlitz, and at its close all Europe lay at the feet of the little man from Corsica. Prussia claimed his attention in 1806, Russia in 1807, Spain in 1808, and Austria in 1809–10. Here marks the highest point attained. In 1812 came the Russian campaign; in

1813 the French armies were driven from Spain; and in 1814 Napoleon was at Elba. Another flash of glory; then in 1815 Waterloo and St Helena, and in 1821—death.

Meanwhile England, having lost the fairest portion of her American provinces, and being deeply in debt from her many European complications and much fighting, was reduced to an unhappy condition. The toilers had great burdens to bear, which were placed upon them mercilessly by all the rest, manufacturers, land owners, and rulers. Everything was excessively taxed, while wages were reduced, sometimes one half. The slave-trade obtained. Forty thousand negroes were annually taken on board by English ships for their West India colonies, half of them perishing by the passage. In a word, manners were coarse and usages cruel. Prussia was badly broken by the war, losing large parts of her domains. There was some disaffection among the German people, but it was checked without difficulty by the strong arm of royalty. Francis and Prince Metternich ruled Austria with an iron despotism, preventing freedom of thought or speech, and holding over the press strict censorship.

With the centuries Spain has continued to decline, until it is many times thought that the bottom has been reached, but only after a little rise to find a lower depth. Yet, during a portion of the three imbecile reigns of the seventeenth century—Felipe III., 1598–1621; Felipe IV., 1621–1665; and Cárlos II., 1665–1700—we find continued for a time the brilliant age of literature and art, dating from the rule of their predecessor. There are Luis de Leon, Castilian Cervantes, Lope de Vega, and Quevedo; Calderon de la Barca, and other writers; and Ribera, Velazquez, and Murillo, painters. Meanwhile the army becomes greatly demoralized; the country is left almost defenceless; the naval strength is reduced to nothing;

the merchant marine is next to nothing, the art of ship-building being lost, Italy, France, and England doing Spain's carrying; while pirates and filibusters ravage colonial waters, and industries and trade fall into the hands of foreigners.

The eighteenth century opens with a thirteen years' war for the succession, when the house of Bourbon crowds out the house of Hapsburg. Of the Bourbon princes before Joseph Bonaparte, are Felipe V., 1700–1746; Fernando VI., 1746–1759; Cárlos III., 1759–1788; Cárlos IV., 1788–1808; and Fernando VII., the same year. Following Bonaparte, 1808–1814, is Fernando VII. till 1833, Isabel II. till 1868, a brief period of republicanism, 1868–9, Amadeo of the house of Savoy, 1871–3, then more republican dictatorships, and finally the house of Bourbon again restored in the person of Alfonso XII.

Out of the necessary discipline incident to the war of the succession grows some improvement. Agriculture and industry are revived. Legislation is in some degree purified. The wings of the holy see are clipped, and the church stripped of part of its property and influence. Fernando VI., being small in body, weak in mind, full of fear and hypochondria, and withal of a kind and benevolent disposition, the country recuperates somewhat under his rule. Retrenchments are made. The inquisition is emptied. Some defences are restored, industry and commerce are cultivated, and other reforms instituted.

Cárlos III. is an abler man and makes more mischief. Church and inquisition are still further checked and the Jesuits are expelled. Among the reformers of the period are Count Aranda, an Aragon grande of French proclivities and friend of Voltaire; Count Campomanes, a man of culture and literary activity, a patriot and friend of progress; and Count Floridablanca, who in 1777 succeeds Campomanes as prime minister. The last named is less bigoted than his age, though opposed to French radicalism; while re-

straining the influence of the church, he protects it. He is a man of talents and culture, less statesman than manager, and believing in autocracy and unquestioning obedience. But whatever the principles held in theory, put into practice through the agency of ignorant, indolent, and corrupt officials, they fall far short of their purpose. There is hostility with England in 1779–83. In 1781–2 Spain puts down an insurrection of the inca, Tupac Amaru, in Peru, and the thousand years' war with the Mahometans is terminated by the peace of Algiers in 1786.

With the accession of Cárlos IV. ends the epoch of reform. Dismal indeed are the next thirty years, during which occur the grand humiliation at the hand of Bonaparte, and the loss of nearly all the transatlantic colonies. The king is a handsome, ignorant, good-natured imbecile; and his wife, María Luisa, an ambitious and passionate profligate, is the true ruler of Spain. Floridablanca and Aranda are alternately removed and recalled, finally to make way for Manuel Godoy, a young officer, and the queen's favorite, impudent, incompetent, ambitious, and thoroughly immoral, sycophant or conspirator according to the tide, but always villain. If politics, war, or intrigue become tiresome, he seeks relief in dissipation.

Under these baneful influences Spain sinks lower than ever. While the rulers are revelling in luxury and licentiousness, the poor throughout the land are crying for bread. Finances are wrecked, the army is rendered weak and worthless, and education and industry are again prostrated. Galicia and other provinces revolt, and presently the French are upon them, and Spain is little better than vassal.

The peace of Basel, 1795–6—as is called the frivolous farce which pretended to free the country of the French, while in reality placing the peninsula still more in their power, besides in its results completing the ruin of the navy, and preparing the way for the general revolt of the colonies—gives Godoy the name

of Prince of Peace, with rich domains and other substantial gifts.

Spain still has many ships and regiments, but no sailors or soldiers. Off Portugal, in 1797, the Spaniards are defeated by the English, who sweep the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas, and sow discord among the colonies. During the past three years there has been 2,445,000,000 reals income, and 3,714,000,000 outgo. There is in circulation 1,980,000,000 paper money current in 1799 at forty per cent discount. Religion is everywhere present as the handmaid of vice. A peace is signed in 1801 between France and Spain, with Godoy as the creature of Napoleon. In thick succession other wars are followed by other ignominious treaties. In 1808 the French are in Spain; Cárlos abdicates; Godoy flees before the fury of the populace; and Fernando VII., idle, incompetent, and faithless, a coward and a hypocrite, base, tricky, and a debauchee—these are some of the many epithets history applies to this monarch —is named successor.

After a royal puppet-play, with Murat as manager-general, during which Cárlos is for a moment recalled, while Fernando abdicates, the English, thirty thousand strong, are in the peninsula. At Aranjuez the supreme junta sits under the presidency of Floridablanca. Then comes Napoleon to Spain; and for a time Joseph Bonaparte holds the reins of government. In 1810—Caracas, in Venezuela, breaking into revolt, and Buenos Aires shortly after—the cortes assemble at Cádiz. A constitution is drawn up in 1812, which, under the impulse of the universal progress of liberty, abolishes seignorial rights, torture, the inquisition, and most of the convents. It is almost republican in its tenor, too liberal for the place and the time, and so does not hold; and Spain still labors under the crushing weight of absolute monarchy.

Fernando, reinstated in 1813, swears to the constitution of 1812, intending never to keep it. There

never was a Bourbon who was not a despot. Four epochs mark his reign: the transient tastes of power before and after Bonaparte; then to the Andalusian revolution of 1820, during which period the Jesuits are recalled, the party of the liberal constitution proscribed, certain notable Spaniards condemned to the galleys, and the power of the freemasons put forth in opposition to crown and clergy; the third from 1820—when the Spaniards rebel, and Fernando is forced by popular clamor to convoke the cortes, call from the galleys to the principal portfolios Herreros, Perez de Castro, and the two Argüelles—to the fall of Cádiz and the constitutional government in 1823, a congress of European powers at Verona having reëstablished the authority of the king, the national militia being meanwhile organized, the press declared free, and the inquisition abolished; and lastly, the decade preceding the king's death, during which despotism is revived, and money matters demoralized, expenses amounting to 700,000,000 reals per annum to be met by a revenue of 400,000,000.

But by this time America and Europe are pretty well separated politically, never again, thank God, to be united. What with conventionality, bigotry, despotism, and general decay in many quarters, the New World can do better alone, and after its own way. Upon the death of Fernando VII. in 1833, his daughter Isabel II. being but three years of age, the child's mother, Cristina, is named regent; but the late king's brother, Don Cárlos, opposes with desolating war. With British aid, however, the queen triumphs in 1840. Still Spain is torn by detestable strife. Millions of miserable wretches must starve and bleed over the issue to determine which shall rule of two of the vilest specimens of the dominating class ignorance, superstition, deceit, and incestuous, idiot-breeding marriages can produce. Now and then the people make a noble stand for their deliverance, when as often France or England would come with

armies and drive them into base obedience. There is revolution in 1854, after which a national junta is established. Isabel is deposed in 1868, and Amadeo, second son of Victor Emanuel of Italy, is elected king. After vainly striving to reconcile contending factions, in 1872 comes the Carlist war, and the following year Amadeo abdicates, when a republic is proclaimed. The failure of its forces against the Carlists, however, brings round monarchy again in the person of Alfonso, Isabel's son, in 1875.

Altogether this Fernando presents one of the most contemptible characters of history. "The conspirator of the escurial," he has been called, "the rebel of Aranjuez; the robber of his father's crown; the worm squirming at the feet of his enemy at Bayonne; the captive of Valençay, begging bits of colored ribbon from Napoleon while his people were pouring out their blood and gold to give him back his crown; the jailer of the illustrious statesman to whom he owed the restoration of that crown; the perjured villain who spontaneously engaged to be true to the constitution of 1812, and then conspired to overthrow it the day after he had sworn; the promoter of anarchy during the three years of constitutional government; the invoker of the Holy Alliance and the intervention of France; the author of innumerable proscriptions; the coarse voluptuary; Ferdinand leaves no memory but that of a man worthy of our profoundest scorn."

Thus we have seen how at the beginning of the present century all Europe was at war. The most intelligent, civilized, and christian nations of the earth were hotly engaged in such senseless quarrels as would make a savage smile; and for lack of any other method of settlement, like savages they were falling on each other to kill, burn, or otherwise damage and destroy as best they were able. France in particular was pouring out her best blood and treasure at the caprice of a despot whose paramount aspiration was

self-aggrandizement, and whose exploits were destined to plunge her in deep abasement. Even the pope himself about that time had been upon the war-path, sending out his armies with fire and sword where words failed, and all greatly to his discomfiture and humiliation.

To the principle of evil in human affairs mankind owes much. To war, a great evil, a beastly arbitrament, but the only ultimate appeal yet found by man with all his wisdom, America owes much. To the silly strifes of European powers America owes more than to any butchering done by her own hands. It was due to this preoccupation, and to the weakness thence arising, rather than to any extraordinary display of wisdom, patriotism, or power on the part of the colonists, English or Spanish, that their independence was achieved.

There are foolish wars, and there are necessary wars: foolish sometimes on both sides, always foolish on one side. Hundreds of wars there have been, and will be, which leave the combatants, after tearing each other like wolves for a time, exactly as at the outset. Resorting to war for freedom or the integrity of the nation is not the same as war for the arrangement of differences which after any amount of fighting can only be settled upon some basis of equity which has to be determined upon other principles than those of arms. It is better to fight than to be a slave. It is not well to fight simply for power or aggrandizement, since the issue is based on injustice, and is sure to be transient. It is not worth while to fight purely for the mastery, as it is foreordained that no man shall be master on this planet.

The United States had finished the war which gave them their freedom; and were now busy trying to raise money, frame a constitution, and organize a government, while turning an honest penny by furnishing supplies to the combatants who were still destroying

themselves in Europe. When England and France each pronounced the ports of the other closed against commerce, and the former persisted in claiming a right to search American vessels for deserters, the United States forbid the shipment of American products to Europe, and declared war against England. After indulging in some foolish fighting, uncalled for and resulting in no adequate benefit, though attended with much misery and loss of life, commissioners met at Ghent and adjusted their differences, which might just as well have been done before the war as after.

It has been the fashion, in various quarters, because the northern confederation of states has prospered more and reached a higher plane of distinction and power than the united provinces of Mexico, unduly to extoll the founders of the former, and ridicule the pretensions to patriotism, intelligence, and skill on the part of those who fought for the deliverance of the latter. It is pleasing to tell stories to children, and talk among ourselves of the superior courage and self-denying heroism of those who fought on our side in the dark days of American revolution, above those who fought against us; but it is a form of egotism in which I cannot indulge, unless the assertions conform to the facts of history, which in this instance they do not. Fortunately for the reputation of our early heroes, their associates and subordinates, our history is written by men of our own nation, primarily to feed our vanity; to accomplish which purpose that which is damaging to our side—in so far as is politic and practicable—is toned down or omitted, while that which is damaging on the other side is emphasized and exaggerated, and vice versa. If we would know the truth, we should sometimes look fairly into the character and deeds of some who were not citizens or soldiers of the United States.

Those who fought for our independence; those who suffered unrewarded and died unknown, as well as those whoes names are remembered and honored, and

who live to-day in our hearts, deserve all praise. But that as a class they were superior to their opponents; that they were so greatly superior to those who fought for the same object in Mexico, as we have been taught to believe, is not true. Lecky, with many others, holds that they have been "very unduly extolled," and that "the general aspect of the American people during the contest was far from heroic or sublime;" while Washington himself writes in 1778 that "idleness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of most of them; that speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration, and almost every order of men."

Let us then learn to omit some portion of our self-adulation in speaking of ourselves, some portion of our spread-eagle and Fourth-of-July buncombe and bombast in speaking of our country, to practise a little less hypocrisy and humbug in our politics, to say nothing of bribery and other corruption which is quite rank enough in our republic to-day.

Europe was bad enough, as we have seen, without any accentuation; monarchies were bad enough, the chief recommendation of the rulers being that they made no pretensions to honesty or piety, or rather made their piety to suit their honesty. And now with this showing of the influence from which the people of the New World determined to free themselves, I will proceed to show how it was done.

CHAPTER II.

ADMINISTRATION OF VICEROY ITURRIGARAY.

1803-1808.

CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION OF INDEPENDENCE—ARRIVAL OF THE VICEROY—HIS ANTECEDENTS AND COMPORTMENT—THE VICEREGAL FAMILY—SORDIDNESS OF ITURRIGARAY—HIS VISIT TO THE MINES—PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS—INTRODUCTION OF VACCINATION—SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY—EFFECT ON THE LAND OWNERS—HUMBOLDT'S VISIT—INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS—DEMANDS FOR TREASURE—DIFFICULTIES WITH THE UNITED STATES—WAR WITH ENGLAND—MILITARY PREPARATIONS—EUROPEAN AFFAIRS—ABDICATION OF CÁRLOS IV.—ITURRIGARAY'S INDIFFERENCE—EFFECTS IN MEXICO OF EVENTS IN SPAIN—POWER OF THE INQUISITION—ATTITUDE OF THE PRESS—SPARKS OF REVOLUTION.

WHEN the subjects of Spain in America awoke to a realization of their position, they found present no lack of reason for revolt. Almost every form of oppression that ever a people had been called to undergo at the hand of despotism they had suffered. The worst that had come to England's colonies we find among the mildest of Mexico's wrongs—so mild, indeed, that they were scarcely felt amidst the others weightier.

Hitherto, they had expected, as a matter of course, that the king of Spain would make such laws for his provinces as suited him. He was to his people almighty power, differing in degree rather than in essence from the power of the almighty, and they had learned to obey the one as the other. And if at the first there had been no more than the English colonies had to complain of—such as the interposition of authority between the people and laws of their making, dissolving or forbidding representative bodies, restrict-

ing migration and population, regulating the administration of justice, creating and sustaining unnecessary officers, keeping among them standing armies, imposing taxes, interference in commerce, and other like little things—there might have been to this day no separation from the mother country, except, indeed, it had been the falling-in-pieces from natural decay. I say such was the feeling before revolution was thought of; after the people began to consider, then certain of these minor wrongs seemed exceedingly exasperating. But behind all these, if not indeed one with them, were more serious evils. Looking well into the causes of Spanish American revolt, we find there the full catalogue of wrongs and injustice common to political subordinations of this nature, and in addition some of the blackest crimes within the power of tyranny to encompass. What were such matters as duties per cent, free coming and going, sumptuary regulations, or even local laws and legislation beside intellectual slavery, the enforcement of superstition, the subordination of soul, the degradation of both the mental and spiritual in man!

In regard to material impositions, probably one of the most outrageous as well as most absurd within the range of European colonization was that which denaturalized the son of the Spaniard born in America. What ridiculous nonsense for reasonable beings to act upon, not to say believe in, that the blood of him of pure Spanish parentage who first saw the light under the clear skies of the New World should thereby be politically and socially debased! Such was the royal edict, and to the end that all in Mexico might the more and forever be bound body and soul to Spain. Thus while pretending to parental care, the Spanish monarchs would reduce the colonists to the position of serfs.

In New Spain the first creoles[1] were identified

[1] The dictionary definition of creole is a native of Spanish America, born of European parents, or descended from European ancestors, as distinguished

with the European Spaniards, and for several succeeding generations the ties of parentage prevailed over the distinctions of nationality. It has been claimed that even when these bonds of consanguinity were loosened by the ever increasing numbers of the creole population and the divergence of interests, union between the two classes was still maintained as a security against insurrection of the native races. Indeed, Humboldt assigns this as a reason for the passive tolerance which the Spanish Americans exhibited during a long period of oppression.

But this was not all the reason; it was not in fact the chief or true reason. It had become so ingrained in their nature, the doctrine of loyalty, obedience to rulers, the divinity of kings, that to repudiate in any wise this idea was to defy the power of the almighty, and bring deserved death and the pains of hell. It was sin against God to disobey the king; and this rather than fear of uprisings held Mexico so long in servility. While such a state of things lasted, the Spaniards in Spain could deprive the Spaniards in America—or rather their descendants—of their legitimate political status, and aggrieve their rights with impunity; but none the less in due time did European pride and disdain provoke irritation and bitter jealousy. A mutual antipathy was thus gradually developed—an antipathy which was fostered by the action of the home government; for though by theory and law the privileges of all subjects of the crown were equal, in practice it was far otherwise.

Three prominent causes of disrupture were ever actively at work engendering hatred and thirst for independence. They were, in the inverse order of effect, social jealousies, exclusion from preferments, and the odious system of commercial monopoly enjoyed

from a resident inhabitant born in Europe, as well as from the offspring of mixed blood, as of mulatto, born of a negro mother, or of mestizo, born of an Indian mother. To this definition as regards creole I adhere; but in regard to the word 'mestizo,' I apply it generally to any intermixture of native American and European blood.

by the Spaniards. With regard to the first, it is unnecessary to enlarge upon what has been said in the previous volume;[2] but the question of political, military, and ecclesiastical preferments requires consideration, inasmuch as the exclusion of creoles from them is as strenuously denied by the advocates of the Spanish faction as it is emphatically asserted by those of the creole class. Although the Spanish American was eligible to all offices, from the lowest to the viceregal dignity, the higher were almost exclusively filled by men from Spain;[3] and in spite of the asseverations to the contrary,[4] it cannot be denied that promotion to important positions was practically closed to American Spaniards. No stronger evidence can be found than in the opposition to American representation in the Spanish government, and the public expressions of scorn and odium heaped upon the race in the Cádiz periodicals of that time.

The Spanish rulers were determined that New Spain should be ruled exclusively by Spaniards, howsoever the published policy of the nation might be affected thereby; and their opportunities of obtaining political

[2] *Hist. Mex.*, vol. iii. 742–4, this series. See also *Cancelada, Tel. Amer.*, 146–55.

[3] Walton, the author of *Present State of the Spanish Colonies*, London, 1810, secretary to the expedition which captured the city of Santo Domingo from the French, and resident British agent there, in his *Exposé on the Dissensions of Spanish America*, London, 1814, states, on page 47, 'that on examining authentic records, it results: that from the period of the first settlement up to the year 1810, out of 166 viceroys and 588 captain-generals, governors, and presidents who have governed in Spanish America, in all 754, only 18 have been creoles, and these few merely in consequence of their having been educated in Spain.' Only three viceroys of Mexico down to 1813 were creoles. *Alaman, Mej.*, i. 12.

[4] Torrente, *Hist. Rev. Hispano-Amer.*, i. 72–4, quotes observations made by 'un Americano del sur,' who stoutly maintains the generosity 'de una nacion que fiaba á americanos los Vireinatos, Capitanías generales, Presidencias, Magistraturas, Arzobispados i Opispados;' and gives a list of European and American officials for the year 1811, in which he shows that 338 were of the latter class and only 76 of the former. He moreover enumerates the political, military, and ecclesiastical positions held by the creoles during the same year. But I must remark that the appointments conferred upon creoles at the commencement of the nineteenth century afford no criterion of the proportion which prevailed during the two preceding centuries. Spain felt herself compelled to open the doors of promotion in the hope of allaying the gathering storm. Cancelada, *Tel. Amer.*, 265–73, argues that the creoles were more favored than the Spaniards in the matter of appointments.

preferments being so much greater than those of the creoles, they succeeded in securing for themselves all the higher offices. It is true that the Americans occupied most of the subaltern grades, but this only tended to bring them into more jealous competition with the Europeans by inspiring them to seek the more important. Although in the ecclesiastical preferments they were more favored than in political and military matters, during the last century of the colonial period they were gradually excluded from the high dignities of the church; and in 1808 all the bishoprics in New Spain, with one exception, and most of the rich benefices, were held by the European clergy. In the cloisters also of the regular orders there was the same want of fairness which even the alternative system failed to correct. Thus it was that as generation after generation passed away, not only in social communications but in public careers and professions, envy and jealousy became more marked, and finally developed into a deadly hatred between the two classes.

But after all, and toward the end, though not the most iniquitous, it was the commercial monopolies which caused the most wide-spread discontent. The entire control of trade by Spanish merchants, and the exorbitant prices charged by them for every commodity, the grinding restrictions upon such industries as interfered with the commerce of the mother country, and the limited amount of productions received by her, were more sweeping in effect, since all classes suffered, and the poor people the more severely. A bond of union to a greater or less extent was thus initiated between the creoles, mestizos, and native Indians, all of whom at an early date exhibited inclinations to acquire independence. The Englishman, Thomas Gage, who was in Mexico in 1625, correctly estimated the prevailing sentiment, and in his observations about the disturbances during the administration of Gelves thus prophetically expresses himself: "The chief actors were found to be the Criolians or

Natives of the Country, who do hate the Spanish Government, and all such as come from Spain; and reason they have for it, for by them they are much oppressed, as I have before observed, and are and will be always watching any opportunity to free themselves from the Spanish yoak."[5]

But apart from these main causes of discontent, other aggravations, permanent or periodical, excited a spirit of antagonism. Excessive taxation galled and irritated; the venality of officials and the corruptness of the judicial courts caused indignation; while the expulsion in 1767 of the Jesuits, who had ingratiated themselves in the hearts of the lower orders, insulted the people in their dearest affections. From that time conspiracy arose and became widespread; and the attempt at Apatzingan, prematurely undertaken, and abortive though it proved, opened the eyes of the Spanish rulers to the fact that ideas of independence were abroad in New Spain. The measures adopted to suppress such wickedness only added fuel to the fire. Disdaining the further support of the church, the government determined to rely on military force, and organizing the army on a much larger scale, humiliated in a variety of ways the clergy, who thus alienated became a powerful element in working out the independence.

While the industries of the country were cramped, the masses were unaware of the extraordinary resources of New Spain; but when certain restrictions were removed by the home government, and the war with England at the close of the eighteenth century almost annihilated trade with the peninsula, great impulse was given to the development of internal resources and commerce with foreign nations. While belief in the necessity of dependence on Spain was thus being weakened, Humboldt opened their eyes to their re-

[5] *New Survey*, 145. He, moreover, states that the Indians and mulattos 'brooked not the severe and rigorous justice and judgment of the Viceroy, no, nor any Government that was appointed over them from *Spain*.' *Id.*, 142.

sources, and set them further thinking of divorcement. Again, the creoles were more intelligent, better informed, and far more numerous than the blue-blooded Spaniards; in view of which we can only wonder that the people of Mexico remained in such humiliating subjection so long. The Spaniards in America and their children were even better educated than the Spaniards in Spain, and the higher their station and the more inflated their pride, the more their minds were filled with prejudice and ignorance. The establishment of the university at Mexico afforded facilities to the creoles superior to any enjoyed by their fathers, who for the most part, exclusive of those holding high positions, were of inferior birth and breeding, and without title to the superiority claimed. Students and graduates in Mexico by no means confined themselves to the narrow curriculum prescribed by the university, and the prohibited works of French philosophers, of political and moral writers, and especially of Rousseau, found their way of late into the country. Proletarian principles, and the detestation of oppression which they breathed, were absorbed with avidity, and stimulated the longing for freedom. The very danger incurred by the study of these books, and the secrecy with which of necessity they were perused, only served to intensify insurrectionary ideas and provoke conspiracy.[6] The liberal principles thus acquired by the educated class were gradually infused into the ignorant.

Nevertheless, it seems a little strange to us, to whom the doctrine of right of revolution has become so clear, and so cherished as the highest prerogative of liberty, that it should have made its way so slowly among an educated and intelligent people. But the cause is

[6] It was the special province of the inquisition to guard against the importation of books. As late as 1807, a Mexican named José Roxas was denounced by his own mother for having a volume of Rousseau in his possession, and was confined for several years in the dungeons of the holy office. He finally made his escape, but died in 1811 at New Orleans. *Ward's Mex.*, i. 110.

explained when we remember the powerful hold religion yet had upon these people. The first step toward freedom is to emancipate the mind from some of its superstitions. There can be no political liberty without some degree of religious liberty. It was primarily for religious liberty that the puritans had come from England to America; and the first step thus taken toward political liberty, they were prepared to throw off the yoke for slighter cause than were the people of Mexico, who were satisfied with their religion, and had no desire to change it. Thus while their religion, still the strongest sentiment possessing them, constrained them to loyalty, they were ready to endure much by way of duty, and to escape damnation —so much that it was rather Spain's weakness than Mexico's strength that secured independence, as we shall in due time see.

But gradually reason, long dormant if not dethroned, began to show signs of vitality, first in other quarters, and finally in Mexico. It was a period of political turnings and overturnings in Europe and America, and it were a pity if Mexico, ground into the very dust by the iron heel of despotism, should not find some relief.

The downfall of monarchy in France, and the independence of the British colonies in North America, had established precedents of the successful uprising of peoples against the oppression of rulers. More especially was the acquisition of freedom by the United States regarded as a solution of the difficulty in regard to the right of revolution, as Spain in 1783 had somewhat imprudently recognized the independence of the English colonies, thereby tacitly excusing revolt in her own.[7]

[7] The reader is already aware that the conde de Aranda at this time proposed to Cárlos III. the independence of the Spanish colonies in America. See *Hist. Mex.*, iii. 388–90. Dr Luis Quixano, a prominent leader of the revolution in Quito, made prisoner when Toribio Montes entered that city, deemed it advisable to retract his views on the right of a colony to assert its independence. He based his reconstructed argument on the principle that what is useful and convenient is not necessarily lawful and just. His ex-

While the proclivities of the people were thus becoming daily more dangerous, their anger was still further aroused by one of those acts of tyranny which Spain periodically committed in order to raise money in the colonies to meet home expenses. I refer to the sequestration of the funds of the benevolent institutions, a measure which seriously affected the welfare of almost every land owner in the country. As the particulars of this proceeding will be given later, it is only necessary to state here that numbers of families were ruined or impoverished by its operation. Thus Spain kept on using the goad. It is, however, a question how long the creoles would have suffered had not political affairs in Spain, as we have seen, afforded an exceptional opportunity for throwing off the yoke. For nearly two centuries the watchfulness of the government had prevented serious outbreak; even during the war of succession the tranquillity of New Spain was undisturbed. The majesty of the king was so deeply impressed upon the masses that it is probable, had it not been for the occupation of Spain by Napoleon, a few salutary reforms would have secured the loyalty of Mexico. But when two Spanish monarchs in succession, Cárlos IV. and Fernando VII., were compelled to lay aside their crowns, the one in obedience to the will of a mob and the other at the dictation of a foreign parvenu, the glory of the Spanish throne had departed, and the awe with which the greatest earthly potentate had been venerated by his transatlantic subjects was seriously lessened.

Nevertheless, when in 1808 the Spaniards rose against the French invaders, the demonstrations of feeling throughout New Spain showed patriotism on the part of the creoles, though perhaps as much by

ceedingly defective logic went no further, however, than to show that an oppressed colony has no more right to free itself from the mother country than has a slave to acquire freedom without the consent of his owner! 'Aunque á un esclavo le sea util gozar de su libertad, él no se la puede tomar por sí mismo contra la voluntad de su amo.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep.*, v. 63-4.

reason of hatred for the French as of any lingering affection for the Spaniards; and this, notwithstanding that the American deputies to the Spanish cortes, in their address on the 1st of August, 1811, represented that the Spaniards of America were so closely connected with the peninsula by the ties of interest and relationship, that leading men among them proclaimed the doctrine that the colonies ought to follow the fate of Spain, even if she succumbed to the power of Napoleon.[8] Some go so far as to attribute outright the outbreak of the revolution to the fear of subjection to the French.[9] Be this as it may, the repeated defeats of the Spanish arms during the following year, the incompetency of the junta central in the peninsula, and still more its popular origin, destroyed any favorable impression which might have been created in the discontented ranks, and afforded an example to them of delegates, elected by the people, investing themselves with the supreme government. Thus revolutionary impressions became yet more strongly confirmed; for the creoles could not recognize the right of a mob-appointed government claiming obedience from the subjects of a mighty monarchy.

And during this period, so critical to the existence of Spain's future hold upon the colonies, there was no viceroy in Mexico capable of appreciating the true condition of affairs; none who had the ability either to avert revolution or best serve Spain in accepting the situation. The incompetency and vacillation of the next three viceroys hastened the culmination of events, and during the years 1809 and 1810, the conspiracy to throw off the yoke of Spain spread fast and far throughout the land. It was on the 15th of Sep-

[8] Such a course would certainly relieve them from the persecution of Spain, though neither covert irony nor hibernicism were intended. 'Muchos de los mismos gefes y otros Européos proferian á las claras, que la America debia seguir la suerte de la Península, y obedecer á Bonaparte, si ella le obedecia.' *Diputac. Amer. Represent.*, 1° de Agosto de 1811, 6.

[9] *Id.*, 8; *Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 138.

tember of the year last named that the strife began, and which was marked by reprisals as vindictive and cold-blooded as the annals of any christian nation can record, as we shall see.[10] With these preliminary remarks on the political attitudes of the two classes, and on the origin of their divergence, I now proceed to narrate the historical events which preceded the final rupture.

The fifty-sixth viceroy of Mexico, José de Iturrigaray, arrived with his family at Guadalupe, and took charge of the government on the 4th of January, 1803. He held the rank of lieutenant-general in the royal army, as had nearly all those who filled this office during the rule of the house of Bourbon in Spain. A veteran soldier and sexagenarian, he still retained a youthful energy and vigor.[11]

Iturrigaray was a native of Cádiz, descending from a genteel but not illustrious family. With an honorable record in the Spanish militia, he had served with some distinction as a colonel of carabineers in the campaign of Roussillon, at the beginning of the French revolution in 1792. His reputation, however, as a military commander was not of the best;[12] and his elevation to the viceregal office was due to the favor of Godoy, the Prince of Peace, who still maintained influence over the weak and incompetent king.[13] His reception at Guadalupe and in the capital was,

[10] The same causes were at work in all the Spanish colonies in America; and it is significant to note the unanimity of the feeling entertained everywhere by the creoles, as well as the synchronism of their start for the goal of freedom. In this same year five revolutions broke out in South America: that of Caracas on April 19, 1810; that of Buenos Aires on the 25th of May following; that of New Granada on the 3d of July; that of Bogotá on the 20th of the same month; that of Cartagena on the 18th of August; and that of Chile on the 18th of September. *Diputac. Amer. Rep.*, 1811, 2–3.

[11] As a Mexican writer says, 'Con el arrebatamiento y fuego de un francés atolondrado.' *Medidas, Pacif.*, MS., 57.

[12] 'Hombre de una mediana reputacion militar en su patria.' *El Indicador*, iii. 215. Compare also *Disposiciones Varias*, i. 120; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 10–11; *Ratzel, Aus. Mex.*, 344–5; *Gazeta Mex.*, xi. 222–3.

[13] 'No fueron estos méritos los que lo elevaron al virreinato, sino el favor de D. Manuel Godoy.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 46. 'Favorecido del principe de la Paz.' *El Indicador*, iii. 215.

unlike that of Marquina, most flattering and obsequious. The festivities, begun in the former place, were continued in the latter with the customary processions and bull-fights. This unchecked privilege of the populace, in such agreeable contrast with the unwelcome prohibitions of the former viceory, combined with the gracious deportment of Iturrigaray and the affable demeanor of his stately spouse, gained him at once the favor of the people. Erelong, however, it was discovered that his condescension was but a cloak to less worthy traits of character.[14] Branciforte's corruption was barefaced; dissimulation under a fascinating exterior was the prominent feature in Iturrigaray's character.[15]

The family of the viceroy consisted of his wife, Doña Inés de Jáuregui y Arístegui, who although no longer young possessed many attractions, a grown-up son, several younger children, and a numerous train of relatives, all bent on amassing fortunes. This was also the dominating passion of Iturrigaray, whose first act on taking charge of the government was to defraud the crown. Following the example of Branciforte, he had obtained a royal decree before his departure from the peninsula, permitting him to introduce free of duty into New Spain unfinished family apparel.[16] Under this pretence he landed a cargo of merchandise at Vera Cruz, which he sold in that port, netting an enormous profit.[17] Moreover, he at once began a system of sale of offices and employments on his own account, and by an abominable venality established for his benefit an impost on quicksilver,

[14] The character of Iturrigaray was 'estremadamente popular.' *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 30. The populace was 'complacida con el trato afable y popular de la Vireina, señora de regular figura, y de un comportamiento airoso y galan.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 200.

[15] 'Su carácter estremadamente popular disimulaba sus sórdidas ganancias.' *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 30; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 47.

[16] According to *Real Orden*, Sept. 12, 1802.

[17] The sale amounted to 119,125 pesos, as attested by *Rel., Real Acuerdo*, Nov. 9, 1808, in *Arch. Gen'l Mex.* This fraud was the first of many serious charges proven against him in his residencia, of which an account will be given later.

by which he unjustly secured to himself large sums from the sales of that metal.[18]

Other frauds were perpetrated in contracts for paper used in the government cigar manufactories, the contractors charging fictitious prices and paying a bonus to Doña Inés.[19] The administration of Iturrigaray was modelled after that of his protector, Godoy, and it was believed that the king's favorite shared in the profits.

Sumptuous entertainments, presided over by Doña Inés, were given at the palace, with the twofold object of pleasure and profit. Thither assembled grave oidores, hypocritical inquisitors, venerable prelates, and members of the most distinguished families, who, to win the good favor of their viceregal hostess, vied with one another in their efforts to please, and in the costliness of their gifts.[20]

Marquina never gained the affection of the people, because of his restrictions on all kinds of excesses. Iturrigaray would try the opposite course, and make the capital the centre of pleasure and dissipation. To the discredit caused by the venality of the father were added the profligacy and vulgar passion for play of his son José, who was a constant visitor to the

[18] He received generally a gold ounce per quintal of quicksilver delivered. *Represent. Min. Guan.*, in *Cancelada, Conducta Iturr.*, 92–5. Alaman states that the traffic in offices was managed through one of the vice-queen's maids, an elderly person, named Joaquina Aranguren, wife of Gabriel Palacios. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 47. Some few miners, with whom a secret compact was made, were greatly favored, while the majority suffered for want of mercury, resulting in immense profits to the viceroy. These frauds are given in detail with attestation, in *Representacion, Dip. Min. Guan.*, Oct. 31, 1808. Compare also *Cancelada, Conducta, Iturrigaray*, 92–5; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. app. 43–4.

[19] 'Se justifica el robo que hizo al rei argandole un peso mas en cada resma, con las cuentas mismas de los que lo vendieron, que existen en autos de infidencia.' *Cancelada, Conducta*, 11. This author also charges Iturrigaray with shipping surreptitiously many millions of treasure out of the country, in English and neutral ships. This was the popular belief, but no proofs were brought forward. *Id.*, 11–12. From the two contracts of 1806 and 1807 the viceroy's wife received 6,633 ounces of gold. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 47. Consult also *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep.*, i. 643–4.

[20] 'Hacia descender la corte hasta sobre el teatro, ó subia el teatro á la corte por la aficion que tenia á esta clase de diversiones. La conducta de la de Madrid bajo María Luisa, era el ejemplo que se seguia.' *Zarala, Rev. Mex.*, 30; *El Indicador*, iii. 216–17.

cock-pit.[21] Such conduct on the part of the viceroy and his family, though fascinating at first, could not fail to produce the same effect as the over-scrupulous proceeding of his predecessor; the halo of royalty which had protected viceregal authority for centuries was dimmed, and the respect formerly offered to Casafuerte, Revilla Gigedo, and others was now withheld.[22]

All the same the viceroy managed to accumulate a large fortune, consisting of coin, jewels, and plate,[23] which was a great comfort, and this notwithstanding his extravagance and the enormous expenses of his court, which far exceeded his salary of sixty thousand pesos.[24]

The desire to visit the rich mines of Guanajuato was obviously natural; he wished to see whence came the wealth he coveted.[25] Without precedent in this respect, and without royal permission, Iturrigaray set out on this journey by way of Querétaro, Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato. The inhabitants of these regions, who had never beheld a viceroy, were overawed by the magnificence of his appearance, and thousands assembled to pay their respects. His arrival at the city of Guanajuato was celebrated by a triumphal procession and festivities. Among the presents graciously accepted by him was one of a thousand ounces of gold, upon the occasion of his inspection of the Rayas and Valenciana mines. Mining operators soon discovered how to gain the

[21] 'La inclinacion de aquel al juego de gallos, concurriendo á la plaza pública en que se lidian.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 48.

[22] The avarice of this vicergal family was one of the chief causes of their downfall. *Disposiciones Varias*, i. 120; *Bustamante, Medidas*, MS., 57; *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, i. 10–11; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 46–9; *Mora, Rev. Mex.*, iii. 296-350.

[23] And 400,000 pesos invested in the funds of the mining institute, the safest place of investment at the time. Further on, after the removal of the viceroy, an account of the treasures found in the palace will be given.

[24] According to the subsequent declaration under oath of his mayordomo, Antonio Paul. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 48.

[25] 'En la larga serie de los vireyes que tuvo Nueva España, éste fué el único que conoció una parte del interior del reino.' *Negrete, Mex. en Siglo XIX.*, i. 49.

favor of this great man.[25] In return for homage received, Iturrigaray magnificently granted the town of Celaya the privilege to celebrate occasional bull-fights to defray the expenses of a bridge over the Laja.[27]

In the matter of material improvements, we find little during this administration not started under former viceroys. There was the completion of two roads to Vera Cruz; one of them, passing through Orizaba and Córdova, begun by Branciforte, was in charge of the consulado. Credit, however, must be given Iturrigaray for his exertions to secure the capital against inundation. To inspire zeal, he deigned occasionally to labor on the works with his own hands, and by his care the city was saved from inundation in 1806. Yet this praiseworthy caprice eventually gained for him the enmity of the fiscal de lo civil, Zagarzurieta, as well as of Aguirre and the other oidores. Funds being required to carry on the works, Iturrigaray increased the impost on cattle, and to this Zagarzurieta raised objections, to which the viceroy would not listen; because, he said, Zagarzurieta was connected with the family of the greatest cattle-dealer in the country, and therefore was not disinterested.[28]

Existing literary and benevolent institutions were favored to some extent, not, however, in a manner sufficiently effective to reflect unusual credit on the viceroy. Mining, internal commerce, and agriculture

[26] 'A poco tiempo se advirtiò que no le era desagradable recibir dones y regalos, y sucesivamente cantidades de dinero y alhajas por las provisiones que se llamaban de gracia.' *Cancelada, Conducta, Iturrigaray*, 10. See also *Peña, Arenga Civic.*, 19–20. It is gratifying to us to learn from Bustamante, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 204, that 'the presents then received by the viceroy relieved partly the great necessities in which he stood.'

[27] In connection with bull-fights, Bustamante takes occasion to slur Marquina, congratulating the people that the government had passed into the hands of a man 'accesible, jovial y divertido,' from the 'tétrico y adusto de un hombre anciano, que merecia estar en una porteria de capuchinos.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 201.

[28] 'Porque su hija está casada con el primogénito del Marqués de S. Miguel de Aguayo, que es el primer ganadero y de los principales abastecedores de México.' *Id.*, 244–5.

continued to prosper, owing to the efficient measures of his predecessors. An important event during this period, which marked a new era in medical science, but in which Iturrigaray merely complied with the royal orders, was the introduction of vaccination into New Spain.[29] In the course of this history the terrible ravages of small-pox at different periods have been dwelt upon. Jenner's discovery, after having met with long opposition on the part of the medical faculty, finally overcame the prejudices of the age. In 1801 its value was recognized by the government of Spain, and its introduction in America intrusted to Alejandro Arboleya, professor of medicine, who came over with Iturrigaray. His method of preserving vaccine matter, however, was defective, and its application was not successful till two years later, when the home government sent out a special commission of medical men under Francisco Javier de Balmis.[30] They arrived at Vera Cruz in July 1804. Some months previously Iturrigaray had imported vaccine matter from Habana, but found the prejudice against it so strong that only ten soldiers could be induced to use it. After the arrival of Balmis, however, the remedy was soon introduced throughout the country, when of course the horrors of smallpox were greatly diminished.[31]

[29] Jenner, the discoverer, was a native of Berkeley, England; he was born May 17, 1749, and died January 24, 1823. For his biography, see the excellent work of Dr Baron, of Gloucester, 2 vols., 1827, 1838.

[30] He was honorary physician to the king and honorary counsellor of the treasury. The other members of the expedition were Antonio Gutierrez, professor of medicine and surgery, Angel Crespo, secretary of the commission, Francisco and Antonio Pastor, Pedro Ortega, Doña Isabel Cendal, and lastly, 26 infants from a foundling-house, on whose bodies vaccine matter was preserved during the voyage. *Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist.*, pt v. 342–4. This author received the particulars from two members, Gutierrez and Crespo. See also *Humboldt, Essai Pol.* The first child vaccinated was that of the viceroy. *Alaman, Disert.*, iii. app. 87; *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 207; *Rivera, Gob. de Mex.* i., 522; *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, vi. 15.

[31] Balmis extended his labors to Manila. Some of the commission went to South America, and one to Guatamala. The historical infants were reared at the expense of the government, and finally adopted by respectable families. *Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist.*, pt v. 344; *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 207.

During this period great increase of material wealth is noticeable. After the last peace with England, Spanish commerce revived; in 1805 one hundred and fifty thousand quintals of quicksilver were transported from Vera Cruz to Mexico for the mines, and during the same year more than twenty-seven millions of pesos were coined at the mint. But this epoch of opulence was soon to be terminated by fatal disasters, marked by bloodshed and ruin. A series of calamities, caused by foreign convulsions and misrule at home, was approaching Spain.

The Spanish government, involved under Godoy's rule in political difficulties, corruption, and extravagance, and harassed by the exorbitant demands of Napoleon, brought fresh discontent to the colonies by the adoption of a new method to draw from them the necessary funds to save the mother country from ruin. Spain's plight was desperate, and desperate must be the remedy, if, indeed, there was any. And woe in consequence must fall on Mexico!

It was decreed by royal order of December 26, 1804, to sequestrate all the real estate belonging to benevolent institutions,[32] chiefly under control of the clergy, including the sums, by far the greater part of their wealth, invested by them as loans on city and rural property, the mortgages on which had lapsed. The amounts collected were to be appropriated by the crown for the amortization of government bonds, the obligation being recognized by the payment of interest.[33] Though in Spain similar measures had been adopted,[34] the attendant circumstances were different from those in Mexico. In the Old World most of the church property consisted of real estate, which being sold, the clergy received a perpetual income from the

[32] Obras pias, or fundaciones piadosas.

[33] The sums were to be applied to the 'Caja de consolidacion de vales reales,' with interest to the respective benevolent institutions at 3 per cent, payable from the royal revenues. *Cedulario*, MS., i. 179-97.

[34] According to *Real Cedula*, Oct. 15, 1805, the amount of ecclesiastical property permitted by the pope to be sold under bull of June 14th of the same year was such as to yield in interest $320,000.

government equal to the interest on the capital represented, while the purchasers were obliged to contribute to the royal treasury by the payment of taxes.

Throughout New Spain the accumulation and investments of the funds of these institutions had become enormous. There was scarcely a land owner, great or small, whose estate was not hypothecated to one or another of the benevolent institutions.[35] The loan once effected, restitution of the capital was not demanded as long as the interest was punctually paid; nor did the debtors ever prepare for such an event, although most of the mortgages had lapsed.[36] The sudden demand for the payment of these sums carried consternation throughout the country, and brought ruin on many proprietors. For all to raise money on short notice was impossible; so the sale of the property had to be forced—not alone what belonged directly to the church, but that of the farmer, the merchant, the miner, and the mechanic. Thereby all industries suffered, while in the end the crown was no gainer, since the ruin of property holders cut down the revenue.

The execution of the decree was intrusted to a junta presided over by the viceroy, and composed of the principal civil and ecclesiastic authorities, and of special commissioners appointed by the crown.[37] In order to stimulate the zeal of these functionaries, and to make the sequestration more productive, they were allowed a percentage of the sales.[38] Such an incentive with such men as Iturrigaray left little hope

[35] The value of the real estate and the funds so invested of the obras pias in New Spain amounted in 1804 to $44,500,000. *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, ii. 476. In *Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletin*, ii. 35–6, the most moderate calculation of the value is, in the archbishopric of Mexico $20,000,000, and in the eight bishoprics, $30,000,000.

[36] These loans, made for the term of nine years, were at the expiration suffered to continue in force at the option of the contracting parties. See *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 138.

[37] 'Qui porte le titre de Junta superior de Real Hacienda.' *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, ii. 476.

[38] See the royal order in *Cedulario*, MS., i. 179–97; also *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, ii. 476–7; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 139; *Not. de N. Esp.*, in *Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletin*, ii. 35–6; *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, vi. 16–19.

for the people; and great was the clamor among all classes, especially the clergy, who were far from satisfied with this enforced investment.[39]

Formal protests were made by many,[40] and the pernicious effect of the measure was duly set forth; but no notice was taken of this action by the authorities. To make matters worse, Iturrigaray received orders from Spain that while steps were being taken to accomplish the sequestration, all funds belonging to corporations and communities, deposits of Indian tributes, the treasures lodged in sacred shrines, and even moneys designed to ransom prisoners should be appropriated. "Peace has been preserved at the cost of millions!" was the cry; "so pay! pay!" But the day was fast approaching when Spain's peace would be of small moment to Mexico. Never had royal license to fleece the colonists been more barefaced; never had the robbery of a people by their rulers been more merciless or infamous. And after all, only about ten millions of pesos were secured, when in 1809 the order was rescinded.[41] Of this sum twenty-four million francs were delivered to Napoleon in May 1806, by Eugenio Izquierdo, Godoy's special agent at Paris,[42] after a large amount had gone as commissions to royal officials in Mexico.[43]

[39] 'La résistance fut si forte de la part des propriétaires, que depuis le mois de Mai 1805 jusqu'au mois de Juin 1806, la caisse d'amortissement ne percevoit que la somme modique de 1,200,000 piastres.' *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, ii. 477.

[40] One by the merchants and laborers of Michoacan, under the direction of Abad y Queipo, afterward bishop elect; and another by the mining board, headed by Miguel Dominguez, corregidor of Querétaro, for which presumption he was removed from office by the viceroy. *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 222–3.

[41] 'Toda esta trápala,' says a marginal note on the cédula in *Cedulario*, MS., i. 179–97, 'del malvado Godoy, Solér, y sus sequaces se suspendio p^{r} R^{l} Ord^{n} ...de 26 de En^{o} de 1809, pero yá no remedió los estragos incalculables y desastrosos que aquellos malvados y sus sequaces hicieron, con esta infame trápala, sin el mas minimo provecho del erario.' See also *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, ii. 476–7.

[42] *Toreno, Hist. Rev. Esp.*, tom i. lib. ii. 12.

[43] The sum produced by the sequestrations, according to *Cancelada, Tel. Mex.*, 29, was $10,509,537. Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, i. 140, and Bustamante, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 250, give $10,656,000. *Soc. Mex. Geog. Boletin*, ii. 35–6, gives productos $10,507,957, and reditos $524,904 pesos. Of the com-

The merciless rigor with which the viceroy executed every oppressive decree, and the irritating fact that he and a host of officials profited by the ruin of others, gained him the odium of the sufferers. Any discussions of a scientific or practical nature on the part of her subjects was at this juncture bad for Spain. Permission had been granted Humboldt by the court to visit the New World, with the privilege of access to official archives. The result of his sojourn in Mexico was his famous treatise on New Spain,[44] containing abstracts of his political and economical observations. Some new ideas crept in upon the people concerning possibilities. With freedom, what might they not achieve! Such was the prevailing feeling which, mingled with the odium against the home government, increased by late acts of oppression, prepared creoles and natives alike for revolution.[45]

When Cárlos IV. ratified the humiliating treaty of 1796, which made him a subject rather than an ally of France, he considered neither the money he would have to pay, nor what would be the attitude of England. To annoy Napoleon, Great Britain offered the means of prolonging the war which broke out in 1803, while Spain, asserting her obligations to pay France former subsidies, maintained that she would be subject to far greater expense in case of further hostilities. This led to rupture with England; for though that power at first manifested no desire to declare open war with Spain, in 1805 neutrality was broken

missions known to have been paid to officials, who at the same time drew large salaries, the diputado principal Arrangoiz received $124,000; Iturrigaray, $72,000; the archbishop Lizana, who, according to Bustamante, was not a favorite with the Mexicans since his arrival in December 1803, $22,000; ministers of the treasury, $50,000; the secretary, $40,000; and so on to the amount of half a million. Cancelada hurls invectives against all connected with this wholesale robbery.

[44] *Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne*, Paris, 1811. For biographical notice, see *Hist. Mex.*, iii. 513, this series.

[45] 'Este proyecto fué, sin duda, la primera jornada de los desastres de la America—la insurreccion fué la segunda.' Marginal note on royal cédula, in *Celulario*, MS., i. 179–97.

by the seizure by Nelson of four treasure-laden ships bound from America to Cádiz.[46]

And now commerce again wanes, being carried on in neutral vessels only, while free intercourse with Spain is greatly interrupted. Moreover, besides being pressed by Napoleon for prompt compliance with the treaty of 1796, Spain is beset with calamities. Famine and pestilence are decimating her population; earthquakes destroy several towns in Andalusia; debts are enormous, and the exchequer empty; and lastly, England has lately seized her treasure-ships, and will probably capture others. More and more urgent, therefore, are the appeals to the viceroy for Mexican silver and gold.

Iturrigaray seems in every respect equal to the emergency. The colonists are made to bleed. From corporations, from the clergy, and from private individuals, thirteen millions of dollars are secured at this juncture, and shipped in four frigates, some five millions more being retained for later transportation. To make up this amount, he has not only seized any deposits, however sacred, he could lay his hands on, and forced money from the poor, but he has resorted to a swindling system of lotteries.[47] It is true that in the matter of forced loans promises to pay are made, and a small annual interest promised.[48]

The French just now are as much feared in New Spain as the English. French ships anchored at Vera Cruz are jealously watched by the viceroy, who refuses to furnish supplies to French troops stationed at Santo Domingo.

Difficulties, moreover, threaten with the United

[46] The vessels were seized in reprisal for the assistance alleged by England to have been rendered by Spain to France during the war; more subsidies having been paid the latter than those stipulated for in the treaty of 1796. *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 209.

[47] See *Gaz. de Mex.*, from 1804 to 1810, passim.

[48] The viceroy was admonished, however, to come to some understanding with the archbishop and bishop, so as not to impede the process by prejudicial disputes with the clergy. This accounts for the $22,000 commissions to Lizana. See *Cancelada, Tel. Mex.*, 29.

States. In 1801 Philip Nolan makes an incursion into Mexican territory as far as Nuevo Santander, under the pretext of purchasing horses, and erects some small forts. He is, however, attacked on the 21st of March by a force sent against him by the viceroy, and slain, his followers being dispersed or made prisoners. A few years later Burr attempts the invasion of Texas. During this period the first cloud arises between the United States and Mexico on the question of limits. Monroe's efforts at Madrid to arrange an amicable settlement are fruitless, and the American government orders troops to her southern frontier.[49]

Having thus the United States to watch, the long coast lines to guard against the English, and the ever-present pirates to beat off, Iturrigaray is like a hyena at bay. It is no easy matter amidst the dissatisfaction attending the royal robberies to enlist the colonists to fight. Of what avail is this pouring-out of their treasure if the old mother cannot protect them from her enemies?

It is in 1805 when the news of this rupture of Spain with England reaches Mexico, and spreads consternation among the people. Besides orders to prepare for

[49] *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 145–6. In 1805 James Monroe, U. S. minister at London, and Mr Pinckney, minister at Madrid, failed to agree with the Prince of Peace as to the limits of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida; the relations between the two countries assumed a delicate nature, and Monroe asked for his passport and returned to London. Consult *Amer. State Pap.*, xii. 1–327; ii. 596–695, 798–804. On the feeling at this time in New Spain against the United States, I quote from the irascible Bustamante, who, in connection with the viceroy's military preparations, thus gives vent to his ire: 'Esta nacion, si puede dársele tal nombre á un enjambre espesísimo de aventureros, emigrados de la Europa por la miseria ó por sus crímenes, presenta la anomalia mas extraña y ridícula en la historia.' 'She proclaimed,' the author continues, 'the freedom of nations; developed the theories of Rousseau's social contract, which was followed by France and cost torrents of blood,' winding up with a pious exhortation against American slave-holders. See *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 217–18. Rivera, *Gobernantes*, i. 525–6, limits himself to stamping the claims of the U. S. against New Spain as 'el colmo de la injusticia y de exhorbitantes pretensiones, hijas de la ambicion...inicua...absurda.' Of what the Spanish population in Mexico consisted at the time, a contemporary of Bustamante gives us an idea in *El Indicador*, iii. 216–17: 'Unos hombres semi-salvages, como los españoles avecindados en el pais, que nacidos los mas en su pátria, en una condicion muy obscura, apenas habian podido medio civilizarse en Nueva España'

defence, the viceroy is told to furnish Habana, Puerto Rico, and other exposed points with the necessary supplies. He is moreover authorized to increase the permanent forces by enlisting natives for service on the frontier, the veteran troops not being sufficient for that purpose. Two Spanish regiments stationed in Cuba are also ordered to Mexico.

But the viceroy is more clever than his master. Notwithstanding the many difficulties in the organization of troops, he soon has nearly 18,000 men at his command.[50] Recruiting offices are established throughout the country; deserters are pardoned; the old militia, scattered or disbanded, are reunited and increased in number. The defences of San Juan de Ulúa, where Lieutenant-colonel Juan María Soto is in command, are improved. To discipline the troops a camp is established at Jalapa. Command of the army is given to García Dávila, governor of Vera Cruz, efficient and experienced. Indeed, he is the only officer of rank in New Spain competent to fill the place. There are two other generals, Pedro Ruiz Dávalos and Pedro Garibay, but both octogenarians and subject to consequent infirmities.

The troops are exercised and drilled under the eye of the viceroy. There are reviews and manœuvres which awaken a military spirit in the Mexicans, who have never before witnessed spectacles of the kind.[51]

In 1806 intelligence of two events is received which spreads alarm throughout the country—the destruction of the combined Spanish and French

[50] Bustamante says 18,000 well disciplined troops. *Medidas para la Pacif.*, MS., 58. Queipo, in *Pap. Var.*, 164, no. i., states that there were stationed in the canton of Jalapa, serving under the viceroy's orders, 11,000 men, and that there were 6,000 more elsewhere ready to march when called upon. Alaman gives the number as 'cosa de catorce mil hombres' in the year 1803. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 146.

[51] *Mex. Mem. Guerra*, 10. On October 14, 1805, the spectacle of troops being landed and engaging in sham-fight with the enemy was witnessed by the inhabitants of Vera Cruz, the viceroy displaying great enthusiasm, taking part in the exhibition. 'No pudo el ingenio militar de Su Escia olvidar su aficion, y montando á caballo mandó por esquadrones varios movimientos de exercicio á los lanceros.' *Diario de Mex.*, i. 92.

fleets at Trafalgar by Lord Nelson on the 21st of October, 1805,[52] and the attack on Buenos Aires by the English. It is thought that an attempt will presently be made on New Spain. Iturrigaray's friends begin to fall off. Several officers of high rank and merit withdraw from the encampment at Jalapa, among others Count Alcaraz, of the Spanish dragoons, Manuel García Alonso, Manuel García Queritana, and Lejarza, all commanders of high standing. He who becomes the most determined enemy, however, is the ex-corregidor of Querétaro, Miguel Dominguez.[53]

Meanwhile the star of Godoy, the scourge of Spain, is still in the ascendant. He puts on the titles of royalty, and holds communion with Napoleon, if indeed he does not conspire to sell Spain. At one time, all the strongholds of the peninsula being occupied by French, Godoy advises the king to take his family to Mexico. The court is at Aranjuez, and the intended flight becoming known, the populace rise and cry vengeance on Godoy. The tumult is only allayed by the abdication of Cárlos in favor of the prince of Asturias, who assumes the crown as Fernando VII. on the 19th of March, 1808. Godoy escapes popular fury by secreting himself,[54] but his house and those of his satellites are stripped, and everything in them is

[52] A subscription for the relief of the widows and orphans of those who fell in the engagement was raised in Mexico. The amount contributed up to Sept. 30, 1807, was 31,235 pesos. *Gaz. Mex.*, xiii. xiv. xv., passim, and xvi. 641.

[53] Dominguez was afterward reinstalled in his office by order of the king, dated September 11, 1807. *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 223. When Iturrigaray's residencia was taken he was condemned to indemnify Dominguez for loss of salary, and pay him daños y perjuicios. This was not done till 1824, when on Iturrigaray's death his heirs, after contesting the case in the courts, were compelled to pay 12,000 pesos to Dominguez. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 265–7.

[54] 'Fué confundido por la debil voz de un anciano Ministro. *Ved aqui el traydor; el pueblo pide su cabeza:* dijo Caballero á Carlos IV. señalando á Godoy; *y este cobarde como si oyera el estampido de un trueno, calla, teme, huye, y temblando se oculta del Cielo y de la tierra.* Asi permanece dos dias atormentado de la sed, del hambre, por las imprecaciones de los hombres, y los remordimientos de su consciencia.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 841.

delivered to the authorities. The fallen Prince of Peace is afterward placed under arrest by Fernando and his ill-gotten property confiscated.

The downfall of Godoy was hailed in New Spain with universal satisfaction. Spaniards and creoles were equally demonstrative in their loyalty to the king, confident that any change in the government which excluded the influence of Godoy must be for the better. On the arrival of the news of the abdication of Cárlos and the decrees of Fernando,[55] Iturrigaray was attending the cock-fights at San Agustin de las Cuevas, now Tlalpan, where the festivities of pentecost were being celebrated. He commanded the decrees to be read, and then went on with the games. Doña Inés was disgusted over the abdication, and the regidor Azcárate displayed his contempt by flinging aside the journal containing the news.[56]

The festivities at Tlalpan continued for three days, and not until they were concluded did the viceroy give orders for a public demonstration in honor of Fernando VII. This manifest indifference, which did not fail to create much bad feeling, was in truth owing to the fall of Godoy, his protector, and some began to suspect treasonable designs.

On the 23d of June the departure of the royal family to Bayonne and the abdication of Fernando were known in Mexico.[57] Then my lord Iturrigaray wore a pleasant countenance, and he was over-

[55] The abdication of Cárlos IV. and accession of Fernando VII. were published on the 9th of June, 1808, by an extra issue of the *Gaz. de Mex.*, q. v.

[56] Cancelada, who was present during the occurrences at San Agustin de las Cuevas, says, in *Iturrigaray, Conducta*, 14: 'La vireina, oida la abdicacion y suerte del ex-príncipe de la Paz, dixo: Nos han puesto la ceniza en la frente; y el regidor Azcárate al llegar con la lectura á los decretos del Señor Don Fernando VII. tiró la gazeta con desprecio en ademan de quererla pisar.' Negrete maintains that there is no proof of these assertions, although both Bustamante and Alaman accept them as true. They emanated, he says, from the statements of Cancelada, a bitter enemy of the viceroy, and should not be received as historical. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 78.

[57] The intelligence was brought by the ship *Corza*, which anchored in the harbor of Vera Cruz on the 21st of June. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1808, 424; *Cancelada, Conducta*, 15–16. Negrete commits an error in stating that this was the occasion when Iturrigaray received the news of Fernando's accession to the throne while diverting himself in the cockpit. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 69.

heard to say that the king would never return to the throne.[58]

These tidings of the dethronement of the royal family, and the assumption of the crown by Joseph Bonaparte, arrived in the midst of preparations for the solemn festivities to be held on the occasion of swearing allegiance to the young monarch. The impression which these events created in Mexico was at first painful. Creoles as well as Spaniards hated the French. Napoleon was their arch-enemy. They swore they would never be ruled by him, or any of his creatures. On the 14th of July, the viceroy received copies of the Madrid official gazettes confirming the news, and on the following day he convoked a council of the real acuerdo, at which it was resolved neither to obey the decrees of Murat, then commanding at Madrid, nor those of any government other than that of the legitimate sovereign.[59] The official portions of the Madrid gazettes were, moreover, ordered to be published.[60]

But the first surprise over, very different and vehement feelings began to spring up among the people. Their ideas were confounded at the possibility of being without a king. Those who had hitherto regarded a monarch as an infallible personage remembered the fate of Louis XVI., and beheld with consternation the sudden removal of their own kings, father and son. That a mob of his own subjects should effect the down-

[58] 'Los oidores creyeron ver en esta vez en el semblante del virey pintado la alegria, y que se complacia en decir que el Rey no volveria al trono.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 227. This conduct and the occurrence at Tlalpan were subsequently brought forward in the accusations of treason against the viceroy. Compare *Cancelada, Conducta Iturr.*, 15–16.

[59] The revisor Oidor Aguirre added the words: 'Que S. E. y el real Acuerdo estaban penetrados de unos mismos nobles y leales sentimientos.' These Iturrigaray tore off, objecting to their publication. *Cancelada, Conducta Iturr.*, 18–19; *Verdad Sabida*, 19. This action of the viceroy was considered by his enemies as a mark of disloyalty. The *Verdad Sabida* of Cancelada is severely criticised and the statements it contains denied by Lizarza in his *Discurso vindicando Iturrigaray*. For his reply on the above question, see p. 16. Much sympathy for Fernando was shown by the citizens of Mexico. *Guerra, Rev. S. Esp.*, i. 3–18.

[60] They appeared on the 16th of July in the *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1808, xv. 465–73.

fall of Cárlos IV. was not likely to maintain that faith in the high majesty of the Spanish sovereigns which for ages it had been impious to hold in doubt. Respect for monarchy was weakened, and the more reflective and enlightened recognized with satisfaction that these convulsions would augment the possibilities of independence for New Spain. The holy inquisition still maintained its power, and indeed we find it at this period more zealous than ever in attempting to stifle the progress of the age. Libertinism and impiety, as it was called,[61] were so great, that there were over a thousand cases pending before that tribunal.[62]

One of the victims of an auto de fé at this time was the presbyter Juan Antonio Olavarrieta, curate of Axuchitlan. In his possession was found a work written by himself, entitled *Man and Beast*. On the frontispiece was a representation of a tyrant king. The author had come well recommended from Spain to the chief inquisitor, Bernardo de Prado y Obejero, and great was the scandal. The auto was celebrated with more than ordinary solemnity in the presence of the secular and ecclesiastical authorities, the nobility, and principal persons of the city. Olavarrieta was sentenced and shipped to Spain, but managed to escape during the voyage. Soon after this the same ceremonies were repeated on the person of José Rojas, professor of mathematics in the college at Guanajuato. A man of extraordinary talents and great learning,[63] he possessed but little knowledge of the world. Carrying on a correspondence on philosophical and theological topics with a woman at Guanajuato, he was denounced by her and imprisoned. After sentence by the holy office, Rojas escaped to New Orleans. There he published inflammatory proclamations against the Spanish gov-

[61] *Iturrigaray*, in *Carta á Caballero*; Cuev. *Tres Siglos*, iii. 208.

[62] Bustamante remarks that a great number of these cases must have been of a political nature, 'pues este tribunal era el brazo derecho del despotismo.' *Id.*

[63] 'Y de una memoria tan feliz, que aprendió literalmente las principales actuaciones de su causa, con solo haberlas oido leer.' Id., 207–8.

ernment, which being clandestinely introduced into Mexico caused no little annoyance to the political authorities and the inquisition. This institution consisted at the time of thirty-one officers, exclusive of a multitude of secret agents and spies, and their labors were so arduous and important that the inquisitors petitioned for an increase of salary on that ground. Such was the powerful array of zealots, ever on the alert to persecute those whose religious and political views dared to pass the bounds prescribed by church and state.

The deplorable condition of the press was another proof of the incessant endeavors on the part of the authorities to keep the people in intellectual bondage. It was not well for subjects of Spain to know too much of what was going on in the world. Four daily papers appeared in Vera Cruz between 1804 and 1807; three of them were soon discontinued, and the other was prohibited from publishing any political news from foreign countries, that being a privilege granted only to the *Gazeta de México*.[64] In 1805 the Mexican writer Cárlos María Bustamante, and the alcalde del crímen Jacobo de Villa Urrutia, established the *Diario de México* with but little better success. Being suppressed at one time, this periodical was allowed to appear again only on condition that it should be subject to the personal revision of the viceroy.

[64] 'Escepto en casos muy estraordinarios, para no perjudicar á la *Gaceta de México*, que era la que tenia el privilegio de publicarlas.' *Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist.*, pt v. 344. The editor of this gazette was Juan Lopez Cancelada, author of several philippics against Iturrigaray, and whom Bustamante calls an 'español irrequieto, atrevido y charlatán, que habia insultado al Virey.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 215.

CHAPTER III.

ITURRIGARAY'S DEPOSAL.

1808.

THE AYUNTAMIENTO CLAIMS SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE—A NATIONAL CONGRESS PROPOSED—OPPOSITION OF THE AUDIENCIA—GLAD TIDINGS FROM THE PENINSULA—FOUR MEMORABLE JUNTAS—RIVAL SPANISH JUNTAS—ANGRY DEBATES—CONSPIRACY TO DEPOSE THE VICEROY—YERMO TAKES THE LEAD—ITURRIGARAY'S APATHY—A MIDNIGHT COUP D'ÉTAT—THE VICEROY IN DURANCE—GARIBAY APPOINTED HIS SUCCESSOR—FATE OF ITURRIGARAY'S SUPPORTERS—HE IS SENT TO SPAIN—HIS RICH SWEETMEATS—INDICTMENT FOR TREASON—ACQUITTAL—RESIDENCIA—HEAVY FINES—CHANGE OF OPINIONS—THE SENTENCE ANNULLED—ITURRIGARAY'S INTENTIONS ANALYZED—BIBLIOGRAPHY.

THUS stand matters in Mexico in 1808. The times are out of joint. Tradition is failing. Old maxims no longer hold good. The minds of men are dimmed by the dust arising from the clash and clatter of events. Born in ignorance; cradled amidst the occult forces of nature; looking along the centuries for that power and protection from the creature found only in the creator —it has taken all these thousands of years for man to find out his mistake, to find out that all men come into the world on terms of equality, that no man or class of men are born almighty, either by virtue of blood, inheritance, occupation, or wealth, and that all have equal rights.

At length the time has come. All the world is astir, and Mexico must be moving. Three centuries back there had been a grand awakening, one of those spasms of progress in which intellect is wont to disinthrall itself; now there is at hand another. Half the

world are in arms. The few are fighting to be master; the many are struggling to be free. The result is predetermined.

In Mexico opinion is becoming somewhat clarified; ideas are coalescing and action concentrating, particularly in the capital. And yet all is dim and indistinct enough. The leaven of liberty is working; but beware the fangs of superstition, beware the sword of Spain, beware the dungeons of the inquisition and tortures beyond the grave! And where shall be found a leader? Here is opportunity; where is the man?

Perhaps through Iturrigaray's brain run ambitious dreams. As likely there as anywhere. He is none too good to play the part of traitor to his king; though if successful revolution makes of him a thing for popular worship, he is indeed in a dilemma, for nature has not endowed him with one spark of nobility or patriotism. Most justly upon the head of this vile representative of a vile monarchy has fallen the curse of the colonists. He and his associates, like their master, have made themselves rich over the ruin of the most industrious and worthy of Spain's subjects. Yet he may be deemed useful. A bad man is sometimes better for the furtherance even of a good cause than a good man. But Iturrigaray is a coward and a hypocrite—a man not the best either for traitor or patriot. He has no thought of self-sacrifice; on the contrary, should he perchance make Mexico free, he must be well paid for it. Mexico may be freed from France, from Spain perchance; but not from him, not from Spain's officials. If he can save Mexico to Spain, of course Fernando, or whoever may be at Madrid to draw and spend the revenues, will remember it. So day after day this dog waits to see which way the French cat will jump.

When the intelligence reaches Mexico that the Spanish crown has slipped from the fingers of Spanish kings, it seems to the people as if the earth was loosened from its orbit. Groups of anxious men,

greatly concerned about their fate, gather in the streets and discuss the situation. Public meetings—a rare occurrence in that quarter—begin frequently to be held, at which much is said and nothing done. Placards are posted by the several factions of city government, cautiously hinting their own views, or feeling for the views of others. There is manifest every phase of feeling from loyalty, wholly or partially, to independence, wholly or partially. Pasquinades are sent to high officials, and some even propose a crown for Iturrigaray.[1]

On the 19th of July, at the suggestion of the regidor Azcárate, the municipal authorities presented to the viceroy a memorial,[2] claiming that as the throne of Spain was not occupied by the lawful sovereign, the government devolved upon the people, and that the city of Mexico, as the metropolis and representative of all New Spain, would sustain the rights of the deposed house. The address concluded with the request that the viceroy would assume provisionally the government of the kingdom, and that he would surrender it neither to any foreign power, nor to Spain herself while under foreign rule; and that he would not receive any other viceroy or accept a new appointment from the usurping power.[3]

[1] On the 9th of August the consulado of Mexico addressed a petition to Iturrigaray requesting him to adopt measures for the suppression of these seditious demonstrations. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 511.

[2] 'Bajo de mazas y en coches.' *Bustamante, Suplemento*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 228.

[3] 'Pidiendose al Exmo. Señor Virrey que interin llega el momento felis de que salga de Francia S. M. y Altesas, ó el Reyno elije persona de la Real familia para que lo mande y govierne como su Rey y Señor natural, permanesca de Virrey Gobernador y Capitan General de esta Nueva España, entendiendose con la calidad de provicional, sin poderlo entregar á Potencia alguna extrangera, ni á la misma España aun quando para ello se le presenten ordenes ó del Señor Carlos quarto ó del Principe de Asturias bajo la denominacion de Fernando Septimo antes de salir de España,...que no entregue tampoco el Virreynato y Govierno del Reyno á ningun Virrey que hayan nombrado el mismo Señor Cárlos quarto ó Principe de Asturias:...Que aun quando S. E. mismo será continuado en el Virreynato por Real orden de S. M. ó de Principe de Asturias...no la obedesca ni cumpla, sino que continue encargado provicionalmente en el mando del Reyno.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.* i. 477-8. Such were the expressions contained in the address of the ayunta-

Iturrigaray received the address graciously, affirming that he would shed the last drop of his blood in the protection of the country, and that he was ready to take the oath of loyalty.[4] A crowd had gathered, for all was done openly, and when the viceroy dismissed the regidores the people shouted, and among them largess was liberally flung by supporters of the project. The audiencia did not like it, and their wrath waxed hot when, during the day, Iturrigaray laid the address before the real acuerdo and asked their vote upon the matter.[5] The ayuntamiento was presumptuous; further, the members were mostly creoles. So the audiencia rejected the proposition, as contrary to law and the public weal,[6] thereby bringing chagrin upon Iturrigaray, who of course regarded with favor a change which would have secured him in power, whatever turn affairs might take.[7]

As nearly as we can interpret ideas so vague as were these in the minds of those who held them, the several shades of opinion, of inclination, hope, fantasy, were somewhat as follows: The viceroy

miento to the viceroy, the whole of which interesting document is supplied by Dávalos, who expresses his thanks to José María Andrade for his kindness in furnishing him with a copy of it.

[4] 'Terminó pues esta escena, en la que todo estaba convenido, de antemano entre el virey y Azcárate.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 170.

[5] Copy of note to the real acuerdo will be found in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 486.

[6] In the reply of the real acuerdo, these words are used: 'Aquel nombramiento provisional y juramento, debilitarian mas bien que afirmarian aquellos sagrados inalterables vínculos y constituirian un gobierno precario expuesto á variaciones, y tal vez á caprichos ahora ó en lo venidero, y por tanto seria ademas de ilegal, impolítico este paso.' The viceroy is advised to assure the ayuntamiento 'que cuando convenga y nos hallemos en circunstancias que lo exijan, no se desentenderá V. E. ni este Real Acuerdo de convoçar ó al cuerpo entero ó á sus representantes.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 487.

[7] On the occasion of the ayuntamiento having sent two commissioners to the viceroy a few days afterward, one, the marqués de Uluapa, as affirmed by the alcalde Fagoaga, reported to the corporation that he had protested to the viceroy 'que el ayuntamiento no descansaria hasta colocarlo sobre el trono.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 173. A short time later, in the disposal of civil and military positions Iturrigaray's assumption of prerogatives never before exercised by any viceroy caused growling. 'Tales disposiciones se citaban como ejemplares del poder soberano que empezaba á ejercer el virey y como escalones para el trono á que intentaba subir.' *Id.*, 233–4. José Luis Alconedo, a silversmith, was charged with making a crown for Iturrigaray's coronation. *Id.*, 295. Guerra disbelieves in Iturrigaray's aspirations to a throne. *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 70.

thought that almost any change would be beneficial to him so long as he remained at the head of affairs. If the people desired him to hold the country for Spain—well; Spain would hardly object to that. If France was to rule, then he could be for France—particularly if Godoy was on good terms with Napoleon. And even if New Spain broke into full rebellion, declared absolute independence, and he could be their king or president—why, that would be well too; and if afterward France or Spain should prove too much for Mexico, then he had only done his best for France or Spain.

The audiencia, the church, the inquisition, all suspected the viceroy, and regarded with contempt the ayuntamiento. If there was to be a change, each of these powers desired to be at the head; they were each determined at the least not to lose what influence they had, and to gain as much more as possible. In regard to the people, the military, officers of the government, ecclesiastics, and the rest, there was held every phase of ideas. The sympathies of some were with Fernando; many prided themselves in their loyalty to Spain; all hated France; the bolder dreamed of actual independence. The creoles and the viceroy acted together in favor of a national congress, but for widely different ends: the former being for the liberty of the nation, the latter for personal aggrandizement. One looked to the representative body as the first movement toward securing that quality of self-government so lately secured by the United States; the other regarded it only as an agent to do him service—perhaps to place upon his head a crown, either in his own name or in the name of Spain.

Out of these several phases of opinion arose several factions. But the two great final divisions, of course, were the royalists, who would have America always ruled by Europe, and the independents, who would have America always free. In the main, the Spaniards in America belonged to the former faction, and

the creoles to the latter. Yet, when it came to important ecclesiastical, political, or commercial bodies, whose pecuniary or other interests were paramount to those of birth and blood, this distinction did not hold good. Thus it was that at each step in marching events, new issues divided anew people and opinion; and so matters progressed until principles and positions could be more defined.

The feeling between the audiencia and the ayuntamiento increasing, Iturrigaray threatened to resign; but he was easily dissuaded by his friends. Peace was not restored, however, and finally the alcalde de corte, Villa Urrutia, suggested that the infante Don Pedro be invited to assume the government as regent. This proposal did not, however, meet with approval, whereupon he proposed to call a representative junta of the kingdom, the supreme authority remaining with the viceroy when necessary. The audiencia rejected this proposition also. But Urrutia's scheme was submitted to the authorities of several places, and was not unfavorably received. Even the ayuntamiento of Vera Cruz, whose members and policy were almost wholly European, saw no objection to it; while the authorities of Jalapa and Querétaro expressed their willingness to send deputies at once to the proposed congress.

Meanwhile a vessel had arrived at Vera Cruz, with information that Spain had risen against Napoleon. The news reached the capital on the night of the 28th of July, and at daylight guns were fired, bells were rung, and all was joy. The enthusiasm was universal, for Napoleon was much hated, as I have said.[8] Alle-

[8] To illustrate the detestation in which Napoleon was held, it will be sufficient to quote from the dedication in a published exhortation of the cura of Purépero in Michoacan to his flock on the 15th of August of this same year. 'A Napoleon Bonaparte exêcracion de los pueblos españoles,' and after informing the 'infame corzo' that this small and remote parish had proclaimed for Fernando VII., he concludes: 'Desiste pues, desiste, oh monstruo de ambicion, de tus delirios, porque la América española está bien penetrada de tu carácter impio, feroz y sanguinario: y te aborrece como á furia desatada del abismo, que solo espira à destriur la religion verdadera, la moral sana, y la felicidad tem-

giance to Fernando VII. was proclaimed, and volunteer corps were ready to aid him in escaping from the meshes in which he was entangled,[9] while Godoy and Napoleon were burnt in effigy.[10]

Thus it would seem that the first cry for independence is smothered by hatred of an invader and loyal sympathy for a fallen monarch. But we may see now how a bad man may help a good cause. Iturrigaray hates Fernando, though he pretends to serve him. If he does not secretly favor the French, he is easily reconciled to their success so long as his patron Godoy is permitted to worship before Napoleon. Nevertheless, the viceroy puts on a smiling face, and is wheeled in a chariot of state through the city, accompanied by over two thousand horsemen, who publicly offer their services in defence of the Spanish sovereign. The viceroy is gracious, and praises their horsemanship and their steeds; nevertheless, he does not fail to reiterate soon after that Spain could not resist the arms of France. Such speech and conduct on the part of the chief ruler is the surest road to revolution, and the viceroy is well aware of it.[11]

The question now arose whether to recognize the junta governing at Seville in the name of Fernando. The viceroy convoked a general council, composed of the audiencia, the ayuntamiento, the different tribunals, the archbishop, and the most prominent members of the community. On the 9th of August the junta

poral de los pueblos. Tu mas mortal enemigo. Filopatro Ángelopolitano.' *Diario de Mex.*, xii. 219.

[9] *Id.*, ix. 165–8, 343–4; *Orizava, Libro Cur.*, MS., 2–3; *Pap. Var.*, xxxvi., no. lxviii., ii. 21–2. The síndico procurador proposed that $12,000,000 be employed in effecting the escape of Fernando from France; six million to be paid to the commander of the fortress in which he was confined if he would conduct him to Vienna and thence to England; and six million to that nation for his safe conveyance to Vera Cruz. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 489–90. El real cuerpo de mineria, or mining corporation, offered to provide at its own expense 100 pieces of field artillery and equip and maintain eight companies to work them. *Id.*, i. 505–6.

[10] 'En 1° de Agosto del año de 1808 quemaron en estatuas al traidor de Godoi, y al intruso Emperador de los franceses Bonaparte.' *Orizaba, Libro Cur.*, MS., 1.

[11] *Bustamante, Suplemento Hist. Mex.*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 230; *Alaman, Hist. Mex.*, i. 181.

met. The discussions were warm, the viceroy being somewhat ill-tempered. Verdad, the syndic of the ayuntamiento, proposed the establishment of a provisional government, still maintaining the previous theory that in the absence of a legitimate monarch the sovereignty reverted to the people. These views were strenuously opposed by the audiencia, which represented the Spanish faction, and regarded Verdad's expressions as seditious.[12] Allegiance to Fernando was agreed upon, and he was proclaimed king of Spain and the Indies; an oath was taken to obey no orders proceeding from the emperor of the French or his representatives; and the viceroy was recognized as the king's lieutenant in New Spain, the audiencia and other royal tribunals retaining their authority. These decisions were drawn up in the form of an act, which was signed by those present.[13]

A disturbance occurred at Vera Cruz, occasioned by the arrival of a French vessel bearing despatches from Joseph Bonaparte. The ship was fired upon from Ulúa, and was not allowed to enter port until she had lowered her colors and hoisted a white flag. When the documents were read they were found to contain orders of Joseph, confirming in their several positions the Mexican authorities in that port, and extending to them various favors. The despatches

[12] *Rev. Verdadero Origen*, no. ii. 34–7.

[13] See copy of the act in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep.*, i. 513–16. There are eighty-two signatures, comprising those of the viceroy, archbishop, oidores, and principal authorities. It was declared null by the audiencia of Guadalajara, *Id.*, i. 534; while Riaño, the intendente of Guanajuato, considered that certain expressions might be improperly interpreted, 'pueden motivar alguna siniestra inteligencia que conviene evitar.' *Id.*, i. 529. On the 11th of August Iturrigaray proclaimed the result. The document was severely criticised by Fray Melchor de Talamantes, of whose political tendencies mention will be made later. Talamantes charges the viceroy with having his own interest more at heart than those of the kingdom. 'Qué debe esperarse de vos,' he asks, 'que habeis velado hasta ahora sobre vuestras propios intereses y no sobre los del reino y en su organizacion; que no habeis tenido otra ley que vuestros caprichos, que solo habeis consultado á vuestras diversiones y paseos mirando con indiferencia la administracion pública.' *Id.*, i. 516–7, where see copy of the proclamation with Talamantes' annotations. On the 13th of August allegiance to Fernando was expressed by a celebration in his honor, solemnized by religious ceremonies, and enlivened by processions and illuminations. *Id.*, i. 518–19; *Gaz. de Mej.*, 1808, xv. 568–70.

were burned in the plaza. A rumor having spread that two commissioners by this vessel were secreted in the house of Ciriaco Ceballos, the comandante of the port, a mob broke into and plundered it. The host was taken to the house to allay the tumult, but the crowd was only dispersed by a heavy fall of rain.[14] Iturrigaray heard of it on the 13th of August, the day on which the oath of allegiance to Fernando was taken, and it ought to have been a warning.[15]

On the 30th two commissioners from the junta of Seville arrived at Mexico demanding recognition of its sovereignty over New Spain.[16] They were Juan Gabriel Jabat, a naval commander, and bitter enemy of Iturrigaray,[17] and Colonel Tomás de Jáuregui, a brother of the viceroy's wife. They were instructed to arrest the viceroy in case he refused compliance. A junta was convened on the following day, at which Iturrigaray expressed his dissatisfaction at the tone and want of courtesy of the despatch.[18] The debate which ensued was warm and lengthy, and tended in no way to procure harmony. Oidor Aguirre pro-

[14] 'Lo que realmente resfrió á los amontinados, y los disolvió, fué un fuertísimo aguacero, que hubo en aquella hora.' *Lacunza, Discursos Hist.*, no. xxxvi. 535. Bustamante states that the tumult was occasioned by the indiscreet action of Ceballos, who prohibited under pain of death any one from visiting the French ship. This gave offence to the sailors in Vera Cruz, and led to the sacking of Ceballos' house: 'la chusma marinera...arrojó sus muebles á la calle, quemó su quitrin, y robó sus planos de la comision hidrográfica que habia levantado, y juntamente una porcion de instrumentos de marina.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 232–3.

[15] 'El modo fácil con que se inició la asonada, y que manifestaba el grado de exaltacion en que se hallaban los ánimos, indicó al virey lo predispuesto que estaba el pueblo á lanzarse á la revolucion.' *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i., 89. This author states that it was believed in Vera Cruz that José Miguel de Azanza, formerly viceroy, and at this time minister of war of Joseph Bonaparte, had arrived on the French vessel.

[16] Three days before, Iturrigaray had deemed it advisable to issue a proclamation exhorting the people to maintain allegiance to Fernando and unite in resisting Napoleon. *Diario, Mex.*, ix. 239–42.

[17] 'Porque este le habia hecho salir mal de su grado dos años antes para España, porque queria percibir los sueldos sin trabajar.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 233.

[18] Villa Urrutia thus expresses himself: 'Celebróse la junta, se vieron los papeles de aquella'—the junta of Seville—'reducidos á una proclama, y á dos ordenes en tono soberano, confirmando la una á todos en sus respectivos empleos, y mandando por la otra qe se embiasen los caudales qe ubiese.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 535–6.

posed that in all matters belonging to the war and treasury departments, the sovereignty of the Seville junta should be acknowledged, but not in those of patronage and justice. These views were opposed by the Marqués de Rayas and Villa Urrutia, on the ground that the sovereignty was indivisible. Although the plurality of votes was in favor of Aguirre's motion, the result was ineffective, owing to further complications caused by the arrival that same night of despatches from deputies of the junta of Oviedo, which, like that of Seville, claimed royal authority, as holders of the crown for the lawful king of Spain.[19] On September the 1st the viceroy summoned another council, at which he stated that Spain was in a state of anarchy, since all juntas wished to be supreme. The complication caused by the claim of two separate Spanish juntas to the supreme power led to a suspension of action, and a resolution to wait for further news was passed. But the indiscreet language of the viceroy was construed into a hint that he intended to depose Aguirre and Bataller and other oidores,[20] and it was suspected that he was fully aware of nightly meetings which were now being held by the faction opposed to him, and at which were discussed plans of overthrowing him.

Again and for the last time Iturrigaray convened a junta on the 9th of September. The main point discussed was the convocation of a general congress and the establishment of a provisional government. Great confusion marked the proceedings. Villa Urrutia was the main promoter of the idea, and to him were

[19] *Id.*, i. 536; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 102–104. Called by Villa Urrutia 'la junta de Asturias.' *Pap. Var.*, clvii., no. xxxiv. 7.

[20] *Cancelada, Verdad Sabida*, 36–7. The fiscal Borbon, in a long address, made use of expressions highly flattering to Iturrigaray, whom he called the vicegerent of the king. 'Bien, bien,' replied the viceroy, 'pues si yo lo soy, cada uno de V. SS. guarde su puesto, y no extrañe si con alguno, ó algunos tomo providencias.' *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 235; *Rev. Verdadero Orig.*, ii. 38. Guerra ascribes still stronger language to Iturrigaray. 'Cada uno guarde su puesto, que yo haré que todas lo guarden, y si se viere que hago alguna demostracion con algunos Señores, no será extraño porque habrá fundamento para ello.' *Rev. de N. Esp.*, i. 93.

opposed the three fiscales, Francisco Xavier Borbon, Ambrosio Zagarzurieta, and Francisco Robledo, all of whose opinions and votes were read before the junta. The eldest inquisitor denounced the proposed convention as seditious.[21] The oider Miguel Bataller looked to Villa Urrutia to reply to the objections, upon which the oidor Aguirre proposed that those favoring the junta should confine themselves to the discussion of five points, namely: the authority to convoke it; the necessity of so doing; the benefit to be derived; the persons who should compose the congress; and whether their votes should be decisive. The city procurator-general, Agustin Rivero, then boldly stated that although the syndic could only represent the plebeian element, he himself, from the nature of his appointment, could be the representative of the other classes. This caused additional commotion. The archbishop at once expressed his utter disapproval of such a claim, while others also vociferously denounced it. And he said further: "If such dissension is occasioned by the simple suggestion, to what extent will matters go if it be realized?" He then declared himself opposed to a convocation, although he had previously been inclined to favor it. While discussion was at its height, a voice was heard: "If the municipalities are not convoked they will assemble of their own accord." By some this bold speech was attributed to Rivero.[22] Meanwhile the viceroy maintained an affable demeanor toward all. He even condescended to explain that he had been informed that some of his expressions at the last junta had caused offence, had been regarded as a threat against certain members; and thereupon he declared that his language was only

[21] 'Sostendré,' he said, 'que tales juntas son por su naturaleza *sediciosas*, ò à lo ménos *peligrosas* y del todo inútiles.' *Rev. Verdadero Origen*, no. ii. 38.

[22] 'Pero como el señor fiscal de lo civil, Zagarzurieta, redarguyera al instante aquella proposicion sediciosa...y siguiera el confuso murmullo, quedo sin apurarse.' *Ib.*; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 632.

directed against the authors of certain pasquinades of a seditious character.

During this session the rumored intention of the viceroy to resign was brought forward. The regidor Antonio Mendez Prieto[23] arose; and having stated that such a report had reached the ayuntamiento, requested Iturrigaray, if he had such intention, to reconsider the matter and remain at the head of affairs, since grievous evils would be certain to follow at such a critical time, if the country were left without a chief so capable of defending it. The viceroy said he wished to resign; he was getting old and difficulties were thickening—all the same he had no intention of laying aside sweet authority. Then Verdad spoke in support of the representations of Prieto, and after a few words from Rivero and Uluapa, a profound silence reigned while they were waiting to hear from the opposition. Not a word came from them, however, and Iturrigaray finally ordered the business of the junta to proceed.[24] The debate continued, but with no other result than to increase feeling between the two factions.

Had the viceroy at this crisis exhibited a prudent restraint the storm might have passed; but he persisted in a congreso consultivo, and had indeed already on the 1st of the month issued circulars to the ayuntamientos of the principal cities, instructing them to send deputies to the capital. His assumption of prerogatives, moreover, his failure to seek the approval of the acuerdo, and his order for troops to move from Jalapa and Nueva Galicia to the capital, confirmed

[23] Called by Zamacois, *Hist. Mej.*, vi. 48, Antonio Mendez Cano.

[24] The viceroy was at this time 66 years of age. The silence of the other members of the junta was held as indicating their wish that he should resign. That he never had any intention of doing so may be drawn from the fact that a few days later, assuming a prerogative never claimed by preceding viceroys, he appointed García Dávila mariscal de campo, and José María Laso to be superintendent of the real aduana, besides granting a subsidy of 400,000 pesos from the royal treasury to the consulado of Vera Cruz for the continuation of the road to that port. This administrative act was done independently of the approval of the junta superior as required by law. *Rev. Verdadero Origen*, no. ii. 39.

opinion that his intention was ultimately to govern without dependence on the crown. The party opposed to him, therefore, determined to hasten their plans. There was organized against him what the viceroy would probably call a conspiracy.[25] Those composing it were mostly European Spaniards, and were supported by the commercial class. Believing that the convocation of a national congress, determined upon by the viceroy, would bring to a conclusion Spanish rule in Mexico, they resolved to stifle all tendency to what they might call disloyalty to Spain, by the seizure of the viceroy and his principal supporters. Gabriel de Yermo, a native of Vizcaya, and warmly attached to the party of the oidores, was selected as their leader. Nor was the choice ill made. Courageous, energetic, possessed of ability and caution, Yermo was in every respect the man to take the lead. Moreover, he had at his command wealth, and the affection of liberated slaves and other dependents on his large estates.[26] Though he considered that the condition of affairs required a desperate remedy, he did not immediately accept the invitation of the conspirators to put himself at their head. Having, however, consulted with his confessor, he at last expressed his willingness to act as their leader, and as no time was to be lost, he acted promptly.[27] At a close meeting it was determined that the

[25] *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 108.

[26] Gabriel Joaquin de Yermo was born in the neighborhood of Bilbao on the 10th of September, 1757. He married his cousin María Josefa Yermo in Mexico, who had inherited from her father valuable sugar-cane haciendas in the valley of Cuernavaca. On the birth of his son José María in 1790, he liberated his negro and mulatto slaves to the number of more than 400, and again in 1797, when he purchased the estate of Jalmolonga, he enfranchised 200 more who belonged to it. The freedmen ever afterward exhibited undeviating fidelity and affection for him and the cause of the king of Spain. His success as an agriculturist was well known in New Spain. Speaking in defence of his action in this conspiracy, he thus alludes to this occupation: 'He sido y soy puramente un agricultor industrioso, cuya riqueza tal cual es, dimana exclusivamente de los frutos de mis haciendas, mejoradas en mi poder extraordinariamente, como sabe toda la Nueva España.' *Pap. Var.*, xxxvi., no. lxviii., ii. 54–9; *Cancelada*, in Id., ccxv., no. iii., xliv.–l.; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 238. He died in Mexico on the 7th of September, 1813, being nearly 56 years of age. *Id.*, i. 503.

[27] Iturrigaray's defenders assert that Yermo's decision was influenced by

person of the viceroy should be seized, and the government of the country held for Spain. Yermo told his associates that if he took the lead the affair must be conducted without display of any rancorous feelings, that bloodshed must be avoided, and the proposed coup d'état accomplished in a single night.

Assembling in the city a force composed of faithful laborers on his estate,[28] he next proceeded to gain over the officers of the palace guard. This force was composed of a company drawn from the infantry regiment organized and paid by the merchants of the capital,[29] who moreover had the appointment of the officers. These, being selected from the commercial class, were with few exceptions devoted to the European faction, and it would not be difficult to win over the officers of a single company. The troops of the viceroy were already drawing near to the city, and the active conspirators, who numbered three hundred, appointed the night of the 14th of September. The viceroy had been several times warned of the plot, and had it not been for his egotism, apathy, and obstinacy, he might have prevented it.[30]

resentment against the viceroy for interfering with his interests as a contractor for meat for the city, and because the viceroy was active in prompting the sequestration of the estates of the benevolent institutions to which his own property was mortgaged in the sum of 400,000 pesos. Yermo, moreover, had taken an active part in a suit brought by the producers of aguardiente to protect themselves against a heavy and irregularly imposed tax upon that liquor. By the extreme and free opinions which he expressed on the subject, he incurred the anger of the viceroy, who ordered his imprisonment, from which he was only saved by the influence of one of his countrymen, who was a friend of Iturrigaray. Alaman defends Yermo against the charge that personal motives influenced him in the action he took against the viceroy. *Id.*, i. 259–13. Negrete takes a different view. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 118–19; *Rev. N. Esp.*, *Verdadero Origen*, no. ii. 53–6.

[28] Bustamante, in making mention of this fact, apologizes to Yermo's family for doing so. 'Protesto...no es mi ánimo ofender en nada á la virtuosa familia de aquel ciudadano, justamente apreciada hoy en México.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 236.

[29] Called el regimiento del comercio. Each day a company of this regiment formed the guard of the viceregal palace.

[30] 'Conduciase en todo como un hombre narcotizado.' *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, i., carta 1ª, 5. A month before Bustamante had informed Iturrigaray that a conspiracy was on foot to seize his person and depose him, but the viceroy paid no heed to him. A woman, also, presented a paper to him one day as he was leaving the palace and implored him to read it, as it revealed a plot to make him captive. Others warned him to no purpose. *Cavo, Tres*

Plans for the 14th were frustrated by the fears of Juan Gallo, captain of the guard, who, while sympathizing with the movement, refused to join in such arbitrary measures, though he promised not to betray them. They therefore tried Santiago García, who would be in command on the following day. He also at first refused to admit them into the palace, but was finally won over by the arguments of his lieutenant, Luis Granados, the captain of the artillery, who accepted a bribe of eight thousand pesos.[31]

Thus all was made ready. The oidores[32] were advised of the meditated attack, and the conspirators, who had assumed the name of Volunteers of Fernando VII., and were afterward distinguished by the appellation of Chaquetas,[33] cautiously assembled in the portal de las Flores at 12 o'clock on the night of the 15th.[34] Yermo placed himself at the head, and they proceeded silently to the palace gates. The guard had been locked up in their quarters, and the sentinels at the entrance stood mute and motionless.[35] Connected on the north side with the palace stood the court prison, and the sentinel on guard there, not

Siglos, iii. 236–7. Iturrigaray states in his defence that at the commencement of the conspiracy a youth unknown to him informed him that the oidores were forming a design to seize him. *Alaman, Hist. Mj.*, i. 244–5.

[31] This, according to the statement of Iturrigaray. Alaman discredits the assertion. Granados was afterward banished by Garibay to Acapulco, where he died shortly after. *Id.*, i. 246. Bustamante accepts Iturrigaray's statement. 'Captain D. Luis Granados estaba vendido a la faccion, y en la tarde habia mandado al mismo Palacio ochenta artilleros para que hiciesen cartuchos y tuviesen la artilleria á punto.' *Sup. Cuev, Tres Siglos*, iii. 236.

[32] With regard to previous and final communications with the oidores, consult Yermo, in *Amigo del Pueblo*, ii., no. vii., 211–24.

[33] Referring to the jackets worn as part of their uniform.

[34] The portal de las Flores was opposite the palace; but the conspirators were screened by the parian which intervened. Bustamante states that many of them went to the archbishop 'a recibir su bendicion, les deseó buen suceso, y exhortó como si fuesen á guerra de moros.' *Sup. Cuev, Tres Siglos*, iii. 237. Alaman denies this. Negrete considers that the conspirators actually did receive the archbishop's benediction. *Mx. Siglo XIX.*, i. 117.

[35] The mayor de plaza, Coronel Juan de Noriega, was afterward charged with having been bribed, and having cooperated with the conspirators by giving orders that the troops should not leave their quarters on that night. Noriega defended himself by depositions taken from a number of the principal actors. In 1821 his family caused this vindication of his character to be printed and published, a copy of which is to be found in *Pap. Var.*, clvii., no. xxxiii. Consult *Yermo*, in *Amigo del Pueblo*, ii. 218–19.

being in the secret, challenged them as they approached. Receiving no reply, he fired on them, and was preparing to reload when he was shot down.[36] Recovering from this mishap, they entered the palace without further opposition; and notwithstanding the two shots which had been fired without, they found Iturrigaray asleep in his chamber. Aroused, the viceroy found himself a prisoner, and having given up the keys of his cabinets, he was conducted with his two eldest sons in a carriage to the inquisition, and lodged in the house of the inquisitor Prado. His wife and two children of tender age were at the same time conveyed to the nunnery of San Bernardo.[37]

Thus fell this vacillating viceroy, whose mediocrity of character, courage, and ability rendered him signally unfit to govern during this most critical period. Intriguing but feeble in design, ambitious but timid, he could neither skilfully plan nor boldly execute, while his temporizing policy encouraged his enemies and disappointed his friends. Had he at the first adopted with decision the views of either faction, and supported them by positive measures, he would doubtless have retained control of affairs. Although the arbitrariness of his final acts, and his intention to concentrate forces in the capital, seem to indicate that at last he had determined to support the creole party with a view to independence, his want of caution in allowing his action to outstrip his power to maintain it by the presence of troops which he could rely upon was his ruin, and he was seized in the viceregal palace

[36] Bustamante makes the strange assertion that this sentinel, whose name was Miguel Garrido, after having fired, attacked them with his bayonet, and that they fled 'como timidas palomas;' but that they afterward attacked him from behind as he was returning, and wounded and disarmed him. But Bustamante is here strongly partisan, and not to be trusted.

[37] A few days later Iturrigaray was removed to the convent of the Bethlehemites. His fall, without the effusion of blood, was considered by many as miraculous. 'Muchos—acaso los mas de estos habitantes—atribuyen tan feliz suceso á la milagrosísima Madre de Dios Guadalupana, cuya Novena en su Santuario, acaba de verificarse, y en la que las almas devotas derramaron muchas lágrimas pidiéndole el remedio de los males que nos amenazaban.' *Gaz. Mex.*, xv. 688–9.

when his regiments were almost at its gates, by a band of civilians led by a wealthy farmer.[38]

No sooner had the successful chaquetas lodged their prisoner within the walls of the inquisition, than they summoned the archbishop, oidores, and other authorities to council, and demanded the deposal of the viceroy. By six o'clock in the morning of the 16th their decision had been given. Iturrigaray had been deposed, and the mariscal de campo, Pedro Garibay, appointed as his successor ad interim. At seven o'clock a proclamation to that effect was posted on all the corners of the capital by order of the archbishop as president of the council.[39] Then followed arrests of the ex-viceroy's principal partisans, and other individuals suspected of revolutionary tendencies. Verdad,

[38] For a concise outline of Iturrigaray's administration, and the course of action which led to his downfall, see *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep.*, i. 643–52. The document here used was published Nov. 9, 1808, and commented upon by the oidor Aguirre. Cancelada, the editor of the *Gaz. Mex.*, xv. 687, thus holds up to praise the action of the merchants and their dependents: 'La Nueva España sabrá con el tiempo lo mucho que debe á todo el Comercio de Mexico por esta accion, la cual se executó sin efusion de sangre:...Así se sabe portar la Juventad (sic) española reunida para exterminar los malvados y proteger los hombres de bien.' Cancelada published this extra number of his gazette without having submitted it to the revision of the oidor decano as required by law. Garibay reprimanded him, and ordered him to call in all the copies issued. *Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 222–6. Consult Yermo's account of the viceroy's deposition addressed by him to the Spanish junta. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 655–60.

[39] A copy of the proclamation is found in *Gaz. Mex.*, xv. 679–80. It informs the inhabitants of Mexico that 'El Pueblo se ha apoderado de la Persona del Exmô Señor Virrey: ha pedido imperiosamente su separacion por razones de utilidad y conveniencia general: han convocado en la noche precedente á este dia al Real Acuerdo, Illmô Señor Arzobispo, y otras autoridades: se ha cedido á la urgencia, y dando por separado del mando á dicho Virrey, ha recaido conforme á la Real Orden de 30 de Octubre de 1806, en el Mariscal de Campo Don Pedro Garibay, interin se procede á la abertura de los pliegos de Providencia.' At eleven o'clock Garibay, according to this government organ, was recognized by all the government authorities. *Id.* The oidores in their report to the junta de Sevilla, dated the 24th of September, represented that on the 17th preceding the people demanded that the pliego de providencia should not be opened, but that Garibay should continue at the head of the government. In accordance with this wish, the opening of the pliego was deferred. In *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 239–42, is a copy of this report, Lizarza gives a very different reason. He states that it was presumed that the successor to Iturrigaray appointed in the pliego was the Marqués de Someruelos, the governor of Habana; but that the audiencia were anxious to have at their head Garibay, an octogenarian, to direct in such a crisis, and who would offer no opposition to their views and measures. *Discurso*, 6–7.

Azcárate, and Rafael Ortega were imprisoned in the archiepiscopal jail, and shortly afterward Francisco Cisneros,[40] the abbot of Guadalupe, the canon José Mariano Beristain, Jose Antonio Cristo, and Fray Melchor Talamantes of the order of la Merced.[41]

The new government at once proceeded to take precautions to secure itself in its position. Despatches were sent to all the principal cities with news of the occurrences in the capital. Instructions were given to the colonels of the regiments from Jalapa and Nueva Galicia to fall back. García Dávila was removed from his command as mariscal de campo,[42] and the conde de Alcaraz appointed in his place.

[40] Called by Alaman, José Cisceros. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 250.

[41] Talamantes was a native of Perú, and a strong advocate for independence, as is proved by papers in his own handwriting which were seized at the time of his capture, and among which was found the sketch of a plan of independence. It begins: 'El congreso nacional Americano debe ejercer todos los derechos de la soberania;' and then the duties and power of the congress are laid down in 13 items, which include extensive reforms in political, civil, and ecclesiastical administrations, the regulation of commerce, and the promotion of agricultural, mining, and manufacturing industries, 'quitándoles las trabas.' The last item in this interesting document is to the effect that an ambassador should be sent to the U. S. 'á tratar de alianza y pedir auxîlios.' In another paper he uses these words: 'Aproximándose ya el tiempo de la independencia de este reino, debe procurarse que el congreso que se forme lleve en sí mismo, sin que pueda percibirse de los inadvertidos la semilla de esta independencia: pero de una independencia sólida, durable, y que pueda sostenerse sin dificultad y sin efusion de sangre.' *Cancelada, Conducta Iturrigaray*, 119-22. Alaman compared the above quoted documents with the originals of Talamantes, which exist in the general archives. The friar was also the author of a work entitled *Representacion de las Colonias*, which he dedicated to the ayuntamiento of Mexico under the nom de plume of Irza, verdadero patriota. In this, the most important of his productions, he establishes twelve cases in which a colony can with justice free itself from the mother country. *Hist. Mej.*, i. app. 36. Talamantes was conveyed on the 6th of April to the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, where he was confined in irons. He died shortly afterward of yellow fever, his jailers not having the compassion even to remove his fetters during his sickness. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 234. Zamacois does not believe such unnecessary inclemency credible. *Hist. Mej.*, vi. 63; Guerra states that 'le añadieron otro par de grillos.' *Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 236. Bustamante asserts: 'No se le quitaron los grillos...hasta el momento de enterrarlo.' *Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 238. Verdad died in prison on the 4th of October, 19 days after his capture, not without suspicions of having been poisoned, while Azcárate was seized with an attack of epilepsy, induced, it was also believed, by poison. He however recovered, and having vindicated himself, was afterward set at liberty by Viceroy Venegas. Cisneros, Beristain, and Cristo were liberated soon after their incarceration. *Ib.; Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, vi. 62-3; *Rosa, Discurso en la Alameda*, 11.

[42] Dávila, having obtained his appointment from Iturrigaray, had offered to resign if the authorities doemed it advisable under the new order of things. *Gaz. Mex.*, xv. 700.

The dragoon regiment of Mexico was ordered in all haste to the capital, and measures were taken to preserve public order and tranquillity. Nor were these precautions unnecessary. Confusion and tumult prevailed in the city. Armed bodies of creoles and natives thronged the streets with threatening demonstrations, while fears were entertained that an attempt at rescue would be made by a division of the Jalapa regiment, whose captain, Joaquin Arias, and his brother officers declared that they would liberate Iturrigaray or perish in the attempt. They were finally, however, dissuaded from their purpose. For greater security Iturrigaray was removed to the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa,[43] being conducted thither on the 21st by a guard of sixty soldiers of the volunteers of Fernando VII. and fifty dragoons. A few days later he was joined by his wife and family, and on the 6th of December embarked with them on board the *San Justo* for Cádiz. On his arrival at that port he was confined in the castle of San Sebastian, whence he was removed to that of Santa Catalina. There, impeached for treason, and accused of extortion and maleadministration, he awaited his trial.

Meanwhile, all the hoarded wealth in his palace besides other property was sequestrated,[44] and the oidor

[43] At attempt at rescue was made, of which Vicente Acuña was the instigator. Acuña was sent prisoner to Spain, where he was acquitted. Returning to Mexico three years later, he was arrested at Perote, and shot under sentence of the council of war stationed there. *Bustamante, Sup., Tres Siglos*, iii. 243–4.

[44] His accumulations were immense. In three apartments of the palace were found, besides a great quantity of diamonds, snuff-boxes, ornamental bouquets, breakfast services, knives, forks, and spoons, all of solid gold, a gold writing-desk, gold cigar-cases, and costly ornaments, trinkets, and bric-a-brac almost without number. The silver ware was hardly less valuable; no fewer than 50 dozen sets of plates, knives, forks, and spoons were found, with corresponding dinner-services and table ornaments. Behind his cabinet a box was discovered, labeled 'Dulce de Querétaro.' The sweetmeats it contained were 7,383 gold ounces. In another chest was a massive circular ingot of gold and a great variety of rare trinkets of the same metal, 'que no será muy comun hallarlas en los palacios de los monarcas.' In the corners of these apartments were found more than [illegible] duros in bags. Moreover, among the spoil were four interest-paying bonds of 1[illegible],000 duros each. (The duro was the same coin as the peso fuerte.) *Veracruzano*, i. 76–7. The editor of this periodical states that the document from which the above particulars are taken is a copy of the original manuscript. The same is to be found

Bataller was commissioned to draw up indictments. The first process despatched to Spain, being hastily prepared, was not couched in legal terms,[45] and the proceedings instituted were delayed until an instrument in proper form, supported by the necessary documents, was obtained from New Spain, and it was not until August 1809 that the trial proceeded.[46] The accusations were then divided into two classes, forming two distinct suits, the prosecution for treason and the residencia of the accused. On the 9th of November following, Iturrigaray submitted his defence to the council of the Indies, in which he claimed acquittal of the charge of treason, on the ground that he had cleared himself of the accusations before the Spanish junta central. With regard to his residencia, he maintained that it ought not to be taken while he was in captivity, with his salary suspended, his property sequestered, and his honor aspersed. He then petitioned that he might be permitted to reside in the neighborhood of Cádiz, that the arrears of his salary should be paid, or the income of his sequestrated capital be allowed him, and that the documents necessary for the proof of his innocence be obtained.

Before any decision was arrived at, Iturrigaray addressed a similar petition to the regency created by the córtes January 29, 1810, and installed on the island of Leon, requesting, moreover, permission to reside with his family in Habana. This met with a more speedy result, and his trial for treason was suspended and leave was granted him to reside in any province of Spain which he might select, or in the

almost verbatim in *Cancelada, Conducta Iturrigaray*, 88-91, and in *Alaman Hist. Mej.*, i. app. 41-3, copied from Cancelada. Before the wife of Iturrigaray left Mexico she petitioned that the jewelry of which she had been deprived, and the bonds of her children, might be returned to her, and also that her husband's plate and ornaments be restored to him. The audiencia acceded to her request as regarded the jewelry and plate, but refused to surrender the bonds. *Id.*, i. 260–1.

[45] Pedimento del fiscal del consejo de Indias en la causa de Iturrigaray, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 693–4.

[46] *Id.*, i. 693–6.

Balearic Islands.[47] Two days later, on February 12th, a royal order was issued still more favorable to the unfortunate man, now broken in health. By it the sequestration of his property was removed, with the exception of forty thousand pesos to be left on deposit as a bond for his residencia. To this clemency the council of the Indies was strongly opposed, as being inconsistent with the gravity of the case, and the fiscal, supported by all the members of the council, requested the regency to revoke the orders.[48] No notice was taken of this address, and Iturrigaray was released, when he retired to Algeciras. On the 28th of October, 1810, however, the second regency having been elected, orders were issued therefrom that he should again be placed under arrest, his property sequestrated, and his case proceeded with in the most expeditious manner. It was, however, too late for this action to have any effect. Iturrigaray's property had already been returned to him, and apprehensive of the result if he should again be arrested and put on trial, he crossed over to Africa, leaving it to his wife and friends to fight the case. These so successfully conducted matters that after much debating he was allowed, by order of the córtes, on the 26th of November, the benefit of the general pardon, which in the mean time had been extended to the revolutionists in New Spain, and the impeachment for treason was removed.

In the matter of his residencia, Iturrigaray did not so fortunately escape. Ramon Osés, alcalde de corte in the Mexican capital, was appointed his judge, and as he was a man of high integrity, and had not been a member of the audiencia when Iturrigaray was deposed, Alaman is doubtless correct in concluding that the investigation was conducted with fairness. Yet

[47] Copy of the decree of the consejo de regencia, dated February 10, 1810, is given in *Rev. Verdadero Origen*, no. ii. 47–8.

[48] The fiscal advanced numerous reasons in support of the objection raised, and concludes: 'Vuestro fiscal en su respuesta, que apoya enteramente el consejo, dice cuanto se halla de repugnante en derecho y política á que se lleve á efecto lo mandado en las Reales órdenes de diez y doce del corriente.' *Id.*, 49–50.

the late viceroy was mulcted in the sum of $435,413, $119,125 of which he was condemned to pay as the value of the invoice of goods which he illegally introduced into New Spain on his arrival there in 1803. The other amount was for money fraudulently obtained from the distribution of quicksilver, and sales of offices and contracts, to each of which original sums was added a fine of equal amount.[49] To secure payment, Iturrigaray's interests in the mining tribunal of Mexico, amounting to $400,000, were attached.[50] He appealed to the council of the Indies, but the sentence was confirmed by it in February 1819, and later by the supreme tribunal of justice.[51] Its execution, however, was interrupted by the declaration of independence in 1821, and Iturrigaray having died a short time before, his widow[52] and family went to Mexico and petitioned that the sentence might not be carried out. The arguments now employed were exactly opposite to those advanced by Iturrigaray, who maintained that he had ever remained loyal to Fernando.[53] The family claimed that the deceased

[49] He received from his quicksilver frauds $36,816. In 1806 and 1807 his receipts from illegal contracts for the manufacture of cigarette paper amounted to $106,128. The legal price of this paper as sold from the factory was $12 a ream. During the year mentioned it was raised to $13, one dollar being paid by the manufacturers to the viceroy for their monopoly. *Id.*, 24–5; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. app. 45–7. Zamacois, who copied extensively from Alaman, has given in app. no. 7 of his *Hist. Mej.*, vi., a verbatim duplicate of the latter's appendix, but has failed to detect certain errors of Alaman. Iturrigaray's wife was his principal agent in these nefarious transactions, and into her hands most of the sums were paid. He feebly attempted to defend his conduct by the support of precedents supplied by the action of his predecessors.

[50] Bustamante states that the total amount in which Iturrigaray was condemned was 384,241 pesos. *Cuadro, Hist.*, i. 9; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 265; *Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 245.

[51] For copy of sentence, see *Ateneo, Mej.*, i. 234.

[52] Bustamante writing in 1821 says: 'Con la muerte de dicho Gefe, su familia se ha acabado de arruinar, y á la sazón en que escribo, yace su esposa paralitica en una cama en Jaén.' *Cuadro, Hist.*, ed. 1823, i., carta 1ª, 16. Iturrigaray died in 1821, at the age of nearly 80 years. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 134.

[53] Alaman met and conversed with Iturrigaray in Madrid in 1814. The ex-viceroy was then 72 years old, and on all occasions when Mexican events were the topic, he assured Alaman that he had never entertained the thought of effecting the independence of New Spain. Indeed, it was impossible to prove the charge of treason against him, as the only ground for supposing

viceroy had really been the first promoter of independence, and had fallen a victim to the cause! And further, the claim was respected. The Mexican congress in 1824 stopped proceedings, and restored to Iturrigaray's heirs the $400,000 invested in the mining tribunal. Such was the result of one of the most important and memorable investigations made during the whole period of viceregal administration.[54]

The trial of Iturrigaray, while exposing his grasping avarice and nefarious transactions, throws little light upon his political pretensions. It is only by a consideration of the discussions carried on by his supporters and opponents, by an impartial estimate of the effect of his administrative acts,[55] and by a close study of his character that we may reasonably expect any light on his secret intentions or expectations. Not only did his enemies directly accuse him of treasonable designs, but even insinuated that he was not unwilling at one time to recognize Murat, Napoleon's representative in Madrid.[56] But this is far fetched; and in regard

that he meditated the independence of New Spain was his intention of convoking a national congress. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 270.

[54] Alaman states that the heirs surreptitiously obtained from the audiencia archives the original process against the ex-viceroy. Proceedings were instituted against Guiol, who abstracted them. Alaman received his information from Senator Olaguibel, who defended Guiol at his trial, and authorized Alaman to use his name in proof of the fact. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 267.

[55] Nothing gained for him more hostile feeling than the strictness with which he conducted the consolidation of the funds of the Obras Pias: 'Interesóle en este maldito negociado en un tanto por ciento el Ministerio Español, y asi procuró hacer efectivas sus providencias con un rigor, que le atrajo el odio del Reyno.' Thus writes Bustamante, one of his principal defenders. *Cuadro, Hist.*, ed. 1823, i., carta 1ª, 15.

[56] At the junta held on the 9th of August, 1808, according to Martiñena, the viceroy used these words: 'Señores, aun estamos en tiempo de reconocer al duque de Berg, ¿que dicen V. SS.?' and when all exclaimed, '*No Señor! no Señor!*' Iturrigaray, observing that the oidor decano Ciriaco Gonzalez Carvajal was conspicuously emphatic, asked him. 'Y qué dirá V. S. si lo ve autorizado con la firma del Señor Porlier?' *Rev. Verdadero Origen*, ii. 36. Bustamante's version is very different. He states that when the question of submission to the orders of Murat was put, the oidores turned pale, 'mas el virey con ánimo denodado la decidió, diciendo, que no lo obedeceria mientras mandase un ejército.' He afterward cast this timidity in their teeth: 'Diciendoles á los mismos oidores...Que...solo despues quo han visto mejorarse las cosas era cuando estaban valientes.' *Sup. Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 228.

to the independence of Mexico, whatever he thought of it, I am sure he did not look much beyond present issues. Independence as a principle was with him a small matter; independence as a means of profit depended greatly upon relations between France and Spain. Hence his anxiety to provide against the contingency of being thrown over by a new power on the convocation of a national congress; for he doubtless believed that Spain would be unable to cope successfully with the arms of Napoleon. Under such circumstances, if New Spain declared herself independent, there would be no special disloyalty on his part to the mother country.

But Iturrigaray had not the sagacity to recognize that the creole faction which he favored was laying deeper plans, and would not be satisfied with only temporary freedom. He was not aware that beneath his feet was a political vortex, a fact which the Spanish element appreciated more clearly. His want of tact, moreover, and his intemperate language,[57] had given great offence, and he was cordially hated by the oidores and their party. During the latter days of his administration every expression of his countenance was watched by his opponents; every syllable that fell from his lips was caught up, and, if possible, interpreted as significant of his want of loyalty to Spain. That the European party were fully persuaded that he was aiming at the independence of Mexico, there is no doubt, giving as proof his dismantling the seaward battery of Ulúa, and conveying its guns into the interior, the changes made by

[57] At the session held on the 9th of August, when the archbishop, perceiving that the discussions were becoming interminable, proposed that they should be confined to essential matters, Iturrigaray rudely and angrily replied: 'Que allí cada uno tenia libertad de hablar lo que quisiese, y que si le parecia larga la junta, desde luego se podria marchar á su casa.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 196. On the same occasion Oidor Aguirre rose and said: 'Señor Exmo. La resolucion de defender estos dominios necesita alguna explicacion.' The viceroy immediately answered: 'No hay necesidad de explicacion: él que no lo entienda que se vaya, abierta tiene la puerta.' *Rev. Verdadero Origen*, ii. 36.

him in military chiefs, and his intended establishment of a national congress.[58]

These arguments were combated by his supporters, who noted the fact that Iturrigaray had taken the oath of allegiance to Fernando, and denied any intention to establish an independent government. The removal of the artillery from San Juan de Ulúa was done, they asserted, for the purpose of avoiding the mortality which prevailed among the troops stationed at Vera Cruz[59] by placing them in more healthy localities. While they thus repudiated the accusations of treasonable designs, they nevertheless acknowledged many grave defects in his administration.[60]

[58] How strongly opposed the European party was to such a congress may be seen from Bishop Queipo's views expressed on the 26th of September: 'Una junta nacional...es una verdadera rebelion.' *Col. Doc.*, 29; *Pap. Var.*, 62, no. 19, 28–34.

[59] 'Que en Veracruz perecerían, como siempre, a millares.' *Rev. de N. Esp., Censura Particular*, 3. Lerdo de Tejada, *Apunt. Hist.*, 362, makes the strange statement that Iturrigaray entertained such an infatuated belief in his military skill that he dismantled the battery for the purpose of enticing the English to make an attack on Vera Cruz, being confident of victory. 'pero afortunadamente para el virey, no sucedió así, y á esto debió el que su reputacion militar no quedase tan perdida como la de gobernante.' Lacunza, *Doc. Hist. Museo Mex.*, 534, makes the same statement.

[60] Bustamante, one of his stanchest defenders, remarks: 'Conozco los graves defectos de su administracion; uno de ellos es la venta escandalosa de los empleos que hizo.' *Sup., Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 245. The deposal of Iturrigaray was the subject of various works and the theme of innumerable diatribes which rancorously discussed the cause of his fall, and its bearing on the future destiny of Mexico. These writings embrace productions of every dimension, from the size of a volume to small pamphlets or a couple of leaves in a periodical. They were issued during a period which extended from the time of Iturrigaray's trial before the council of the Indies till long after the declaration of independence. A large proportion of the pamphlets and smaller essays are anonymous. Their style, which is usually virulent, shows the bitterness with which the two chief factions regarded each other. By far the most important of these productions are published by Cancelada, Lizarza, Mier y Guerra, and Martiñena. Juan Lopez Cancelada, the editor of the *Gazeta de Mexico*, represented in Spain the interests of the commercial community of Mexico which endeavored to obtain a revocation of the decision which liberated Iturrigaray, released him from the accusation of treason, and restored his ill-gotten wealth. Cancelada proved himself an inveterate enemy of the fallen viceroy, and probably was influenced by personal feeling. In the *Gaz. de Méx.*, xv. 522, of the 2d of August, 1808, the editor published a rumor that Fernando had been restored to the throne. This incensed Iturrigaray, who summoned Cancelada before him and banished him. By the intercession of the vice-queen, however, the order was withdrawn, and Cancelada allowed to remain in Mexico, but was made to retract his assertion. After the deposal of Iturrigaray, Cancelada assailed Villa Urrutia by petitioning the audiencia to pronounce him a traitor, and punish him as such; but his language was so malignant that he was condemned in a fine of 500 pesos for calumny,

or to imprisonment for two months. He later addressed the archbishop, then viceroy, in such discourteous and unmeasured terms that he was arrested and tried before the junta de seguridad y buen órden. Numerous persons brought against him charges of insults and grievances, and his fractious and turbulent tendencies being well known, the junta condemned him to banishment to Spain. *Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. xix.–xxiv. There he occupied himself in writing on the political affairs of New Spain, displaying therein a vicious enmity toward the creole and revolutionary party. In 1811 he published in Cádiz *La Verdad Sabida y Buena Fé Guardada*, in which he maintains that the revolution which broke out in Mexico in 1810 originated in Iturrigaray and his treasonable designs. He asserts that a revolutionary tendency did not exist at the time when Humboldt was in New Spain, as affirmed by 'el Español escritor en Londres,' and said that Humboldt's travels in Mexico were too limited to admit of his understanding the spirit of the people. The *Verdad Sabida* gave great offence to the ayuntamiento of Mexico, and the regidores petitioned the supreme council of the Spanish regency to order his arrest on the charge of abominable libels principally directed against that municipality. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 725. In Mexico Cancelada for some years followed the avocation of a pedler. He was of a quarrelsome and rancorous disposition, and is described by the ayuntamiento of Mexico as 'hombre bien conocido en este reyno por su cavilosidad, estupidez y audacia.' *Id.* Of low origin and uneducated, it is a matter of surprise that he obtained the position as editor of the *Gazeta de Mexico*, the official organ of the government, which was under his direction for some years. Fernando, on his return to Spain, caused him to be placed in a convent, from which, however, he was liberated in 1820. He died a few years afterward. Besides the *Verdad Sabida*, he was the author of many other works, among which may be mentioned *Ruina de la Nuera España si se declara el comercio libre con los extrangeros*, Cádiz, 1811, 4to, pp. 84; *Conducta del Excelentísimo Señor Don José Iturrigaray*, Cádiz, 1812, 4to, 2 l. pp. 135; and the *Telégrafo Americano*, a periodical which he published in Spain, and which was opposed in the *Censor* by Alcocer of Tlascala. In reply to the *Verdad Sabida*, appeared in the same year the *Discurso que Publica Don Facundo de Lizarza Vindicando...Iturrigaray*. It handles Cancelada with great severity, and frequently gives him the lie direct. Lizarza, who was Iturrigaray's lawyer, was not the author of the *Discurso*, but José Beye de Cisneros, the brother of the abbot of Guadalupe, who was imprisoned on the downfall of the viceroy—and at that time Mexican deputy to the córtes at Cádiz. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 268. The work displays considerable acumen in the refutation of Cancelada, and supplies many facts favorable to Iturrigaray purposely ignored in the *Verdad Sabida*. Although Cisneros is not sparing in severe animadversions upon the dissertation, describing it as a texture of lies, falsifications, and fiction, he has the good taste to refrain from the gross vituperation so noticeable in the writings of that time. Cancelada in reply published his *Conducta del Exmo. Señor...Iturrigaray*, Cadiz, 1812, which is valuable as being composed mainly of transcripts of official documents bearing upon Iturrigaray's fall and trial. Among these appear the report of his administration and conduct from the time of his arrival to his deposal, drawn up by the real acuerdo of Mexico, November 9, 1808; official accounts of the four memorable juntas convoked by him on the 9th and 31st of August, and the 1st and 9th of September, 1808; the royal orders issued by the regency of the isla de Leon; and other official papers quoted in this chapter. With regard to the report of the real acuerdo, to which Cancelada triumphantly appeals as conclusive evidence of Iturrigaray's aspirations to the sovereignty of New Spain, I have only to remark that the members of that court were bitterly hostile to the viceroy, and that their representations cannot be accepted as impartial. *Historia de la Revolucion de Nueva España*, etc., *Escribia la Dn José Guerra*, Londres, 1813, 2 vols, 8vo. This work was first undertaken by José Servando de Mier y Guerra, with the object of defending Iturrigaray against the defamatory attacks of Cancelada, but the author, being supplied

with a great quantity of material for the history of subsequent events, carried it forward and included the first years of the revolution in Mexico. The first volume is almost entirely devoted to the vindication of Iturrigaray; in the second the progress of the revolution is narrated down to the year 1812. Guerra in his preface supplies us with a biographical sketch of Cancelada's life down to the date of the publication of the *Historia*, and exposes his career with most contemptuous irony. His work is largely taken up with extracts from official documents, of which he possessed a great number. For the insertion of so much of such material he excuses himself upon the plea that having been far from the scene of events, and having undertaken to refute the false representations of one who professed to have been present at them, he was compelled to support his arguments by documentary evidence. Guerra, after the fall of the viceroy, narrowly escaped arrest, and fleeing from Mexico took up his residence in London. There he became the most able defender of Iturrigaray, who, according to Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, i. 208–9, supported him in London until his tendencies inclined to the support of the revolution. His work displays great talent and skill. While the style is elegant, the author had at his command a sarcasm that could bite. Alaman speaks highly of this work, which, party spirit aside, will, he says, be ever appreciated for the amount of information which it contains. *Verdadero Origen... de la Revolucion de Nueva España*, etc., Mexico, 1820, fol. pp. 17. (Followed by) *Manifiesto á Todas las Naciones por el Superior Gobierno de Nueva España.* The author of this angry treatise was Juan Martin de Juan Martiñena, who in 1816 took up the gauntlet in defence of Iturrigaray's deposers. Martiñena quotes extracts from Lizarza, Cisneros, Bustamante, and other supporters of Iturrigaray, and condemns these writers with vehement asperity. 'How degrading it is,' he exclaims, 'to find in them the same language, the same ideas, object, and even vulgar outcry—voces materiales —as in the rebel leaders with respect to Iturrigaray and the faithful patriots who put a stop to his criminal proceedings, the only difference being that the former affect peace, harmony, and fidelity, which the latter do not, being in a position to explain frankly their true sentiments!' The historian has, however, to thank Juan Martin de Juan Martiñena for his transcript of the *Manifiesto*, but particularly for the large number of interesting documents appended thereto. The publication of the *Verdadero Origen*, etc., immediately brought out a number of anonymous replies, from among which I will make mention of *Censura Particular é Imparcial del Cuaderno Titulado: Verdadero origen*, etc.; *Breves Reflexiones que pueden añadirse por via de impugnacion al*, id.; and *Consejos al Sr Autor, Editor y Anotador del Cuaderno en Folio Titulado*, id. With regard to the *Manifiesto* above mentioned, it was issued on the 16th of January, 1816, by the government of New Spain, in refutation of the 'falsehoods, calumnies, and errors which the rebels of Mexico have given utterance to in a paper entitled *El Supremo Congreso Mexicano á todas las Naciones*, escrito en Puruarán á 28 de junio de 1815.'

CHAPTER IV.

VICEROYS GARIBAY AND LIZANA.

1808–1810.

GARIBAY'S CHARACTER—A BADGE OF LOYALTY—REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY—BONAPARTIST INTRIGUES—LAMPOONS AND SEDITIOUS SHEETS—EFFECT OF REVERSES IN SPAIN—ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUNTA CONSULTIVA—PRETENSIONS TO THE THRONE OF MEXICO—ARCHBISHOP LIZANA APPOINTED VICEROY—REMITTANCES TO SPAIN—LIZANA'S CHARACTER—THE JUNTA DE SEGURIDAD—REVOLUTION AT VALLADOLID—SPANISH AMERICAN REPRESENTATION IN THE CÓRTES—LIZANA REMOVED FROM OFFICE—WEAK ADMINISTRATION OF THE AUDIENCIA—FRENCH EMISSARIES—ARRIVAL OF VICEROY VENEGAS—HIS ANTECEDENTS, CHARACTER, AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE—TITLES AND HONORS FROM SPAIN.

WHEN the chaquetas conceived the design of seizing and deposing the viceroy, they imagined that they would thus be cutting off the hydra's head, that by one bold stroke they would annihilate the monster of disloyalty. But they erred in their calculations. The creole party, disappointed that their hope should fail in a season so fair for its accomplishment, were doubly embittered. They believed that as matters stood in the mother country, they, and not the Spaniards, were the power in the land. Rivalry and hatred between the two factions increased, and henceforward the revolutionary spirit spread silently and far with rapidity.[1]

At a time so fraught with difficulties, arising from violent political change, no more incompetent man

[1] In 1811 the Mexican deputies to the Spanish córtes represented that the imprisonment of Iturrigaray had provoked the rivalry between the Spaniards and creoles, 'difundiéndose sordamente por el Reyno, y creciendo de dia en dia.' *Diputac., Amer. Rep.*, 1° de Agosto de 1811, 3.

could have been placed at the head of affairs than Pedro Garibay, field marshal of the royal armies. Infirm of body[2] and weak of will; of meagre resources, lacking ability, and wanting in authority even in his own household; a victim, moreover, to the anxiety attending poverty—he was undergoing the penalties which those must pay who by reason of great strength arrive at the age of fourscore years.[3] Nevertheless, he eagerly accepted the high position offered him. In the early part of his life he had served in the wars in Italy and Portugal, and in 1764 went to Mexico with General Villalva. By slow promotion he attained the grade of brigadier in 1789, and at a later date was allowed to retire on account of his infirmities, with the rank of mariscal de campo de los reales ejércitos. His poverty was such that he was frequently compelled to borrow small sums from his acquaintances.[4] He was honorable, and well liked by high and low. Such as he was, however, his insufficiency was the reason of his election. The oidores, whom he regarded as his protectors,[5] were not desirous that a strong man should be at the head of affairs; and during Garibay's short administration, in all acts of government he was but the mouth-piece of the audiencia.[6]

As soon as the coup d'état in the case of Iturrigaray was accomplished, the new government, without formally recognizing either of the Spanish juntas, proceeded to rule in the name of Fernando VII.; and

[2] 'Padecia una enfermedad de estómago...teniendo que apoyarse en un criado cuando salia á la calle.' *Rivera, Gob. Mex.*, i. 545.

[3] Bustamante states that he was over 80. *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 230. Alaman says, 'era un anciano de mas de setenta años.' *Hist. Mej.*, i. 279. But as he entered his military career in 1742, the former's statement must be nearer the truth. He was unable from his infirmities to sign documents, and was compelled to use a stamp. *Disposic. Varias*, i. f. 134.

[4] *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 280.

[5] 'Vió su exaltacion como un gran beneficio, y en los oidores unos *protectores*, cuyo titulo no les negaba en sus contestaciones secretas.' *Bustamante, ut cit.*

[6] 'Era todo de ellos, y hacia precisamente lo que le mandaba Aguirre, capataz de la Audiencia.' *Ib.* 'Pero este era el hombre que convenia al Acuerdo y a sus miras.' *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iii. 347.

an order was issued that the inhabitants of the capital, in token of their loyalty, should wear on their persons a badge bearing his name.[7] The tribunal del consulado was instructed to communicate the same order to all corporations within the jurisdiction of that court.[8] The first important step which the new government took in order to insure its stability was the reorganization of the army. Neither the volunteers of Fernando VII. nor the forces at Jalapa were regarded as supports free from objection. The party from which the former were drawn seemed to expect their own political views adopted in the new order of affairs which they had created, and the oidores feared that the freedom of their own action would thereby be impeded. Accordingly the chaquetas were disbanded by Garibay, who would no longer detain such loyal and self-denying persons from their commercial occupations. He thanked them in the name of Fernando for their patriotism, for the ever memorable services they had rendered, and informed them that he should not fail to place a memorial of their merits at the feet of his majesty.[9] In breaking up the encampment at Jalapa the oidores were influenced by still more forcible reasons. The regiments which composed the army stationed there were drawn from the different provinces, and the ranks filled by Mexicans, whose loyalty could not be safely relied upon if the flag of independence should be raised. Orders were therefore issued that each corps should return to its respective district; the reason assigned being that, in view of the alliance which had been formed between Spain and England,[10] the concentration of so large a force for defence was no longer necessary. It was further urged that the government,

[7] *Gaz. de Mex.*, xv. 687. Many persons had gold medals made, and wore them on their coat collars. Alaman possessed a collection of them, and states that they were of poor workmanship. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 282.

[8] *Gaz. de Mex.*, xv. 699.

[9] *Id.*, 804. The order was given on the 15th of October. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 616–17.

[10] England had made peace with Spain in July 1808.

in its efforts to send pecuniary aid to the peninsula, could not afford the expense of maintaining a standing army.[11] A regiment of grenadiers was organized, and this with the dragoons of Mexico constituted the military force in the capital.

During Garibay's rule the revolutionary tendency advanced apace. Secret meetings were held at private houses.[12] A society known as the Racionales Caballeros was organized at Vera Cruz, Jalapa, and Mexico, which by its machinations greatly aided the cause of independence.[13] Further than this, the secret agents of Joseph Bonaparte were actively at work inciting the inhabitants to rebellion.[14]

[11] Manuel Abad y Queipo condemns this action of Garibay, stating that he did so 'por haber entendido que entre algunos oficiales se hablaba con libertad sobre independencia, y por remediar este mal... incurrió en otro mayor, que fué poner en contacto á los milicianos con sus vecinos, sus parientes y amigos, en que es imposible que el contacto de los unos deje de contaminarse con los otros.' The bishop says that he ought to have punished these free-spoken officers, and placed others in command who could have been relied upon. *Informe dirig. al rey.*, in *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, ix. 867–8.

[12] A prominent personage now was the marqués de Rayas, who was a stanch adherent of Iturrigaray, and espoused the cause of independence after his fall. The proofs of disloyalty against him were so strong that he was sent prisoner to Spain, but was detained at Vera Cruz by sickness. In 1821 he returned to Mexico. *Refutac. Artic. de Fondo*, 19–21.

[13] Their mode of operation was to work on the government so to act as to foment discontent. The efforts of this society were particularly successful with Viceroy Iturrigaray, according to Queipo, who states that by flattery and cajoling they so influenced him that 'lo hizo titubear en la fidelidad de tal modo, que su conducta ambigua hizo creer á los sediciosos que estaba decidido en su favor, y con esto arrojaron la máscara y atacaron cara descubierta los derechos de la monarquia.' *Informe dirig. al rey.*, in *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, ix. 862.

[14] 'Pero no olvidando tampoco Napoleon el objeto interesante de las Américas, envió comisionados á seducir y comprar los virreyes, gobernadores y demas personas que por la fuerza ó por su influxo pudiesen dominar el pueblo.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, xv. 935. In August 1808, among other seditious papers seized at Vera Cruz was a despatch from Champani, the French minister of foreign affairs, officially recommending a system of operations to promote rebellion. *Arrillaga, Informe*, in *Ceballos, Cedulario*, iv. f. 59, no. 1. The same year General Octaviano d'Alvimar, having been authorized to expend large sums of money with this object, entered Mexican territory from the U. S. He was arrested at Nacodoches, in Texas, in August 1808, and proceedings were instituted against him as an agent of Napoleon. Garibay sent him prisoner to Spain in 1809, and after the independence D'Alvimar attempted to recover damages for his imprisonment and loss of personal effects. *Gaz. de Mex.*, ut sup; *Rivera, Gob. de Mex.*, i. 549; *Bustamante*, in *Caro, Tres Siglos*, iii. 249–51. D'Alvimar, while being conducted to the capital, passed through Dolores, and had several interviews with Hidalgo, whom he earnestly encouraged, it is asserted, in revolutionary designs. *Diaz Calvillo, Sermon*, 107–8. Hidalgo, however, at his trial asserted that his conversations with

Lampoons and scurrilous pasquinades were posted on the walls; insulting caricatures of the leading members of the government and loyalist party disfigured the public buildings; and seditious sheets in print were scattered on the floors of the cathedral and churches.[15] The image of his majesty, moreover, was grossly disfigured on the coinage,[16] and the supreme junta of Spain ridiculed. And all these seeds of insurrection were so secretly and warily sown that no efforts of the government were effective in sup-

D'Alvimar had no political significance. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 359–60. Monsieur Desmolard was Joseph Bonaparte's agent at Baltimore, and the French usurper issued instructions to him which disclosed the plan to excite revolt in Spanish America. The main points were to declare to the creoles that his imperial majesty had solely in view to give liberty to Spanish America, the only return expected being the friendship of the people and commerce with the country. To effect their independence, his majesty offered all necessary troops and stores. The emissaries were further instructed to point out the advantages which would accrue by suspending the heavy remittances to Spain, and by the acquirement of freedom from commercial and agricultural restrictions. The good-will of the ecclesiastics especially was to be gained, with the object that at the confessional they should urge the necessity of independence. The injustice to which the creoles were subject in the disposal of public appointments was to be dwelt upon. At the same time the agents were to be careful not to declaim against the inquisition or the church, and on the insurrectional standards the motto 'Viva la Religion católica, apostólica y romana! Perezca el mal gobierno!' was to be inscribed. The servants of governors and high officials were to be won over, and subagents were to keep the principal agents duly informed of the progress made, and these in turn were to communicate with Joseph Bonaparte's envoy in the U. S. A copy of these instructions was found in Caracas, in the office of the secretary to the suprema junta, and forwarded by the junta to the English admiral at the Barbadoes station. *Rev. in Span. Amer.*, 80–7; *Walton's Exposé*, app. 2–7; *Calvo, Annales Hist.*, i. 43–5. The Spanish government warned the colonial authorities of Bonaparte's machinations. A royal address, dated May 10, 1809, exhorting the inhabitants of New Spain to maintain their loyalty, and be on guard against French intrigues, says 'para que haciendolo público,' that is, the address, 'en esos Dominios se precavan sus naturales de las impresiones siniestras que podrian causarles las maquinaciones é intriguas que nuestros feroces enemigos emplean ahora con mas arte que nunca.' *Disposic. Varias*, i. f. 141. Garibay on April 18, 1809, published a proclamation forbidding the landing of Frenchmen at the ports, whether they had passports or not. All French settlers also were ordered to appear within eight days before the alcaldes, by whom they were examined. If suspicion attached to any of them, such were to be imprisoned. *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 337–40.

[15] On the 6th of October, 1808, Garibay published a decree with the object of suppressing these papers. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 608–9.

[16] Garibay on the 19th of May, 1809, issued a proclamation offering 2,000 pesos for the discovery of the mutilators of the coins. He says: 'Pretenden vengar el mal éxito de sus maquinaciones en el real busto de las monedas, de las que han llegado á mis manos varias piezas señaladas de modos diferentes, todos enormemente ofensivos á la magestad, y en odio de la dinastía reynante.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 423.

pressing the hostile demonstrations. In vain the use and sale of hand printing-presses were prohibited,[17] and in vain rewards were offered for the detection of the authors of these treasonable acts.

In April 1809 news of reverses sustained by Spanish arms in the peninsula reached Mexico, and Garibay issued a proclamation on the 20th,[18] exhorting the public to show their loyalty by contributions in aid of the mother country, by sentiments expressing a closer union in mind and heart,[19] and above all, by refusing to be influenced by the secret operations of those who were endeavoring to seduce them from their allegiance. But this proclamation had no effect in arresting the steady advance of the revolutionary party. Its adherents were jubilant, and did not refrain from openly expressing their joy at the news. They greeted with delight the intelligence of disasters suffered by the Spanish forces; and while they exaggerated their defeats, they underrated and derided the advantages which they gained.

Day by day the government was losing its influence over the public mind, and becoming more and more an object of ridicule on the part of the disaffected. In the hope of changing the current, Garibay, or rather his advisers, established a junta consultiva, composed of three oidores, before which all cases of treason were to be tried instead of in the criminal court. This tribunal was formed in June

[17] On the 27th of April, 1809, the viceroy published a proclamation ordering that all such presses should be delivered up to the judge of the tribunal de la Acordada within three days. *Diario de Mex.*, x. 508. Yet on the 20th of May following he found it necessary to offer a reward of 2,000 pesos for the discovery of the persons who had scattered treasonable sheets in the churches during holy week. *Gaz. de Mex.*, ut cit. These sheets were directed against the Spanish junta central, and invited the people to assert their independence. The junta central of Spain was recognized by the viceroy by decree of March 16, 1809. *Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 680–3.

[18] *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 365 &.

[19] 'Olvidad desde ahora para siempre esos apodos de criollos y gachupines, de que haceis una aplicacion odiosa e ideal, supuesto que todos los miembros de una nacion no deben ser conocidos sino por el nombre mismo que lleva la nacion de que son parte: ademas de que es tan ridículo como absurdo hacer mérito de una cosa que no esta en nuestra mano: es decir de nacer aqui ó del lado de allá del mar.' *Li.*, 368.

1809, and some arrests were made, but instead of tending toward suppressing sedition, its creation was turned to advantage by the independents, and supplied additional means of fomenting discontent. The innovation made by transferring the prerogatives of the sala del crímen to an extraordinary court arbitrarily established, and employing a great number of spies, was seized upon as an illustration of despotism on the part of the government. A rumor was spread that the prisons were crowded with innocent victims; households were filled with fear of arrests, and the public were taught to believe that the mere suspicion of free opinions being entertained by a man was sufficient to cause his being sent prisoner to Spain.[20] Outward demonstrations were, it is true, for the time suppressed; but none the less did the cause of independence gain ground under the more cautious and secret operations of its promoters.

Illustrative not alone of the anomalous position in which New Spain stood with regard to the mother country during this period, but also of the unsettled and somewhat incongruous ideas as to government and succession, was a claim in 1808 of an Indian to the throne of Mexico. This personage alleged that he was a descendant of the emperor Montezuma, and maintained that in view of the downfall of the Spanish monarchy he had a right to the crown of the Aztec royal line. Had the native population been as well prepared for revolt as they were two years later, such a claim might have caused much alarm, and probably bloodshed. As it was, ridicule was the

[20] Alaman attempted to trace the grounds for these reports, but could only discover the names of the following persons arrested: The Franciscan padre Sugasti, the silversmith José Luis Alconedo, charged with making a crown for Iturrigaray, the escribano Peimbert, Antonio Calleja, the cura Palacios, and the licentiates Vicente Acuña and Julian Castillejos, 'todos acusados y muchos convencidos de ser autores de papeles ó maquinaciones sediciosas.' *Id.* Compare Bustamante, in Cavo, *Tres Siglos*, iii. 253. Negrete agrees with Bustamante's statement that the jails were filled with prisoners. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 181.

only weapon employed, and the pretender came to be regarded by many as a madman.[21]

On the 13th of March, 1809, the English brig *Sappho* arrived at Vera Cruz from Rio Janeiro, bearing despatches from the infanta Doña María Carlota Joaquina, the sister of Fernando. The letter was addressed to the viceroy, audiencias, governors, and municipalities of New Spain, and contained her wishes and expectations that her son, the infante Don Pedro, would be received and acknowledged as regent and lieutenant of the king. Such pretensions caused the viceroy and audiencia much inquietude, and they endeavored, though in vain, to keep the matter secret. In their reply to the infanta they confined themselves to expressions of courtesy, reporting that tranquillity reigned in the country.[22] Not long after, the viceroy received a letter from the junta central of Spain, informing him that it had become aware that Napoleon meditated sending Cárlos IV. to reign in New Spain, with the object of creating a division in the Spanish monarchy,[23] and instructions were given him to prohibit the landing of Cárlos, and arrest him if he persisted. With the approval of the real acuerdo, the viceroy issued the corresponding orders to the authorities at the ports.

[21] 'Los Europeos hicieron la mas alta burla de esta solicitud y su apoyo.' His pretensions were finally crushed by a poetical burlesque, one of the lines of which ran thus: 'Y treinta mil Indios guerreros vestidos á su usanza—esto es cencueros,' etc. *Cancelada, Verdad Sabida*, xx. The whole story is denied in *Lizarza, Discurso Vind. Iturr.*, 16–17.

[22] Bustamante furnishes a copy of a portion of the infanta's despatch, the tone of which is somewhat assuming. She thanks the members of the audiencia and the archbishop for their zeal and wachfulness in having saved the country; urges the viceroy to be vigilant in maintaining order and the prosperity of the country; and wishes to be supplied with an exact account of all notable events in the capital and kingdom, 'y si posible es de toda esa América Septentrional.' Bustamante remarks: 'Su Alteza sin duda estaba muy ociosa cuando escribió dicha carta, y al tenor de ella otras muchas; pudo haber ocupado el tiempo en hacer calzeta para sus hijos.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 261–2. The letter is dated Rio de Janeiro, May 11, 1809.

[23] Bustamante discredits any such idea on the part of Napoleon. 'La Junta de Sevilla'—he means the junta central, which had withdrawn to Sevilla—'tenia tan anchas tragaderas para engullir las mentiras mas absurdas, como las tenia Garibay y su Consejo de Oidores;' but was confident that if the attempt had been made Cárlos would have triumphantly entered Mexico. *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 262–3.

During the first six months of Garibay's rule no formal recognition of the Spanish juntas had been made. The decrees of the junta de Sevilla had been published and acted upon, but no oath of allegiance to it as representative of the king was ever taken. After the defeat of the French at Baylen, by Castaños, and their evacuation of Madrid, the juntas of the different provinces came to an understanding, and the suprema junta central was installed at Aranjuez on the 25th of September 1808. In March 1809 its authority was recognized in Mexico, and the viceroy, audiencia, municipality, and tribunals took the oath of allegiance. The occasion was celebrated with salvoes of artillery and illuminations.[24]

The mental and physical incompetency of Garibay, who possessed neither bodily activity nor intellectual vigor, soon made it apparent to the Yermo party that the political situation was daily becoming critical. Under the misrule of the oidores they observed that revolutionary principles were spreading instead of being suppressed, and there were those who foresaw the coming struggle.[25] Warnings were whispered to the oidores, but passed unheeded, and the party which had overthrown Iturrigaray represented the true state of affairs to the junta central, urging the appointment of an able and energetic viceroy without delay. By such a measure only could the tranquillity of the country be maintained.[26] The Spanish junta accordingly

[24] *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 207, 265–70, 294–5; *Disposic. Varias*, i. f. 135–6; *Diario Mex.*, ix. 632. On April 5th the bishop of Oajaca delivered an oration in support of this recognition. *Id.*, x. 451–5.

[25] Manuel Abad y Queipo in March 1809 addressed the real acuerdo, urging the necessity of augmenting the military force in order to insure internal tranquillity and protection against invasion. With regard to the danger threatened by the prevailing discord, he remarks in a note that at the time when he wrote the representation 'no se podia entonces ponderar este peligro sin aumentarlo en realidad por cuya razon solamente lo indiqué, en concepto de que esto era bastante para unos majistrados sabios é ilustrados en el asunto.' *Represent. al Real Acuerdo*, in *Mora, Obras Sueltas*, i. 119–26, and *Col. Escritos Import.*, 124–31.

[26] Bustamante assisted in drawing up the 'instruccion, clamando por el justo castigo de unos oidores revoltosos que nos iban orillando á la revolucion.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 264.

appointed Francisco Javier de Lizana y Beaumont, archbishop of Mexico, to be viceroy in the place of Garibay, whose election had not been confirmed by the home government, and whose elevation could not be deemed legal. On the 19th of July Garibay surrendered the place, having been nominally the head of the government for a period of ten months, but in reality the political tool of Oidor Aguirre, who, in some alarm at the change, requested leave to retire from office four days previous to Lizana's installation. Garibay returned to private life and poverty. From the latter, however, he was relieved by the generosity of Yermo, who made him a monthly allowance of five hundred pesos. He was afterward decorated with the grand cross of Cárlos III., and granted a pension of ten thousand pesos a year.[27] He died on the 17th of July, 1815, at the age of eighty-six.

During his brief administration he exerted himself in raising remittances for Spain, and when news of the victory at Baylen arrived, he issued a proclamation, on October 4, 1808, asking for war contributions. His call in the general enthusiasm was liberally responded to, and the subscriptions, headed by the archbishop with 30,000 pesos, amounted to 716,346 pesos by the end of the year.[28] A few days after its publication the Spanish man-of-war *San Justo* arrived at the port of Vera Cruz in command of the marqués del Real Tesoro, who had been commissioned by the junta of Seville to obtain all the funds that could be raised in New Spain and other American colonies. At this time there were fourteen and a half millions pesos in the treasury, nine millions of which, together with two millions more contributed by wealthy individuals, were at once transported to Vera Cruz for shipment to Spain.[29]

[27] Cienfuegos, *Hist. Mej.*, i. 301; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 765.

[28] By the end of June 1809 these donations reached the sum of 1,482,131 pesos. *Id.*, xvi. 580.

[29] Eight millions were put on board the *San Justo*, and the remaining three millions were shipped on two English frigates which entered the port at that

The new viceroy was no better than the old one. Had Spain specially desired to throw away Mexico, the appointment of Archbishop Lizana was the very thing to do. Old, sickly, as feeble in mind as in body, he was fitter for a hospital than for the viceregal palace.[30] In one sense he was too good for the place. Spain wanted there a mean man, a hypocritical, lying trickster; one who could be false to all the world except Spain—particularly one who would be false to Mexico. Now Lizana was none of these. He was passably honest. He had a good heart, and a benign disposition; he lacked altogether the force of will to hold down insubordination, or regulate contending factions. Yet it was a lucky choice for the cause of independence. The policy of such a ruler must necessarily be timid, and his purpose vacillating.[31] Episcopal pastorals were employed where viceregal orders should have been presented on the point of the sword. Frank and sincere, he had no insight into human character,[32] and he allowed himself to be entirely swayed by the oidor Manuel de la Bodega and his cousin, the inquisitor Alfaro, to whose charge he committed the administration of his archiepiscopal government. Alfaro, spurred by ambition but blinded by his vanity, soon fell into the toils of the racionales caballeros; and Lizana, under his guidance, adopted administrative measures which, while they excited the spirit of re-

time. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 286. Negrete makes no mention of the $2,000,000 contributed by private subscriptions. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 156.

[30] His state of health frequently compelled him to transact the public business in bed. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 303.

[31] As already related, the archbishop was at first favorably disposed to the convocation of a general congress; but alarmed at the angry disputes on the question, he suddenly changed his opinions, and took part with the deposers of Iturrigaray. He as quickly, however, repented of his action, 'confesó á la Junta Central que habia sido engañado en la separacion de Iturrigaray, y que estaba arrepentido de haber cooperado á la ejecucion de tan horrenda maldad.' *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 265, also 244. Henceforth he favored the party which had advocated the convocation of a general congress.

[32] Bustamante describes him as 'candoroso como uno niño,' and Abad y Queipo says: 'Este virtuoso prelado era un hombre muy sencillo, que no conocia el corazon humano, ni tenia luces en materias politicas ni de gobierno.' *Informe diriy. al rey.*, in *Zamacois*, ix. 863.

bellion, conduced even more directly to the advancement of the intriguers' designs.

Thus led by the craft and machinations which were brought to bear upon his adviser, Alfaro, he entered upon a system of opposition to the Yermo party and the stanchest loyalists. Their dissatisfaction at his official action was so marked that the intriguers had no difficulty in persuading the guileless archbishop that a plot was hatching among the gachupines to capture or assassinate him; whereupon he fortified the viceregal palace with artillery and increased the guard. He placed all that portion of the city under martial law. The patrol force was augmented, and detachments were stationed at all important points. Orders were issued that the patrols should arrest after eleven o'clock at night all persons on whom arms were found; and should more than six men in one party be met, they were all to be arrested.[33] Military officials of unquestionable loyalty to the mother country were removed. Aguirre and other prominent Spaniards were threatened with banishment,[34] and Lizana, abhorring the Yermo party, and hoodwinked by the racionales caballeros, who about that time were loud in their protestations of loyalty, identified himself with the creole faction, which so eagerly had advocated the convocation of a national congress. He could not see

[33] *Ib.* A copy of this brilliant órden de la plaza, dated November 3, 1809, is supplied by Martiñena and *Hernandez y Dávalos*, *Col. Doc.*, i. 715–16. I copy the instructions given to the palace guard as indicating the extent to which the fears of Lizana had been worked upon. 'La guardia del arzobispado y casa de Moneda, no abrirán las puertas principales de la calle aun cuando oigan tiros de fusil ó cañon durante la noche, á menos que no vaya mandarlo personalmente uno do los ayudantes de S. E. I.' *Rev.*, *Verdadero Origen*, no. 1, 78–9. Consult *Guerra*, *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 254. Mora, however, states that a formal plot against his government and person actually existed, the conspirators being of the Yermo faction, with Aguirre at their head. *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iii. 364–5.

[34] Aguirre was ordered to Puebla, and it was rumored that he would be sent to Spain. The excitement was so great that Lizana recalled him, and Aguirre returned to the capital in triumph, 'con gran discrédito del arzobispo, quien con esta facilidad en dictar providencias contrarias, daba á conocer que ó no meditaba debidamente lo que hacia, ó que despues de hecho no tenia firmeza para sostenerlo.' *Alaman*, *Hist. Mej.*, i. 312; *Bustamante*, in *Cavo*, *Tres Siglos*, iii. 268–9.

that it was identical with the independents, and the partiality which he displayed, far from appeasing the spirit of discontent, only served to fan the flames by undesigned encouragement. It was as cunning a by-play as the age can boast, and most successful withal.[35] And all the while the good old prelate was thus unwittingly playing into the hands of independence, he was in truth intensely loyal to Spain. Money he sent without stint, and money was always Spain's most chronic desire. Besides obtaining large donations, he surrendered all the surplus funds of his ecclesiastical revenue, and even threw in his salary.[36]

On the 26th of July an Englishman, Andrew Cochrane, arrived in Mexico, the bearer of an order from the junta central of Spain for the sum of three million pesos, on behalf of the British government. The treasury was empty, and again the colonists were asked to give, give![37] The viceroy appealed for a loan; the call was answered with astonishing promptness, and by the 7th of August $2,955,435 had been subscribed by the commercial class and other persons of wealth. The remainder was soon made up; and the commissioner, after being royally entertained, returned to his vessel, bearing with him the three million pesos, and a high appreciation of the wealth of Mexico[38] and the

[35] Lizana was by no means a supporter of independence, except by accident, and without knowing it. 'Este prelado en ningun sentido podia llamarse amigo de la independencia; pero testigo de los escesos cometidos en muchos meses por los Españoles, aprensores de Iturrigaray, habia concebido por ellos una conocida aversion.' *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iii. 363.

[36] 'He cedido gustosamente para las urgencias de la corona el sobrante de mi renta episcopal; y cedo gustosisimo para el mismo efecto los sueldos del virreynato.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 700.

[37] *Cancelada, Tel. Mex.*, 32. Consult also *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 619-20, 703; *Diario de Mex.*, xi. 119-20.

[38] *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 761-4. Among the subscribers of large sums to the loan, I notice the names of Antonio Bassoco, $200,000, Domingo de Acha, $150,000, and Prior Francisco Alonso Teran and his brother Antonio, $200,000. The total, as given by Cancelada, *Tel. Mex.*, 36, was $3,210,435. Cochrane was entertained with great hospitality. At Puebla he was presented with two valuable paintings by Murillo! *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 304. This last author states that $400,000 of the above contribution were forcibly taken from the house of the duke of Terranova, marqués del Valle, and a descendant of Cortés. *Id.*, 305-6. Bustamante, however, informs us that Lizana had received orders to confiscate the property of Terranova, who had attached himself to the party of Joseph Bonaparte. The sum which was seized, as

senseless stupidity of the people in thus spending their lives and substance to minister to the follies of Spain's licentious and imbecile rulers.

In regard to his government, the viceroy fully believed that his conciliatory policy toward the discontented would allay any spirit of revolt that might exist; nevertheless, he deemed it right to carry out the measure adopted by his predecessor for the maintenance of public tranquillity, and on the 21st of September, 1809, permanently established the court initiated by Garibay, under the name of junta consultiva. This court, which Lizana named the junta de seguridad y buen órden, was composed at first of three members of the audiencia and a fiscal,[39] and its jurisdiction extended to all cases of French tendencies and infidelity to the crown of Spain.[40]

Hitherto the independent party had formed no concerted plan of operation. The arguments, however, which had been employed by the partisans of Iturrigaray, and their opponents, suggested ideas which led to the belief in the possibility of independence. The former, in defending Iturrigaray's character from the aspersion of disloyalty, urged that had he established an independent nation, it could not long have continued as such. Whether Spanish or French arms prevailed, an invincible force would quickly be sent against the revolted colony. Their opponents in reply imprudently endeavored to prove that Mexico could well sustain her independence. The force of their arguments was such that the more eager of the revolu-

given by this author, was 700,000 pesos. *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 265–6. On March 23, 1809, the Spanish government ordered the confiscation of the property of French partisans. *Gaz. Mex.*, xvi. 769–70; *Disposic. Varias*, i. f. 140. The repayment of these loans was commenced in the following September, a date earlier than that promised by the viceroy as the time for their liquidation. *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 826–7.

[39] The members appointed by the viceroy were the regent of the audiencia, Pedro Catani, the oidor Tomás Gonzalez Calderon, the alcalde del crimen of the audiencia, Juan Collado, and the fiscal of the criminal court, Francisco Robledo. *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 867.

[40] 'Sobre el delito de adhesion al partido frances, y sobre papeles, conversaciones, ó murmuraciones sediciosas ó seductivas con todas sus conexiones é incidencias.' *Id.*, 868.

tionists decided to act, and in September a formal plot was laid at Valladolid in Michoacan for the overthrow of the government.[41] The principal persons in the scheme were José María Obeso, captain of the militia regiment of Valladolid; a Franciscan friar, Vicente de Santa María; Manuel Ruiz de Chavez, cura of Huango; José Mariano de Michelena, lieutenant of the Spanish infantry, and at this time engaged at Valladolid in recruiting for his regiment; his brother, the licentiate José Nicolás Michelena; Mariano Quevedo, lieutenant of the regiment of New Spain, also present on recruiting business; and the licentiate Soto Saldaña. These and some others met and discussed a plan of action. With great caution they endeavored to confine discussion to two questions: whether they would be able successfully to resist the French in case Spain succumbed, and thereby preserve the dominion for Fernando; and whether, such being their object, they ought to maintain their ground if opposed. Adherents to the cause were despatched to Pátzcuaro, Querétaro, Zitácuaro, and other places to promulgate the scheme; and by the middle of December their operations had been so successful, that the 21st of that month was appointed as the day on which to raise the standard of revolt; their intention being first to seize the asesor of the intendencia, José Alonso de Teran, and the comandant Lejarza, and then proclaim the revolution in the intendencia of Guanajuato. The regiment of native infantry, commanded by Obeso, could be relied upon, as also the detachments with Michelena and Quevedo; and it was confidently expected that with the promise of release from the payment of tribute, eighteen or twenty thousand Indians would immediately join their standard. Hitherto the plans of the revolutionists had been conducted with such caution that the government officials appear to have been wholly unaware of the movement; but on the

[41] See Michelena's account of the influence which these arguments had upon the independent party. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 5.

14th of December Francisco de la Concha, cura of the cathedral parish, warned Teran of the impending danger. One of the revolutionists, Luis Correa, had communicated particulars of the scheme to the cura of Celaya, who in turn revealed them in confidence to Concha. Teran acted with wariness and circumspection, and instead of proceeding to make arrests, was contented for the time silently to watch the persons accused. On the morning of the 21st, however, Concha again visited him and urged the necessity of immediate action; whereupon he caused the padre Santa María to be arrested. This was immediately known by the principal revolutionists, who met to plan his rescue, while Correa in alarm for his safety hurried to Teran and divulged all that he knew. Summoned by the comandante Lejarza to appear before him, the revolutionists, deeming it prudent to obey, were made prisoners. Soto Saldaña, who was not with the arrested party, rashly attempted to rouse the native population, but was discovered; he escaped, however, and hid himself.[42]

Teran now proceeded to prosecute the accused with activity, and with a vigor which eventually was the cause of his assassination.[43] But the viceroy, more inclined to mercy, and believing that severity would only fan the revolutionary flame, listened to the representations made to him in favor of the prisoners.[44] He ordered in January following the proceedings to

[42] This account has been mainly derived from Michelena's narrative, supplied by him to Bustamante, a copy of which is furnished by that author in his work *Cuadro Hist.*, i. 12-16. Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, i. 314–17, has also been consulted, and his version of the denunciation been adopted.

[43] His severity 'le atrajo el ódio publico, por lo que en la revolucion del año 1810 fué cruelmente asesinado.' *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 268.

[44] Bustamante, counsel for the accused, pleaded for them personally with Lizana. 'El oidor Aguirre,' he said, 'opina que el dia que se ahorque el primer insurgente, España debe perder la esperanza de conservar esta America.' 'Yo soy de la misma opinion,' replied the viceroy, 'vaya V. seguro de que mandaré sobreseer en esta causa.' *Cuadro Hist.*, i. 17. Abad y Queipo represented to Lizana that 'este primer movimiento se debia tratar, ó con mucho vigor, ó con mucho indulgencia,' but remarks, 'La enormidad del delito exigia la enormidad de la pena.' *Informe dirig. al rey.*, in *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, ix. 865–6.

be stopped. Obeso was sent to serve in the military camp at San Luis Potosí, and Michelena in that at Jalapa; the rest were released from prison, but confined to the limits of Valladolid and its suburbs.[45]

This affair thus nipped in the bud, in spite of the failure to prove its connection with Hidalgo's later insurrection, was in fact the initiation of active movements in the revolution. The views and intentions of the leaders had been widely spread; numbers of their associates having escaped zealously carried on the work, and in nine months after the failure at Valladolid the battle-cry of freedom was raised at Dolores.

In order to allay the excitement caused by the discovery of the affair at Valladolid, the viceroy, on the 22d of January, 1810, proclaimed that there was no reason for alarm, as the late occurrences had only arisen from a difference of opinions relative to the result of affairs in Spain. He himself was wholly free from anxiety, and the public were exhorted to rest without dread of popular commotion.[46]

[45] When the revolution headed by Hidalgo broke out in September 1810, these conspirators were again placed under arrest, and their case continued by the junta de seguridad. No connection, however, between the Valladolid conspiracy and that at Dolores could be proved against them, and in 1813 they were released under the pardon granted to revolutionists by the Spanish córtes on the 15th of October, 1810. Copy of decree in *Dublan* and *Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 336. Michelena on the occasion of his second arrest was treated with great severity by Viceroy Venegas, who imprisoned him in the fortress of Ulúa. There he was cruelly dealt with, though suffering from rheumatism, and was finally shipped in a helpless condition to Spain where he served as a captain in the regiment of Búrgos. Padre Santa María having escaped from the convent of S. Diego where he had been confined, died of fever at Acapulco, whither he had gone to join Morelos, who was besieging the castle. Obeso died soon afterward, having been imprisoned for more than two years. Few of these early patriots lived to see the day of independence. Michelena says: 'Casi todos murieron y solo vimos realizada la independencia D. Antonio Cumplido, D. Antonio Castro, D. José María Izazaga, D. José María Abarca, D. Lorenzo Carrillo, yo, y no sé si alguno otro.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 16. The same authority states that both Allende and Abasolo, so conspicuous at a later date as leaders in the revolution, were connected with this affair. Bustamante is of opinion that Iturbide was the informer, offended at not being given a high command by the revolutionists whose meetings he attended. Alaman, however, advances arguments to disprove this. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 317–19.

[46] 'Y pues vuestro virey está tranquilo, vivid vosotros tambien seguros.' *Mex. Proc. del Virey*, 12.

While thus blindly affording every encouragement to rebellion at home, Lizana took great precaution against the less imminent danger of foreign invasion. Out of the scattered companies formed by Iturrigaray in various towns, he organized battalions;[47] the regiment of Vera Cruz was increased, and arms were ordered to be purchased in London and the United States. In the exhausted condition of the treasury, the viceroy once more appealed for money to pay for these weapons, and considerable sums were contributed. A cannon foundry was established in the capital, Francisco Dimas Rangel engaging to furnish the government weekly with one piece of artillery. The cost of the establishment was $8,000, which amount was contributed by the dean and chapter of Valladolid.[48]

Meanwhile disaster attended the Spanish arms. After the battle of Talavera, Wellington had retired into Portugal, leaving the Spaniards to cope with the French as best they could; and Venegas, the future viceroy of New Spain, rashly giving battle at Almonacid was routed on the 9th of August, 1809. Then followed the defeat at Ocaña, and the retirement of the junta central from Seville to the island of Leon. The unpopularity of the junta was so great, however, that the members recognized the necessity of dissolving, and their last official act was the creation, on the 29th of January, 1810, of a regency composed of five members, the bishop of Orense, Pedro de Quevedo y Quintano, who had firmly opposed the projects of Napoleon at the congress of Bayonne; Francisco de Saavedra, president of the junta de Sevilla; Fran-

[47] This was the origin of the battalions of Tula, Cuautitlan, Tulancingo, and others. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 321.

[48] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 247–8; *Diario, Mex.*, xii. 535–6. The celebrated sculptor Manuel Tolsa was also engaged at this time in casting 100 cannon at the expense of the tribunal de mineria, the cost of which was $300,000. These cannon as already mentioned had been offered by that tribunal to Iturrigaray, and Tolsa commenced work at the close of Garibay's administration. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 300, 321.

cisco Javier Castaño, the victor at Baylen; Antonio de Escaño, a distinguished naval officer; and Fernandez de Leon, a member of the council of the Indies. On the 14th of February this change in the government was communicated to the viceroy of New Spain, and on the 7th of May following the oath of allegiance to the regency was taken by Lizana and all the royal officials, the occasion being celebrated for three days in the usual manner.[49] In the same decree by which the junta central appointed the regency, it was ordered that the members, when they took the oath of office, should also swear to convoke the córtes at the earliest opportunity. As the American colonies were for the first time represented in the córtes when they finally assembled, it will be necessary to give some account of the admission of colonial deputies into the legislature.

The critical position of Spain at the close of 1808 induced the junta central—which had been compelled to withdraw from Aranjuez to Seville—to consider by what means it might hope to secure the fidelity of the colonies. To admit them to a share in the national government appeared the most pacifying offer; and on the 22d of January, 1809, a decree was passed recognizing the Spanish dominions in America as no longer colonies but an integral part of the nation,[50] and declaring their right to representation in the Spanish córtes. It is then ordered that the viceroys of New Spain, Perú, New Granada, Buenos Aires, and the captain-generals of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Chile, Venezuela, and the Philippines proceed to the election of one deputy for each of those dominions.[51] On the

[49] *Dispos. Varias*, ii. f. 2; *Diario de Mex.*, xii. 511-12; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 378–84. The oath was also ordered to be taken in all other places of the kingdom. New Spain was the only Spanish colony which recognized the consejo de regencia. *Rivera, Hist. Jal.*, i. 273.

[50] 'Considerando que los vastos y preciosos dominios que España posee en las Indias no son propiamente colonias ó factorías como los de otros naciones, sino una parte esencial é integrante de la monarquia Española.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 326.

[51] New Granada expostulated against this small concession, and Mier y Guerra comments upon such inadequate representation in the córtes, which

14th of April following, this regulation was proclaimed by Viceroy Garibay; but the concession had been granted grudgingly and under the pressure of circumstances, and the junta central was in no haste to see the córtes assembled. Although on the 22d of May following it proclaimed the establishment of the old form of representation, and convoked the córtes to meet on March 1, 1810, it took no preparatory steps for such an event.[52]

When, however, the junta central was compelled to resign the affairs of the nation to the care of a regency, it required the new government, as already narrated, to convoke the córtes at the earliest opportunity. This could not be immediately accomplished, since there were difficulties which rendered it no easy matter to readopt the ancient mode of government, and assemble in one congressional body the córtes of the various kingdoms of Spain. While these kingdoms respectively retained their córtes, the general assembly of them for purposes of government had during the dynasty of the Bourbons been neglected, and they were seldom convoked except to do homage, or sanction a succession to the crown. The córtes formerly had been composed of three classes representing the nobility, church, and burghers; and the

would be composed of 36 European members, 9 American, and one from the Philippines. *Rev. de N. Esp.*, i. 253, ii. 638–9. The election of an American deputy was to be thus conducted: The ayuntamiento of the capital town in each province of a viceregal kingdom was to nominate three competent persons, one of whom was then to be elected by casting lots as the representative of his province. When all such representatives were elected, the viceroy and real acuerdo were to select by vote three of them, from whom the deputy to Spain was finally appointed by lot. *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 325–8. In New Spain the ayuntamientos which sent up candidates to Mexico were those of Puebla, Vera Cruz, Merida de Yucatan, Oajaca, Valladolid, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Guadalajara, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Queretaro, Tlascala, Nuevo Leon, and Nuevo Santander. *Id.*, 1810, i. 420.

[52] This decree was published in Mexico on the 14th of August, 1809. *Disposs. Varias*, i. f. 139; *Intercep. Brit. Gov.*, MS., in *Mayer MS.*, no. 27, p. 2. On the 4th of October the deputy for New Spain was appointed, the lots having decided the election in favor of Miguel Lardizábal, a creole of Tlascala resident in Spain. *Gaz. de Mex.*, xvi. 901 (Gaz. Ex.); *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 308. He was afterward appointed member of the regency for the American colonies in place of Fernandez de Leon, who suffered from ill health. *Bustamante* in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 269; *Córtes, Diario*, 1810, i. 8.

junta central had decided that the córtes convoked by them on the 22d of May should be divided into two houses, the one formed by the deputies popularly elected, and the other by the church and nobility. Just before its dissolution[53] it modified its former decree relative to American representation, and for the speedy assembly of the córtes ordered that forty substitutes should be selected by lot from the number of American creoles resident in Spain, out of which number twenty-six were to be finally elected to the córtes, also by lot. This decree was not published, however, and the regency being in no greater haste to assemble the córtes than the junta central had been, published one on the 14th of February, 1810, ordering the election of American deputies to be proceeded with, and extending their number to representation of each district,[54] instead of each dominion. But this increase was virtually no nearer an approach to equality in representation than the first concession had been, since the number of Spanish deputies was proportionately increased, by allowing a member for each fifty thousand souls. In fact, though both the junta central and the regency acknowledged equality of rights, they could not admit creoles to be represented in congress in the same ratio as the inhabitants of the peninsula. The unjust disparity again caused dissatisfaction in the colonies, which was still further excited by an order of the 28th of June limiting the total number of American representatives to twenty-eight, without designating how many should pertain to each province. The consequence was that in some districts no elections were held, while in other cases the for-

[53] On the 31st of January 1810. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 334. The regency was installed on the 2d of February. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 380.

[54] 'Estos diputados serán uno por cada capital cabeza de partido de estas diferentes provincias.' *Id.*, 419. The decree was published in Mexico on the 16th of May following, and no less than 17 deputies elected, representing Mexico, Guadalajara, Valladolid, Puebla, Veracruz, Mérida, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Querétaro, Tlascala, Nuevo Leon, Oajaca, Sonora, Durango, and Coahuila. They were all natives of the districts in which they were elected with one exception, and were nearly all ecclesiastics. For a list of their names see *Alaman, Hist Méj.*, i. app. 49–50.

mally elected deputies declined going to Spain in the expectation that some new order would exclude them from the córtes on their arrival.

Such treatment of the colonies did not tend to promote more loyal feelings toward the mother country,[55] in spite of the regency's proclamation that Spanish Americans were raised to the dignity of free men, and the extraordinary admission that hitherto they had been crushed by an oppressive yoke, regarded without consideration, and made the victims of avarice.[56] Eventually on the 24th of September, 1810, without waiting for the arrival of the American deputies, the córtes were installed in the theatre of the island of Leon, and in the list of members I find New Spain represented by seven substitutes.[57] But it is time to consider how affairs were progressing meanwhile in that country, and narrate the events which immediately preceded the revolution of independence.

Great as had been the sums of money contributed by the inhabitants of New Spain in the form of loans and donations for the support of the mother country, they seemed only to encourage further demands. On the 12th of March, 1809, the junta central issued a royal cédula for the negotiation of a loan

[55] *Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 640. The regency had been stimulated to action by the representations of some provincial juntas which had assembled in Cádiz; and on the 18th of June a decree was issued to hasten the appointment of deputies, who were to meet in the island of Leon during the month of August, and hold sessions as soon as a sufficient number had assembled. Those provinces of Spain which were occupied by the French were represented by substitutes selected from natives of such districts resident in Cádiz, while 28 substitutes for the deputies of American and Asiatic colonies who could not arrive in time were also provided from American creoles residing in the same city. *Ib.*; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 336; *Diario de Mex.*, xiii. 385–6.

[56] 'Os veis elevados á la dignidad' are the words used in the regency's proclamation of the 14th of February. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 418—'de hombres libres: no sois ya los mismos que antes encorbados baxo un yugo mucho mas duro mientras mas distantes estabais del centro del poder, mirados con indiferencia, vexados por la codicia, y destruidos por la ignorancia.'

[57] Their names were Andrés Savariego, Francisco Munilla, José María Gutierrez de Teran, José María Couto, Salvador Samartin, Octaviano Obregon, and Máximo Maldonado. *Cortes, Diario*, 1810, i. 2. By decree of August 20, 1810, Indians and Spanish-Indian offspring were made eligible to the rank of deputies. *Diario de Mex.*, xiii. 689.

in New Spain for twenty millions of pesos. This demand was published in Mexico on the 9th of August following, at the very time when three millions were being so cheerfully contributed to meet the order presented by Cochrane. The colonists were disgusted at old Spain's avarice. This incessant drainage of specie was crippling commerce and impoverishing the people. They were neither able nor willing to respond.[58] A second attempt to raise this amount made in 1810 by Viceroy Venegas was equally unsuccessful.[59]

In addition to the discontent thus created, and naturally tending to independent thought and action, the defeats sustained by the Spanish forces at the close of 1809 still further influenced the colonists, who now regarded the cause of the mother country as lost. The news of these disasters was received at Vera Cruz on the 25th of April, 1810; and so fully convinced were the viceroy and oidores of the irretrievable prostration of Spain by France, that in secret sessions they discussed their future course of action, and had already decided to invite the infanta Doña Carlota Joaquina, previously mentioned, to assume the government as regent of her brother Fernando,[60] when intelligence of the installation of the regency caused them to abandon their intention.

But the administration of Lizana was drawing to a close. The commercial class, thoroughly conservative in principles, and unyielding opponents of the creoles, was disgusted with his conciliatory system; and informed the junta of Cádiz,[61] composed of lead-

[58] Abad y Queipo pointed out to the viceroy the impracticability of effecting it, and suggested plans for the relief of the junta central by increasing the alcabala duty two per cent, and the price of tobacco from ten reals to twelve or even fourteen reals as the urgencies of the nation might call for. *Col. Escritos Import.*, 132–48; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 272; *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 266.

[59] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 797–801.

[60] Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, i. 324–5, asserts that he derived this information from manuscript notes of his brother Dr Arechederreta, who was an intimate friend of the oidor Tomás Gonzalez Calderon, from whom Arechederreta must have heard these particulars, which were kept very secret.

[61] This junta had been established by popular demand for the protection

ing merchants in accord with those of Mexico, of the direction affairs were taking under his management. The pressure brought to bear by this junta upon the regency caused that council to issue a decree on the 22d of February, 1810,[62] relieving the archbishop, in consideration of his advanced age and failing health, from the labors of administration, and placing the audiencia in charge of the government until the arrival of a new viceroy. Lizana immediately obeyed the command, and on the 8th of May following surrendered the viceregal power to the audiencia, and retired to his archiepiscopal palace.[63]

Though Lizana's rule tended to foster the revolutionary spirit, it was not owing to any infidelity on his part, but to a mistaken principle and a childlike trust in men. A few days before his retirement, he issued an exhortation to loyalty, denouncing a proclamation of Joseph Bonaparte which he publicly burned in the principal plaza of the capital.[64] He recognized later some of his mistakes, and endeavored with the ecclesiastical weapons of excommunication and pastoral circulars to rectify the evil which he had unintentionally fomented. The Spanish regency decorated Lizana with the grand cross of Cárlos III., an honor conferred upon him a few months before his death, which occurred on the 6th of March, 1811.[65]

The removal of Lizana in no way improved matters. There was want of harmony among the oidores; when unanimous accord was the only road to successful administration, the audiencia was divided into two factions. The regent Catani was influenced by the same ideas and the same advice which had so ill directed

of the city; but its influence soon became greater than that of the regency. *Id.*, 226–7; *Junta Sup. de Cadiz, á la Amer. Esp.*, 3.

[62] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 21.

[63] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 391–2.

[64] *Proclama del Arzob. Virey*, 24 de Abril de 1810; *Bustamante*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 272; *Diario de Mex.*, xii. 674; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 28–32.

[65] *Sosa, Episcop. Mex.*, 206–13.

the archbishop, and was, moreover, at enmity with the oidor decano Aguirre. These members were the heads of the two parties, Aguirre being recognized as the enemy of the creoles and Catani as their supporter.

On the 9th of May the audiencia organized its government, by declaring that to it as a body pertained the superior administration and the captain-generalship of the kingdom, while Regent Catani was invested with the presidency and superintendence of the royal treasury. The oidores Blaya and Calderon, in view of their increased duties, were removed from the junta de seguridad, and their places supplied by the governor and the two eldest alcaldes of the criminal court. The ordinary business in the different departments of the government was to be despatched by respective oidores commissioned for the purpose; a council of military chiefs was to supply all necessary information and advice relative to the condition of the army; and in all the more important cases of the tribunal de la Acordada the regent was to be consulted and his approval obtained for the execution of the heavier sentences.[66]

During the administration of the audiencia, exhibitions of natural phenomena occurred, presaging disaster. On the 20th of May, the church of Nuestra Señora de los Remedios was struck by lightning; and a great portion of the edifice being destroyed, it was found necessary to remove to the cathedral the sacred image, which was greatly venerated by the native Mexicans. It was afterward borne in solemn procession to the different churches of the capital, and the demonstrations of devotion were noticed as being extraordinarily earnest. When on the 10th of August the image was returned to its sanctuary, it was accompanied by an immense concourse, who in tears chanted prayers for divine protection.[67] But in the night

[66] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 411–13.

[67] Bustamante, who was an eye-witness of these religious observances,

which preceded this auspicious day, a furious hurricane had spread desolation in Acapulco, no less than 124 houses being torn down, while orchards and plantations were destroyed. On the 18th Vera Cruz was visited by a terrible storm which wrecked and damaged much shipping.[68]

The discord in the audiencia was favorable to the development of revolution. Apart from the absence of secrecy which want of unity naturally entailed, the annoyance which each party experienced by the opposition of the other created a feeling of indifference, and a consciousness that efforts to arrest the public will would be unavailing. Consequently apathy and toleration marked the sluggish proceedings of the audiencia, affording an unwonted freedom of discussion on political topics. The spirit of revolt was further aggravated at this time by the unjust illiberality displayed by the regency in the matter of colonial representation at the forthcoming congress of the córtes. If the mother country in her apparent death agony refused to do justice to her American colonies—which in the past had so loyally aided her, and in which she seemed to rest her only hope for the future—no relief from her oppression could be expected in case her arms triumphed.[69] Moreover, the continued proclamations of Joseph Bonaparte, and seditious papers issued by his agents, gave additional impetus in the direction of independence.[70]

wrote a detailed account of them bearing the title: *Memoria piadosa que recordará á la posteridad, la piedad de los Mexicanos manifestada en la venida de Ntra Sra de los Remedios, y contiene dos partes.* *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 274–5.

[68] *Guz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 686–7.

[69] *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iii. 372–4.

[70] Bonaparte in 1809 openly announced: 'Que era ya llegado el tiempo de que las Americas españoles quedasen independientes, y que el gobierno frances no se opondria a este paso necesario.' *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iii. 368. The inquisition in vain attempted to suppress the circulation of such sheets. In the months of April, June, and September, 1810, it published proclamations against King Joseph, and under threats of excommunication ordered all papers of the kind to be delivered up that they might be publicly burnt by the executioner. *Diario Mex.*, xii. 463–8; *Dispos. Varias*, iii. f. 153, vi. f. 58, 60. French emissaries were a constant source of alarm, and measures to

On the 25th of August, 1810, the frigate *Atocha* dropped anchor in the port of Vera Cruz. The vessel brought to the shores of New Spain her fifty-ninth viceroy, Francisco Javier de Venegas, knight of the order of Calatrava.[71] Venegas was in no haste to reach the seat of his government, but journeying slowly from Vera Cruz to the capital, made himself conversant with the state of affairs, and formed friendly relations with persons whose services he considered useful. For Campillo, the bishop of Puebla, and Flon, the intendente of that city, he contracted a sincere attachment. On the 13th of September the audiencia surrendered the government to him at Guadalupe, and on the following day he made his public entry into the capital with the customary pomp and ceremonies.

Venegas, who had retired from the army with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, returned to active service in 1808, on the invasion of Spain by the French, and won distinction in the memorable battle of Baylen. Henceforth his promotion was rapid, and he soon obtained the grade of lieutenant-general. Although he suffered defeat at Almonacid[72] by imprudent self-confidence, he enjoyed a high reputation in New Spain as a courageous military chief. Bustamante, in somewhat disparaging and ill-measured language, thus describes his personal appearance: "Tall and robust of frame, the expression of his countenance was sour, and his glance angry and threatening; his lips were thick, and his head, which he held inclined

prevent their operations and destroy their influence were taken both in Spain and Mexico. For copies of instructions given to these agents, their proclamations, and descriptions of their intrigues, consult *Gonzalez, Col. N. Leon*, 155–8; *Manifiesto contra las Instruc. Emperador; Calvillo, Discurso;* and *Diario Mex.*, xiii. 43–4.

[71] For a list of his names, titles, and decorations, see *Cedulario*, i. f. 92, and *Dispos. Varias*, ii. f. 3. In the latter document appears his rúbrica.

[72] Guerra states that he lost the army of the centre at the two battles of Tarancon and Ucles, 'que dió y perdió por su ineptitud, como consta del Manifiesto del Duque del Infantado.' Cuesta went so far as to state that Venegas 'by gross ignorance, want of skill, envy, or malice, lost, perhaps forever, the only opportunity of saving Spain.' *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 296.

over the left shoulder, was of enormous size. His whiskers were of the same cut and shape as those of the myrmidons of the acordada, desperadoes, and bull-fighters; and his impetuous gait was similar to that of an ill-tempered corporal."[73] Venegas was, however, honest and disinterested, an indefatigable worker, and energetic and quick in the despatch of business. Distrustful when in security, he was calm and self-possessed in danger, but displayed a sanguinary and cruel disposition.[74]

On the 18th of September the new viceroy convoked an assembly composed of the audiencia, all the principal civil and military authorities, the dignitaries of the church, prelates of the regular orders, the nobility, and prominent land owners and members of the commercial class. To this numerous attendance a proclamation addressed by the regency to the Americans on the 5th of May was read. In it the condition of Spain was set forth, and an appeal made for still further contributions in order to continue the war. A list also of patriotic individuals on whom had been conferred titles of nobility and honors was also read. A plan for the collection of donations suggested

[73] His dress and personal appearance were the subject of numerous pasquinades which were posted on the corners of the principal streets. One quoted by Bustamante was as follows: 'De patilla, botas y pantalon, hechura de Napoleon.' *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 277. Another which was posted on the palace gate aggravated the viceroy to make reply. It ran thus:

'Tu cara no es de excelencia
Ni tu trage de virey,
Dios ponga tiento en tus manos
No destruyas nuestra ley.'

Venegas caused the following lines to be posted in the same place:

'Mi cara no es de excelencia,
Ni mi trage de virey,
Pero represento al rey,
Y obtengo su real potencia.
Esta sencilla advertencia
Os hago, por lo que importe:
La ley ha de ser el norte
Que dirija mis acciones.
¡Cuidado con las traiciones
Que se han hecho en esta Corte!'

Rivera, Gob. de Mex., i. 564.

[74] Opinions with regard to the abilities of Venegas are diametrically opposite according as they are regarded by his friends or opponents. Abad y Queipo describes him as a talented, learned, and upright man, *Informe*, in *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, ix. 867–8; while Zavala states that he possessed neither political nor military talent. *Rev. Mex.*, i. 43. Consult *Adalid, Causa*, MS., i. 134–6.

by the fiscals was then discussed and approved, many of those present subscribing at once, the archbishop heading the list with thirty thousand pesos. Among the recipients of honors were Garibay and the archbishop, both of whom were decorated with the grand cross of Cárlos III., while Gabriel de Yermo, Diego de Agreda, Sebastian de las Heras Soto, and José Mariano Fagoaga were raised to the dignity of títulos de Castilla.[75] Other honors were conferred upon a number of individuals corresponding to their positions and the services rendered by them, and it was observed that many of the recipients had been principal actors in the deposal of Iturrigaray.

Both the demands for money and the awards of honor were offensive to the Spanish Americans. The appeal to them for more gold and silver in the same breath that bestowed titles and distinctions upon their opponents was an insult, and their indignation drove them in still greater numbers to the ranks of the revolutionists who were already in the field.[76] For Hidalgo had given the signal for revolt; the *grito de Dolores* was already echoing throughout the land, and thousands were rising in arms to do battle for liberty and the rights of man.

[75] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 764–5, 776–86; *Diario de Mex.*, xiii. 347–8. The título de Castilla was a title of nobility intermediate between those of the grandees and hidalgos of Spain. *Salvá, Nuevo Dicc.*, 1054. Yermo and Fagoaga declined the honor. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 343–4.

[76] The Mexican deputation to Spain stated in August 1811 that 'las gracias que llevó el Virey Don Francisco Venegas para los autores cómplices de la faccion' carried alarm through the country. *Diputac. Amer. Rep.*, 3.

CHAPTER V.

OPENING OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

1810.

DEVELOPMENT OF QUERETARO—AFFAIRS IN GUANAJUATO—THE TOWN OF DOLORES—ITS CURA, MIGUEL HIDALGO Y COSTILLA—SECRET MEETINGS OF REVOLUTIONISTS—IGNACIO ALLENDE—PLOTTING AT SAN MIGUEL—GENERAL PLAN OF UPRISING—HIDALGO'S BIOGRAPHY—ARRESTS—THE CORREGIDOR IMPRISONED—HIS ACQUITTAL—HIS BIOGRAPHY—EL GRITO DE DOLORES—HIDALGO MARCHES TO SAN MIGUEL—A TUMULTUOUS ARRAY—THE SACRED BANNER—SUCCESS OF THE INSURGENTS AT SAN MIGUEL—PILLAGING—HIDALGO PROCLAIMED CAPTAIN-GENERAL—HE ENTERS CELAYA—HE APPOINTS A NEW AYUNTAMIENTO.

FROM the time when Viceroy Velasco made grants of town lots and agricultural lands to settlers in Querétaro,[1] the progress of that place was rapid. Beautifully situated in a sheltered valley, the fertility of the soil and the pureness of the air invited immigrants from the capital and other populous towns lying to the south. In 1592 municipal books were opened, and henceforward its prosperity was such that in 1655 Felipe IV. elevated it to the rank of city, with the appellation of Santiago de Querétaro, and the honorable title of muy noble y real ciudad. A coat of arms was also granted, significant of the miraculous manifestation witnessed by the opposing armies in that strange battle which was fought in 1531.[2] The

[1] Consult *Hist. Mex.*, vol. ii. 544–5, this series.

[2] See *Id.*, 540–4. The arms consisted of a cross with the sun for its pedestal and a bright star on either side. The figure of Santiago on horseback occupies the dexter base, and a palm tree and other plants the sinister base. The whole is surmounted by the royal arms of Castile and Leon. I give herewith a plan of the city from *Queretaro, Orden. que para la Division.* See also *Zelaa é Hidalgo Glorias de Quer.*, 2–3, containing plan of city, p. 243.

position of Querétaro on the borders of the unconverted Chichimecs attracted at an early date the attention of the regular orders. The first monastic establishment was the Franciscan convent of Santa Cruz, the date of the founding of which is, however, uncertain, although its origin was the humble hermitage which was constructed at the time when the miraculous stone cross was erected on the Sangremal. The first convent and its church were in time re-



PLAN OF QUERÉTARO, 1796.

placed by larger buildings, and in 1666, when the new edifices were completed, the convent was made the *casa de recoleccion* of the provincia under the name of San Buenaventura. In 1683 it was converted into the apostolic college of propaganda fide, founded by Fray Antonio Linaz de Jesus María—the first establishment of the kind in the Indies.[3]

[3] *Id.*, 38–40. Linaz was born at Arta, in the island of Majorca, in January 1635, became a friar in 1653, and presbítero in 1659. His name, Jesus María, was derived from the convent in which he was novitiate. In 1664 he arrived

By the enthusiastic members social reforms were introduced, which, however beneficial to the poorer classes, grievously interfered with public and private amusements. Balls, comedies, and public games were discontinued; certain feasts in which bulls, Moors, and christians were represented in procession, were also done away with. These festivities were so attractive to the lower orders that in order to participate in them with appropriate display they would sell their household chattels. Another abuse corrected was the promiscuous bathing of the sexes in the river, to the sound of music, and midst the noise of feasting on the banks. Henceforth the inhabitants of Querétaro were, doubtless, a devout and moral community, though much against their will.[4]

After the surrender of their convent of Santa Cruz, the Franciscans erected what may be considered the third monastery of the order built in Querétaro, and which was the capitular convent of the province. Annexed to it is a sumptuous church, which was greatly embellished by Fray José de Soria, who died in Mexico in December 1734. Within the limits of its cemetery various other sacred edifices were erected, among which may be mentioned the church of the Venerable Orden Tercera de Penitencia, in which the noble and the wealthy performed their devotions and penitential vows.

in Michoacan from Spain and was elected guardian of the convent of Valladolid in 1671, and in 1674 was appointed custodio to attend the general chapter held in Spain in 1682. He returned in 1683 to found the colegio de propaganda fide. Linaz fasted much, and at times fell into ecstatic trances while at prayer. Miraculous virtues are attributed to him, which he continued to manifest after his death, which occurred at Madrid on the 29th of June, 1693. *Espinosa, Cron. Apost.*, i. 93–251, 320–1, 80–4.

[4] Espinosa, after describing the reforms, speaks of a citizen, who having been absent for some time, on his return as he approached the city inquired of one whom he met on the road what news there was in Querétaro. 'Señor,' replied the man, 'Querétaro is no more Querétaro; some priests have come, and no longer are there fandangos as before; sadness prevails, no harp or guitar is heard; there is nothing but praying and preaching, so that the place has lost its mirth.' *Id.*, 54–5. Consult also *Arricivita, Cron. Seraf.*, 8–9, 34–5, 174–82, 201–6. The miraculous cross was removed from its original site in 1701 and placed in the crucero of the church of this convent. *Espinosa, Cron. Apost.*, i. 19; *Glorias de Quer.*, 39.

Numerous other convents added to the sanctity and embellishment of the city, but special notice must be taken of the convent and royal hospital of the Purísima Concepcion. This hospital was founded by Diego de Tapia, son of Fernando de Tapia, the conqueror, about the year 1586. The same benefactor founded the Franciscan nunnery of Santa Clara, which was transferred to a new site in 1633, and thither were conveyed the same year to their final repose the bones of the founder. Other religious establishments were the monasteries of the Franciscan order of barefooted friars and the barefooted Carmelites; the Jesuit church and college of San Ignacio de Loyola founded in 1625; the Dominican convent of San Pedro y San Pablo; the royal college of Santa Rosa and its magnificent church; the Capuchin, Austin, and Carmelite nunneries, and other religious institutions. By royal cédula of October 10, 1671, permission was granted to the congregation of our lady of Guadalupe founded in 1669 to erect a church in Santiago de Querétaro; and in 1680, owing to the munificence of Juan Caballero y Osio,[5] by whom the greater part of the expenses were defrayed, the building was so far advanced as to admit of its being dedicated. The ceremony took place on the 12th of May, and was conducted with a solemnity and splendor never before witnessed in the city. Visitors from all parts of New Spain assembled on the occasion, and the festivities which followed were continued for eight days. The church is the most sumptuous in Querétaro.[6]

The success of the religious orders in the conver-

[5] Osio had previously proved himself a munificent benefactor by his liberal donations to numerous religious institutions, in several instances defraying the entire cost of the erection of chapels and convents. He was a captain of infantry, became alcalde mayor of Querétaro, and was finally ordained priest. He possessed a large fortune which he devoted to such purposes and charity. He died in Querétaro on the 11th of April, 1707, at the age of 73, 'y fué sepultado en la Santa Casa de Loreto, dentro de una caxa de hierro, mandando poner por epitafio solo estas breves palabras. Hæc requies mea.' *Sigüenza y Góngara, Glorias de Quer.*, 19; *Iglesias, Rel.*, 157–8.

[6] *Id.*, 95–171; *Medina, Chron., S. Diego Mex.*, 254; *Diario, Mex.*, 117.

sion of the Chichimecs was signal, and the missions they founded in the Sierra Gorda had more effect in reducing them to submission than the steel and gunpowder of the military. In time, however, the missions became secularized, and in 1785 only two out of the twenty established remained under the control of the friars, namely San Miguel de las Palmas, administered by the Dominicans, and Concepcion Soriano, or Bucareli, by the barefooted friars of San Diego.[7]

Although the Indians of Sierra Gorda were occasionally troublesome during the eighteenth century, their insubordination did not interfere with the growth of the city or the development of industrial interests. In the architectural beauty of its churches, religious establishments, and public buildings, Querétaro is equal to any city in Mexico, except the capital. In 1796 it had 272 streets with twenty-one public fountains and six plazas. Its length from east to west at this date was nearly two miles and three quarters, and its width from north to south over one mile and a quarter.[8] The water supply of Querétaro, obtained at a distance of two leagues, is conveyed into the city by its celebrated aqueduct, a structure of singular solidity and architectural beauty. The arches are supported on seventy-two pillars of hewn stone, eighteen varas apart, and twenty-seven varas high. The work was begun in January 1726, and completed in October 1735, at an expense of $124,800, $82,000 of which were donated by Juan Antonio Urrutia y Arana, marqués del Villar de la Águila.[9] But the pride of the place is La Cañada, a beautiful glen penetrating for two leagues the mountains which surround the city, and affording views of such exquisite loveliness that no city in the

[7] *Pinart, Col. Doc. Mex.*, MS., 271–3, 457–8. In 1740 the number of missions was 17, ten of which were founded by Franciscans and seven by Dominicans. *Orozco y Berra, Carta Etnog.*, 260–1; *Arricivita, Cron. Seráf.*, 169–71; *Sigüenza y Góngara, Carta al Almir*, MS., 10–11.

[8] *Querétaro, Ordenanza qué para la División.*

[9] For an account of the festivities held in celebration of the completion of the aqueduct see *Navarrete, Relac. Peregrin.*, no. i. 66–163.

world can surpass them, or offer suburban recreation grounds more attractive.[10] About five leagues to the south-east of the city are the hot mineral springs of San Bartolomé, situated about a mile from the pueblo of that name, the medicinal properties of which both as a beverage and for the bath have proved efficacious in a variety of diseases.[11] Although Querétaro is signally exempt from epidemics and physical catastrophes,[12] it has occasionally been visited by disasters. The year 1786 was noticeable for the severity of a famine which caused much suffering, and in 1806 great mortality of children occurred from an epidemic lung disease.[13]

The agricultural and manufacturing industries indicate great prosperity when compared with those of larger and more populous provinces. The cotton and woollen factories in 1793 worked up 200,000 pounds of the first-mentioned staple and 63,900 arrobas of wool, equivalent to 1,597,500 pounds, affording employment to three thousand operatives. The tobacco factory also employed three thousand workmen and women, producing annually cigars and cigarettes to the amount of $2,200,000.[14]

Such was the city of Santiago de Querétaro at the time when the spirit of Mexican independence broke out. The reader will recollect that Miguel Domin-

[10] Navarrete says: 'Esta Cañada es para Querétaro lo que Aranjuez para Madrid, Versallas para París, Frascati para Roma, y la Favorita para Viena.' *Relac. Peregrin.*, 6.

[11] A full account of these springs is given by *Beaumont, Trat. de la Agua Mineral.* Mexico, 1772.

[12] 'Goza el grande, raro y apreciable privilegio de que jamas se ha experimentado en ella temblor alguno de tierra.' *Zelaa é Hidalgo, Glorias de Quer.*, 10.

[13] *Querétaro, Dos Palabras*, 4–5; *Diar. Mex.*, ii. 167.

[14] *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, 666–9; *Raso* in *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, iii. 198–9. In all the manufacturing industries 9,216 persons were employed, of whom 2,700 were women. In commercial and agricultural pursuits 2,234 persons were occupied. From this date to 1810 an increase in industries of one fifth is observable. *Id.*, 200. In 1803 the population of the city was 50,000 souls. Its ayuntamiento was composed of a corregidor, two ordinary alcaldes, twelve regidores, two honorary regidores, a procurador, syndic, and escribano mayor y de cabildo. *Glorias de Quer.*, 5–6.

guez had been reinstated in the office of corregidor of Querétaro, after having been deprived of it by Iturrigaray. From that time forward he was a secret supporter of the independence party. After the collapse of the Valladolid plot, meetings of the chief revolutionists were held at Querétaro in houses of the presbyter José María Sanchez and the licentiate Parra. The corregidor attended the assemblies at the first-mentioned house, which passed under the name of a literary academy, while his wife Doña María Josefa Ortiz took still more earnest interest in the success of the undertaking. In Parra's house secret meetings were held and plans of operations discussed. Here met the principal promoters of the revolution, the licentiates Laso and Altamirano, captains Allende and Aldama of the queen's regiment, Joaquin Arias, captain of the Zelaya regiment, Francisco Lanzagorta, lieutenant of the dragoons of San Miguel, the two brothers Epigmenio and Emeterio Gonzalez and others of less note.

While these preliminary matters were in progress in Valladolid and Querétaro, the leaven of liberty was working in Guanajuato; and indeed to this province may be more specially given the proud distinction of cradle of Mexican independence. And forever famous above all must remain the town of Dolores, situated in the higher level of the sierra de Guanajuato, eleven leagues from the provincial capital. Its beginning dates from the sixteenth century, when viceroys Enriquez and Velasco exerted themselves in uniting the Indians in municipal communities called congregaciones, Dolores receiving the name of Congregacion de Nuestra Señora de los Dolores, and being included in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the curato of San Miguel el Grande. In 1717 it was elevated to the dignity of a pueblo, and somewhat later became an independent curacy.

As usual in places of this kind, the parish church

overshadowed the other buildings, being an extensive structure, and completed about the middle of the eighteenth century. The exterior presented quite an imposing appearance, the front having two towers and an ornamented entrance. At the close of the eighteenth century a church of the third order of San Francisco was erected which, though small, was of beautiful design and construction. There were also several smaller churches or chapels. In 1826 the constituent congress of Guanajuato bestowed upon the town the title of villa. It contained later about 9,000 inhabitants, while the number of those within its civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction was between 35,000 and 40,000, scattered over a territory of sixty-eight square leagues. Agriculture constitutes the chief occupation of the people, a few only being engaged in retail traffic, and in the manufacture of common woollen goods, of bricks, and in tanning. The district of Dolores is better adapted for the culture of the vine than any other part of Guanajuato. Though silver deposits exist in many places, the mining interest is not large.

The cura of this parish was Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, a name forever to be honored as one who gave his life to his country, who sacrificed himself for the right as against injustice and oppression. Past middle age, as he was now approaching fifty-eight, he had reached the period when most men are ready to lay aside some portion of life's burdens; yet he was about taking upon his shoulders the most vital issues of his country, and that before his country was ready fully to respond to his efforts.

Rather above than below medium height, of somewhat stout proportions, large limbs and ruddy-brown complexion, he presented altogether a robust constitution. The head was large and well modelled, bald and shining on the top, with many brain-compelling bumps; hair, what there was of it, nearly white; massive features; forehead of course high, neck slightly twisted to the left, nose straight, lips thin, eyebrows promi-

nent, and as usual with the cloth, face clean-shaven. He wore at this time short black trousers and stockings of the same color, leathern shoes with buckles, and a long gown with cape. His heart was kind and sympathetic; his manner soft and winning; his voice sonorous, vibrating, and most pleasing to the ear; and his deportment was natural and attractive. He had the true scholarly stoop; and in all his features, air, and attitude a profoundly meditative expression—a fitting incarnation of a great soul bathed in settled calm. Yet the clear, black, brilliant eyes betrayed the activity of the mind, and through them shone the light from the burning fires within.

It does not appear that Hidalgo attended the early meetings of the revolutionists with regularity. Indeed, from his own statements I conclude that he visited Querétaro only on one occasion for that purpose, although he frequently held conversations elsewhere with Ignacio Allende and others on the subject of independence.[15]

Allende was certainly one of the moving spirits of the revolution; and although his fame as a patriot has been eclipsed by that of Hidalgo, it is only justice that his merits and patriotism should be fully recognized. He was born on the 21st of January, 1779,[16] in San Miguel el Grande, his father being a Spanish merchant and estate owner, named Domingo Narciso de Allende. When Don Domingo died, which was while Ignacio was of tender years, his affairs were greatly embarrassed, and had it not been for the high character of his executor, Domingo de Berrio, the

[15] *Hidalgo y Costilla*, *Cd. Doc.*, i. 9. At these conferences with Allende, Hidalgo continually and prophetically expressed his opinion that 'the authors of such enterprises never enjoyed the fruits of them.' *Ib.* Negrete, however, states that he went several times to Querétaro. 'Varios viajes aunque de una manera oculta, hizo á Querétaro Hidalgo, con el objeto de fomentar la revolucion.' *Hist. Mex. Soc. MX.*, i. 83.

[16] Copies of his baptismal certificate can be seen in *Lizana, Adic. y Rectific.*, 210–11, and in *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii., app. 75–6. Lizana, *ut sup.* 15, 17, however, and Zamacois make the mistake of assigning 1780 as the year of his birth.

house would have been bankrupt. The creditors, however, were tolerant, and in some years the debts were paid, and the means of livelihood saved to the family.[17]

Being passionately fond of dangerous sports and martial exercises from early youth, Ignacio was conspicuous for his boldness and skill as a horseman, and frequently signalized himself in the bull-ring, from which he did not always escape unharmed, being crippled in the left arm from injuries received there. His strength was so great that he could hold back a bull by the horns,[18] and he was ever ready to employ it in defence of the weak. Before he had attained the age of seventeen he was appointed provisionally a lieutenant in the queen's dragoons, was confirmed in the appointment in the following year, and in 1807 promoted to the rank of captain. He was present with his company at the military encampment established by Iturrigaray at Jalapa, and won for himself the marked approbation of the viceroy by his soldierly bearing and ability.[19] According to Mier y Guerra, his regard for the viceroy was such that he took an oath to avenge his deposal on the Europeans, and thenceforth began to form a definite plan of independence. Allende was an extremely handsome man, of engaging manners and captivating address. To resolution he united a perseverance which never yielded to obstacles or opposition. His daring both in the field and in the expression of his opinions

[17] Ignacio had two brothers, Domingo and José María, the former dying before the revolution, the latter taking no part in it. *Id.*, 355. There were also three sisters, Josefa, Mariana, and Manuela. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 15-16.

[18] 'Era un sugeto bien educado, insinuante y fino, de tal fuerza que detenía un toro por las hastas.' *Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 290. See also *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 27. Pedro José Sotelo, an eye-witness, speaking of a bull-fight in which Allende took part, says: 'En esta corrida toreó D. Ignacio Allende, y luchó con un toro, con cuya accion dejó admirados á los espectadores.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 322.

[19] 'Habia merecido los elogios del virey Iturrigaray, principalmente porque adiestrando este el exército acantonado en las maniobras y ardides de guerra aquel le sorprehendió en una noche con toda su guardia.' *Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 290.

exposed him to unnecessary dangers.[20] At an early age he entered the marriage state, and betrothed in April 1802 Doña María de la Luz Agustina de las Fuentes.[21]

When the encampment at Jalapa was broken up, at the close of 1808, Allende with all the determination of his nature put his shoulder to the work. Having returned with his command to San Miguel, he gradually associated himself with a number of confederates[22] who were leading inhabitants of the town. To avert suspicion and cloak their proceedings, balls were frequently given at the house of his brother Domingo, in the festivities of which they joined, different members occasionally retiring from the dancing-hall to a room below to hold consultation. Ramifications of the plan were extended to the principal neighboring towns, where branch societies were established by Allende and Aldama, who were appointed commissioners for that purpose.[23]

The general plan of the uprising was the simultaneous seizure of the rich Spaniards and authorities in the important towns and then to raise the standard of independence. This was to be accomplished with as little violence as possible, and the captives were to be allowed the privilege of remaining with their families in the country,[24] or returning to the peninsula, in which case their property was to be confiscated and appropriated for the public treasury. In case the government, after this coup de main, should be able to offer resistance, Allende acting as generalis-

[20] [illegible] *Mej. y sus P.*, [illegible] 9.

[21] [illegible] document is supplied by Liceaga, ut sup. 211–[illegible] con su bondad acostumbrada, que [illegible] de disipaciones; pero [illegible] estas aseveraciones.' *Gallo*, [illegible]

[22] [illegible] a list of 22 of his principal associates.

[23] [illegible] meetings were organized [illegible] was the first promoter of [illegible]

[24] [illegible] treatment. *Mej. y sus P.*, [illegible]

simo would organize the forces in different districts and maintain the struggle. The government proposed to be established was a senate of representatives appointed by the provinces, which should rule in the name of Fernando VII., ignoring all submission to Spain.

To accomplish their designs, Allende and Aldama visited Mexico, Puebla, and other important places in New Spain, while Hidalgo assisted in the cities of Valladolid and Guanajuato, his efforts being especially directed to gaining over the clergy. During 1810, Querétaro appears to have been the centre of action, and Allende and Aldama frequently attended the meetings there.[25] More than half the year had gone and the plans of the revolutionists were almost ripe. There were as yet no signs of discovery or treachery. Then the day was appointed on which the cry of independence should be sounded. The great fair held at San Juan de los Lagos, commencing on the 8th of December, offered a good opportunity. Amidst the gathering crowds their movements would escape observation, and enable them to concentrate their forces without detection.[26] It was accordingly decided that Allende and Aldama should meet there by different routes on the 1st of that month, and prepare matters for the proclamation of independence on a concerted day of the fair. Events, however, occurred which frustrated this design.

As the cura Hidalgo will presently become the principal leader and most prominent character in the

[25] *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 348; *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, vi. 160-1. Mora, however, states that 'San Miguel el Grande...se constituyó el centro y foco de la revolucion.' *Ut sup.*, 15.

[26] *Liceaga*, ut sup., 19–20. Mora states, however, 'se fijó el dia 1 de octubre para hacer el pronunciamiento en Querétaro, Guanajuato, San Miguel, y otros lugares.' *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 16. Again from an official document in the national archives it is reported to the government that 'segun dijo Lanzagorta á Galvan, el proyecto debia tener efecto en todo Septiembre.' *Zerecero, Disc. Civ.*, 21. Guerra gives November 1st as the date. *Rev. N. Esp.*. i. 291. Hidalgo states that October 2d was the day finally appointed for the uprising. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 14.

early revolution, a better acquaintance will aid our purpose. His father, Cristóbal Hidalgo y Costilla, was a native of Tejupilco in the intendency of Mexico, and established himself in Pénjamo in the province of Guanajuato. There he betrothed and married Ana María Gallaga,[27] and in May 1753, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla was born.[28] Don Cristóbal presently removed to the hacienda of Corralejo with his wife and four children, of whom Miguel was the second. Their father afterward sent them to Valladolid to be educated, and there Miguel distinguished himself in philosophy and ecclesiastical studies at the college of San Nicolás, where his fellow-collegiates gave him the name of The Fox, an appellation intended as complimentary by reason of his sagacity.[29]

So highly did the ecclesiastical chapter of Valladolid estimate his theological acquirements, and the ability he displayed in the public discussion of certain themes, that it gave him $4,000 to enable him to go to Mexico and obtain his degree of doctor of theology. Hidalgo, however, spent the money—some say at play and in dissipation—before accomplishing his journey.[30] Nevertheless, in 1778 and 1779 he went to the capital and was there ordained, receiving the degree of bachelor of theology. On his return to Valladolid he obtained successive appointments as cura to two of the richest benefices in the diocese,[31]

[27] Tradition affirms that Ana María was an orphan in the house of Gallaga, and that while waiting at table, on the occasion of Don Cristóbal's first visit, her grace and beauty won his heart. *Galv., Hombres Ilust.*, iii. 240.

[28] A copy of his baptismal registry will be found in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. app. 75. Documents establishing the place and date of his birth are supplied by *Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 455–72.

[29] *Alcocer, Hist. Méx.*, i. 361. Montaña, *Canto r Polit. y Marcial*, in a metrical table published shortly after the battle of Aculco represents Hidalgo as a fox, and Allende as a serpent, leading their followers, 'una lucida tropa pavida,' to destruction. The closing lines are:

'Huyen sin tino entrambos
Los que [illegible]
Nos [illegible]
Que [illegible] Allende.'

[30] *Cuevas, Hist. Nac. Méx.*, i. 291. 'Los perdió al juego en Maravatio, al huesped viajero á Mexico para solemnizarse.' *Alaman*, u. sup., 352.

[31] I have in my possession an original autograph letter of Hidalgo written while he was the cura of Colima. It is dated Colima, July 20, 1792, and signed

and eventually on the death of his elder brother Joaquin succeeded him as cura of Dolores, a town at that time of 18,000 souls, yielding him a stipend of from $10,000 to $12,000.[32] Here he devoted himself to a variety of occupations, independent of his clerical duties, and congenial with tastes acquired in his boyhood on his father's hacienda. He established a porcelain factory, improved the cultivation of the vine, planted mulberry trees, and grew silk-worms. But his mind was not satisfied with industrial pursuits and experiments alone. The seclusion of his library often won him from more practical life, and there he studied the sciences and political economy,[33] perused French philosophical works,[34] and investigated the doctrines propounded in unorthodox books.[35] It was during these years of self-education that he acquired those enlightened views which enabled him to recognize the injustice which marked both the ecclesiastical and temporal governments, and caused him to look with indignation upon the warped tenets and proceedings of the church, and with detestation upon the despotism exercised by the state.

Hidalgo was a brave and determined man; he was a pleasant conversationalist, and, though quick-tempered, had an obliging and kindly disposition. The interest which he took in the welfare of his flock by the development of industries and his lavish expenditure of money on such enterprises gained for him

'Migl Hidalgo y Costilla,' with his rúbrica affixed to the signature. It is addressed to the cura of the pueblo de Elagualulco, and relates to ecclesiastical formalities required to be observed with respect to the second marriage of an Indian named Pascual de los Santos with a free mulatto woman.

[32] *Guerra*, loc. cit. Negrete says $8,000 or $9,000 'un año con otro.' He generously divided this stipend with a clergyman named Francisco Iglesias, whom he employed in assisting him in his clerical duties. *Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, i. 79.

[33] This study attracted his attention while at the college of San Nicolás, of which he was appointed rector, 'y la desarrolló cuando fué cura en la villa de S. Felipe y congregacion de Dolores.' *Bustamante. Cuadro Hist.*, i. 264.

[34] Hidalgo knew French well, 'cosa bastante rara en aquel tiempo en especial entre los eclesiasticos.' *Alaman*, loc. cit.

[35] 'Leia y tenia algunas obras literarias y politicas proibidas severamente por la inquisicion y desconocidas para el comun de los Mejicanos.' *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 8.

the lasting affection of the Indians, in whose languages he was proficient. Extremely enterprising, he was, however, too precipitate in action. With regard to his moral character, many vices are laid at his door,[36] which were made the most of by the opposite party after he raised the standard of revolt. From the fact that as early as 1800 accusations of immorality were preferred against him before the inquisition by two women, it may be concluded that his life was not of that purity which his clerical calling would seem to demand; but as the inquisition did not at the time proceed against him, although the accusations included charges of heresy, it may be inferred that proofs were wanting, or that his derelictions were not of a flagrant nature.[37]

As early as the 11th of August the government had intimation of a plot.[38] One Mariano Galvan, an official in the post-office, gave information about the secret meetings to Joaquin Quintana, chief of the department, who communicated with the postmaster-general of Mexico. By him Aguirre was made acquainted with the danger. He, however, contented himself with giving orders that the revolutionists should be watched, without bringing the matter to the notice of the government. Meanwhile Hidalgo

[36] 'Poseido del abominable vicio de la luxuria.' *Diaz Calvillo, Sermon* (1811), 107.

[37] Consult *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 78, et seq. Afterward the inquisition continued the charges with additional ones, and proceeded against Hidalgo with every severity, publishing a memorable edict on the 13th of October, 1810. In it heresy, blasphemy, and profession of the doctrines of Luther were charged. On the score of morality it contains this extraordinary accusation: 'Teneis por inocente y licita la polucion y fornicacion, como efecto necesario y consiguiente al mecanismo de la naturaleza, por cuyo error habeis sido tan libertino, que hicisteis pacto con vuestra manceba de que os buscase mugeres para fornicar, y que para lo mismo le buscariais a ella hombres, asegurandola que no hay infierno, ni Jesucristo.' *Dispos. Varias*, iii. f. 152. Consult also *Mora, Méj. y sus Rev.*, iv. 60–1. This author considers that the early inaction of the inquisition was partly due to the fact that Bishop Abad y Queipo, in matters of opinion, was somewhat implicated with Hidalgo. The fact that these charges were brought against an excommunicated and rebel priest renders them unworthy serious consideration.

[38] For minute particulars consult extracts from documents in the Mexican archives supplied by *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, i. 286–97.

was endeavoring to gain over the provincial infantry battalion of Guanajuato, and to that end opened his plan to several of the subaltern officers. One of these, Garrido, the band-master, exposed the affair on the 13th of September to his captain, Francisco Bustamante, who lost no time in informing his superior officer, Diego Berzábal, who communicated the matter to the intendente Riaño, and offered to arrest Hidalgo. Riaño, however, preferred to watch affairs, and instructed Francisco Iriarte, who was going to San Felipe, to report occurrences in Dolores, and sent orders to San Miguel to arrest Allende and Aldama. The despatch was, however, intercepted by Allende, who received timely warning of the denouncement made by Garrido, and thus gained some little time to deliberate with his associates at San Miguel[39] as to their proper course.

While this was taking place in Guanajuato, Captain Arias turned traitor in Querétaro, and to secure his own safety denounced the plot on the 10th of September to the alcalde Juan de Ochoa.[40] This officer immediately despatched a courier with a written account drawn up by the escribano Juan Fernando Dominguez to the viceroy, who was already on his way from Vera Cruz. Again, on the 13th, a man named Francisco Bueras informed Padre Gil, cura of

[39] *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 18–9. Alaman states that he was playing at cards in the house of Camuñez, the major of his corps, when he received the advice from Guanajuato. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 373. Riaño's action with regard to Hidalgo was probably influenced by friendship, as the cura was a frequent visitor at his house. See *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iii. 42.

[40] Such is Alaman's account of the discovery of the plot. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 361–6. Guerra says: 'Pero abortó el plan por la confesion en el articulo de la muerte del Canónigo de Valladolid Iturriaga, cómplice en la conspiracion, al cura de Querétaro Gil.' *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 292. Bustamante states simply that an ecclesiastic denounced the plot at 10 o'clock of the night of the 14th of September. *Cuadro Hist.*, i. 31. Liceaga considers it probable that Arias first gave information. *Adiciones y Rectif.*, 43. Consult also *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 52–58, for copies of documents addressed to the audiencia on the 11th of September; and the same author, *Discurso Cívic.*, 19–25, for information conveyed to the capital from August 11th to the above named date. Ochoa, on the 10th and 11th of September, sent despatches to Aguirre and the viceroy informing them of the meditated revolution, and forwarded a list of the principal persons concerned in it. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 64–8.

Querétaro, that there was a plot to assassinate all the Spaniards, and that a quantity of arms were stored in the houses of one Sámano and Epigmenio Gonzalez. He also stated that the corregidor knew of it. The cura, being a friend of Dominguez, at once placed the facts before him, advising him either to proceed against Epigmenio Gonzalez or share imprisonment with him. Whereupon the corregidor went to consult with the escribano, who, already aware of the corregidor's complicity, dissimulated by declaring that he did not believe a word of the statement. Corregidor Dominguez, however, persisted that his information was correct, and Juan Fernando suggested that he should ask assistance of the comandante Ignacio García Rebollo, and search Gonzalez's house. This was done, and forty men placed under arms, twenty of whom under the corregidor surrounded the house of Gonzalez while the comandante, with the remaining twenty, invested that of Sámano.

Had the corregidor been fortunate enough to avoid communication with the escribano, all might have gone well with the revolutionists and himself; but the escribano displayed such zeal, and instituted so thorough a search of the house, that the escape of the inmates was rendered impossible, and a quantity of ammunition and weapons was discovered. The corregidor, however unwilling, was now compelled to arrest Epigmenio, his brother, and all the household. While he was thus occupied, his wife, faithful to the cause, devised means[41] to communicate with Allende at San

[41] Alaman says that Dominguez locked the entrance gates of the house on his departure, and that Doña Josefa signalled to Ignacio Perez, the prison alcaide, whose room was immediately beneath her recamara, by tapping thrice on the floor. Perez, being an ardent supporter of the revolution, considered the intelligence which she communicated through the wicket-grating so important that he undertook to convey the message himself. Not finding Allende at San Miguel, where he arrived at daylight on the 15th, he sought Aldama and informed him of what was taking place. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 368–9. Lemoa states on the authority of a manuscript that two messengers, Francisco Lopez and Francisco Arriva, were also sent by the corregidora, the former alone arriving at the destination, and as late as five in the evening of the 16th. Ibar Alcalde, however, should have already left for Dolores on the arrival of Perez, being informed of danger by the intercepted order for his

Miguel, informing him of the serious position of affairs. She also informed Arias, but received a reply so unsatisfactory as to cause her much anxiety.[42]

On the following morning the corregidor began proceedings against the accused, but conducted them in so procrastinating a manner that evidently his heart was not in the work. Probably Arias was right in representing to the alcalde Ochoa that Dominguez was endeavoring to gain time, and that the plot was rapidly approaching its denouement. A little by-play was enacted: the traitor, with his own connivance, was arrested on the evening of the 15th, and on his person were discovered papers implicating Hidalgo and Allende. But this was not enough. The letters spoke of friends who could be relied on; and when closely questioned Arias admitted that these friends were the corregidor, his wife, and a number of others who were wont to assemble at the revolutionary meetings. The subordinate officer, the alcalde Ochoa, supported by the Spanish faction, now proceeded to act. The comandante Rebollo, who hitherto appears to have been quite unaware of the magnitude of the revolution, placed under Ochoa's directions three hundred soldiers;[43] and Dominguez, his wife and family, with a number of other suspected persons, were arrested and imprisoned during the night.[44] The corregidor was closely confined in a cell in the college

arrest, he considers not probable, since his inactivity under the circumstances for 24 hours would be inexplicable. Moreover, citizens of San Miguel affirmed that he was in that town on the morning of the 15th, attending with his troops a religious ceremony, and was seen there as late as 5 o'clock in the afternoon. From the evidence, therefore, this author concludes that Hidalgo and Allende acted immediately upon receipt of the news from Querétaro, and did not waste a day in indecision. *Adiciones y Rectific.*, 44–5. Liceaga's conclusion is proved to be correct by the statements of Sotelo, a participator in the proceedings. He asserts that Allende arrived at Dolores at ten on the night of the 15th of September. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 322.

[42] 'Pero aquel contestó de una manera desabrida, diciendo que se veia en aquel compromiso por haberse fiado de quienes no debiera y que ya tenia tomado su partido.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 369.

[43] 'La mañana de 15 al 16 una faccion de europeos regentados por el alcalde ordinario D. Juan Ochoa, y como trescientos soldados del regimiento de Celaya, auxiliados por García Rebollo, sorprendieron al Lic. Dominguez.' *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, i. 31.

[44] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 74–5.

of Santa Cruz, without being allowed to communicate with any one. His wife was conveyed to the convent of Santa Clara, and although enceinte, was deprived of the company of her friends, and even of her children, who were separately imprisoned.[45]

It is difficult to account for the subsequent proceedings of the government against Dominguez, unless they can be explained by the contemptuous regard with which Oidor Aguirre viewed the political attitude of the creoles. Information of the corregidor's arrest was conveyed without loss of time to Venegas, who consulted with Aguirre. That minister expressed such disdain for any attempt that could be made by 'Americans' to overthrow Spanish rule, that he assured the viceroy that at an official piece of parchment on a stick they would be frightened like asses.[46] He concluded by suggesting that Juan Collado, the alcalde del crímen, should be sent, with an escribano and minor officials, to investigate the matter.[47] The viceroy acted upon this advice, and Collado briefly dismissed the charge against Dominguez and reinstated him in office.[48]

[45] Bustamante states that her daughters were not allowed to speak with the servants who attended on her. *Cuadro Hist.*, i. 32.

[46] Throughout this war the Mexican people, creoles, Indians, and mestizos, are often called 'Americanos,' and sometimes 'gente del pais.'

[47] Bustamente regards this exhibition of authority with great contempt. He ironically represents Aguirre as suggesting, 'que en el caso, lo que convenia hacer, seria mandar al alcalde de crimen D. Juan Collado á Querétaro con un escribano y algunos porquerones,' and adds that the viceroy accepted the advice and Collado the office, the latter appointing José María Moya his escribano, and 'corchete mayor á D. Antonio Acuña que en Mexico desempeñaba la plaza de capitan de sala.' *Ib.*

[48] Venegas disapproved Collado's action and removed him from the audiencia. *Id.*, 36. Dominguez was a man of great literary ability and acquirements. As a magistrate, both his talents and integrity were justly appreciated by the public. Having occupied in the Mexican capital an official position of importance and trust with regard to both public and private business of the viceroy, his strict attention to his duties and his fidelity gained him the favor of Marquina, who appointed him to the corregimiento of Querétaro, an office so important and lucrative that it was regarded as equal to an intendencia. The salary was 4,000 pesos, and other sources of income amounted to as much more. Under the administration of Iturrigaray, Dominguez was instructed to reform the abuses which existed in the cloth factories at Queretaro. The system under which these were conducted reduced a large proportion of the operatives to actual slavery—a pecuniary advance making them subject to thraldom remorselessly exacted by their

No sooner had Allende received news of the arrest of the Gonzalez family and household than he hastened to Dolores, being now aware that his purposes were widely known to the authorities.[49] His interview with Hidalgo was marked by rapid deliberation and prompt decision. When Allende and his companions arrived at Dolores the cura was entertaining visitors, and the revolutionists remained outside until they had departed. When admitted, they informed Hidalgo of the arrests which had been made, and the discovery of their plans. The cura, who had listened to their statements with imperturbable calmness, exclaimed, "Action must be taken at once; there is no time to be lost; we shall yet see the oppressors' yoke broken and the fragments scattered on the ground!"[50] He then ordered the street watchmen who were attached to the cause to be called in, and sent them to summon the workmen in his pottery and silk factories. These soon assembled to the number of fifteen or sixteen, to whom Hidalgo communicated his intention of immediately raising the cry of liberty.

employers. Dominguez effected the necessary reforms, and drew upon himself the enmity of the owners, who were mostly Europeans. Nevertheless, his public conduct, and the faithfulness with which he managed the large estate and fortune left in his charge by Doña Josefa Vergara for beneficent purposes, won for him the regard of the inhabitants of Querétaro. Zamacois attributes the easy acquittal of Dominguez either to policy on the part of Collado, who considered it might be prudent to show generosity when the revolution had already commenced, or to the pressure of a threat expressed by the Indian inhabitants of the Cañada that they would rise in revolt if the corregidor were not released. *Hist. Mej.*, vi. 324. That the corregidor was enabled to maintain his position at such a crisis speaks loudly to his credit as possessing a strong hold on the regards of both parties—or as a consummate political craftsman.

[49] Guerra states that Allende 'conoció su peligro por este murmurio público, ó tal vez, por que su mismo gefe Canal le avisó de la orden que habia recibido de Mexico para prenderle.' *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 292. As 'este murmurio' has reference to the arrest of Dominguez on the night of the 15th, Guerra is in error, since Allende was at that time on his way to Dolores.

[50] This is the statement of Sotelo, an eye-witness. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 322. Alaman gives a different account, derived from statements made at the trials of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and others. He states that Allende went to Dolores on the 14th, and that the news of the arrests at Querétaro was brought by Aldama, who only arrived at Dolores at two o'clock in the morning of the 16th; that the cura was roused from his bed, and exclaimed: 'Gentlemen, we are lost; the only resource left is to seize gachupines.' *Hist. Mej.*, i. 373–4. In view of the narration of Sotelo, who was present on the occasion, and taking into consideration the statements made in the trials, I follow Sotelo's version.

A rumor of what was transpiring had, however, spread, and a number of the populace assembled before the cura's gate, ready to take part in the enterprise. Weapons, which had been secretly made and hidden, were now brought out, and Hidalgo distributed them with his own hand. The first step taken was to secure the person of Padre Bustamante, the sacristan mayor of the parish, who was a Spaniard. Hidalgo then addressed a few animating words to those assembled, raising in loud voice as he concluded the cry, "Viva Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe! Viva la independencia!"

The revolutionists now sallied forth,[51] and having first liberated the prisoners in the town jail,[52] thus swelling their numbers, they made captive the principal Spaniards.[53] Dawn was now approaching. It was Sunday. Hidalgo caused the church bell which summoned his flock to mass to be rung at an earlier hour than usual. The townspeople came forward and gathered in groups before the church door, and from the neighboring haciendas countrymen on foot and mounted were seen flocking in and congregating in

[51] Accounts differ as to their number. Sotelo gives a list of twenty-one names, without including any of the leaders and others whose names were not known. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 330. Negrete supplies a list of 43 names, only two of which appear in that of Sotelo. *Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, i. 134-5. The number in all must have been far in excess of that given by many Mexican historians, the smallness of which is incompatible with the success attained. Alaman states that Hidalgo, supported by his brother Mariano, José Santos Villa, Allende, Aldama, and ten armed men whom he retained in his house, 15 in all, proceeded to execute the design of seizing the Spanish residents. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 375. Liceaga maintains that there were only ten engaged in the undertaking. *Rectific. y Adic.*, 53. Mora, who incorrectly mentions Abasolo as being present, as also does Negrete in his list, says: "Con diez hombres pues, de los cuales cinco eran forzados, se procedió a prender los Españoles del lugar." *Mej. y sus Rev.*, 20. Guerra's statement that Allende left San Miguel with 50 soldiers of his company on the 13th of September for Dolores, and increased his force to 800 men on his march by declaring that he was going to liberate the corregidor Dominguez, is utterly at variance with facts.

[52] Liceaga disputes this fact, but the evidence is conclusive. Consult *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 17, 40; ii. 323.

[53] On page 55 of his *Adic. y Rectific.*, Liceaga gives a list of 13 names of Spaniards made prisoners. Bustamante states that only seven were seized. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 22. Alaman says the number was seventeen. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 376-7.

the sanctuary.[54] But it was the matters of this world rather than those of the next that were now to claim their attention. Deliverance was demanded, and from the evil one; but it was from Satan in the flesh, from devils incarnated as temporal masters, inflicting wrongs and injuries and infamies without number—time enough left when men are free from the tyrannies of their fellows to continue the eternal battle with the powers of darkness!

There was no mass that day. The cura entered his pulpit and looked abroad upon the sea of upturned anxious faces with deep and yearning solicitude. "My children," he said, "this day comes to us a new dispensation. Are you ready to receive it? Will you be free? Will you make the effort to recover from the hated Spaniards the lands stolen from your forefathers three hundred years ago?" Thus the great project of independence was laid before them, and they were called upon to prove their devotion to their country. For the last time Hidalgo addressed his flock as cura of Dolores. Henceforth he would be their guide to liberty; they would fight for it; they would die for it; he would lead them himself to battle and to victory! "To-day," he continued, "we must act. The Spaniards are bad enough themselves, but now they are about to surrender us and our country to the French. Danger threatens our religion, and oppression our homes. Will you become Napoleon's slaves? or will you as patriots defend your religion and your rights?" "We will defend them!" shouted the people. "Viva Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, muera el mal gobierno, mueran los gachupines!"[55] "Live, then, and follow your cura, who has ever watched over your welfare," was Hidalgo's answer. The *Grito de Dolores* has gone forth! The poor and ignorant

[54] During the morning a message was sent to Mariano Abasolo, inviting him to join the cause, which he did without hesitation, according to Sotelo's statement. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 323.

[55] Long live our lady of Guadalupe, perish the bad government, perish the Spaniards!

and down-trodden of this little Indian town proclaim the future independence of a great nation! Enthusiasm rises to religious height, and unarmed as they are, they will follow no matter where, and fight and die no matter how.

It is somewhat strange that independence should be born in such a quarter and of such parentage; yet perhaps not more wonderful here and thus than elsewhere and in some other way. Its days were now fully come, and it must be brought forth. We know after what manner religions have come to man; we have seen great spasms of enlightenment fall at various epochs on the race; we have seen the intellect awaken as from a dream, and re-awaken again and again - but what it all is, or how, or why, no man can tell, howsoever hard our teachers may try.

In the evolution of human affairs two elements are essential to progress, the opportunity and the agent. There may be and often is one condition without the other. Opportunity may be ripe and no one at hand to act; or the individual may be present and lack opportunity; or the agent may be before his time, act prematurely, and so spoil all. Under such conditions there can be no great bringing-forth.

It was a question how far such auxiliaries could be of service in the coming crusade. Hidalgo maintained that the display of numbers would be beneficial to their cause. Allende, however, entertained grave doubts, but he finally acquiesced. To provide their followers with arms was the great difficulty. The houses of the Scanlands were ransacked; lances which Hidalgo had already provided were brought forth; the Indian served his [illegible] and those who could obtain no better weapon supplied themselves with [illegible] bows and arrows. Fire-arms they had [illegible] San Miguel would furnish them some

[illegible] in the shape of [illegible] sharpened [illegible]

munitions of war, and thither Hidalgo and Allende led their rabble, which soon numbered nearly 4,000 men.[57]

Some attempt at military order was made. The mounted herdsmen of the haciendas, carrying lances, were formed into a troop of cavalry, while the better armed Indians on foot represented the infantry. Then followed a promiscuous crowd, in which women and children joined. The die was cast; and the aroused people hastened on. The maize was in full ear, and haciendas abounding in cattle lay on their line of march. There was no lack of food, and they took what they wanted. As they passed through the villages volunteers swelled their ranks, and other Spaniards were added to the number of the captives. On their arrival at Atotonilco, Hidalgo halted in order that he might surprise San Miguel at nightfall. Here a picture of the virgin of Guadalupe was obtained,[58] and raised on high above the throng, amidst shouts of "Viva Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, y mueran los gachupines!" Henceforth it became the banner of the crusade; and while it waved on high, emblem of peace and intercession, many a brave deed, many a bloody deed, was done for those rights and liberties which on no other ground than violence and force would ever be vouchsafed to them.[59]

[57] *Mora, Mej. y sus. Rev.*, iv. 21. Negrete states that Hidalgo marched out of Dolores with only about 80 men, which number as he advanced was increased to 300. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 19–20. Sotelo says: 'Mirando que ya se contaba con un número considerable de gente adicta, resolvió organizarla en forma de tropa.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 323.

[58] Alaman states that Hidalgo took it from the sacristy and raised it on a lance in order to support his enterprise by the religious devotion which his followers entertained for the sacred emblem. This is refuted by Liceaga, who explains that one of the insurgents procured a copy of the picture from 'Doña Ramona N. que vivía allí como otras, con el nombre de beatas,' and that it was hoisted upon a clothes-pole. The enthusiasm it roused caused the leaders to adopt it as a banner. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 58. Zamacois supports Alaman's statement on the strength of Hidalgo's declaration. *Hist. Mej.*, vi. 253; *Hernadez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 13.

[59] Other banners with a like design were in time procured and borne along in all parts of Hidalgo's army. 'Aun existe en poder del hijo del denodado insurgente Víctor Rosales, el diseño original de la primera bandera de Hidalgo que tenia la forma de un estandarte, que fué hecho con uno de los pálios de la parroquia de Dolores, y sobre el cual se puso un escudo muy parecido al adop-

Meanwhile intelligence of the uprising had reached San Miguel,[60] and the Spanish residents, aware that they could not rely upon any creole or native servant, and informed by Colonel Canal that no dependence could be placed on the regiment, assembled in arms at the municipal buildings for self-defence. As the dusk of evening fell, Hidalgo entered the town. The excitement was intense, the population cheering the insurgents and hurling bitter denunciations against the Spaniards. Allende placed the prisoners brought from Dolores in the college of San Francisco de Sales, under the guardianship of Aldama, while he proceeded to arrest the Spaniards of the town. Through the representations of Canal, after some parley the latter were induced to yield without opposition and surrender their arms. Allende assured them that while he lived no harm should befall them, and thereupon they were removed to the college.

The Spaniards having thus been secured without bloodshed, no difficulty was found in winning over the soldiers of the garrison. The officers and troops of the queen's regiment of provincial dragoons were already predisposed to support Allende. In vain Major Camuñez endeavored at the barracks to hold them to their loyalty by representing that the rebels were partisans of the French. His words were received with an ominous silence, and when two of the officers raised a cheer for Allende and independence, Camuñez was made captive,[61] and the whole regiment joined the insurgents. A portion of the Celaya infantry

tado despues de la independencia y era de papel negro recortado.' *Gallo, Hombres I.*, 272.

[60] Authors differ with regard to this statement. Mora asserts that the authorities were completely surprised, and knew nothing of the movement until Hidalgo was at their door; but Lizcaya more reasonably affirms that news of what had taken place in Dolores reached San Miguel early. I have accepted his version as being the more probable. He gives a list of the principal Spanish residents in San Miguel. *Apuntes*, MS., 58–60.

[61] Colonel Canal, if he did not actually favor the movement, was indifferent. He had, however, been superseded in the command by Camuñez that morning. *Lizcaya, ut supra*, 61.

stationed there also declared for the cause of independence.

During the night and on the following morning the populace began to exhibit symptoms of violence, which afterward became uncontrollable. Having liberated the prisoners in the jail, with much uproar and cries of "Death to the gachupines!" they assembled in dense throngs before the houses of the Spanish residents, intent on pillage and destruction. Stores and private dwellings shared a like fate. Doors were battered in and the rabble ransacked and robbed ad libitum.[62] Hidalgo endeavored to moderate these wild passions, and Allende, sword in hand, rode through the crowds threatening their death, until the disorder was stopped.

Our standpoint of morality depends on our teaching, if we still hold to our teachings, or to our line of independent thought, if we have any. The merchant's morality is different from that of the doctor, the priest's from that of the military man. While Hidalgo had as much conscience, as much heart and humanity, as Allende, whose profession was that of man-killer, he was now out on the work of an avenging angel, in so far as it was necessary for his work to assume that form. The Spaniards had robbed and insulted these many years. This was now to be stopped, whatever the cost. If the permission of pillage would add to the power of his cause, it were but small difference when the demon of murder was abroad. Our most refined and christian civilization will kill human beings in battle by the hundred thousand, will commit horrible and wholesale butcheries without justice and without mercy, employing all the arts and advantages the mind can invent to injure and destroy the enemy—all for the cause, killing to prevent further killing; but over some few minor and comparatively insig-

[62] According to Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, i. 143, not even creoles' houses were spared. 'Se lanzaron como lobos rabiosos contra todos los europeos i contra sus propiedades, sin perdonar á sus mismos compatriotas.'

nificant injuries it raises its hands in holy horror, and cries out against them as barbaric and savage. Stuff and humbug! Savage warfare is no worse than civilized warfare, no less necessary, no less righteous. It may be a little less decent and refined; but what are refinement and decency beside butchery and body-mangling machines! All is as bad as it can be; the civilized men are the more to blame, however, for they should know better.

Hidalgo was a far more self-sacrificing, honorable, and humane man than the average military leader. But he was not hypocrite or fool enough to pretend that it was worse to take a dead man's goods than a living man's life. But the killing in war is done for the cause. True; and now pillage is permitted for the cause. It was not that he was in favor of robbery. But sacking a town he regarded as no worse than killing the people; and in his present emergency he deemed one as much a matter of necessity as the other. In any event, he would win this cause if within his power to do so.

Allende thought differently. He was a man of narrower mind, of more restricted ideas; he was a soldier, and felt bound by conventional rules and the regulations of his craft. He urged that they ought not to rely upon the common people, who were addicted to pillage, but upon disciplined troops. The discussion was continued with considerable warmth, until it became evident that two leaders at discord might prove fatal to the cause. Hidalgo, therefore, suggested that his own and Allende's authority should be defined, in order that each should act within the limits of his own powers, and Allende at once offered to surrender the supreme command to the cura, whose ability and influence he very sensibly deemed superior to his own. He expressed the determination, however, to separate himself from him if they should be unable to act in harmony. But all thought of independent action on the part of Allende

was set at rest by the arrival somewhat later of a despatch from Riaño, the intendente of Guanajuato, addressed to the subdelegado Bellogin, who was a prisoner at the time, and ordering the immediate arrest of Allende, Aldama, and, if possible, of Hidalgo, "because his talents, character, and reputation would render the revolution more vigorous and formidable." The postmaster having been also made captive, the letter was delivered to Allende, who, recognizing the truth of its comments on Hidalgo, insisted that the cura should retain supreme command, which he did.[63]

The suddenness with which the insurgents had been compelled prematurely to proclaim their purpose had entirely overthrown their previous plans, and their future operations would in a great measure have to be guided by circumstances. To discipline overwhelming numbers, provide their followers with arms, and institute some degree of military tactics was now their object. In order to provide for public tranquillity, a conference was held in the evening, to which the principal citizens were convoked, and a junta, presided over by Aldama, was established.[64] On the following day the work of organizing the forces was commenced. Officers from the grade of corporal to that of colonel were appointed; recruits were obtained from the surrounding haciendas, and lances constructed with the greatest diligence. A quantity of gunpowder, also, which was being conveyed from Mexico to the mines of Guanajuato, fell into the hands of the insurgents.

On the morning of the 18th Hidalgo led his forces, now counted by tens of thousands, out of San Miguel, after having appropriated what money there was in the treasury, and some belonging to the Spanish captives.[65] Marching through the towns of San Juan

[63] *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 65–7.

[64] The other members were, Padre Manuel Castilblanque, Felipe Gonzalez, Miguel Vallejo, Domingo Unzaga, and Vicente Umaran. The administration of the aduana and of the tobacco monopoly was given to Antonio Agaton de Lartiendo, and that of the post-office to Francisco Rebelo. *Id.*, 68.

[65] *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, 22. Mariano Hidalgo, brother of the cura, was

de la Vega and Chamacuero,[66] he moved toward Celaya, and approached the town on the evening of the 19th. The officers in command of the troops stationed there, deeming resistance useless, retired at night with some companions of the provincial regiment to Querétaro, accompanied by the European residents. On the night of the 19th, Hidalgo and Allende conjointly addressed a letter to the ayuntamiento, summoning the town to surrender, and threatening to put to death



PROVINCE OF GUANAJUATO.

their prisoners to the number of seventy-eight if opposition was offered.[67]

appointed treasurer. One dollar a day was paid a cavalryman and half that sum to a foot-soldier. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 381.

[66] At this last place he made captive the cura, who was a European. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, 811.

[67] The captive Spaniards had been brought with them, surrounded by the dragoons of the queen's regiment. The following is a translation of the document, a copy of which is to be found in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. app. 50–1: 'We have approached this city with the object of securing the persons of all the European Spaniards. If they surrender at discretion, their persons will be treated with humanity; but if on the contrary resistance should be made,

A man is never so old as to cease to be an enigma to himself, provided he continues to place himself in new and untried fields, and has sense and patience enough fully and fairly to regard himself. The burglar does not know how he would behave as a banker; the merchant does not know what his price would be were he a politician. So the lately humane man may become a bloody fanatic, and the soft radiance of charity may make tender the heart of the cruel. Men pride themselves upon their character as something adamantine, when all the time it may be but putty, never having been tried; were it so, it would change to white or black twenty times under as many and weighty influences.

The man of God behaves badly in the livery of the devil. He behaves worse than the devil. War is Satan's enginery, and he is the only one worthy to employ it, the only one who seems to win at it. God fights his enemies, we are told, and yet his enemies everywhere abound; he does not wholly overcome them. The sterner qualities of the soldier, resolved to win at all cost, were being developed in the parish priest of Dolores. Happily for these unfortunate Spaniards, no event occurred to cause the leaders to put their dreadful threat in execution. A copy of the despatch was sent by the ayuntamiento three hours after midnight on the 20th to the municipality of Querétaro, and on the same day Hidalgo was informed that no resistance would be offered to his entrance.

On the 21st the insurgents marched into the city. At the entrance of the plaza a spectator had stationed himself on a house-top to witness the marshalling of this motley army. The man was shot dead;[63] and as

and the order to fire upon us be given, they will be treated with a corresponding rigor. May God protect your honors many years. Field of battle, September 19, 1810. Miguel Hidalgo, Ignacio Allende. P. S. The moment that the order is given to open fire upon our troops, the seventy-eight Europeans whom we have in our power will be beheaded. Hidalgo, Allende. Sres. del Ayuntamiento de Celaya.'

[63] Alaman states that he was the coachman of Manuel Gomez Linares, and denies Abasolo's statement during his trial that the man first fired at the in-

if the report of this murderous gun were the preconcerted signal for onslaught, the work of violence began.[69] Joined by the populace, the insurgents rushed in excited bands through the city, and ere long the houses of the Europeans were broken into, their furniture battered to pieces and cast into the streets, and every article of clothing, of common requirement, or of use in war, was carried off, and the rest was wantonly destroyed. Again remonstrances were laid before Hidalgo; but he maintained his previous views that numbers would insure success, and that a system of plunder would both weaken their foes and attract partisans to their own cause.[70]

In taking this ground Hidalgo, as patriot and revolutionist—for he was both—has been severely censured. But there is much to be said in extenuation. Hidalgo claimed that the Indians had been wrongfully dispossessed of their lands, property, and rights in the first instance, and consequently the wealth the Spaniards and their descendants had thereby acquired was not theirs, but belonged to the aboriginal occupants of the soil and their descendants. Robbery and murder had been employed by the Spaniards in wresting the country from the Indians, and they would adopt the same measures to win it back. Further than this, he argued, it was his only resource. He had but few trained soldiers, and he had no money to pay these except what he could take from the enemy. If war is ever justifiable, this one was; there is no more sacred cause man can fight for than personal and political independence. If it is right to wage war and afterward force the losing side to pay the cost of all, as the great nations of the earth seem agreed, it is equally right to rob and plunder as hostil-

surgent troops. *Id.*, 384. This incident is not accepted by some authors. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 24.

[69] Mora says: 'La señal de posesion que se dió al vecindario fué una descarga general de todas las armas de fuego verificada en la plaza, y que fué el toque de llamamiento para el destrozo y el saqueo.' *Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 26.

[70] *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, vi. 288; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 16.

ities proceed. All war is murder and robbery; it is in order to murder and rob each other that men go to war. I do not attempt to justify this course; I only say that such were the opinion and custom, to a great extent, in Mexico at this time, and were held and practised alike by both sides throughout the war for independence.

Before Hidalgo's entrance into Celaya his followers, who now amounted to fifty thousand, proclaimed him Captain-general of America,[71] and he had conferred the rank of lieutenant-general on Allende, and corresponding grades on Aldama, Abasolo,[72] and other leaders. Here also he was joined by Captain Arias, whom the reader has lately seen playing the rôle of informer, while cautiously scheming for his self-protection.[73]

The recognition of Hidalgo's rank and authority by the ayuntamiento might be beneficial; he therefore called a session of its members and the principal citizens on the 22d. Only two regidores presented themselves, the rest, being Europeans, having fled to Querétaro, whereupon the captain-general appointed others to the vacant offices, nominating Cárlos Camargo subdelegado.[74] The new municipality acknowledged

[71] *Id.*, ii. 107, 109. See his summons to surrender, addressed to the intendente of Guanajuato, in *Alaman*, ut sup., 421. Mora comments on the absurdity of this title. True, it smacks somewhat of worldly vanity; but after all, I do not see why it is not as good as another. *Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 27. Two companies of the Celaya regiment, which had failed to unite with the troops that retired to Querétaro, joined the insurgents.

[72] Mariano Abasolo was at this time 27 years of age. He was a native of Dolores, and the son of a wealthy Spaniard who left him a large fortune, which was still further increased by marriage with the heiress Doña María Manuela Taboada. At his trial, some months later, he deposed that he had not been connected with the revolt previous to the grito de Dolores. The influence of Hidalgo, and his friendship for Allende, being a captain in the same regiment with him, appear to have induced him to join their cause. His sergeant, José Antonio Martinez, afterward executed in Mexico, declared that Abasolo commanded him to deliver up to Hidalgo the arms in the barracks at San Miguel. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 356–7; *Dicc. Univ. Hist.*, i. 12–13.

[73] Alaman states that Arias was always regarded with suspicion by the insurgent leaders, while Zamacois affirms that he was received by Hidalgo with delight, and repudiates the charge brought against Arias of having given information about the revolt. *Hist. Mej.*, vi. 292.

[74] Camargo did not sympathize with the movement; and he advised the viceroy of the circumstances, protesting his fidelity. Venegas ordered him to

the authority of Hidalgo,[75] who, having thus arranged matters in Celaya, and fearing that Querétaro was too well defended to be successfully assailed under the present condition of his troops, marched on the morning of the 23d in the direction of Guanajuato.[76]

remain in the position, with the full consent of the government. The insurgents in Celaya, however, discovered this side-play, and Camargo escaped to Querétaro, pursued by a troop of cavalry. The exertion and agitation threw him into a fever, and he died a few days afterward. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 100. Liceaga obtained his information from Abasolo's family, which was intimate with Camargo.

[75] See Hidalgo's letter, Doc. 3, in *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 212. Alaman erroneously states that the municipality conferred the rank of captain-general upon Hidalgo. Liceaga corrects this mistake. The municipality had no power to appoint military commanders: it was by the proclamation of his troops that Hidalgo was made captain-general.

[76] Additional authorities consulted for the preceding chapters are: *Bustamante, Defensa*, 27; *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 1–11, 33, and iv. 40, 87–111, 138–40; *Campañas de Calleja*, 1–8; *Martirologio*, 4; *Medidas Pacificacion*, MS., ii. 45–59; *Mem. pa. la Hist. Mex.*, MS., i. 47–9; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i., passim; *Disertacion*, iii., ap. 86–7; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, passim; *Torrente, R. Hisp.-Am.*, i. 58–64; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, passim; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i., passim; also ii. 5–42, and v. 60–3, 837–38, 853–60; *Cancelada, Verdad Sabida*, passim; *Conducta Iturrigaray*, 27–135; *Tel. Mex.*, 415–20; *Ruina de la N. Espan.*, passim; *Gaz. Mex.*, xi.–xvi., passim; *Diar. Mex.*, i. 91–2; iv. 65; also v. 149, 533; vi.–ix., passim; xi. 119–20, 350, and xii. 185–6, 219; *Cedulario*, MS., iv. 25; *Guerra, Rev. de N. Mex.*, i., passim; *Mayer, Mex. Azt.*, i. 127–281; *Mora, Mex. y Sus Rev.*, i. 284–8; iii. 193–369; iv. 10–17; *Rev. N. Esp. Censura*, passim; *Consejos*, passim; *Breves Reflex*, passim; *Fisiologia Cosa Pub.*, 35–6; *Rosa, Discurso*, 11; *Lizarza, Discurso Vind. Iturrigaray*, passim; *Queipo, Canon. Peniten.*, passim; *Col. Escritos*, 70–131; *Luli, Refutacion*, 21; *Rev. Verdad. Orig.*, no. i. 67–84; no. ii., passim; *Lizana y Beaumont, Cart. Past.*, passim; *Pradt, Hist. Revol. Espan.*, 40–1; *Pretensiones Anglo-Amer.*, 2; *Noriega, Vindicacion*, passim; *Urrutia Jacobo, Voto*, passim; *Represent. al Virey*, no. i. 6; no. ii. 5–8; *Frost, Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 149; *Indicador*, iii. 221–73; *Calvillo, Oracion*, passim; *Entrada, Representacion*, passim; *Fernandez, Engaños que á los Insurgentes*, passim; *Lastarria, La America*, passim; *Lafond, Voyage autour du Monde*, i. 217–24; *Galiano, Hist. España*, vi. 337–8; *Gonzalez, Hist. Est. Aguascal*, 496; *Guiridi y Alcocer, Sermones*, passim; *Presos Juicio Imparcial*, passim; *Kottenkamp, Unabhangig.*, 1–45; *Kennedy, Texas*, i. 270–1; *Rev. N. España*, passim; *Perez, Proclama*, passim; *Orizava, Ocurr.*, MS., 1–3; *Michelena, Relacion*, ii. 7; *Martinez, Rev. Mex.*, i. 215–17; *Mofras, Exploration de l'Oregon*, i. 1–38; *Modern Travels, Mex. and Guat.*, i. 101–2; *Lerdo de Tejada, Apunt. Hist.*, no. v. 362–4; *Las Clases Prov. Guadalaj.*, Sept. 15, 1878, 3; *Mosaico Mex.*, ii. 462; *Mendibil, Resumen*, 1–6, 93; *Mex. Album, Fotog.*, i. 14–15; *Mex. Scraps*, ii. 60; *Lacunza, Discursos*, xxxvi. 535; *Arrangoiz, Mej.*, i., passim; *Hidalgo, Biog. Cura*, 30–1; *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, ii. 817–25; *Cortés, Diar. Obs.*, iv. 204–5, 216–18; *Diar. Senado*, ii., no. 79, 948–9; *Poole, Texas*, i. 92–4; *Edinburgh Review*, xiii. 277–311, 345–53; xv. 164–82; *Dunoc. Review*, i. 268–9; *Zamacois, Hist. Mex.*, vi., passim; viii. app. 761, 768–9; ix. 864–5; x. 1335–84, 1422–8; xi. 649; *Dublan y Lozano, Ley Mex.*, i. 326–7; *Duvernois, Franzö. Interven. Mex.*, 18–21; *Domenech, Hist. Mex.*, i. 312–13; ii. 11–12; *Disposic. Varias*, i. 135; *Natl. Dem. Quart. Review*, 1860, 252–3; *Dic. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, x. 592, 909–11; app. i. 103–5; *Caro, Tres Siglos*, viii. 225–64, 268; *Conder, Mex. and Guat.* 100–1; *Brit. Quart. Review*, vii. 242–8; *Brancifortе, Instruccion*, MS., passim; *Amigo del Pueb.*, ii.,

no. 7, 206-24, 236-55; no. 8, 236-55; *Annals Congress*, 1806-7, 913-26; *Amer. State Pap.*, ii. 596-695, 798-804; xii. 1-327, 388-434; *Amer. Register*, i. 71-3; ii. 79-83; *Bib. Mex. Trat.*, i. 496; *Beulluch, Mex.*, i. xx.-xxxv.; *Campillo, Manifiesto*, 7; *Carbro, Proclama*, passim; *Chevalier, Exped. Mex.*, 4-5, 17-40; *Merique*, 331-8; *Chateaubriand, Congress de Ver.*, ii. 230-43; *Carson, State Register*; *Calvo, Annales Hist.*, vi. 11-34; *Yucatan, Diccion. Hist.*, i. 295; *Young, Hist. Mex.*, 73; *Walton's Exposé*, app. 7-10; *Ward, Mex.*, vi. 155-6; *Veracruzano*, i. 76-7; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Mej.*, 3; *Stricker, Bibliothek*, 36-40; *Squier, Travels C. A.*, ii. 371-5; *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, ii. 62-7, 566-75; *Salo, Diar. Ofic.*, 5; *Sosa, Episcop. Mex.*, 212; *Rivera, Gob.*, i. 127-8; *Hist. Jalapa*, i. 198-268; *Revilla, Dicc. Univer.*, v. 429; *Mayer*, MS., no. 11, passim; *Quarty. Review*, vii. 248-9, 257; xvii. 530-40; xxx. 171-2; *Portilla, España en Mex.*, 117-98; *Pike, Explor. Travels*, 370-1, 386-436; *Pinkerton, Mod. Geog.*, iii. 159-60, 174-6; *Quinoñes, Descripcion*, passim; *Palafox, Iturrigaray*, 21-2; *Campillo, Exhortacion*, passim; *Tapia, Exhortacion*, passim; *Perez, Orac. Funeb.*, nos. ii. and iii., passim; *Robertson, Reminiscences*, 1-45; *Robinson, Mex.*, 11-29; *Iturrigaray*, i. 18-20; *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 1862, 516-32; *Ordenes Corona*, MS., iii. 141, 155; v. 60, 128.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ALHÓNDIGA OF GUANAJUATO TAKEN BY STORM.

1810.

LOCAL HISTORY OF GUANAJUATO—ALARM IN THE CITY—DEFENSIVE MEASURES OF INTENDENTE RIAÑO—THE ALHÓNDIGA DE GRANADITAS—AN INTERESTING MANUSCRIPT—RIAÑO RETIRES TO THE ALHÓNDIGA—HIDALGO SUMMONS RIAÑO TO SURRENDER—THE ATTACK—A MURDEROUS CONTEST—RIAÑO'S DEATH—HIS BIOGRAPHY—CONFUSION IN THE ALHÓNDIGA—THE BARRICADES WON BY THE INSURGENTS—THEY GAIN ENTRANCE—BERZÁBAL'S FALL—HIS BIOGRAPHY—NUMBER OF THE KILLED—ACTS OF HEROISM—PILLAGE AND DEVASTATION.

THE province of Guanajuato was the theatre of the first tragic events of the revolution, and no city in the kingdom of New Spain suffered more cruelly in loss of life and ruin of prosperity than its capital, Santa Fé de Guanajuato, from which the province derived its name.[1] At the time of the conquest this territory was inhabited by barbarous tribes living on the produce of the chase, and the first Spaniards who penetrated it were the conquerors of Acámbaro, in which exploits joined the cacique of Jilotepec, Nicolás Montañez de San Luis, a near relative of Montezuma. In 1526 these adventurers apportioned out among themselves the districts of Acámbaro, Jerécuaro, and Coronéo.[2]

[1] The word is of Tarascan origin, and corrupted from Quanashuato, meaning *cerro de ranas*, or froghill, a name given to the site, because of a rock shaped like a frog which was an object of worship to the natives. *Medina, Chron. de S. Diego*, 257–8. The capital at an early date was known by the single appellation of Guanajuato.

[2] 'Segun aparece de la relacion inédita escrita por Montañez que copia íntegra el P. Fr. Pablo de la Concepcion Beaumont en su historia manuscrita de la provincia de Franciscanos de Michoacan, que existe en el archivo general.' *Romero, Mich.*, 149–50.

In 1531 Nuño de Guzman passed through Pénjamo to the vicinity of the site of Guanajuato, and added the territory to his conquests. For seventy years the Chichimecs disputed with persistent bravery their right to the soil, until in 1598 peace was established by Rodrigo del Rio, who, in the name of the king of Spain, promised to supply the Indians with food and clothing on the conditions that they should tender allegiance and keep in subjection the refractory. At the same time the viceroy caused to settle there some Tlascaltecs and Aztecs, who instructed the Chichimecs in agricultural and mechanical industries, all under the guidance of missionaries. The first settlements in this province grew out of the establishment by Viceroy Velasco the first, of the presidios at the places now known as San Felipe and San Miguel, as a frontier protection against the Chichimecs; but on the discovery of the Guanajuato mines, as narrated in a previous volume,[3] a small fort was erected in 1554 on the site where Marfil stands, and was called a real de minas. A few years later another real de minas[4] was established at Tepetapa, which is the name of one of the wards of Guanajuato city. For many years this latter settlement was a place of little importance and few inhabitants, and was under the jurisdiction of the alcalde mayor of Celaya. At the close of the sixteenth century a curacy was founded, the population at that time being about four thousand. From this date, owing to the richness of the mines in the vicinity, the prosperity of Guanajuato increased rapidly, and in 1679 the king of Spain granted it the title of villa y real de minas de Santa Fé de Guanajuato.[5]

[3] *Hist. Mex.*, iii. 588, this series.

[4] In the times of the conquest, the site on which a Spanish army encamped was called 'real,' and not unfrequently was partially fortified. Real de minas, therefore, means a military station in a mining district.

[5] The name of Santa Fé had been given to the place in 1658 by the oidor Antonio de Lara y Mogrovejo, who had been commissioned by Viceroy Alburquerque to preside over the elaboration of the silver accruing to the crown in that district. *Medina, Ib.; Romero, Mich.*, 157. 'Elle reçut le privilége royal de villa in 1619.' *Humboldt, Essai Pol.*, i. 247. This date must be a misprint.

From this time the district remained under the rule of the ayuntamiento and subdelegados, subject to the audiencia of Mexico, until 1786, when the intendencias were established,[6] of which Guanajuato became one of the principal. In the mean time the town had been raised in 1741 to the dignity of city, an appropriate coat of arms being granted it.[7] At the opening of the nineteenth century, the progress made by Guanajuato and its prosperity were almost unprecedented.

Coat of Arms of the City of Guanajuato.

The reader will be able to form some idea of the wealth and activity of the district at the time when the revolution broke out from the fact that in the year 1800 the mines, including those worked and those exhausted, numbered 1,816, employing 116 mills, 1,898 arrastras, and 366 establishments for the elaboration of the metal. There were crushed daily 11,500 quintales of ore, and 9,000 operatives employed. At this time the population of the city, including those occupied in the mines, was 66,000. Nor were the agricultural industries of the province, which embraced about 1,750 square leagues, less thriving; the numerous populous towns were surrounded by rich pastures and lands covered with maize and other grain. But now, like a flail of destruction, war falls on the unhappy city, and at its conclusion the population has diminished to six thousand souls, the unfrequented streets are cov-

[6] Consult *Hist. Mex.*, iii. 452, this series.

[7] The coat of arms consists of a draped female figure blindfolded, holding in her right hand a chalice, and supporting a cross with her left arm. The design is symbolical of faith.

ered with grass, and the abandoned houses are offered rent free.[8]

The first church established in the city was the edifice known to-day as the chapel of the college of La Purísima Concepcion, and in it Rivera placed the image of the santísima vírgen in 1557. A few years later another chapel was erected near by, and these two buildings were used as hospitals, the first one for the Tarascans and the second for the Otomis, a third being built for the benefit of the Mexican settlers. In 1671 was commenced the parish church, which was completed and dedicated in 1696, and thither was conveyed in the same year the image of our lady from the church of the hospital. The parish church of Guanajuato is one of the finest edifices of the kind in the Mexican republic. The ecclesiastical government of the province is under the bishopric of Michoacan. In 1663 Viceroy Serda and Bishop Ramirez del Prado granted permission to found the Franciscan convent of San Diego, but the work was stopped by order of the council of the Indies in the following year, because it had been begun without royal license. In 1667, however, the king's permission was granted, and the convent was erected into a guardianía in 1679. This church and convent were almost destroyed by the inundation of 1780, but were restored by the conde de Valenciana and some members of the brotherhood of el Cordon.[9]

On the 18th of September, Intendente Riaño received intelligence from Iriarte of the occurrences in Dolores and San Miguel. He immediately ordered the call to arms to be sounded, believing that Hidalgo was already on his march against the city. The

[8] After the independence Guanajuato again rapidly advanced, and in 1825 the city had a population of over 33,000, according to the census taken by the governor, Carlos Montesdeoca. *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, ix. 93.

[9] According to Fernando Navarro y Noriega, the intendencia of Guanajuato comprised in 1810 three cities, four villas, and 62 towns, the total population amounting to 576,600 souls. *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, 2ª ep., i. 290–1.

guards and battalion of provincial infantry were hastily formed into line, while the principal citizens and the commercial class, hurriedly seizing their weapons, rushed with crowds of the populace to the buildings of the intendencia. All was confusion and terror; the stores were closed and house doors barred; the plazas were deserted by the hucksters; frightened women hurried along the thoroughfares for their homes; while horsemen at full speed spread wider the consternation as they galloped in different directions through the streets with orders from headquarters.[10] Riaño explained to the assembled throng the cause of the alarm, and the populace expressed a desire to engage the enemy,[11] believing that the insurrection was a demonstration in favor of the French.[12] At two o'clock in the afternoon the intendente convoked a junta of the ayuntamiento, the prelates of the religious orders, and the principal citizens, at which he expressed his apprehension that the danger was great, but declared that he was determined to take every defensive measure possible.[13]

After some consultation it was decided to defend the city, and during the day barricades were thrown up at the entrances of the principal streets. Spaniards and Americans—as the creoles and Indians are now called[14]—were assembled in arms, and outlying de-

[10] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 277.

[11] 'Los que segun el general entusiasmo si entraron en aquel dia hubieran perecido sin remedio.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 23.

[12] *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 73–4.

[13] The ayuntamiento of Guanajuato in February 1811 states to the viceroy that several of its members proposed to Riaño that he should immediately march against Hidalgo with the provincial battalion, which numbered more than 400 men, and with such armed citizens as could be mustered; and that had this measure been adopted the revolution would have been nipped in the bud. *Guan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt.*, 10–11. Brigadier Miguel Costansó, the commissioner appointed to report on the matter, approved of Riaño's action in refusing to accede to the proposal, by doing which he would have left the capital of his province defenceless. *Id.*, 71–2. Liceaga, with tedious length, also supports the intendente. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 71–89. Alaman, on the contrary, considers that the proposed movement would have been the best that could be adopted, and supplies the additional information that Major Berzábal was one of those who proposed it. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 407.

[14] We have here the most proper use, except as applied to the aborigines, of the many-sided and generally misappropriated word Americans. In treat-

tachments posted on the Santa Rosa and Villalpando highways which lead to Dolores and San Miguel. A third body of troops was stationed on the Marfil road. Squadrons of the cavalry regiment del Príncipe were ordered in, and advice asking for aid sent to Brigadier Feliz Calleja, in command of the troops at San Luis Potosí. On the following morning a false alarm was raised that the enemy was approaching on the Marfil road; and the tardiness of the lower orders to assemble for defence amounted almost to indifference—a state of things significant of impending misfortune. For six days these defensive measures were maintained, and still no enemy appeared.[15] The intendente displayed an energy and endurance which only the conviction of his perilous position could have called forth; but day by day he became more certain of the disaffected inclination of the lower classes. "The seeds of rebellion spread," he writes to Calleja on the 26th, "security and confidence are gone. I have neither rested nor undressed myself since the 17th, and for the last three days have not slept an hour at a time." Indeed, he could no longer rely upon the fidelity even of his own troops. The responsibility of saving, if possible, the royal treasury and archives increased Riaño's anxiety; and deeming his present arrangements defective, since he could avail himself neither of the barracks, the plaza, nor any of the churches, owing in part to the threatening attitude of the populace,[16] on the 23d he decided to retire to the alhóndiga de granaditas, or government granary—a building which from its size and strength would afford the advantages of a fortification.

ing of the aborigines the term properly fits all races indigenous to America. Next it may be employed, as in the present case, to designate a mixed mass of Indians, creoles, and mestizos as distinguished from European Spaniards with whom they are at war. But when we come to use the word Americans as opposed to Canadians, or still worse as in California to Mexicans, it is reduced to an absurdity.

[15] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 277–8.

[16] 'Manifestándose con chistes y con burlas contrario á la causa de gobierno español.' *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 89.

The Alhóndiga de Granaditas, as famous in the history of Mexico as is the Bastile in that of Franco, had been erected by Riaño for the purpose of storing in it a quantity of corn sufficient for one year's consumption as a provision against failure of the crop. During such periods of scarcity not only did the lower orders suffer, but the mining industry was seriously interrupted through want of food for the mule-trains employed at the mines. The building was begun in January 1798, and finished in August 1809. It is a massive oblong two-story structure, 80 by 54 varas, and cost $218,263.[17] The exterior is void of ornament, and its lofty solid walls pierced by windows opening into the numerous store-rooms give to it quite a formidable appearance. In the interior a portico of two stories surrounds the spacious patio, or open court, the lower columns being of Tuscan architecture, and the upper ones, between which a balustrade of stone extends, of Doric. Two magnificent flights of stairs connect the stories, which consist of independent store-rooms.

On the northern side is the principal gateway, and another opens at the eastern end of the building, adorned with two columns and a Tuscan entablature. It stands at the south-western entrance of the city, on a rising ground which terminates the height called the cerro del Cuarto by which it is dominated. Stored

[17] Liceaga, followed by Zamacois, here falls into several errors; but I am enabled to rectify their mistakes from the original statement of March 1810 passed by the intendente and audiencia. This document, which is in my possession, is particularly interesting as bearing the autograph signature of the unfortunate Riaño, as well as those of the members of the ayuntamientos for 1809 and 1810. Among these I may mention Marañon, Septiem, José Ignacio Rocha, Martin Coronel, and Ginori, all of whom signed the *Pública Vindicacion del Ilustre Ayuntamiento de Santa Fé de Guanajuato Justificando su Conducta Moral y Política*, a representation addressed to the viceroy in January, 1811, relative to the occurrences at Guanajuato, and printed by permission the same year. The intendente's and above mentioned names, with the exception of Ginori's, appear twice. The building accounts occupy nine folios, and are preceded by the order of the municipal junta on sealed paper for their examination by Martin Coronel. The document is inclosed in and attached to a portfolio of native leather on which is engrossed: *Tomo 5°, 1809, Contiene la Cuenta General de la Fabrica de la Famosa Alhondiga de Granaditas.*

with maize and supplied with water, the alhóndiga[18] was the only place where the intendente could hope to hold out till the arrival of Calleja, whom he expected within a week. Anticipating that the movement would meet with opposition, on the night of the 24th he caused secretly to be conveyed thither all the royal and municipal treasures, amounting to over $620,000 in money, bars of silver, and gold ounces,[19] the archives of the government and ayuntamiento, and eventually the treasures of many private persons, estimated at three million pesos.[20] Thither, also, were removed the arms and ammunition of the barracks, sacks of flour, and other provisions. In the dead of the night, too, the barricades were taken down and the material carried to the alhóndiga. Then the troops were withdrawn from the barracks and outlying posts, numbers of the Europeans mustered together, and soldiers and civilians, in one common lot, took refuge within the walls of this building.

When morning dawned and the city was astir the news spread. The unguarded streets, the disappearance of the barricades, and the silent barracks proclaimed to the populace that their reluctant allegiance had been recognized, and that they were left to choose between loyalty and rebellion. Fear fell on all. The ayuntamiento in great excitement requested the intendente to preside over a junta composed of its own members, the curas, prelates of the religious orders,

[18] An anonymous correspondent in a letter to the intendente's brother, dated Guanajuato, October 2, 1810, says: 'Este edificio es una verdadera fortaleza, y acaso la única que hay en el reino. El Sr Riaño cuando la hizo se propuso formar un castillo para defensa del lugar, dándole el nombre de Alhóndiga.' *Zerecero, Disc. Civic.*, 30.

[19] 'Se pasaron de las reales caxas á la alhóndiga trescientas nueve barras de plata, ciento setenta y quatro mil pesos efectivos, treinta y dos mil en onzas de oro, treinta y ocho mil de la ciudad, que estaban en las arcas de provincia, y treinta y tres mil que se hallaban en las del cabildo; veinte mil de la minería y depósitos, catorce mil de la renta de tabacos, y mil y pico de correos.' *Guan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt.*, 14–15. A bar of silver weighed 135 marcs and its standard value was 1,100 pesos.

[20] Bustamante states the value of property in the precious metals, jewelry, and valuable merchandise that was removed into the alhóndiga during the night and following days amounted to 5,000,000 pesos. There were also 700 quintales of quicksilver deposited there. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 25.

and principal citizens, in the municipal hall. Riaño declined on the plea of weariness, but expressed his willingness to attend a junta in the afternoon; but it must be held in the alhóndiga de granaditas, and not in the municipal hall. The meeting took place; but civil officers, priests, and prelates in turn vainly endeavored to induce Riaño to change his purpose. The intendente was inflexible, and according to the representation of the ayuntamiento to the viceroy a few months later, he bluntly dismissed them with the assurance that, in the interest of the king, he should remain with the troops where he was, and that as for the city it might defend itself as best it could.[21]

During that and the two following days the intendente devoted all his energies to the defence of his position. Additional provisions were introduced into the alhóndiga; strong barricades were thrown up at the only three points by which attacks could be made through the streets; the eastern gateway was closed with solid masonry; the iron quicksilver flasks, charged with gunpowder, were converted into grenades, and further information was despatched to Calleja,[22] setting forth his want of arms, and the doubtful fidelity of his troops.[23]

In order that the reader may understand Riaño's position, and the mode of attack adopted by the insurgents in the ensuing engagement, a brief description of the city of Guanajuato will be necessary.

[21] [illegible] Bustamante also affirms that the intendente [illegible] Consult also *Hernandez* [illegible]

[22] [illegible] The bearer of the first despatch left Guanajuato at 1 P. M. [illegible] San Luis at 11 P. M. of the [illegible] Guanajuato, and promising [illegible] With regard to the speed of the [illegible] estos hombres por sal- [illegible] The distance from Guanajuato to San Luis [illegible]

[23] [illegible] y la caballería mal [illegible] that is swords brit- [illegible] no siendo imposible el [illegible]

Situated at the bottom of a deep and narrow hollow, round which on all sides rise lofty mountains, its position in a military point of view is one of the worst. On the south side rises the hill of San Miguel, while from the north the cerro del Cuarto[24] extends like a wedge into the city. So irregular is the site that it might well be described by crumpling a sheet of paper. On the plaza itself but few level spots can be found, and few of the streets accommodate carriages. Most of the houses occupy slopes so steep that in many cases the floor of one is on a level with the roof of another. An extension of this rugged hollow runs off in the form of a rocky valley south-westerly to Marfil, a league distant, and known by the name of the cañada de Marfil. Its whole length was occupied by workshops, mills, and other buildings connected with mining. Formerly the only carriage entrance into the city lay through this glen.[25] To the east of the city rises the river Guanajuato, here a mere mountain torrent, which sweeping in a winding course through the city unites with the Rio de la Cata flowing from the north-west. Although situated on a rising ground, the alhóndiga was so close to the cerro del Cuarto that the houses built on the steep of that height were only separated from it by a narrow street and a small plaza, not more than twenty-five yards wide. On the south-east of the alhóndiga was the convent of Belen, from which it was separated by the descent of Mendizábal, and on the south and west were the extensive workshops and premises of the hacienda de Dolores where the precious metals were treated. On the north, extending east and west, was the street of los Pozitos in a straight line with the descent to the Rio de la Cata, which was spanned

[24] So called because on it was exposed in early times one portion of the body of a malefactor who had been quartered. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 408.

[25] The difficulties of this road were such that in 1822 a new one was commenced over the hills, and this required a fine bridge to be built across the river Cata. It was completed in 1835. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 7–8.

by a wooden bridge. Herewith I give a plan of the alhóndiga and vicinity with explanation.[26]

From this description the reader will observe that the only three directions from which an assault could be made upon the alhóndiga were from the street of los Pozitos; up the cuesta de Mendizábal; and up the ascent from the Rio de la Cata. These approaches were obstructed by the barricades, already mentioned. Riaño did not confine his defence to the alhóndiga, but included in his lines of fortification the house owned by Mendizábal and the hacienda de Dolores, which were surrounded by strong walls and separated from the alhóndiga by two narrow streets.



PLAN OF ALHÓNDIGA.

[26] A. The Alhóndiga. B. Convent of Belen. C. House of the hacienda de Dolores. D D D. Premises and work-shops of the same. E. The well. F. Barricade at the foot of the hill of Mendizábal. G. Hill of Mendizábal. H. House of Mendizabal whence the hill derived its name. I. Barricade in the street of los Pozitos. J. Street of los Pozitos. K. Ascent to the mines. L L. Entrances to streets which Riaño closed with masonry. M. Descent to the Rio de la Cata. N. Barricade preventing approach from the river. O. Principal entrance of the alhóndiga, the only one not closed. P. Eastern entrance closed with masonry. Q. Opening on to the flat roof. R. Window from which Riaño was shot. S. Cemetery of Belen. T. Street of Belen. U U. Bridge and causeway of Our Lady of Guanajuato. V. Rio de Guanajuato. X. Rio de la Cata. Y. The wooden bridge, Z. Workshop of Granaditas and ward of Tepetapa. Z' Z'. The cerro del Cuarto covered with houses commanding the alhóndiga. * Spot where Berzábal fell.

Meanwhile, Hidalgo, marching through Salamanca, Irapuato, and other places which voluntarily joined his cause, approached Guanajuato in the early morning of the 28th. He was well informed of the position of affairs in the city. Arrived at the hacienda of Burras he sent forward Ignacio Camargo and Mariano Abasolo[27] with a communication to Riaño informing him of the proclamation of independence, and urging a peaceable surrender. The letter terminated with a declaration of war to the uttermost in case of refusal.[28]

[27] Liceaga was a relative of Abasolo, and being in Guanajuato at the time tried to see him, but was prevented by the dense crowds. *Adic. y Rectific.*, xi. and 103.

[28] I translate the document and a private letter which accompanied it; also Riaño's reply. The originals remained in possession of Ignacio Camargo, and were given by him to Liceaga, who was his school-fellow. The official communication of Hidalgo is the more important as it refutes Alaman, who misleads regarding the proclamation of independence. He erroneously charges Bustamante with interpolating expressions, claiming that he himself had been supplied with a correct version by Benigno Bustamante, one of the Europeans present in the alhóndiga, and remarking: 'La sola palabra independencia basta para demonstrar la inexactitud de este relato, pues Hidalgo ocultaba este intento cuidadosamente, y nunca tomaba en boca públicamente esta voz.' *Hist. Mej.*, i. 421. Liceaga rightly points out the impossibility of Benigno Bustamante being able to obtain a correct copy of the communication. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 103–4.

Hidalgo's despatch to Riaño. 'Headquarters at the Hacienda de Burras, 28th of September, 1810. The numerous army which I command elected me Captain General and Protector of the nation in the fields of Celaya. The same city in the presence of fifty thousand men ratified this election, as have also all the places through which I have passed; which will make your honor cognizant that I am legitimately authorized by my nation to undertake the beneficent projects which have appeared necessary to me for its welfare. These projects are of equal utility and advantage to the Americans and those Europeans who are disposed to reside in this kingdom, and they are reduced to the proclamation of the independence and liberty of the nation. Consequently I do not regard the Europeans as enemies, but only as an obstacle which embarrasses the successful issue of our enterprise. Your honor will be pleased to inform the Europeans who have united together in the alhóndiga of these ideas, in order that they may decide whether to declare themselves as enemies, or agree to remain in the quality of prisoners, meeting with humane and kind treatment, such as those whom we bring with us have experienced, until the liberty and independence indicated shall be acquired, in which case they will be included in the class of citizens with the right to the restitution of their property, which for the time being we shall make use of for the urgencies of the nation. If on the contrary they do not accede to this demand I shall use all force and stratagem to destroy them, without leaving them the hope of quarter. May God protect your Honor. Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, Captain General of America.'

The private letter from Hidalgo to Riaño runs as follows: 'The esteem which I have ever expressed for you is sincere, and I believe due to the high qualities which adorn you. The difference in our ways of thinking ought not

Before nine o'clock the messengers reached the barricade at the foot of the cuesta de Mendizábal, and Camargo was conducted blindfolded into the alhóndiga. Riaño on receiving Hidalgo's communication assembled the Europeans on the flat roof of the building, apart from the troops, and having read it to them asked their decision. For some moments there was a mournful silence, till finally their captain, Bernardo del Castillo, after a few brief remarks declared for war. He would fight till he died in maintaining the right; and thereupon raised the cry of "Death or victory!" in which the Europeans now joined.[29] Riaño then descended to discover the intentions of the troops. "And my children of the battalion," he asked, "can I doubt about their resolution to do their duty?" Whereupon Berzábal raised the cry of "Viva el rey!" and the soldiers vociferously responded. Nevertheless, before sending his reply, Riaño considered it right to communicate with the ayuntamiento, and sent by the procurator Pedro Cobo, who being a Spaniard had taken refuge in the alhóndiga, copies of Hidalgo's letter and his intended reply.[30] Much delay was occa-

to diminish it. You will follow the course which may seem most right and prudent to you, but that will not occasion injury to your family. We shall fight as enemies, if so it shall be decided; but I herewith offer to the Señora Intendenta an asylum, and assured protection, in any place she may select for her residence, in consideration of the ill health to which she was subject. This offer does not spring from fear, but from a sensibility which I cannot discard from me.'

Riaño's reply: 'Sr Cura of the town of Dolores, D. Miguel Hidalgo. I recognize no other authority, nor is it evident to me that any such has been established, nor other Captain General in the kingdom of New Spain, than His Excellency Sr Don Francisco Xavier de Venegas, its Viceroy; nor more legitimate reforms than those which the Nation at large may adopt at the general Córtes to be held. My duty is to fight as a soldier, which noble sentiment animates all those around me. Guanajuato, 28th of September, 1810. Juan Antonio Riaño.' And to the private letter: 'The exercise of arms is not incompatible with sensibility; this demands of my heart the gratitude due to your offers for the benefit of my family, whose lot does not disturb me on the present occasion.' *Id.*, 212–14.

[29] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 279–80. Mora, who gives a slightly different version of this proceeding, insinuates that the Europeans were inclined to yield, and passes a reflection upon the indiscretion of Castillo, whom he describes as 'uno de aquellos raptos indiscretos y comprometedores que no faltan en semejantes ocasiones.' *Méj. y sus Rev.*, iv. 32. This author states that Camargo read Hidalgo's communication to the troops, a most improbable proceeding.

[30] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 117.

sioned in assembling the members, who had retired to their houses, and when they met they had no advice to offer. Calling attention to the fact that they had neither troops, arms, nor funds any longer at their disposal, they said that it remained with the intendente to act under the circumstances as it seemed best to him. Riaño's reply was at last written and Camargo sent back, but the long delay had caused Abasolo to return, and Hidalgo was already approaching up the Marfil road. The intendente then wrote Calleja: "I am about to fight, for I shall be attacked immediately. I shall resist to the uttermost, because I am honorable. Fly to my succor."

Riaño now disposed his forces, which consisted of four companies of the provincial infantry, commanded by Captain Manuel de la Escalera, in the absence of the lieutenant-colonel, Quintana,[31] and scarcely numbering 300 men. Besides these was a company of armed Europeans, which raised the number to about 500, and two troops of dragoons, not mustering more than seventy, under the command of Captain José Castilla.[32] A portion of the infantry and of the European company was stationed on the roof of the alhóndiga, and detachments of the provincial battalion were posted at the three barricades. The cavalry were drawn up inside the barrier at the descent to the Rio de la Cata; to the remaining armed Europeans was assigned the defence of the hacienda de Dolores, while a body of reserves was retained within the alhóndiga.[33] While these preparations were going on, it was noticed that the surrounding heights were oc-

[31] Liceaga states that Quintana, the Conde de Perez Galvez, colonel of the dragoon regiment del Príncipe, and a number of Europeans had suddenly left the city, while others did not coöperate with those in the alhóndiga, but remained in their houses. He gives a list of 20 names of these latter. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 79. This is confirmed in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 279.

[32] Mora says six hundred in all. *Ut sup.*, 29.

[33] Alaman conjectures that Riaño intended to sally with the reserves and cavalry, and attack the enemy at the most assailable points, 'plan ciertamente de muy aventurada ejecucion, con el corto número de tropa de que se podia disponer.' Ut sup., 424.

cupied by crowds of the populace, who seated on the ground calmly looked on as if at a bull-fight.

Shortly before midday, Hidalgo's army appeared in sight, approaching by the Marfil road.[34] Advancing along the causeway of Nuestra Señora de Guanajuato, the van, composed of a strong body of Indians armed with lances, clubs, and bows and arrows, crossed the bridge and arrived in front of the barricade at the foot of the cuesta de Mendizábal. Gilberto de Riaño, son of the intendente,[35] who was in command at this point, opened fire on them as they continued to advance, when ordered, in the name of the king, to halt. Several Indians fell; the rest retreated, and guided by a native of the place, took up a position on the cerro del Cuarto. The main body now formed into two divisions, one of which, making a detour, approached by the cerro de San Miguel, and entering the city by the causeway of las Carreras,[36] liberated the jail prisoners, and then occupied the cerro del Venado. The other division made a detour by the hacienda de Flores in order to occupy the cerro del Cuarto.

The city was now in possession of the insurgents, and, as they marched through the streets, thousands of voices raised the dreadful battle-cry, while they waved hundreds of different colored banners, on which was depicted the sacred emblem. The miners, a brave

[34] The number of armed men in Hidalgo's force is not exactly known. Robinson, *Mem. Mex. Rev.*, i. 27, says that he left Celaya with nearly 20,000. Bustamante, Torrente, Alaman, and others also place the number at 20,000. Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectific.*, 82, raises it to 25,000 men of all classes, 2,000 of whom were regular troops of the San Miguel regiment of dragoons de la Reina, and of the provincial infantry regiment, companies of which joined the insurgents at Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato. Mora, on the contrary, gives 14,000 as the estimated number, besides 400 regulars, 'sin contar con la tropa reglada que no pasaban de cuatrocientos, y se hallaban como perdidos y absolutamente embarazados para obrar entre esta multitud disordenada.' *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 33–4.

[35] Gilberto was a lieutenant of the line regiment of Mexico, and was staying with his father on leave of absence. He was a young man of considerable military ability. The construction of the barricades was intrusted to his direction, and he devised the plan of converting the quicksilver flasks into grenades. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 417.

[36] On the summit of the cerro de San Miguel was a small plain where the people were wont to attend horse-races on days of festivity. Hence its name of las Carreras. *Id.*, 408.

and hardy class, and the populace joined Hidalgo, and soon all the heights which commanded the alhóndiga were occupied. Soldiers of the Celaya regiment, armed with muskets, and a host of Indian slingers were posted on the cerro del Cuarto; a similar disposition was made on the cerro del Venado. The houses in front of the alhóndiga on the north side were filled with sharp-shooters, and swarms of Indians in the river bed broke stones for the slingers, others carrying them up the heights. Hidalgo, pistol in hand, at the head of about two thousand mounted men, among whom were the dragoons of the regiment de la Reina, hastened from point to point, encouraging his men, giving instructions, and making his dispositions for the assault.[37]

At length the performance begins. Hidalgo's soldiers open fire on the besieged, while from the heights and house roofs a furious discharge of stones is rained down on the alhóndiga. Dense masses of Indians assault the barricades, and though the slaughter from the enemy's volleys, fired at close range into the compact mass, is terrific, it fails to repel the assailants. As the front ranks fall, others supply their places, pressed onward by those behind; and thus over the bodies of the dead and dying the contest rages uninterruptedly. For the besieged the position is terrible. The reports of the muskets, the hiss of bullets, the hoarse hum of the jagged stones as they whirl through the air and fall on the roof as from an emptying volcano is worse than the infernal din of Satan's enginery.[38]

For half an hour the battle rages. The assailants show no intention of ceasing their efforts to storm the barricades. The carnage among the assailants is

[37] Liceaga points out a flagrant misstatement of Alaman's, to the effect that Hidalgo remained during the whole of the contest in the cavalry barracks at the farther end of the city. *Adic. y Retific.*, 108-10.

[38] So furious and continuous was the discharge of stones that after the action the floors of the alhóndiga roof and the open court were found to be raised eight or nine inches above their proper level by the accumulation. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 37.

fearful, but to see their comrades shot down by their side only the more enrages them. The defenders of the barrier at the street of los Pozitos are being hard pressed, and Riaño sallies with twenty men to their support. His courage outstrips his prudence; yet, stationing the men, he returns to the alhóndiga unscathed through a storm of missiles. He mounts the steps of the entrance and turns round to see how the battle goes—then he drops dead, struck through the brain by a bullet. A soldier of the Celaya regiment had marked him for his own. The body is dragged within,[2] and the hearts of those present sink as they gaze on their commander's lifeless form.

Thus fell the first man of note in the revolutionary war, a man whose death was much lamented. Riaño was an incorruptible and just but merciful magistrate. He was headstrong and rash, yet he was honest and humane. The beneficent measures adopted while he was intendente of Guanajuato raised the province to its highest prosperity. It is claimed for him that liberal and enlightened views led him to recognize the blessings of independence; and to his friends, of whom Hidalgo was one, he did not hesitate to express liberal opinions. It is further urged that, had the declaration of independence come from a more legitimate source, had it been proclaimed by the constituted authorities, as might have been the case if Iturrigaray had not been deposed, Riaño would unhesitatingly

[illegible] was a different version of the intendente's fall. He states that [illegible] had abandoned his post [illegible] firing at the enemy, and [illegible] i. 38. Mora gives a similar [illegible] and adds an anonymous narration [illegible] Alaman with reason points out the [illegible] this when the serious duties of a [illegible] Bustamante states that a corporal [illegible] was killed in the head by the same bullet which [illegible] proving that if the sentinel had deserted his post [illegible] Alaman asserts that the shot was [illegible] the alhóndiga. *Hist. Méj.*, [illegible] maintains that it was fired from the [illegible]

have supported it; but he could not countenance what he deemed a lawless movement, a movement whose origin was so humble, and whose agents were so ignoble. But we may well doubt, if the independence of Mexico had been left wholly to Spanish officials, the corrupt and mercenary minions of a corrupt and mercenary monarch, that it would ever have been achieved. New Spain was in no sense a confederation of states, like the English colonies in America, with men at the helm native-born and of independent thought and action. Conditions were different here, and the desired results must come through different means. I believe this uprising of the native and mixed races to have been one of the inexorable dispensations in the case. It was meet that a remnant of that people, who had suffered so gross and long-continued wrongs at the hands of Europeans, should be the first to rise in rebellion against them, when once opportunity offered a reasonable hope of success.

Riaño was a better man than the average Spanish official in America; but it was not at the individual the blow was aimed. We all recognize his simple and modest deportment, his kindness and accessibility to the poor, his pleasant companionship and literary attainments, which made him alike popular with high and low.[40]

The death of the intendente carries confusion and disorder among the besieged. A dispute arises between Manuel Perez Valdés, asesor of the intendencia, and Major Berzábal, each claiming the right to the chief command. There is no time to settle it; the assault is continued with increased obstinacy, and for hours the fierce contest rages. Heavier falls the stone deluge, and fiercer is the rush at the barricades. All discipline is lost; as first one and then another

[40] He was born on the 16th of May, 1757, in the town of Lierganes, in Santander, Spain, being in his fifty-fourth year when he met his death. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 427.

issues orders, the soldiers of the line only obeying their respective officers. The defenders of the barricades can hold their positions no longer, and are ordered to abandon them and retreat to the alhóndiga. The ponderous doors are then hastily closed, leaving the cavalrymen outside, and cutting off from place of refuge those in the hacienda de Dolores. The former are instantly surrounded, and Castilla, their captain, and many others slain; of the rest, some few escape in the crowd, and some take part with the insurgents. The roof of the alhóndiga is no longer tenable, and those posted on it retire below. Surrender, however, is not thought of; and in the dense masses of the revolutionists as they throng in front of the building the slaughter caused by the fire of the besieged from the windows is fearful. Presently miners, partially protected by huge earthen vessels,[41] creep up to the building and work with crow-bars at the wall, trying to effect a breach. But the walls are thick and strong, and Hidalgo, seeing that the door, though of massive wood, can be more quickly broken through, orders crow-bars. A more ready way is found, however, by a young miner standing near, who offers, if provided with pitch and combustibles, to set fire to it.[42] These are procured from a neighboring store, and the intrepid youth, under cover of one of the earthen vessels, makes his way up to the entrance and accomplishes the daring feat.

[41] 'Cubiertos con cuartones de lozas, como los romanos con la *testudo*.' *Alaman*, ut sup., 430.

[42] Bustamante's account, which is repudiated by Alaman, is that Hidalgo addressed one of the crowd standing near him, and asked him if he had the courage to set the gate on fire. The man said 'Yes,' and did it. 'Este lépero comparable con el carbonero que ataco la Bastida en Francia...sin titubear dijo que sí.' *Bustamante*, ut sup., 39. In the text I have followed Liceaga's version, who took great pains to arrive at the true account of this event. See his pages 11-14. He states that this young hero, well known in Guanajuato, was a mulatto 18 or 20 years of age, and named Mariano. He left Guanajuato the same evening, in the direction of Mellado, where he lived, accompanied by several others, carrying bags of money, and under the guard of some insurgent soldiers. As he was never seen again, Liceaga conjectures that he was murdered for his money. Bustamante gives to this youth the appellation of Pípila, a name unknown in Guanajuato according to Alaman and Liceaga.

When they see their barrier yielding to the flames, consternation falls on the besieged. As the fire eats its way into the wood, the impatient assailants rush at the door. It does not yet yield. Berzábal draws up in line before the entrance such soldiers as he can collect, to resist the attack. The deadly grenades are brought into play, and the havoc they cause is terrible. Gilberto Riaño, maddened at his father's death,[43] thinks only of revenge, and the infernal engines which he had contrived are hurled rapidly through the windows upon the multitude. Each bomb as it explodes sows the ground with dead and mangled bodies. But like the rushing-in of mighty waters, every space thus cleared is quickly filled.

The European civilians in the building are demoralized by panic fear. Some shower down among their foes money from the windows. Vain effort! As well throw crumbs to hungry wolves. Are not all the treasures of the alhóndiga theirs? Some throw aside their arms in despair and seek to disguise themselves; others wildly shout out that they will capitulate, and others betake themselves to prayer. A few, brave to the last, resolve to die rather than yield. Finally, confusion increasing and all hope abandoned, the asesor Valdés causes a white handkerchief to be hoisted as a signal of surrender. In denser crowds the besiegers surge forward. But Gilberto Riaño and others, ignorant of what Valdés has done, still cast their destructive bombs.[44] Whereat the besiegers in fury are beside themselves. The roar of the multitude as they raise the cry of Treachery! treachery! is heard all over the city,

[43] Bustamante relates that Gilberto, having embraced his father's body, seized a pistol with the intention of taking his own life. Those present, however, caused him to desist, by offering to post him at the most dangerous point, that he might have an opportunity of avenging his father's death. *Ut sup.*, 38.

[44] Both Mora and Bustamante state that the mistake was caused by the firing from the hacienda de Dolores, the defenders of which could not possibly see the signal. But as Alaman and Liceaga were both in Guanajuato at the time, I prefer to follow the account adopted in the text, and in which they agree.

and the order is issued to kill and spare not.[45] Against the burning door, although not yet consumed, they throw themselves until it yields, and the maddened crowd rush like a torrent of flame over the burning debris through the entrance. A deadly volley at point-blank range is poured into them by Berzábal and his men, strewing the ground with the dead. But their impetus is irresistible. Surging onward over the fallen, the human wave overwhelms or drives before it the defenders at the entrance, and Berzábal with a few survivors makes his last stand in a corner of the court.

The struggle is brief. His soldiers are soon stretched upon the pavement; the standard-bearers fall; but Berzábal, supporting the colors with his left arm, for a while defends himself with his sword, till pierced by a dozen lances he sinks lifeless on the ground,[46] still clinging to the standard in his death agony. The victors now rush forward into every part of the building, killing without mercy and without discrimination. Surrendered soldiers are cut down, and

[45] 'Gritaron todos como si los inflamase un mismo espíritu, traicion! traicion! y los gefes dieron orden de no otorgar la vida á nadie!' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 40. 'La algazara era espantosa, y se oía en todo Guanajuato, multiplicándose su éco por las quiebras y cañadas.' *Ib.*

[46] According to Bustamante, Berzabal fell before the alhóndiga was gained, his death being attributed to one of his soldiers, who shot him because of a reprimand. *Ib.* The father of Diego Berzábal, Don Baltasar, arrived in Mexico in 1743 and married Doña Juana Duarte, a lady of noble family. Four sons and two daughters were the result, Diego being born in Oajaca in November 1769, thus being a creole. At the age of twelve he was sent to Spain as a cadet in the regiment of Granada. Having returned to Mexico in 1789, he received an appointment in the regiment of Nueva España, and served in Santo Domingo during the revolution in that island. Having obtained the grade of captain, he was promoted to the rank of sargento-mayor of the provincial battalion of Guanajuato. As already noticed in the last chapter, it was to Major Berzábal that Garrido denounced Hidalgo's conspiracy. Berzábal was forty-one years of age at the time of his death, twenty-eight of which he passed in exemplary military service: 'sin haber sufrido jamas un [illegible] en sus hojas de servicio.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. [illegible] He left one son and three daughters. Berzábal was a zealous, [illegible] officer. In 1811 his widow caused two official investigations to be made of her late husband's conduct as a military officer, the [illegible] testimonials of his merits, and entirely [illegible] his death as given above. Alaman obtained [illegible] in possession of Berzábal's family, [illegible] app. 51–4.

civilians who have secreted themselves among the stores are dragged forth and ruthlessly butchered. Above the din, shots still are heard in different parts of the alhóndiga, as here and there some one still undaunted dearly sells his life and kills as he dies. But fainter and fainter grow these sounds, which presently cease; then for a brief space the dull, heavy thud of the death-blow is heard; and then all is still; resistance is at an end.

Pillage is next in order. From the living, the dying, and the dead, the clothes are torn. The storerooms are ransacked and the treasures carried off, the plunderers fighting among themselves for the spoils. What a sight is here, oh God! and all for liberty, all for tyranny; liberty or tyranny among some, with others, glory, gold, or plunder—among all with more or less of that horrid gratification a bloodhound feels as it tears its victim limb from limb and scatters around the bloody fragments. Blood! blood and mangled humanity everywhere. Nude, distorted forms lay stretched on heaps of maize saturated with blood, and on piles of silver bars dyed crimson; blood-stained pillagers bear off their blood-bespattered plunder over the pavements slippery with gore; while the wild gesticulations, the exultant shouts, and the savage oaths of the frenzied victors, would put to shame hell's banqueters!

When the Europeans who were in the hacienda de Dolores saw that the revolutionists had possession of the alhóndiga, they meditated escape by a side door on the north-west, which opened to the wooden bridge over the Rio de la Cata. It had, however, already been broken open by the insurgents, who were pouring in in overwhelming numbers. The doomed band —among whom was Francisco Iriarte, who, as the reader is aware, had been commissioned by the intendente to report to him Hidalgo's proceedings at Dolores—then retired to the well, which was situated in an elevated position. There they defended them-

selves till their last cartridge was spent, inflicting heavy loss upon their assailants, Iriarte alone killing eighteen. But the crowd now closed in upon them in overpowering numbers, and the ground was quickly covered with the slain. It is said that some, to avoid death by the hands of the merciless victors, threw themselves into the well.

By five o'clock in the afternoon the contest, which had lasted for four hours, ceased, and orders were given to take the prisoners to the jail from which the criminals had been released. Naked and wounded and bound with cords, the wretched survivors were dragged and driven along with insults, blows, and threats of death, many of them dying on the way. Others perished in the prison. Gilberto Riaño and Bernabé Bustamante, both badly wounded, were permitted to go into a private house, but died a few days afterward. Among the slain were sons of the first families of Guanajuato, and many of the principal citizens. With regard to the number killed no certainty can be arrived at, but it probably amounted to over six hundred men, soldiers and civilians.[4]

Of the insurgents, exclusive of the regular soldiers

[4] According to Bustamante, 1,000 Spaniards and an equal number of soldiers perished. *Cuna*, ii. 42. Alaman says about 200 soldiers and 1,000 Spaniards, following Bustamante, but remarking in a note, "Creo que mucho mayor numero de europeos." *Hist. de Mej.*, i. 444–5. Torrents of letters that more than 200 soldiers were slain, and not less than 150 Spaniards. *Hist. Mej.*, vi. 344. But Lerdo de Tejada examines the question with some closeness. He argues that the number of Europeans as given by Bustamante included known inhabitants of the city whose bodies were not found at the time. A large number of these were, of course, [illegible] at not less than 300, but, however, flocked to the city as a place of refuge from the surrounding [illegible] was as soon as the [illegible]. The greater part of these were unknown, [illegible] even by name to each. Most of the [illegible] persisted, and he considers that 1,000 Europeans as well as nearly all the soldiers. *Apunt. para Hist.*, 117. Alaman in bringing his, perhaps, overestimate of the number of Europeans, [illegible] the extent of the [illegible] character of the success. I think it probable that the soldiers have a considerably still greater proportion to the slain, as there were many Europeans in the city who were not soldiers, and these latter would have a chance to escape by [illegible] while the soldiers, and those first named authors would not. I may add that Lerdo, whose unmitigated partiality to Spaniards [illegible] the colonies leads him to make assertions which can only be classed as ridiculous, boldly states that 2,500 local victims were killed and 2,000 more cast into dungeons. *Hist. de Rev. Mex.*, i. 145. Robinson says, "The unfortunate Spaniards, and all who adhered to them, were sacrificed by the infuriated Indians." *Hist. of Mex.*, i. 28.

who fell on their side, at least two thousand Indians perished, the wounded being in small proportion to the dead, having been trampled to death by their infuriated comrades as they rushed forward to avenge them.[43]

The victory was dearly purchased, the loss sustained being so heavy that the revolutionary leaders deemed it prudent to conceal it. During the night great trenches were dug in the dry bed of the river and into them the dead were thrown. Some of the slain royalists were dragged by their arms and legs from the alhóndiga on the following morning and cast naked

[43] 'Seguramente pasaron de tres mil muertos los que hubo, aunque procuraron ocultar esta pérdida, enterrándolos secretamente en zanjones que hicieron en el rio.' *Guan. Púb. Vind. Ayunt.*, 22. Liceaga considers that the 3,000 slain as reported by the ayuntamiento to the viceroy represent nearly accurately the total number killed on both sides. Alaman regards the number as greatly exaggerated. Bustamante states that it was not known, on account of the Indians having buried their dead in the channel of the river by night. Zamacois places the number of victims at not less than 2,500.

The action of Riaño in withdrawing to the alhóndiga and leaving the city defenceless has been severely censured by some, who regard it as the cause of the disaffection of the populace and the future disasters which befell. The ayuntamiento, in its *Pública Vindicacion*...already quoted in note 13, urges that but for the abandonment of the city the populace would have remained loyal; but that when they perceived that the troops and Europeans had retired to the alhóndiga, they considered themselves deserted by them, 'comenzó á decir públicamente: que los gachupines y señores...querian defenderse solos y dexarlos entregados á el enemigo, y que aun los víveres les quitaban para que perecieran de hambre.' *Guan.*, ut sup., 16. There is, however, little doubt that the lower orders would have joined the insurgents in any case as soon as they appeared, and Riaño was well aware of this. Commissioner Constansó in his report, already mentioned in note 13 of this chapter, entirely exonerates Riaño from blame, considering his action 'conforme al dictámen de la sana razon y á la máxîma de sábios militares.' *Id.*, 74–5. Liceaga also argues in exculpation of the intendente, and asserts that it is falsely stated by the ayuntamiento that the populace only exhibited symptoms of disaffectation after the removal to the alhóndiga. One of the principal causes which influenced Riaño in his decision was the contemptuous manner in which the abolishment of tributes, published by him on the 21st, had been received; the proclamation being made a subject of ridicule, and the unfavorable feeling toward the government being apparent. The same author refutes both Alaman and Bustamante, who state that the abolishment of tribute was proclaimed on the 26th. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 74–5. Bearing in mind the responsibility of Riaño for the protection of the royal treasures and archives, his knowledge that the populace of all towns which Hidalgo had approached had enthusiastically declared for the revolution, his doubt about the fidelity of his own troops who had already been tampered with; and bearing in mind, also, the insolent bearing of the populace of Guanajuato, and the intendente's conviction that Calleja within a week would arrive to his support, I cannot but indorse Liceaga's views, and consider that the representations of the ayuntamiento were warped for the purpose of palliating the political outbreak which involved a fearful chastisement.

into the burial-ground of Belen, the body of the intendente alone being covered with a miserable shroud supplied by the friars of the convent.[49] Any manifestation of pity for the dead was dangerous.[50]

The capture of the alhóndiga was accomplished by no regular military tactics. Hidalgo's dispositions were only general, and confined to directions given to occupy the commanding heights. After the first attack the leaders had little control over their followers, who were little better than a mob of ill-armed and unorganized Indians. Yet there was courage among them, and love of country, self-sacrifice, and true heroism. With all the valor of veteran warriors, they here fought for the first time in their lives. Hidalgo's followers, united with the populace of the city, once launched against their oppressors, moved onward with irresistible force. At the sight of blood, their own blood, that of their comrades and of their enemies, they became demons infuriate. Bustamante relates that an Indian seized a bomb thrown at him and vainly strove to tear out the fuse with his teeth. The bomb exploded, blowing him to pieces. "It matters not," cried his comrades, "there are others behind."

Such were the first men who shed their blood in the cause of independence. On the side of the loyalists also individual acts of bravery were frequent, which bring to mind the dauntless bearing of the conquerors. Conspicuous among the cavalrymen, when they were surrounded, was José Francisco Valenzuela, who three times charged up and down the hill alone, clearing his way with his sabre. When

[49] Alaman relates that the body of Riaño was exposed for two days, to satisfy the curiosity of the populace as to whether he had a tail. It is said that the belief prevailed among some of the lower orders that all Spaniards had tails. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 435. Jews were thought to have tails, and as the Indians were taught to believe that the Spanish authorities were imbued with the anti-catholic doctrines of the French, they placed them in the category with the Jews. *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, vi. 394–5.

[50] 'A una muger le dieron una cuchillada en la cara, tan solo porque á la vista de un cadaver gritó despavorida...¡Ay! ¡pobrecito!' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 44.

dragged at last from his saddle on the points of lances, he still fought and slew his foes, shouting with his dying breath, Viva España![51]

When victory had declared for the insurgents, those who had remained inactive on the surrounding heights swarmed into the city to join in the plunder. As soon as the alhóndiga had been stripped of its treasures, a general assault was made on the shops and houses of the Europeans. During that night and for several succeeding days, pillage, devastation, and riot reigned. Above the noise of human voices were heard the hollow sounds of axe-blow and crow-bar on the doors, the rending of timbers, and the crashing of furniture wantonly destroyed. From the commercial stores merchandise of every description was seized. Bales of cambric and of cloth, sacks of cacao, and barrels of spirituous liquors were rolled into the streets, and sold to any who would buy for anything that could be obtained.[52]

Drunken Indians arrayed themselves in stolen clothing, and staggered along barefooted in bright uniforms and embroidered coats. The iron railings of the balconies were torn from the houses and the gratings from the windows. At night the streets were illumined by smoking torches, around which weird human forms, in every stage of drunkenness, yelled and gesticulated. The mining establishments in the city and neighborhood were ransacked, the precious metals, quicksilver, and implements carried off, and the machinery destroyed. In vain Hidalgo sought to arrest the depredation and disorder. A proclama-

[51] Valenzuela was a native of Irapuato and lieutenant of the cavalry troop of that town. Members of his family still lived there when Alaman wrote. *Hist. Méj.*, i. 429, and app. 77.

[52] Aguardiente was sold for five dollars a barrel, a sack of cacao or almonds for two dollars, a bale of cambric for four dollars, and bars of silver brought from the alhóndiga for five dollars. So ignorant of values were the country Indians that they sold their gold ounces for three or four reales to the men of Guanajuato, who told them that they were copper medals. 'Nothing,' says Robinson, 'can more strongly elucidate the wretched ignorance and poverty of the great mass of Indians.' *Mem. Mex. Rev.*, i. 29. Consult *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 121.

tion issued by him to that effect on the 30th was unheeded, and the rioters only ceased when their work was finished. The scene in Guanajuato was pitiable.[53]

[53] Hidalgo has been greatly blamed for the frightful excesses, as if it had been in his power to prevent them. Robinson holds that it was not extraordinary he should permit the Indians to enjoy the first fruits of their exertions. He considered it politic to let them have palpable proofs that they would profit by the revolution; and with regard to the slaughter of the Spaniards, it was impossible for him to prevent it. Nevertheless, many Europeans and creoles owed their lives to his protection, members of these latter incurring the same danger and violence as the former, their houses being sacked and their persons exposed to continual peril. The historian Alaman narrowly escaped ill treatment if not death, and Hidalgo, in person, with the sacred banner went to the succor of him and his family. Even his authority failed to disperse the crowd bent upon plundering the wealth of a Spaniard that had been secreted in Alaman's house, and it was only by Allende freely using his sword that the mob was driven back. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 438–41. The main authorities consulted for the above account of the taking of the alhóndiga de granaditas have been Alaman, Liceaga, and Bustamante. The testimony of Liceaga is of especial value, since he was a witness of the whole affair from the balcony of a house which commanded a view of the alhóndiga, and which he gained at the risk of his life. The object of his work *Adiciones y Rectificaciones á la Historia de Mexico que escribió D. Lucas Alaman*, published in Guanajuato in 1868, was, as its name implies, to correct mistakes which appear in Alaman's history, and fill up vacancies in the sequence of events by information which Alaman could not obtain. Liceaga, while complimenting Alaman for his diligence, close research, good judgment, and learning, and pronouncing his history the most complete of the kind and worthy of all appreciation, points out that in many portions of his work he had to depend upon the accounts of previous writers, which he himself asserts to be full of errors arising from the want of knowledge of some authors and the prejudiced views of others. Alaman consequently, with all his care, could not avoid falling into mistakes which Liceaga felt himself able to correct from personal observation and contact with eye-witnesses. The additions and corrections supplied by Liceaga do not form a connected history of the revolution, but they constitute a valuable supplement to Alaman's work, and throw light upon many points previously obscure. Many of his details, however, are of minor importance. His comments are generally sound, and his arguments commonly lead to correct conclusions, though more lately obtained evidence shows that occasionally his deductions have not hit the mark. With regard to the author himself, he was born in the city of Guanajuato on the 4th of July, 1788, his parents being Ramon Guillermo de Liceaga and [illegible] de Espinosa. His early education was received in the college of [illegible] and the convent of San Francisco in that city. In 1803 he entered the college of San Ildefonso in the city of Mexico, where he studied [illegible] 1806, when he commenced practical work [illegible] Domingo Lazo. In 1810 he received his diploma [illegible] during the period of the revolution [illegible] he filled several high [illegible] of the Suprema Tribunal [illegible] and district judge in 1827. In 1864, af[illegible] his advanced age and [illegible] the nominal enjoyment of his full [illegible] a small portion. Liceaga's [illegible] 1826 to 1824 and the work which he [illegible] a period of fifteen years. He [illegible] exactly one week before [illegible]

The streets were cumbered with the wrecks of furniture, debris, and destroyed goods. Hundreds of families were hopelessly ruined. Silence reigned within the bare walls of the deserted houses, and the curse of the destroying angel seemed to have fallen on the so lately thriving city.

CHAPTER VII.

HIDALGO'S MARCH TOWARD THE CAPITAL.

1810.

MILITARY PREPARATION OF VENEGAS—ACTION OF THE CHURCH AND INQUISITION—HIDALGO'S REPLY—HE ABOLISHES SLAVERY—HIS ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AT GUANAJUATO—A REFRACTORY AYUNTAMIENTO—HIDALGO ESTABLISHES A MINT—MARCHES AGAINST VALLADOLID—ADDITIONAL REËNFORCEMENTS—HIDALGO'S TREASURY—THE INSURGENTS MOVE TOWARD MEXICO—TRUJILLO DESPATCHED TO OPPOSE THEIR ADVANCE—TRUJILLO'S CHARACTER—ITURBIDE'S BIOGRAPHY—TRUJILLO'S MOVEMENTS—THE BATTLE OF LAS CRUCES—THE ROYALISTS FORCE THEIR WAY OUT—THEIR DEFEAT REGARDED AS A TRIUMPH—ALARM IN THE CAPITAL—ANOTHER SACRED BANNER—HIDALGO PERPLEXED.

WHEN Viceroy Venegas discovered how rapidly the rebellion was spreading, as day after day intelligence came of Hidalgo's progress and the defection of provincial troops, he saw that the affair was of a more serious nature than he had supposed possible. Without any definite knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, he had not the experience of even a few months of quiet administration to enable him to gain an insight into affairs. His position was a difficult one; but he applied himself with energy to the task of holding New Spain to its allegiance. The dispersal of the army concentrated by Iturrigaray now proved prejudicial to his purpose. Scattered as the troops were in provincial towns widely separated, it was not only a difficult matter to collect on the moment any considerable force, but an opportunity of spreading disaffection in the ranks had been afforded the insurgents, and the military were already widely infected with revolutionary sentiments.

At this period there were no European troops in New Spain; and though at a later date Spanish forces were sent into the country, their number was always greatly exceeded by that of the native regiments. Thus the combatants on either side were sons of the soil; and it is necessary to bear this in mind in order to appreciate the critical position in which the viceroy found himself at the outbreak of the rebellion, as well as the political division which existed in the ranks of the oppressed portion of the population. The total number of men which Venegas could count upon did not exceed ten or twelve thousand, the ranks and lower-grade officers of which were drawn almost exclusively from the mestizos, mulattoes, and other castes, the Indian element being small, since that race was exempt from military service. These troops, composed of regiments of the line and the provincial militia, although commanded by Spanish-European chiefs, were officered to a great extent by creoles. It is not, therefore, a matter of surprise that the viceroy's anxiety was extreme, in view of the doubtful loyalty of the military and the smallness of their number; although in this latter respect less fear was entertained by reason of the excellence of their organization and arms.

The first measure adopted by Venegas was to establish at Querétaro a force sufficient for the protection of that city. For this purpose, he ordered the provincial dragoon regiment of Puebla to hasten to the capital by forced marches; and on the 26th of September the Mexican infantry regiment of la Corona, under the command of Manuel Flon, conde de la Cadena and intendente of Puebla, was despatched from Mexico for Querétaro. A battery of four cannon, under the direction of Colonel Ramon Diaz de Ortega, was sent with these troops, who were joined a few days afterward by the Mexican dragoons of the line and those lately arrived from Puebla, with two battalions of grenadiers, each seven companies strong. The grenadiers were commanded by José Jalon, an

officer who had accompanied Venegas from Spain, the whole force being under the direction of Flon as commander-in-chief. In order to provide for the security of the capital, now almost without garrison, the infantry regiments of Puebla, Tres Villas, and Toluca were withdrawn from those towns, and two battalions formed from the crews of the frigate *Atocha* and other vessels at Vera Cruz, and placed under the command of the naval captain Rosendo Porlier.[1] Several battalions also of the volunteers of Fernando VII. were again raised in the city;[2] and Yermo, in his patriotic zeal for the mother country, equipped and maintained at his own expense five hundred cavalrymen drawn from the laborers on his estates.[3] Moreover, Colonel Diego García Conde was appointed comandante of Valladolid and sent thither without delay in company with Manuel Merino, the intendente of that province, and the conde de Rul, colonel of the provincial infantry. Meanwhile the comandantes Felix María Calleja and Roque Abarca, of San Luis Potosí and Guadalajara respectively, were getting their brigades into efficient condition.

But military operations were not the only means employed to crush the rebellion. Prices were put upon the heads of Hidalgo, Allende, and Aldama by the government;[4] the church excommunicated them,[5]

[1] These troops caused general disgust by their uncleanliness and want of soldierly deportment, and especially by their obscene and blasphemous language. The contrast between them and the provincial troops was marked. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 35; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 387.

[2] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 838–40; *Diario Mex.*, xiii. 590–2.

[3] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 165. José María Manzano also supplied from his haciendas horsemen to the number of fifty. *Ib.*

[4] Viceroy Venegas, by proclamation of September 27th, offered a reward of 10,000 pesos for the capture or death of these leaders. *Dispos. Varias*, ii. f. 5; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, 796–7. At a later date this sum was offered for the head of any one of them; and Guerra states that money and arms were advanced to a gambling officer who engaged to assassinate Hidalgo, 'pues este lo recibiria sin recelo como que era su compadre.' *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 301–2; *Dispos. Varias*, ii. f. 8.

[5] Manuel Abad y Queipo, bishop elect of Michoacan, published his excommunication by edict of September 24th. Abasolo was also included in it. The excommunicated were declared to be 'sacrilegos, perjuros, y que han incurrido en la excomunion mayor del Canon. Siquis suadente Diabolo.' All who aided or succored them were threatened with the same punishment of

adding the usual anathemas; the inquisition cited Hidalgo to appear before it, charging him with heresy and apostasy, and raking up old accusations brought against him ten years previously.[6] From the pulpit he was described as a demon of impiety, a monster of bane; and the royal university of Mexico gloried in the fact that he had never acquired the degree of doctor in that institution![7]

Every means, in fact, which would tend to prejudice the cause of independence was employed. The bishops and the higher clergy issued exhortations to loyalty, representing, in the darkest colors, the object of the insurgents as selfish, and their intentions as impious. The archbishop published edicts and pastorals;[8] politicians and officials, barristers, learned doctors of theology, and scribblers, heaped execrations on the authors of the revolution, and the press teemed with loyal productions in prose and doggerel verse, heaping abuse upon Hidalgo, and printed by permission of the supreme government.[9] The viceroy

greater excommunication. The validity of this excommunication was questioned by many, on the ground that Queipo had not yet been consecrated bishop. In order to terminate these doubts, Archbishop Lizana y Beaumont ratified it by edict of the 11th of October following. Mora, *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 52–8, supplies a copy of these edicts. Guerra maintains that Queipo had no power to excommunicate. *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 311–16. The bishops of Puebla and Guadalajara also fulminated excommunications. *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 64–5.

[6] *Dispos. Varias*, iii. fol. 152; vi. fol. 59; *Diario de Mex.*, xiii. 425–7. The edict of the inquisition was issued on the 13th of October.

[7] The rector of the university addressed an official communication to the viceroy, requesting him to make public the fact that Hidalgo's name did not appear in any of the books in which were registered the higher degrees conferred on its members. The request was made because the title of doctor was being constantly given to Hidalgo in the papers and public sheets of the day. *Id.*, 386–7. According to the citation of the inquisition, the cura of Dolores entertained a supreme contempt for the university faculty, which he regarded as a body of ignoramuses, 'y finalmente, que sois tan soberbio que decis, que no os habeis graduado de Dr en esta universidad, por ser su claustro una quadrilla de ignorantes.'

[8] Consult *Id.*, 453–6; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 100–4, 167–9; *Dispos. Varias*, ii. fol. 7; *Lizana y Beaumont, Exhortacion,...*Mex. 1810; *Id., Carta Gratul.*, Mex. 1810; *Queipo, Edict. Instruct.*, Sep. 30, 1810; *Id., Edict.*, Oct. 8, 1810; *Leon, El cura...á sus fieles habit.*, Querétaro, 1810; *Mendizábal, Sermon*, Mex. 1810.

[9] Consult a series of letters written by a Mexican doctor, as a specimen of the style of abuse. They are thus addressed to Hidalgo: 'Carta primera *De un Dr Mexicano al Br. D. Miguel Hidalgo Costilla, ex-Cura de Dolores, ex-Sa-*

issued proclamations, and denounced the rumors which prevailed of the cession of Mexico to France as groundless, attributing their origin to Hidalgo.[10] At the same time, town officers, governors, and other authorities were urged to express their fidelity to Spain, and their detestation of the revolution; while in order to conciliate the Indians they were relieved from the payment of tribute,[11] and measures taken for the improvement of their condition.

This action at first was not without effect, and the capital and many other cities remained loyal. The heaviest blow sustained by the revolutionists was that dealt by the church and inquisition. The awful denouncement of the leaders as heretics, their terrible punishment of greater excommunication, and the dread of the same appalling fate falling on them, working upon an ignorant and superstitious people, decided for a time the vacillating and deterred the disaffected. Hidalgo fully recognized that he had to fight with

cerdote de Cristo, ex-Cristiano, ex-Americano, ex-Hombre, y Generalísimo Capataz de Salteadores y Asesinos.' Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 625–95. Out of the innumerable publications issued during the first months of the revolution, I refer to the few following, anonymous and otherwise, all bearing the date of 1810: *San Salvador, Reflex. Pat. Am.; Id., Mem. Crist. Pol.; Id., Carta de un padre á sus hijos; Calvillo, Discurso sobre los males*, etc.; *García y García, Prosper. Union; Comoto, Discurso Patri.; Bellerrain, Exhort. Instruct.; Campo y Rivas, Manif. Filant.; Monterde, Proclama que el Intendente, etc.; Rivera, Manif.; Exhort. Diputac. Cortes; Montaña, Reflex. Alborotos; Mex. Alocuc. Real Col. Abogados; Exhort. Col. Abogados; Criollo Sensible, Proc.; Proclama* (signed L. B. J. G.); *Exhort. Patriot. Am.; Centinela contra los Seductores.* Among such expressions of loyalty, I find an appeal made to Hidalgo by one of his fellow-collegians in the Real y Primitivo Colegio de San Nicolás Obispo de Valladolid. It is signed Dr Blas Abadiano y Jasso. After briefly calling to mind Hidalgo's collegiate success, the high reputation he had acquired, and his preferments to the benefices of San Felipe and Dolores, the writer brings to notice his backsliding from the church, and indorses the action of the inquisition. 'Ah y con quanta razon el Santo Tribunal de la Inquisicion os ha declarado por herege formal! pues esta es una prueba nada equivoca de que pretendeis apagar la luz del Evangelio.' He then points out the irreparable harm done by Hidalgo, and implores him to cast aside his apostasy and rely upon the mercy of the inquisition. *Carta de un Concolega á Don Miguel Hidalgo.*

[10] *Venegas, Manifiesto*, 27 Oct. 1810.

[11] The order for the remission of tribute had been issued by the regency on the 20th of May preceding, negroes and mulattoes being included with Indians. Venegas published it on the 5th of October. *Dispos. Varias*, ii. fol. 6; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 173, 180–1; *Negrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, i. 195–205. The proclamation was published in the Spanish and Aztec languages. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 137–41.

weapons other than those used on the battle-field; and some weeks later he caused to be published in Guadalajara, which had fallen into his power, a reply to the citation of the inquisition and its charges against him. In this proclamation he solemnly declares that he had never departed from the holy catholic faith; he rebuts the accusations of heresy by calling attention to flagrant contradictions in them;[12] points out the evils with which the people of New Spain were oppressed, and calls on them to burst their bonds and establish a congress that shall dictate beneficent and discriminating laws suited to the several requirements of the different districts.

But other measures, also, were adopted by Hidalgo which inspired confidence in the uprightness of his motives, and afforded palpable illustrations of the benefits to be derived from independence. He ordered the emancipation of slaves, under penalty of death to their owners; he released Indians and persons of all castes from the payment of tributes;[13] and on the

[12] 'Se me acusa de que niego la existencia del infierno, y un poco antes se me hace cargo de haber asentado que algun pontífice de los canonizados por santo está en este lugar. ¿Como, pues, concordar que un pontífice está en el infierno, negando la existencia de este.' And again: 'Se me imputa tambien el haber negado la autenticidad de los sagrados libros, y se me acusa de seguir los perversos dogmas de Lutero: si Lutero deduce sus errores de los libros que cree inspirados por Dios, ¿cómo el que niega esta inspiracion sostendrá los suyos deducidos de los mismos libros que tiene por fabulosos? Del mismo modo son todas las acusaciones.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 439. This writer obtained an original copy of this document from the licentiate Mariano Otero, who assured him that it was one of very few which had been saved in the town of Tizapam in Jalisco. Hidalgo's reply was so convincing that the inquisition felt compelled to issue another edict in defense of the glaring contradictions contained in the first. In this it was stated that although the heresies imputed to Hidalgo were contradictory in themselves, they had not been developed in him at the same time, but in distinct epochs. *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 65. By the detractors of Hidalgo, his defence of his reputation is regarded as the admission of weakness. It was, however, a political necessity. Personally he cared nothing either for the inquisition or the bishops, but he well knew their power over the people, and it was in the highest degree important to refute their statements, especially as in August 1808 the inquisition had condemned as heretical the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Copy of edict in *Diario de Mex.*, ix. 271–3, 275.

[13] See Ansorena's proclamation at Valladolid Oct. 19, 1810, issued in compliance with Hidalgo's orders. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 169–70. On the 29th of Nov. Hidalgo published a decree commanding the manumission of slaves within ten days. This was confirmed by another of the 16th of Dec. Both these documents exist in the collection of Hernandez

5th of December ordered the restoration of their lands to the Indians of the district of Guadalajara.[14] By this policy Hidalgo succeeded in greatly counteracting the expedients to which his opponents resorted.

When some degree of order had been arrived at in Guanajuato, Hidalgo proceeded to make arrangements for the further progress of his enterprise. The more grievously wounded of the European prisoners were removed to the alhóndiga, where they were duly cared for; others were confined in the infantry barracks, while some few were allowed to return to their homes. At a later date all the European captives, including those brought from the different towns which the insurgents had passed through, were collected in the alhóndiga to the number of 247. Those who were allowed their liberty were, however, required to sign a written engagement not to take up arms against the independent cause, under penalty of death.[15] Spanish ecclesiastics of both the secular and regular orders were also left free, and Hidalgo issued especial commands that they should in no way be molested.

Having secured for administrative expenses but a small proportion of the treasures deposited in the alhóndiga, he appropriated, as an unavoidable necessity, considerable sums belonging to private individuals.[16] He next proceeded to organize the civil government of the province. Having summoned the ayuntamiento, he demanded to be recognized as captain-general of

y Dávalos; copies of them are to be found in *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, 2ª ep., iii. 54–6. Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 88, finds fault with Hidalgo for abolishing slavery without compensation to the owners. Alfredo Chavero remarks that Alaman considered the question in a financial point of view, like the abolition of a tobacco privilege, whereas Hidalgo only regarded the emancipation of his brethren. *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, ut sup., 56.

[14] Copy of order is supplied in *Mex. Relat. Art. de Fondo*, 26.

[15] A distinction was made between Spaniards who had offered resistance in the alhóndiga and those who had remained in their houses, the latter being allowed to remain at liberty under the condition mentioned in the text. *Lizana, Adic. y Rectific.*, 124–5.

[16] From the house of Bernabe Bustamante he took 40,000 pesos which had been concealed in the water-cistern, the secretion of which a faithless servant revealed. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 442.

America, as had been done at Celaya, and stated that as it was his prerogative he should proceed at once to the appointment of alcaldes ordinarios. Thereupon he named José Miguel de Rivera Llorente and José María Hernandez Chico. A few days later he called an assembly of the ayuntamiento, the clergy, and principal citizens, for the purpose of appointing officers of the civil government. The ayuntamiento, however, was not well disposed to the new order of things; and when Hidalgo nominated the regidor Fernando Perez Marañon intendente, he declined the position, as also did the regidores José María Septiem, Pedro de Otero, and Martin Coronel. Hidalgo now became irritated, and when the regidores endeavored to explain that they could not reconcile ideas of independence with their oath of allegiance to Fernando VII., or the motto on his own standard, he angrily exclaimed: "There is no longer a Fernando VII.!"[17] Finding the ayuntamiento thus intractable, without further delay Hidalgo appointed José Francisco Gomez, who had been adjutant major of the provincial infantry regiment of Valladolid, intendente of the province, with the rank of brigadier, Cárlos Montesdeoca his asesor ordinario, and Francisco Robledo promotor fiscal, giving them to understand that they must accept the appointments without demur.

The captain-general now turned his attention to the organization and equipment of his army. The cavalry was quartered in the mining establishments which had been sacked, and for the future protection of which he appointed Pedro Mariño as overseer, charged with the care of them. Two additional infantry regiments were raised; one at Valenciana, of which he appointed Casimiro Chovell colonel,[18] and the other in Guanajuato, the command of which Hidalgo gave to Bernardo

[17] *Guan., Pub. Vind. Ayunt.*, 37. According to the same authority, the standard bore the words: 'Viva la Religion, viva Fernando VII., y viva la América.'

[18] Chovell was the superintendent of the Valenciana mine. *Alaman*, ut sup., 446.

Chico.[19] These troops were armed only with lances, an attempt made to convert quicksilver flasks into hand-mortars having failed. Hidalgo also endeavored, with but partial success, not only to cast cannon, but to fabricate them of wood, both kinds proving unserviceable. Numerous were the military appointments made by revolutionary leaders, among which may be mentioned that of José María Liceaga as lieutenant-colonel of the last-named regiment,[20] who played a prominent part during the course of the revolution. Although Hidalgo's treasury now contained more than half a million pesos, inconvenience arose because so much of it was in silver bars. The establishment of a mint was therefore necessary, and on the 5th of October the work of constructing the machinery and dies was commenced, José Mariano de Robles being made superintendent. The establishment was almost completed by the 25th of November, when the Spanish army under Calleja entered Guanajuato and took possession of it.[21]

Hidalgo was fully informed of the preparations for the suppression of the rebellion which were being made by Calleja at San Luis Potosí,[22] as well as of the measures that had been taken for the protection of Querétaro, and therefore decided to march against Valladolid. On the 8th of October he sent forward a detachment of three thousand men under the command of Mariano Jimenez, whom he had made colonel, and on the 10th followed with the main body,

[19] Son of a European of the same name. 'unico de las familias respetables de Guanajuato que tomo parte en la revolucion.' *Ib.*

[20] Luis Liceaga was a cousin of the author of the *Adic. y Rectific.*, already frequently quoted. Their christian and surnames being the same has caused some confusion. See note 2 on pages 131–3 of Liceaga's work.

[21] The artisans displayed great skill in the construction of the machinery and implements and in the engraving of the dies. These were so perfect as to rival those in the mint at Mexico. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 47; *Alaman*, *Hist. Méj.*, i. 448–9.

[22] Much alarm was caused in Guanajuato Oct. 21 by the report that Calleja was marching on the city, and he had already arrived at Valenciana. Hidalgo sent out troops to verify the statement. Allende going to San Miguel and Celaya; but the report proved false. Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectific.*, 127–9; Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 47–8; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, i. 449–50.

leaving the European prisoners still in the alhóndiga under guard.[23]

The reader will recollect that when the bishopric of Michoacan was established in 1536, Tzintzuntzan was elected as the cathedral town.[24] In 1554, however, the episcopal seat was removed to Pátzcuaro,[25] whence it was finally transferred in 1580 to the city of Valladolid, in conformity with a bull issued by Pius V. in 1571.[26] This city was originally founded by Cristóbal Olid in the valley of Guayangaréo, which name was bestowed upon the town and retained until 1540, when it was refounded and formally settled by Viceroy Mendoza, who changed the name to that of Valladolid in honor of his birthplace in Spain. For the purpose of insuring its stability and prosperity, Mendoza sent several noble Spanish families from Mexico to the revived settlement, and among the first settlers mention must be made of Juan de Villaseñor Cervantes, from whose family Iturbide was descended. In 1553 Charles V. ennobled the city and granted it a coat of arms.[27]

[23] Hidalgo's route lay through the valley of Santiago and Acámbaro.

[24] See *Hist. Mex.*, ii. 392, this series. Tzintzuntzan is Tarascan for humming-bird, a name which the town derived from the great numbers found in the vicinity, the capture of which and the use of the plumage in ornamenting mosaic and hieroglyphical designs constituted an important occupation of the inhabitants. *Romero, Notic. Mich.*, 78.

[25] *N. Esp. Brev. Res.*, MS., ii. 247. Romero states that the removal took place in 1540. *Notic. Mich.*, 71. Pátzcuaro, before the conquest, was a suburban ward of Tzintzuntzan, and became the pleasure resort of the Michoacan monarchs who built their court there. According to some linguists, the meaning of the word is 'the place of joy.' *Ib.*

[26] *N. Esp. Brev. Res.*, MS., ii. 247.

[27] *Ib.; Villaseñor, Teat.*, ii. 8–9; *Gonzalez Dávila, Teat. Eccles.*, i. 107; *Romero, Notic. Mich.*, 40. In Gonzalez Dávila, page 136, is given a wood-cut of the arms. The shield, which is surrounded by a crown, is divided in three parts, two occupying the upper portion and the third the lower. In each division is the representation of a crowned king holding a sceptre in his right hand, the left being extended with the palm open. The field is surrounded by a scrolled border. The arms first granted in 1553 were different. They consisted of a plain unornamented shield, surmounted by a crown and divided horizontally. In the upper half is a lake with a peñol in the centre, on the summit of which stands a church of St Peter. Three smaller eminences rise from the lake at the base. In the lower half is a representation of the cathedral, which was dedicated to San Salvador. *Id.*, 110. The three kings according to Romero were intended to represent Cárlos V., his brother Maximiliano, and Philip II.

From the time of the removal of the episcopal seat to Valladolid the progress of the city was steady; and though not situated near any of the great commercial highways, its population so increased, owing to the general prosperity of the province, that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the number of families there was some five thousand. At this time Michoacan had become one of the largest and most important divisions of New Spain, its principal wealth being derived from its prolific soil, which yielded two crops annually.[28] It was during this century that the

ARMS OF VALLADOLID.

ARMS GRANTED IN 1553.

province underwent a great physical convulsion. In the department of Ario, in the southern portion of the territory, extends a vast plain of wonderful fruitfulness, occupied by rich plantations of cotton, indigo, and sugar-cane. Here was situated the hacienda of San Pedro de Jorullo, famous throughout Michoacan for its size, value, and productiveness. On this estate

[28] It is related that a farmer named Francisco de Torres harvested on one occasion [illegible] fanegas of wheat in return for four fanegas sown, or 150 fold. [illegible]

immense herds of cattle were raised, and extensive tracts planted with sugar-cane and indigo.[29]

Toward the end of June 1759, the people on the hacienda were thrown into great alarm by the sound of subterranean rumblings and heavy, dull reports. Later these noises were accompanied by shocks of earthquake, which kept increasing in number and intensity. A prediction was current among the laborers that the hacienda would be destroyed by fire issuing from the bowels of the earth on San Miguel's day, and wild consternation now prevailed. In September great numbers of them abandoned their work and fled to the mountains for safety. Spiritual aid was sought, and on the 21st a novena of masses was commenced and confessions were heard. But these ceremonies were ineffectual to quell the subterranean thunderings, or allay the agitation of the Indians, who continued to take refuge on the neighboring heights. On the 29th, San Miguel's day, with fearful uproar the laboring earth burst open at about a mile from the buildings of the hacienda, belching forth flames and hurling burning rocks to prodigious heights through a dense cloud of ashes rendered lurid by volcanic fire. A new volcano had arisen. The ground to the extent of three or four square miles swelled up like a bladder, the centre of which burst, exhibiting a fiery abyss, surrounded by thousands of small cones or earth-bubbles.[30] Into the chasms the waters of Cuitamba and San Pedro were precipitated, increasing the commotion. Deluges of hot mud were hurled over the surrounding land, while columns of flame blazed upward to such a height that they were visible at Pátzcuaro. The houses of Querétaro, distant more than forty-eight leagues in a straight line, were cov-

[29] The possessor of this magnificent estate was J. Andrés de Pimentel, a citizen and regidor of Pátzcuaro, according to an official report of the occurrence in *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, 2ª ep., ii. 561.

[30] Called by the natives *hornitos*, or ovens. Humboldt visited the scene of this catastrophe in 1803, and found that the thermometer when inserted into crevices in these ovens rose to 202°. For his account of the occurrence, see *Essai Pol.*, 248–54.

ered with ashes. The beautiful hacienda of Jorullo was destroyed, as well as other plantations, by the volcanic deposits of sand and mud and stones.[31] Great numbers of live-stock perished, and hundreds of families were reduced to want. In the centre of the ovens six enormous masses were projected to the height of from 1,300 to 1,650 feet above the old level of the plain. The most elevated of these is the volcano of Jorullo.

The limits of Michoacan were not distinctly defined till 1787, when the intendencias were founded, previous to which time the political government had been invested in alcaldes mayores and corregidores, and governors.[32] The extent of the ancient province was much larger than the state of the present day, since it comprised the territory of the modern state of Guerrero. Besides this reduction, minor variations have been made in its boundary lines, and its present area contains about 3,620 square leagues, its greatest length being 94 and its greatest width 66 leagues. On the south-west it is bounded by the Pacific, its coast line being thirty-nine leagues in length. Michoacan is abundantly watered by rivers abounding in fine fish of many varieties, from the quantity and excellence of which the state derives its name, which means in the Tarascan tongue the land of fish.[33]

When the authorities at Valladolid became aware of the danger which threatened their city, they were greatly disturbed, the more so because they found themselves without a governor or military chief. They nevertheless made some show of preparations for defence, beginning to cast cannon and enlist soldiers under the direction of the bishop Abad y Queipo and the prebendado Agustin Ledos. News, however,

[31] The value of the buildings and working establishments on the hacienda de Jorullo were alone valued at $150,000. *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, 2ª ep., ii. 563.

[32] *Gonzalez Dávila, Teat. Eccles.*, i. 107. The first governor of the province was Colonel Martin Reinoso, who arrived from Spain in December 1755. *Castro, Diario*, 193. Juan Antonio de Riaño y Bárcena was the first intendente. *Cedulario*, MS., iii. f. 2.

[33] *Florencia, Hist. Prov. Comp. Jesus*, 212; *Romero Notic. Mich.*, 33.

presently arrived of the capture near Acámbaro of the intendente Merino, the comandante García Conde, and Colonel Rul by the guerrilla chief Luna,[34] and this so disheartened them that, on the approach of Hidalgo, all thought of resistance was laid aside, and the bishop, most of the chapter, and many Europeans hastily left the capital and proceeded by different routes to Mexico.[35]

In following the career of a great personage, we cannot but note how easily and naturally genius falls into any position, and adapts the man to the circumstances. So it was with Hidalgo: lately a humble priest, now at the head of a large army, fighting battles, making and unmaking rulers, and all with calmness and facility as if he had been accustomed to the work from his youth. Not that the cura was by any means a proficient soldier; on the contrary, he was no soldier at all, did not pretend to be one, and would have been filled with joy unbounded were there any other means at hand to secure his sacred cause. He was not even a cunning man of the world. He was not working for greatness of name or ambition, or for money or power. He would have his country move toward independence. The full glory of it he never expected to see. Yet he would do what he could; his life he would cheerfully give. Such was the quality of his greatness, patriotic, pure, amiable, ethereal, not crafty, not subtle, and not always the most successful.

On the 15th of October the van of the insurgents arrived at the suburbs of Valladolid without opposition;

[34] For an account of their capture, see *García Conde, Informe*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 268. It was during this period that the guerrilleros sprung into existence in Mexico. Bold and lawless men, when Hidalgo's army became dispersed, carried on hostilities against the royalists independently, yet they rendered important services for the revolutionists during the whole course of the war, and many of their leaders were conspicuous for their heroism and noble qualities. *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 109–11.

[35] The asesor, José Alonso de Teran, with many others, was detained at Huétamo by the cura, who roused the people of the town. They were sent back to Valladolid and delivered up to Hidalgo.

and on the 17th Hidalgo came up in person, the number of his forces now amounting to sixty thousand.[36] His reception was not wholly to his liking; for although a commission came out to meet him, and the bells sounded a welcome, when he found that the cathedral was closed on dismounting in front of it to render thanks for his successful entry, he was very indignant. Nor was his anger allayed when, the gates having been at last opened by the servants of the sacristy, he was received only by the chaplains of the choir, and the te deum was badly chanted to peals of the organ abominably played.[37] He resented the slight by forthwith pronouncing vacant all the canonical seats except three.[38]

On the departure of the bishop, the canon, conde de Sierra Gorda, had been left in charge of the mitre, and Hidalgo intimated to him that it would be well to remove the excommunication fulminated against himself and his followers by the fugitive prelate. The obsequious canon complied; the proclamation was taken from the doors of the churches, and circulars sent to the curas in the diocese, informing them that the leaders of the revolutionists had incurred no ecclesiastical censure, and instructing them to read to their flocks on a feast day the removal of the excommunication.[39]

Before entering the city, Hidalgo had promised a commission sent out to receive him that rights of property should be respected, and during the entry no violence was attempted. But the taste for spoils

[36] According to Bustamante. Mora, however, places the number at 40,000. *M[illegible] y sus R[illegible]*, iv. 68. Hidalgo had with him two bronze cannon and two wooden ones.

[37] For these particulars and antecedent events, consult Canon Betancourt's report in *[illegible]*, iii. 406 et seq., and the manifesto of the ayuntamiento of Valladolid, in *Id.*, v. 86-7.

[38] According to Betancourt, those of the conde de Sierra Gorda, Gomez [illegible], and his own, 'porque fue al Parlamento.' The ayuntamiento states [illegible] 'dare por vacantes todas las prebendas por la impolitica [illegible] el Cabildo en mi recibimiento.' *Ib.*, and *Id.*, iii. 411.

[39] [illegible] conde de Sierra Gorda exculpated himself to the viceroy by declar[illegible] had acted under compulsion, 'desdiciendose de lo que habia ejecu[illegible] a coaccion, terror y violencia.' *B[illegible]amante*, [illegible] *[illegible]*, ii. 166-7, 313-4.

among the natives once gratified was not easily controlled. Next day several Spanish houses were assaulted and sacked. Hard as it was to learn, a lesson of discipline must be given. Allende opened fire on his men. Several were killed and wounded; the crowds dispersed and the disorder was stopped.[40] It had hardly ceased, however, before a more serious trouble occurred. The Indians, accustomed to simple diet, had given themselves up to gluttony and drunkenness, gorging themselves with sweetmeats and fruits, and pouring down spirituous liquors like water. The consequence was that a deadly sickness broke out, carrying off many in a few hours. The cry was raised that the aguardiente had been poisoned. Allende, by his presence of mind, however, suppressed the tumult. Drinking in the presence of the multitude a cup of the condemned liquor, he proved to the Indians that their fears were groundless.[41]

At Valladolid Hidalgo's force was increased by the important addition of well armed and well disciplined troops. They consisted of the regiment of provincial infantry, the regiment of the Michoacan dragoons, more generally known by the name of the Pátzcuaro regiment, and eight companies of recruits lately raised and equipped by the bishop and chapter. Additional cannon were also added to his artillery, a means of warfare which the first leaders of the revolution regarded with too high an estimation, directing their principal attention to the casting of as many and as large pieces as possible. Experience taught them their mistake; for to unskilled gunners artillery was of little service.

Having concluded his military preparations, and placed José María Anzorena at the head of the gov-

[40] *Ansorena, Defensa*, 10. Bustamante makes the assertion that the artilleryman fired without orders, killing and wounding 14 of the Indians. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 75.

[41] Betancourt narrates that dining with Hidalgo he was compelled by Allende to drink a glass of the liquor supposed to be poisoned. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 413–14.

ernment,[42] Hidalgo, who had already decided to march against the capital without delay, left Valladolid on the 20th of October,[43] taking with him nearly all the church funds, and those of private individuals deposited for security in the coffers of the cathedral. Besides these funds, which amounted to $200,000, he obtained other large sums from the residents of Valladolid. Aware that Calleja's preparations would soon be completed, Hidalgo hurried forward. At Acámbaro he held a review of his forces, now numbering 80,000, an unwieldy, disorderly mass, which



HIDALGO'S MARCH AGAINST MEXICO.

he divided into regiments of infantry and cavalry, each 1,000 strong. Here he was proclaimed generalísimo[44] at a council of the chiefs, and he conferred

[42] Anzorena, as the sequel will show, proved himself a stanch partisan of the revolutionists.

[43] This is the date given positively by Betancourt. Bustamante gives the 19th of Oct. as the day of Hidalgo's departure.

[44] *Garcia Conde, Informe*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 270–1. Hidalgo's uniform was a blue coat with red cuffs and collar bordered with gold and silver galloon, his shoulder belt being of black velvet similarly bordered. Suspended from his neck he wore a large gold medal bearing the image of the virgin of Guadalupe. The uniform of Allende consisted of a jacket of blue cloth with red cuffs and collar, the seams being covered with silver galloon. Around each shoulder was a silver cord with pendent button. The lieutenant-general's uniforms were distinguished from his by having only

on Allende the rank of captain-general; Aldama, Ballerza, Jimenez, and Joaquin Arias being appointed lieutenant-generals. From Acámbaro the generalísimo directed his march by way of Maravatío, Tepetongo, and Ixtlahuaca, and rapidly approached the capital.

When intelligence was received in Mexico of Hidalgo's coming, Venegas laid his plans to oppose him. He had already at his disposal forces amounting to 7,000 men,[45] and despatched Lieutenant-colonel Torcuato Trujillo with a portion of them to watch Hidalgo's movements, and, if possible, arrest his advance.[46] Trujillo had accompanied Venegas from Spain, and the viceroy, who as yet had but little confidence in Mexican commanders in spite of their protestations, deemed it prudent to place one of his own men at the head of so important an undertaking. It was not altogether a happy choice. Trujillo, indeed, was faithful enough; but he had one fault, he was a fool. Conceited, shallow-headed, he soon succeeded in exciting the profound disgust of all around him. As a man, his followers hated him; as a soldier, they held him in contempt. His conduct as a military com-

one shoulder cord, that on the right. *Ib.; Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 305–6; *Resum. Hist. Insurr. N. Esp.*, 8.

[45] Bustamante says the force consisted of the infantry regiment of New Spain, a battalion of infantry of Mexico, another called the Cuahutitlan battalion, a battalion del fijo de México, the provincial militia regiment of Puebla, the city bakers' dragoons, two infantry battalions of merchants, three of the patriots of Fernando VII., a section of artillery, in addition to the veteran artillery, a troop of cavalry of the patriots, the militia infantry regiment of Toluca, and the Tulancingo, and various other pickets—in all 7,000 men. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 76.

[46] The forces placed under Trujillo's command were the infantry regiment of Tres Villas, which had lately arrived, a battalion of the provincial militia of Mexico, and a portion of the dragoons of Spain. These were afterward reenforced by 50 volunteers with two cannon, commanded by Juan Bautista de Ustariz, a lieutenant of the navy, and about 330 men drawn from the haciendas of Yermo and a Mexican named Manzano. Authors differ as to the total number. Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, i. 475, states that it barely reached 1,400; the author of *Insurrec. Resum. Hist.*, 9, makes it amount to 2,000; Mora, *Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 73, raises it to 2,500; while Torrente, *Hist. Rev. Hisp. Am.*, i. 151, places the number at about 1,200. Guerra makes it 1,500. *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 325. Negrete considers that the number may be safely estimated at 2,500. *Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, i. 354.

ernment,[42] Hidalgo, who had already decided to against the capital without delay, left Valla the 20th of October,[43] taking with him nearly church funds, and those of private individ posited for security in the coffers of the ca Besides these funds, which amounted to $2 he obtained other large sums from the resi Valladolid. Aware that Calleja's preparation soon be completed, Hidalgo hurried forwar Acámbaro he held a review of his forces, now bering 80,000, an unwieldy, disorderly mass.



HIDALGO'S MARCH AGAINST MEXICO.

he divided into regiments of infantry and ca each 1,000 strong. Here he was proclaimed g simo[44] at a council of the chiefs, and he con

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mander was marked by cruelty and treachery. In after days the sound of his name did not ring pleasantly in the ears of the revolutionists.

There was at this time in the city of Mexico a young lieutenant, who had lately come from Valladolid flying before Hidalgo. His name was Agustin Iturbide. The first historical mention of him is found in the official journal of September 21, 1808,[47] where he is commended for his zeal in offering support to the new government after the deposal of Iturrigaray. At this time he was a lieutenant of the provincial infantry regiment of Valladolid. He was born in that city on the 27th of September, 1783, his father, Joaquin de Iturbide, being a native of Pamplona, in the kingdom of Navarre. The families of both his father and mother, whose maiden name was Josefa de Aramburu, were distinguished. Agustin while a child narrowly escaped death by fire, being rescued almost miraculously from his burning home. His school education was limited, he having applied himself to the management of one of his father's haciendas when only fifteen years of age; at which time also he entered the regiment of provincial infantry of Valladolid as ensign, and henceforth adopted the military profession. In 1805 he espoused Doña Ana María Huarte, a creole of good family. He was present with his command at the military encampment at Jalapa, and in 1809 assisted in suppressing the premature attempt at revolution in his native city.

When Hidalgo took the field he invited Iturbide to join him, offering him the rank of lieutenant-general. The latter, however, refused;[48] and when Hidalgo drew near Valladolid, Iturbide, seeing no prospect of

[47] *Gaz. de Mex.*, xv. 702.

[48] Hidalgo sent this invitation while he was approaching Valladolid, according to Iturbide in his manifiesto. Alaman points out that this evidence refutes Rocafuerte's statement—published in his pamphlet directed against Iturbide under the title of *El Pigmalion Americano*—that he declined to take part in the revolution because he could not obtain the same grade as in the royalist army. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 463.

a successful defence, repaired to the capital with seventy soldiers of his regiment who remained loyal to the service. When Trujillo was sent to oppose Hidalgo's advance, Iturbide obtained permission to accompany him, and thus he found himself afloat on his ambitious career.

Meanwhile the two armies approach, and one must give way before the other. But first it is destined that they fight. Trujillo, having arrived at Toluca,[49] sent forward a detachment to occupy the bridge of Don Bernabé over the River Lerma and intermediate between Toluca and Ixtlahuaca whither Hidalgo had arrived. On the 27th the royalist leader moved forward his troops with the intention of attacking the insurgents at the latter place, distant nine leagues, but



PLAN OF BATTLE-FIELD OF LAS CRUCES.

[49] Explanation of the plan.
A. Infantry of the royal army.
B. Infantry of the insurgents.
C. Cavalry of royal army.
D. Cavalry of the insurgents.
E. Royal troops on the march.
F. Insurgent troops on the march.

meeting his advance guard in full flight, and learning that Hidalgo was approaching with all his forces, he fell back to the small town of Lerma, where he hoped to hold the enemy in check by barricading and defending the bridge. On the 28th, as no enemy appeared, Trujillo suspected that Hidalgo had directed his march to the bridge of Atengo, with the object of occupying the Santiago road and attacking the royalists in the rear, at the same time cutting off their retreat to the capital. He therefore sent a detachment to defend that point, and gave orders to the subdelegado of Santiago Tianguistengo to destroy the bridge. This order, however, was not carried out, and on the 29th Allende, with a large body of troops, forced the defenders from their position and gained the Santiago road.

Meanwhile Hidalgo with the rest of his forces marched toward Lerma; and Trujillo, as soon as he learned that the bridge of Atengo, had been lost, saw the necessity of retreating toward the capital, and accordingly withdrew to the mountain pass called the monte de las Cruces,[50] leaving José de Mendívil with one of the two battalions of which the regiment of Tres Villas was composed, and Francisco Bringas with a troop of cavalry, to hold the Lerma bridge until the different sections of the army had united at las Cruces. At five o'clock in the afternoon, Mendívil, supported in the rear by Bringas, commenced his retreat, leaving only a small force under Captain Pino to defend the bridge; and so well did this officer perform his duty that he did not retire until late at night. The position to which Trujillo had withdrawn was a strong one, but it had the disadvantage of being commanded on the south by neighboring hills covered with forest, and by other heights on the north side of the Toluca road. Allende well knew the importance

[50] So called because of the numerous crosses erected there to mark the places where travellers had been murdered by bandits; that hill being a favorite resort of robbers.

of the situation, and had made all haste to occupy it from the Santiago road; but Trujillo's march had been equally rapid, and the royalists gained the eminence first, anticipating, however, the insurgent force only by half an hour.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 30th, the action commenced by light skirmishing between the royalist cavalry and guerrilla bands in advance of the main body of insurgents. Opportunely for Trujillo, he received at this time a reënforcement of two cannon, with an escort of fifty Spanish volunteers, under Captain Antonio Bringas, and 330 mounted lancers from the haciendas of Yermo and José María Manzano,[51] the whole force being placed under the command of Juan Bautista de Uztariz, a lieutenant of the royal navy. About eleven o'clock the attacking column of the insurgents, with the artillery in front, came in sight on the road from Toluca. It consisted of the infantry provincial regiment of Valladolid, the Celaya companies, and the Guanajuato battalion, which were flanked by the provincial dragoons of Pátzcuaro and la Reina, the rear being brought up by the dragoons of el Príncipe—a force in itself greatly superior to that of Trujillo, but which being without efficient officers had already lost much of its discipline. These were preceded on the front and flanks by crowds of ill-armed Indians, and numerous bands of horsemen, who streamed along the Toluca road or wound round the sides of the hills wherever the ground was practicable for horses. Trujillo now made preparations to receive the coming attack. His two field-pieces were placed in position so as to enfilade the road and adjacent ground, and were hidden from sight with

[51] The stanch loyalist Gabriel Yermo, who had displayed such tact in the deposal of Iturrigaray, supplied at his own cost 400 lancers from his haciendas, while his brother Juan Antonio furnished 100 more. These troops were known by the name of the negros de Yermo, and did good service during the war. Of these lancers 279 were sent to Trujillo, according to Yermo's statement of services rendered, *Rev. N. Esp. Verdad. Orig.*, no. ii. 56–7, although Trujillo in his official report to the viceroy states that there were only 150. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 923.

branches of trees, in order to increase the confidence of the enemy. The cavalry was ordered to fall back upon the line without engaging in action, and the fifty volunteers lately arrived, with the lancers of Yermo commanded by Captain Antonio Bringas, supported by two companies of the Tres Villas regiment under the command of Lieutenant Ramon Reyes, were placed in ambush on a wooded height at some distance from the left flank. Trujillo commanded the centre in person, occupying the level summit which overlooks the pass, and on which was planted one of the field-pieces, while Mendívil with the other occupied the front, covering the main approach.

Hidalgo had left the formation of the plan of battle to Allende, and that officer made preparations to surround Trujillo while the main attack was being made in front. For this purpose strong detachments of the better armed Indians, both of foot and horse, were sent by long detours to take possession of various heights commanding Trujillo's flanks, and a force of 3,000 foot and horse was despatched to occupy the road to Mexico in the rear of the enemy. Moreover, a select body of 1,200 of the best disciplined men of all arms was thrown out on the right flank, and took up a position out of range of Trujillo's artillery, and opposite to the place where Bringas was ambushed. The command of the infantry was given to Juan Aldama and Luis Malo, and that of the artillery to Mariano Jimenez, while Allende himself commanded the cavalry.[52]

At eleven o'clock the attacking column, preceded by the four pieces of artillery already mentioned, ap-

[52] *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 139. According to Mora, Allende thought the undisciplined masses should not take part in the general action, but should be posted as rear-guards to the different divisions, where they might prove of service as occasion offered. The Indians, however, were offended at being so placed, and Hidalgo insisted that Allende should assign to them places in the front. Though Allende represented strongly the danger of so doing, Hidalgo so pressed the matter that Allende was obliged to yield. *Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 27. Mora's statements, however, must be taken with allowance.

proached within close range. Trujillo now opened fire with grape and canister from his masked batteries with such deadly effect upon the crowded masses in front, that they were soon thrown into confusion and driven back, causing some disturbance to the disciplined troops. These, however, held their ground, and replied with their artillery, while a brisk fire was maintained all along the fronts, with no little loss on both sides, the insurgents suffering most. Trujillo, perceiving that he could hold the enemy's centre in check, now ordered Bringas to engage their right wing, and sent a detachment of three companies of the Tres Villas infantry under the command of Iturbide to occupy an almost inaccessible height covered with pine trees, at a considerable distance on his right flank.

Bringas now charged with great impetuosity, and engaged with the 1,200 picked men opposed to him. The contest was long and fierce, but eventually terminated in favor of the insurgents. These, encouraged by the bravery and example of Aldama and Malo, who commanded in person in that part of the field, maintained their ground with unflinching firmness, in spite of the heavy loss inflicted by the loyalists; but it was not until Bringas fell mortally wounded that they succeeded in repulsing his troops.[53] Nor was Trujillo more successful in his manœuvre on the right. Allende also had marked the importance of the position which Iturbide had been sent to occupy, and, unnoticed by the royalists, had already proceeded in person with 300 of the infantry and one piece of artillery to take possession of it, approaching unseen

[53] Bringas after being wounded was lifted upon his horse, and with great intrepidity still encouraged his men, effecting his retreat in good order. *Trujillo*, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 925. He died on the 3d of Nov. in the city of Mexico, and was honored by command of the viceroy with a magnificent funeral. A few days after a creole officer died of the wounds he had received, and was buried without display. As Bringas was a Spaniard, this was not unnoticed, and the viceroy was satirized by the following epigram:

¿Bringas era gachupin?
Su entierro fué un S. Quintin.
¿N. era americano?
Su entierro fué liso y llano.

Alaman, Hist. Mej., i. 482.

in a direction opposite to Iturbide's line of march. When the royalist officer had pushed forward halfway up to the summit, he suddenly came in contact with Allende's force, and a brisk engagement followed, which resulted in the repulse of Allende. The disaster sustained by Bringas, however, and the exposure to the enemy of Trujillo's manœuvre by this skirmish, caused the royalist leader to recall Iturbide. Whereupon the insurgents rallied and took possession of the height.[54]

Trujillo's position was now hopelessly exposed; in fact, he was completely surrounded. On his right the piece of artillery planted by Allende on the abandoned height was in a position to enfilade his ranks; a large force of the enemy lay between him and the capital; on his left was Aldama now strongly reënforced, and with two pieces of artillery mounted in a commanding position; while in front Mendívil was not only himself severely wounded, but many of his most efficient men were slain or hors de combat, and his artillery ammunition was exhausted.[55] It was now about three o'clock in the afternoon, and the insurgents had pushed on down the heights on Trujillo's left so near that the combatants were at speaking distance. At this juncture the royalist leader perpetrates an act which places him before the world forever in his true character of villain, and enshrouds his memory with lasting infamy. The insurgents, masters of the position as they feel themselves to be, invite the royalist troops to join their cause; and so

[54] Lleaga attempts to show that Iturbide did not engage with the enemy; but due weight must be given to Trujillo's own statement. 'Se encontraron con los enemigos que subian y rompieron el fuego contra ellos, rechazandolos;' and after recounting the repulse of Bringas, clearly explains the reason of Iturbide's recall. 'Las demás compañias de mi derecha se volvieron á replegar á la linea, pues el gran número de enemigos y lo dilatado del cerro, hacia entrasen hasta mi centro, por lo que me ví en la precision de reconcentrar mi linea en el pequeño plano que hay sobre el camino real á donde tenia colocado un cañon giratorio.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 924–5.

[55] Mendivil defended his post with exemplary bravery, and after his field-piece was no longer of service, held his ground with the infantry under his command. His wounds were so serious that it was long before he recovered. *Mora, Méj. y sus Rev.*, iv. 80.

favorably are their proposals regarded by some of Trujillo's officers, that they induce him no less than three times to hold a parley with the enemy in front of his line of infantry. Hostilities, meanwhile, have ceased. Friendly and specious are the words which Trujillo uses, and at each conference the insurgents, gathering in crowded ranks about their spokesman, draw nearer and nearer. At the third parley he has enticed the unsuspecting revolutionists close up to his bayonets; then he throws off the mask and orders his men to fire.[56] The volley which follows stretches more than sixty victims to his perfidy dead upon the ground.[57]

This treacherous act infuriated the insurgents, and the battle was renewed with increased vigor. Trujillo, however, maintained his position until half-past five in the evening, when, having lost one third of his force in killed and wounded, among whom were many of his best officers, his ammunition, moreover, being wellnigh exhausted, he decided to force his way through the enemy in his rear. His position was indeed no longer tenable. His ranks were being decimated by the insurgents' artillery, his troops, worn out with fatigue, were without provisions; while numbers of the enemy were hastening to reënforce those who were waiting to intercept his retreat. Abandoning his cannon, therefore, he put himself at the head

[56] His own words are: 'Los acerque hasta bien inmediato de mis bayonetas, y recogiendo el teniente coronel D. Juan Antonio Lopez un estandarte de N. S. de Guadalupe que venia en las sacrílegas manos de estos infames, mandè la voz de fuego à la infanteria que tenia.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 926.

[57] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 82. According to Liceaga, a kind of armistice had been established, during which Aldama and Jimenez sent in proposals to the native-born soldiers and officers to join the independent cause, at the same time guaranteeing the lives of Trujillo and the Spaniards who were with him. Whether this was done with the approbation of Allende or not the author does not know. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 140. Trujillo, as is sometimes the case with base natures, instead of seeing anything disgraceful in his act, glories in it. It was, however, severely condemned even in the *Semanario Patriotico de Cádiz*, no. 45, of Feb. 14, 1811, in the following words: 'Hacer fuego sobre estos rebeldes al tiempo de estar parlamentando con ellos, . . . ni fué justo, ni honesto, ni político.' The defence urged is that the insurgents were not sincere in their offers, which were made only for the purpose of hemming in the royalists, which is pure subterfuge. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 348–9.

of two companies of the Tres Villas regiment, and followed by the remainder of his forces in closed columns, successfully fought his way way out, and arrived at Cuajimalpa with some little loss. Here he was compelled to make a stand in order to repel a body of cavalry which was harassing his march and tampering with his men. This effected, with the loss of some killed on the part of the insurgents, he pursued his way unmolested to Santa Fé, where he took up quarters for the night, and on the following day entered the capital.[58] Then, having no one to dispute him, he made his defeat appear a victory; and a medal was struck off in commemoration of his glorious achievements, and the success of the royal arms.[59]

[58] Bustamante states that Trujillo's retreat was conducted in the greatest disorder as far as Cuajimalpa, and that thence 'escapó como pudo en dispersion para México,' *Cuad. Hist.*, 82; that Trujillo entered the capital with only 51 soldiers, 'resto único de toda la fuerza que sacó de esta capital;' and intimates that the regiment of Tres Villas had almost ceased to exist. Mora also asserts that the greater portion of the soldiers deserted on the retreat, so that when Trujillo left Santa Fé he had little over 40 men. *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 81. Now, although it is probable that some of his men deserted, since he himself mentions that attempts were made to seduce them from their allegiance while retreating, it is not possible that the retreat was conducted in disorder; had such been the case, none would have escaped, much less the wounded, who were brought to Mexico, as Alaman reasonably observes. But the author who advances the most incredible conjectures as to what was probably Trujillo's ability as commander and his deportment in the field is the licenciado Don Anastasio Zerecero. He gravely relates that Trujillo, after having given the order to fire upon those with whom he was holding parley, disappeared disguised, as it was said, in the habit of a friar and hastened to Santa Fé; and then, because Trujillo, in his report dated Nov. 6th—that is, seven days after the battle—says that he cannot state the exact loss sustained, and because, moreover, he admits that he was the first to leave the field, Zerecero comes to the conclusion that everything tends to justify the opinion that Trujillo fled at the very first, and did not even see the battle, writing his official despatch from the account supplied him by Iturbide. The same author asserts that Trujillo had 3,000 troops, only 500 of which returned to Mexico. *Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 86–7, 107–8. Guerra, *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, 330, states that 200 royalists escaped to the capital. Though a coxcomb, a liar, and a villain, Trujillo was no coward on the field of battle. Negrete reasonably concludes that the viceroy and Trujillo were of accord that it would not be safe in the excited state of the community to publish at once the official account of the action, which had been reported as a victory; when, however, the insurgents had retreated, there was no danger in doing so. *Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, i. 361–2, 364.

[59] The medal was presented on the 3d of Feb., 1811, on which date the viceroy issued a proclamation in praise of the gallant conduct of the regiment of Tres Villas, and tells them to assume Monte de las Cruces! as their future battle-cry. 'Os remito,' he says, 'los escudos de distincion que merecisteis el dia 30 de octubre por vuestra brillante conducta en el monte de las Cruces ...que el monte de las Cruces sea vuestro grito guerrero en el momento de

Although Hidalgo thus remained master of the field, his victory had been dearly bought. The Indians were terror-stricken over the dreadful slaughter which had been inflicted upon them by the fire of the artillery, the deadly effect of which they had witnessed for the first time;[60] while the disciplined troops were dismayed at the long resistance which so small a force had been able to make against such overwhelming numbers. Thus on the following morning the insurgent army, instead of being flushed with victory, were despondent; and Hidalgo when he arrived at Cuajimalpa halted, although Allende urgently pressed upon him the necessity of marching upon Mexico at once.[61]

The capital was filled with foreboding. From the time intelligence arrived of Hidalgo's departure from Valladolid, fear had fallen on the people. And now when Trujillo returned with but a remnant of his force, notwithstanding his braggadocio, many gave up all hope. Guanajuato had fallen; Valladolid had surrendered; it was Mexico's turn next! Treasures and jewelry were carefully concealed or confided to the sacred protection of convents. Women sought asylum in nunneries; and the city, which for years had been free from popular outbreak, presented a scene of confusion and panic. Even Venegas, taking into consideration the numbers of the enemy, the distant po-

vuestros futuros combates, y la voz que os conduzca á la victoria.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 123–4. It bore the names of Trujillo, Bringas, and Mendívil. *Guerra, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 330.

[60] Trujillo estimated the number of insurgents killed and wounded at 2,000; Liceaga says that on the two sides more than 4,000 were killed: 'Se calcula haber quedado en el campo, mas de cuatro mil cadáveres de uno y otro bando, siendo sin comparacion mayor el número de los que pertenecian á los invasores.' *Adic. y Rectific.*, 148. Again, Diego García Conde in his report to the viceroy after his release from captivity states that the loss to the insurgents in killed, wounded, and deserters was more than 20,000. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 273. For more than five years after the engagement, on either side of the pass of Monte de las Cruces, both on the ascent and descent, for the distance of over a league, great heaps of human bones could be seen piled underneath the trees. *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 109.

[61] The difference of opinion which not unfrequently occurred between these leaders terminated in unfriendly relations. Speaking of this dispute, Bustamante says: 'Desde esta época comenzó (Allende) á desabrirse con él (Hidalgo) desazon que se aumentó cada dia mas, y que terminó con la desgracia personal de entrambos gefes.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 87.

sition of Calleja, and the want of spirit observable in his own troops, at first meditated flight to Vera Cruz. The earnest appeals of the Spaniards and royalists, however, induced him to change his mind, and take measures for the defence of the city.[62] Such forces as he had were placed on the causeway of la Piedad and the paseo de Bucareli. Cannon were planted at Chapultepec,[63] and troops of cavalry detached to watch the movements of the enemy. Internal defence was intrusted to the regiment of the Comercio, the city squadron, and some newly levied bodies of patriots.[64] When the news of Trujillo's failure reached the capital, Venegas had immediately despatched a courier to Calleja, ordering him to hasten by forced marches to the defence of the capital. He also sent instructions to Captain Rosendo Porlier, directing him to unite the crews of the vessels at Vera Cruz, and march them up the country to his aid.

To inspire the fainting hearts of the people with some confidence, Venegas caused the sacred image of los Remedios[65] to be conveyed from its shrine to the cathedral. These were the days of signs and wonders, be it remembered, and this was a time of great tribulation. The viceroy was ready to act, and was well up in his part. Betaking himself to the cathedral, he threw himself upon his knees, and devoutly addressing the image, meanwhile invoking its aid, Vene-

[62] *Negrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, 357, 363; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 88-9.

[63] Venegas' dispositions in a military point of view were extremely bad, and placed his troops in a position where it was impossible for them to manœuvre. Bustamante states that on the 30th, in company with a military friend, he visited the encampment, and that the officer pointed out to him the want of military skill displayed by Venegas in thus placing his troops. 'Muy luego me hizo notar la ignorancia del que lo había situado en aquel punto.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 78.

[64] Alaman, basing his estimation on the enumeration of available forces given by Bustamante—see note 45, this chapter—calculates that there were only 2,000 efficient troops. But he does not include those stationed in the interior of the city, which he considers to have been of little use. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 485.

[65] This image belonged in the sanctuary of Totoltepec; and on several occasions had been conveyed to the capital, during which visits miraculous powers had been displayed. It was greatly venerated, as we know. *Calvillo, Sermon*, 69-106.

gas placed in its hands his viceregal staff of office, and solemnly hailed it as lady captain-general of the army. The religious fervor of the assembled multitude was unrestrained, and tears of thankfulness from a thousand eyes watered the cathedral floor.[66] The presence of this protecting image greatly allayed the panic, while the soldiery, confident of victory with the queen of heaven on their side, begged for medals stamped with her likeness.[67] The royalists, after the example of Hidalgo, erected a sacred banner, which bore the venerated form of Nuestra Señora de los Remedios. Thus on the future battle-fields during the war of independence, opposing armies fought under emblems of the same divine interceder for mercy before the heavenly throne.

The excitement and apprehension on the 31st of October was intense throughout the city, and every cloud of dust seen on the road from Toluca was thought to presage the coming of the foe. But the day passed and no enemy appeared. Hidalgo remained inactive, and on the following day sent commissioners with an official communication to the viceroy. Having arrived at Chapultepec, the envoys sent the despatch to Venegas, who was near by, but he peremptorily refused any answer; and in language by no means refined ordered the commissioners to take their departure immediately, under pain of being shot.[68]

[66] *Mora, Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 84. Calvillo gives a detailed account of the way in which the image was brought from Totoltepec. It being the viceroy's design to have it introduced secretly into the city, he sent a carriage for it; but the Indians in the neighborhood of the shrine became aware of the intention to remove their adored protectress, and assembled in great crowds with demonstrations of sorrow. With much persuasion they were calmed, and then in their veneration accompanied the carriage to the capital, causing no little apprehension to those who were conducting the image, that they would be mistaken for Hidalgo's army and fired on. *Id.*, 115–22.

[67] A private individual, whose name Calvillo does not mention, distributed 5,930 such medals among the officers and soldiers of the line regiments of New Spain, the provincial regiments of Mexico, Toluca, Quautitlan, Tres Villas, and Tulancingo, and the city squadron. *Id.*, 121–2.

[68] *Luli, Refutac.*, 11. This writer states that the contemptuous bearing of Venegas increased the hatred of tyranny. With regard to the language of the viceroy, Bustamante, in describing it, expresses himself in his usual rancorous way: 'Se desató en palabrotas tan groseras y torpes, que no estarian bien ni en la boca de un grumete ó carromatero despechado.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i.

Hidalgo's position was now becoming serious. Up to this time his success had been brilliant. Forced prematurely into action, into the promulgation and defence of long-cherished principles, his people had gathered round him, and after that a large army had come to his support. They were unlettered, untrained, but they were trustful. Thousands of them had already laid down their lives for their country; thousands more were ready to die rather than relinquish their hope of liberty. Here were many, but why were there not more? Why were the men of America so slow to move in this matter? Here was the priceless boon held out to them; why would they not stretch forth their hand and take it? True, fifty thousand had come forward—eighty thousand; but why do not they all come—five hundred thousand, five millions—why do not they come and be free? Oh, base apathy, offspring of iron-bound ignorance!

He had sent agents into the capital, and to the neighboring towns, to stir up the people and make them ashamed of their bonds. Not hearing from them, he had sent others, and these found the first fallen away from the cause. Some of his emissaries had been captured.[89] Evidently the country hereabout was not ripe for revolt. His warmest adherents a little distance away from him became cold. He had no helper, no one with whom to share his heavy load of responsibility. Allende was a good man, a brave soldier, a faithful adherent: but he was nothing more than a fighting man, and like fighting men frequently, he was inclined at times to be rash and reckless, and then to be angry if checked.

The capital city was the tempting prize, the city of Montezuma, of Cortes, a city classic in the annals of America; and it was so near. But he well knew that he was in no condition to march on Mexico. He has

87 The envoys were General Jimenez, Abasolo, Montemayor, and another insurgent officer.

[89] Conceno was one of those captured, and was hanged in Mexico in February following.

been blamed for his three days of inactivity here; he has been called too slow, too careful, too fearful, a dreamer and no soldier, and, when advised, too obstinate; some think Allende should have had supreme command. It is easy to criticise. A man must be judged according to means and conditions. His associates urged that the inhabitants would arise and assist them. Some had so arisen, it is true, but there were few hopes held out thus far from the direction of the capital, and these very officers, who were loudest in their desire to advance, railed most contemptuously of all against Hidalgo's rabble army, as worse than none. In the capital were men, money, arms, and ammunition; even if they had few soldiers just then, the whole city would fight before they would see it sacked. He had few real soldiers, few men who could be relied upon; he had few and poor arms, and his store of ammunition was wellnigh exhausted. He was still further discouraged by the contents of a despatch intercepted by his followers. It was the duplicate of Venegas' instructions to Calleja to hasten to his support. He was now fearful of being caught between two opposing armies. In vain Allende advocated an immediate advance on the city. Hidalgo, with cooler and truer judgment, knew that it would not do. Better find more soldiers, drill his men, and practise for a time on a less formidable foe; and so after lingering another day at Cuajimalpa, Hidalgo moved away.[70]

[70] Herewith I give fuller reference to authorities on this early epoch of Mexican independence: *Diar. Mex.*, ii. 167, v. 217, 228, vi. 117, ix. 326, 371–4, 632, x. 451–5, 485–8, 497–8, 508, xi. 80, 86, 125–7, 199–200, 681–3, xii. 120, 271–2, 288, 463–92, 511–55, 602–94, xiii. 13–70, 245–7, 272, 300–386, 414–16, 629–31, 689–90; *Gaz. Mex.*, 1810, i. 39–114, 210–91, 313–84, 404–39, 530, 717–801, 871–3, 906–54, 1088; *Id.*, 1811, ii. 13–254, 274–393; *Id.*, 1789, iii. 18–397; *Id.*, 1790, iv. 9–25, 120–89, 245–6, 313–81, 425–33; *Id.*, 1792, v. 9–10, 81, 261–2, 341–2; *Id.*, 1794, vi. 1–2, 313, 341–2, 442; *Id.*, 1795, vii. 17–18, 153–4; *Id.*, 1796–7, viii. 10, 51, 85, 109–90, 238–301, 365–81; *Id.*, 1798, ix. 1–51, 138–86, 329; *Id.*, 1800–1, x. 2, 49–209, 235, 242, 329–30, 369; *Id.*, 1802–3, xi. 2, 9, 105–194, 220–6, 285–350; *Id.*, 1804–5, xii. 17–81, 153–63, 230–54, 317, 342–4; xiii. 638, 656–9, 779; *Id.*, 1806, xiv. 47, 56; *Id.*, 1807, xv. 363, 416, 623–6, 690, 707–40, 1010–12; *Id.*, 1807, xvi. passim; *Disposiciones Varias*, i. 134–44, ii. 2–10, iii. 153, vi. 58, 60; *Cortes, Diario*, 1810–11, i. y ii. 10, 12–13, 24–5, 45, vii. 7, 1812, xiv. 205–9; *Diario Congreso*, ii. no. 31, 460–1, 465–8, 470–3, vi. no. 143, 2864–5; *Col. Doc.*, i. 40–1; *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, 258–72;

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CHAPTER VIII.

PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.

1810.

CALLEJA'S PREPARATIONS—HIS BIOGRAPHY—ENGAGEMENT AT QUERÉTARO—CALLEJA JOINS FORCES WITH FLON—CHAVEZ REPULSED AT QUERÉTARO—CALLEJA'S MOVEMENTS—THE DISPERSION OF THE INSURGENTS AT ACULCO—CALLEJA RETURNS TO QUERÉTARO—CHARACTER OF TORRES—DEFENSIVE MEASURES OF ABARCA IN JALISCO—INSURGENT OPERATIONS IN JALISCO—ENGAGEMENT AT LA BARCA—THE ROYALISTS DEFEATED AT ZACOALCO—GUADALAJARA SURRENDERS TO TORRES—MERCADO GAINS POSSESSION OF SAN BLAS—REVOLUTION IN ZACATECAS—FLIGHT OF THE EUROPEANS—AN UNFORTUNATE INTENDENTE—IRIARTE ENTERS ZACATECAS—THE COMMISSION OF DOCTOR COS—A DARING SCHEME—SAN LUIS POTOSÍ WON BY AN INSURGENT FRIAR—A TREACHEROUS VISITOR—SAN LUIS SACKED.

WHILE the events narrated in the two preceding chapters were taking place, Calleja in San Luis Potosí was making preparations, with extraordinary activity, to take the field; but at the same time with that avoidance of unprofitable haste which characterized all his movements.[1] The comandante of San Luis was first apprised of the occurrences at Dolores on the 19th of September. He had a few days before received warning of Hidalgo's meditated insurrection, through information supplied to him by José Gabriel de Armijo, and conveyed through the subdelegado Pedro García. At that time he was at the hacienda de Bledos, a property belonging to his wife. While returning to San Luis he narrowly escaped capture by a troop of horsemen sent by Hidalgo to make him

[1] Abad y Queipo, in his report to Fernando VII. in 1815, says of Calleja: 'Siempre obró con lentitud, dando mucho lugar á los enemigos para aumentar sus reuniones y defensas.' *Informe*, in *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, ix. 871.

ne soldiers arriving at the hacienda only two
r his departure. Without waiting for in-
from the viceroy, Calleja issued orders to
two provincial dragoon regiments of San
San Cárlos under arms, and to draw recruits
different towns and haciendas of his district.
not be very quickly done, scattered as the
re in different localities; nor was it a matter
difficulty to convert into an efficient force
n from their agricultural pursuits. Calleja,
was ably seconded by the authorities and
s of estates, as he had their full confidence.

Iaría Calleja del Rey, the future viceroy of
n, was a native of Medina del Campo in old
nd a member of a distinguished family. He
d his military career as an ensign in the
expedition against Algiers conducted by
de O'Reily in the reign of Cárlos III. At
e, he was appointed captain and instructor
ndred cadets at the military school in the
nta María. In 1789 he came to New Spain
iceroy Revilla Gigedo; and with the rank of
-colonel, served in the frontier states, suc-
levying and organizing troops in Nuevo
and Nuevo Leon, the defence of which ter-
s intrusted to him by the viceroy Branci-
Vhen the government at Madrid adopted the
dividing the provincial militia into ten brig-
command of that of San Luis Potosí was
by Viceroy Azanza upon Calleja, with the
ling rank of brigadier.[4] During his resi-

e, *Instruc.*, MS., 31, in *Linares, Instruc.*, MS.
ist. *Mex.*, iii. 415, this series.
Calleja's military services were such as to gain for him the rec-
f the six viceroys who preceded Venegas, one of whom says:
o de los pocos oficiales de graduacion, de quienes podria valerse,
por las ocasiones dificiles que presentasen, por su inteligencia,
nocimiento.' *Prov. Intern., Real Orden*, in *Mayer MS.*, no. 7.
selected by the viceroy for important work. *N. Esp. Acuer-*

dence in that city he espoused Doña Francisca de la Gándara, daughter of the alférez real, who possessed considerable wealth. His personal influence over the country people was great, and his abilities and culture gained admiration; but he had an inordinate love of flattery, and was obstinate, hard-hearted, and remorselessly cruel.

In order to drill and place upon an efficient war footing the new levies, Calleja established a camp at the hacienda de la Pila, situated in the vicinity of San Luis; and so ably was he seconded by the authorities and leading men, that he soon had more recruits than he could furnish with arms and equipments.[5] Various urban companies were raised for the protection of the city; officers were appointed; and the Europeans who were flying from Guanajuato to the coast were detained and pressed into the service.[6] As the troops consisted principally of cavalry, a battalion of light infantry, six hundred strong, was organized;[7] cannon were ordered to be cast; in the camp at la Pila a portrait of Fernando VII. was put up, and Calleja issued a proclamation to his troops,[8] from whom the oath of allegiance was again exacted.[9] Calleja's money was a great help to him, as he was enabled to meet preliminary expenses, as well as those of the ensuing campaign, for a considerable time.[10]

[5] Conspicuous among those who rendered him aid was Juan Moncada, marqués del Jaral de Berrio, who armed and took command as colonel of a considerable body. According to Alaman, Allende had reported to Hidalgo that Moncada was disposed to support the revolution. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 453.

[6] Many afterward became distinguished leaders, among them Meneso, Armijo, Orrantia, Aguirre, Barragan, the Beistiguis, and Bustamante. *Id.*, 454.

[7] Known by the name of los Tamarindos, from the color of their uniform, which was similar to that of the tamarind fruit. *Id.*, 455. They were commanded by Juan Nepomuceno Oviedo. *Id.*, ap. 78.

[8] The proclamation, which is given in full by *Bustamante, Camp. Calleja*, 13–15, is an exhortation to allegiance; it attributes the revolutionary movement to the machinations of Napoleon. It is dated the 2d of Oct.

[9] A Carmelite friar with a crucifix in his hand administered the oath to each soldier. Of the influence which these religious exercised over the soldiery, Bustamante remarks: 'Prevalido del ascendiente que gozan allí estos religiosos sobre el bajo pueblo, logró entusiasmarlos de tal manera, que cuando marchó con sus tropas creian estas que iban á medírselas con hereges y á defender la religion de Jesucristo.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 48.

[10] The intendente of San Luis Potosí placed at his disposition 382,000

as, before he was aware of the outbreak of and without knowing the extent of the rev- had by despatch of the 17th of September Calleja to hasten to Querétaro for the pur- reventing an uprising in that city. Calleja, replied that he had already discovered a plot in San Luis, and that it would be im- o leave until he had completed his arrange- the same time explaining to the viceroy his plan to raise a considerable force and take against Hidalgo, after having put San Luis of defence. Upon receiving this informa- negas, perceiving the prudence with which as acting under the new aspect of affairs, per- m to continue his operations, and instructed nite his forces when in readiness with those now on his march to Querétaro.

ner had Flon arrived at Querétaro than an ent took place between a detachment of his a body of three thousand insurgents in the f that city. When the enemy appeared in the road from San Miguel, Flon sent out a six hundred under the command of Major Tello, all of whom except one hundred and ith the single officer, Captain Linares, hastily when they found the enemy to be much merous than they had supposed. Linares, made a resolute stand, and the division re- itself, attacked and inflicted great slaughter Indians with their artillery, the effect of ey were so ignorant of, that they attempted t themselves by putting their straw hats

e royal coffers. Besides this, as soon as he heard of the up- ered a conducta of silver which had been detained at Santa by the subdelegado García, to be sent to San Luis. This con- ngot of gold and 315 bars of silver. In addition to this, he loan from wealthy mining speculators of Zacatecas 225,000 es, 94 bars of plata quintada, and 2,800 marks of plata pasta. *aman, Hist. Mej.*, i. 456.

over the mouth of the cannon.[11] The result was not long doubtful; the insurgents were dislodged from their favorable position with heavy loss, the royalists losing only one man.[12]

On the 24th of October, Calleja broke camp and proceeded to Dolores, where he had arranged with the conde de la Cadena to unite their forces on the 28th. This was accordingly done, the latter having left Querétaro on the 22d.[13] After leaving an efficient garrison in San Luis,[14] Calleja's force, nevertheless, mustered 3,000 cavalry and 600 infantry, with four cannon. These united with Flon's troops formed an army of about 7,000 men, with eight pieces of artillery, and which henceforth assumed the name of Ejército de operaciones sobre los insurgentes. As Flon passed through San Miguel el Grande, he had the satisfaction of permitting his soldiers to sack the houses of Colonel Canal, Allende, and Aldama, while a similar gratification was indulged in by Calleja in Dolores by the sacking of Hidalgo's house and the ill treatment of the inhabitants.

The project of Calleja had been to proceed to the capital by way of Celaya, Acámbaro, and Toluca, following, in fact, Hidalgo's line of march; but while at Dolores he received a despatch from the comandante of Querétaro, García Rebollo, stating that the city was threatened with the whole force of Hidalgo's

[11] Alaman remarks: 'Este hecho apenas creible, me ha sido asegurado por todos los que han tenido conocimiento del suceso.' *Hist. Mej.*, i. 459.

[12] According to Tello's version, 200 Indians were killed; the royalist slain met his death by accident while passing in front of a cannon. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 850. Tello does not say anything about his own hurried departure from the field. The most reliable particulars are those given in the text, being the statements of Linares in a representation setting forth his services, and addressed to Viceroy Apodaca. Alaman obtained a copy of this document. *Hist. Mej.*, i. 459.

[13] Before leaving Querétaro Flon addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, describing to them in sanguinary terms the manner in which he intended to suppress the insurrection, and concluding by threatening to make the streets of Querétaro flow with blood if, during his absence, they acted disloyally. *Id.*, 469; *Negrete, Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, i. 292; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 173–4.

[14] This consisted of 350 foot, 110 horse, and three companies of the urban troops. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 55.

Calleja accordingly marched to Querétaro, but at an insignificant attack on the city by a ll-armed Indians had been all.[15] One Miguel had raised the cry of insurrection on the ha- e San Nicolás, belonging to the augustinians acan, occupied Huichapan and the neighbor- s, and being joined by Julian Villagran, a f the militia of Huichapan, attempted in the of Flon to gain possession of Querétaro. his rabble into the town, they broke and fled rst cannon-shot, which killed a considerable of them,[16] while their opponents lost not a an. This futile movement of Sanchez was , however, with most important results; for, e seen, it saved Querétaro from being occu- Hidalgo, and was the indirect cause of the leader's later defeat.

arrived at Querétaro on the 1st of Novem- engagement having taken place on the 30th er, the same day on which was fought the the monte de las Cruces. Finding himself to approach Mexico by a different route, he cted his course by way of Estancia, San Juan

report in *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 965.
this defeat of Sanchez was considered one of the reasons for reat. 'Se tuvo por cierto entonces que habia recibido la noticia del general Sanchez en Querétaro.' *Insurrec. N. Esp. Res. Hist.*, ante's account of this affair, deemed improbable by Alaman, is Brigadier Sanchez, after raising the standard of revolt, marched del Rio, where he captured the oidor Juan Collado, who, having s commission, was returning to Mexico. He also made prisoner ña, 'Teniente de corte de la sala del crimen,' who beguiled San- ieving that if he would allow him to return to Querétaro he could nce succeed in winning over the garrison for him, the signal to of a cannon from the fort de la Cruz. Sanchez consented, but sed the plot, so that the city might be put in defence. The sig- n, nevertheless, and the credulous Sanchez entered the city with rrated in the text. The same author states that their whole force men, who had only 14 muskets amongst them, and that 31 were spot, without counting the wounded and others killed in the d. *Hist.*, i. 88–9. The version of Comandante Rebollo is, how- fferent. He states in his report to the viceroy that there were 0 of the insurgents; that the engagement lasted from half-past orning till half-past seven in the evening, and that 300 of the killed and as many more taken prisoners. *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810),

del Rio, and San Antonio, arriving at Arroyozarco on the 6th of November. Meanwhile Hidalgo, retreating by the same way by which he had approached the capital, arrived at Ixtlahuaco. Unaware of Calleja's last movement, and confident that Querétaro could now be taken possession of with little difficulty, he directed his march toward the city, and the two opposing commanders were thus approaching each other without either of them knowing it. Hidalgo's force was reduced to one half its previous number, thousands of his followers, who had been attracted by the prospect of sacking the capital, having returned to their homes.[17] But what is more significant of the waning star of the first leaders of the revolution is the disagreement which existed among themselves, and the growing jealousy which Allende and his friends, the Aldamas, began to entertain for Hidalgo.[18] Where there was so much fighting to be done, these military men did not like to be led by a priest; they were determined to submit to him no longer than was necessary.

On the 6th of November the advance guard of Calleja's army came in contact with a detachment of Hidalgo's forces at Arroyozarco, and after a sharp skirmish put the enemy to flight, killing some and taking others prisoners. From the captives, and from Colonel Empáran, whom Calleja at once sent forward with a strong force to reconnoitre, it was discovered that the insurgents were at the neighboring town of Aculco. Calleja at once made his arrangements for battle, taking up a military position two leagues distant from that of Hidalgo. The in-

[17] The captive García Conde afterward stated to the viceroy that although Hidalgo's loss after the battle of las Cruces amounted to 40,000 in killed, wounded, and deserters, there still remained to him 40,000 followers. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 274. Guerra, *Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 339, thinks this an exaggeration although confirmed by Calleja. *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 967–8.

[18] According to García Conde, when speaking of Hidalgo, they used to call him 'el bribon del cura,' that knave of a priest. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, i. ap. 66.

s were drawn up in two lines on the summit
ctangular hill which overlooked the town[19]
almost surrounded by barrancas and gullies.
the lines numbers were drawn up in the form
long, the artillery being stationed in the front
the right flank, while the rear was occupied
rderly crowds. The encounter which followed
properly an engagement, but rather a feint
part of the revolutionary leaders, who had de-



PLAN OF BATTLE-FIELD AT ACULCO.

ine of battle of the royalist army.
ark of artillery in position.
avalry on the left.
avalry on the right.
ody of cavalry covering the flank of the infantry.
odies of infantry.
eserve of cavalry.
Cavalry on left and right in column.
ompany of volunteers.
avalry on left flank of infantry columns.
eserve cavalry of same columns.
olumns of infantry.
ark of artillery in second position.
Park of artillery opening fire.
olumns of infantry mounting the hill to attack.
avalry in reserve.
Position of the insurgent army.
surgent artillery.
quipage, ammunition, and carriages.
ompanies of patriots of San Luis doing service as light troops.

cided not to give battle, but effect a retreat under cover of a show of resistance.[20] Calleja, undeterred by the difficulties presented by the enemy's position, commenced the attack with three columns of infantry,[21] on the morning of the 7th of November. For some twenty minutes the royalists pushed on,[22] exposed to the sluggish fire of the insurgents, whose cannon-balls flew high above their heads. Unscathed they reached the foot of the steep on which the enemy was posted, but when the stormed columns had scaled the heights, the foe had fled. Meanwhile Calleja had marked the disorder in the revolutionary ranks, caused, as he supposed, by his well directed fire; and thereupon ordered the cavalry on his right flank to attack the enemy's left, which could only be done by a long detour.

Doubtless it would have pleased him—as he affirmed that he did[23]—to commit great slaughter by his cavalrymen who pursued the enemy two and a half leagues over the hills and through the glen; but the truth is, they did not kill a hundred.[24] He lost, however, only

[20] Hidalgo published at Celaya on the 13th of Nov. a circular giving an account of the affair, assigning as a reason for his not engaging the enemy his want of ammunition. He says: 'Solo se entretubo un fuego lento y a mucha distancia, entro tanto se daba lugar a que se retirara la gente sin experimentar quebranto, como lo verifico.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.* ii. 221. A quantity of cannon-balls and grape-shot and 120 cans of powder were left on the field. *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 22. Zerecero regards the sudden flight of the insurgents as a skilfully executed retreat, which the leaders considered necessary in the present condition of their troops, and to effect which they were willing to sacrifice their artillery. *Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 114, 117.

[21] Calleja boasts of the coolness and precision displayed by his well drilled troops. *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 968. At the same time Zerecero was informed by his uncle, José Azpeitia, an officer in the regiment of la Corona, that those troops, and a part of the second battalion of la Columna, were wavering in their allegiance when the order was given to advance. *Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 115. Bustamante inclines to this opinion. 'He hablado,' he says, 'con persona presencial de este suceso, la cual me ha asegurado que los cuerpos principales del ejercito real estuvieron vacilantes y á punto de pasarse.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 91–2.

[22] García Conde timed the duration of the firing, and states: 'En veinte y dos minutos sesó el fuego.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep.*, ii. 275.

[23] Calleja estimated the entire loss to the insurgents in killed, wounded, and prisoners at 10,000. 'Pasa de cinco mil,' he says, 'el número de los tendidos en el campo.' And he adds this pious reflection: 'Dexando el campo lleno de cadáveres, y el espectáculo horrible que presentaba, y de que son responsables ante Dios y los hombres, los traidores Hidalgo, Allende y sus sequaces.' *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 969.

[24] Manuel Perfecto Chavez, the justice of Aculco, in an official despatch

killed and one wounded, while he captured all
go's cannon,[25] ammunition, and baggage, a large
of cattle, sheep, and horses, and a quantity
handise,[26] besides rescuing the captives García
Rul, and Merino. Thus terminated the af-
aculco, which, trivial as it was, regarded as a
achievement, was important as effecting the
n of Hidalgo's forces and frustrating his de-
ainst Querétaro. Had the insurgents not
ed their position, they would probably have
victory. But the leaders were at variance;
ers were disheartened; the Indians were dis-
d at not having been led to the capital; and
affected by the demoralizing consequences of
. As it was, a great victory was celebrated
yalists in the capital, and solemn thanksgiving
o their divine general, our lady of los Reme-

the movements of the revolutionary chiefs
he ten days following their departure from
historians are strangely silent; but one fact
n, namely, that they effected their retreat to
with insignificant loss.[23] Here Hidalgo and
formed new combinations, and it was decided
latter should march with the forces to Guana-
hile the former, accompanied by a few fol-
hould return to Valladolid, and there repair
the manufacture of arms and the levying of
ops.

reports to Calleja that the killed at Aculco, together with those skirmish of the day before, were 85—'y nada mas;' and that of ten died subsequently. *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 23. , including the two abandoned by Trujillo at las Cruces. *Id.*, 22. ages, ropa, papeles, y...ocho muchachas bien parecidas (que a el serrallo de los insurgentes).' *Ib.*

or, Accion de Gracias, 1–8. The accounts of the battle of Aculco, d, are extremely contradictory; but I have no hesitation in ac- version of it given by Negrete, *Hist. Mil. Sig. XIX.*, i. 375–8, as in the main, I have followed it in the text.

o, in his circular dated Celaya, Nov. 13th, states that his forces nited, and that he had more than 40 pieces of artillery already d was well provided with ammunition. *Hernandez y Dávalos*, 221.

Meanwhile Calleja retraced his steps and marched toward Querétaro. As he repassed through San Juan de los Rios he made proclamation offering ten thousand pesos for the head of any one of the five leaders, Hidalgo, Allende, the two Aldamas, and Abasolo.[29]

Though the revolution had apparently received a deadly blow at Aculco, and the royalists confidently expected its near termination, the end was not yet. Hidalgo's agents had not been idle. Though often disappointed, they were not wholly cast down. In the northern provinces, and in those bordering on the Pacific, the revolution had widely spread. At the time of the disaster at Aculco, the arms of the independents had triumphed in Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí, and those provinces were wholly in their power. In the south the star of Morelos, Hidalgo's worthy successor, was just rising above the horizon. At Huichapan a body of insurgents, headed by Julian Villagran,[30] interrupted communication on the highway between the capital and Querétaro, capturing convoys, killing royalists, and when threatened with capture, escaping to the mountains. Thus it was that a movement, regarded by the government as an affair of two short months, now about ended, was indeed but begun, and was practically never to be extinguished. As the future operations of Hidalgo

[29] The offer was ratified by the viceroy. Calleja on previously passing through San Juan de los Rios, which had been held for a time by Sanchez, demanded all arms to be delivered up within six hours, extending on those conditions a pardon to those who had aided the insurgents, adding that in case of further disobedience the inhabitants 'serán tratados sin conmiseracion alguna, pasados á cuchillo, y el pueblo reducido a cenizas.' The viceroy approved of the edicts of Calleja, and extended the indulto to all towns in New Spain, promising that if one of the leaders would deliver up the rest he should benefit by the pardon. *Dispos. Varias*, ii. f. 8; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 206, 219–21.

[30] This movement was initiated, as before stated, by Miguel Sanchez. Villagran, who was of a ferocious character and addicted to drunkenness and all other vices, murdered Sanchez for some slight offence soon after his repulse at Querétaro. His son Francisco, known by the name of Chito, and as notorious for his crimes as his father, was also one of these insurgents. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, 135–6.

Allende will be more particularly confined to the
inces of Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis
osí, it will be necessary to give some account of
events there occurring during these same two
ths.



INTENDENCIA OF GUADALAJARA.

While Hidalgo was in Guanajuato, José Antonio
res, who had joined the revolutionary standard
h a few followers at Irapuato, asked for and ob-
ed authority from Hidalgo to occupy Guadalajara.
es was an honest, conscientious man, without ed-
ion, being a peasant of San Pedro Piedragorda
uanajuato; but he was not without talent, and

possessed unbounded enthusiasm in the cause of independence. Energetic, intelligent, brave, and honorable, he was nevertheless modest and had good common sense. When he entered Guadalajara as victor he molested no one, and interfered with the administration of affairs no more than was necessary.

At this time Brigadier Roque Abarca governed in Guadalajara, holding the three-fold office of comandante, president of the audiencia, and intendente. As soon as he received intelligence of the grito de Dolores, he took measures to exclude revolution from his province; but not being well regarded by either the audiencia or the European commercial class, on account of his disapproval of Iturrigaray's deposal, he was fettered in his operations. Finally, instead of asserting his authority, he consented to the establishment of a junta composed of lawyers, ecclesiastics, and others,[31] which styled itself the auxiliary of the government,[32] though it seemed satisfied with little less than supreme power. By order of this junta a considerable military force was collected. The divisions from Tepic, Colima, and Colotlan were called in and the provincial militia got under arms, while two companies of volunteers were raised from the commercial class in the city.[33] In a short time Abarca, by levying recruits, had no less than 12,000 men under arms; but being of weak resolution, and wanting in military ability as well as in courage, his action benefited the revolutionists rather than the royalists. In truth,

[31] *Carta de Abarca; Bustamante Campañas de Calleja*, 97–8.

[32] 'Junta Superior auxiliar de Gobierno, seguridad y defensa.' See *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc. Indep.*, iii. 693–4, where will be found the names of the members who composed it.

[33] The bishop, Juan Cruz Ruiz Cabañas, in his zeal against the heretical insurgents, raised a regiment composed of both the secular and regular clergy, and any others who might wish to join. The name given to this extraordinary body was La Cruzada, and each member wore a red cross on his breast. Morning and evening this band of church militants issued from the episcopal palace on horseback, sword in hand, and, as they paraded through the streets, the staring rabble raised the cry, Viva la fé católica! Bustamante calls the regiment 'una piadosa compañía de asesinos.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 138–9.

ıs newly levied troops soon deserted to the

e mean time Torres had raised in revolt the
f Colima, Sayula, Zacoalco, and those of the
of the tierra caliente,[34] while other revolu-
chiefs, Gomez Portugal, Godinez, Alatorre,
idrobo, were no less active among the pueblos
Rio Grande,[35] so that by the end of October
districts bordering upon Guanajuato and Mi-
were in insurrection. Though day by day
ger became more imminent, the want of har-
the city of Guadalajara still prevailed. In
barca, in view of the continued desertion of
epresented to the Europeans that they should
ns and defend themselves. They would not
him, and would neither fight nor pay.[36] Nor
action of the junta auxiliar any more favor-
the success of the royalist cause in Jalisco.
ng as traitors efficient officers in whom Abarca
fidence, the members of the junta appointed
r Recacho, and Villaseñor, a rich landed pro-
commanders of two divisions to be sent against
rgents. Guadalajara was by this time threat-
the south by Torres, who had occupied Za-
and on the east by Huidrobo, Godinez, and
e, who were at La Barca. Villaseñor com-
the division despatched against Torres, and
that opposed to Huidrobo, each detachment
ve hundred strong. Recacho, on arriving at
ca, discovered that the enemy had abandoned
n, and on the 1st of November entered it with-
stance. On the 3d, however, Huidrobo at-
he royalists with a large body of Indians, but
ulsed with some loss, Recacho having taken
ition in the plaza. On the following day the

t was charged against him in the sentence of death pronounced
of May, 1812. *Id.*, 144.
n as the Rio de Santiago de Lerma.
de Abarca; Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 99–100.

insurgents again assailed the royalist forces with great intrepidity, but with no better success.[37] Recacho, however, having lost several of his best officers, deemed it prudent to retreat to Sula and wait for reënforcements. There he received orders to return to Guadalajara, and the expedition ended without any serious blow having been inflicted upon the insurgents.[38]

Still more unsuccessful was Villaseñor in his operations at Zacoalco. Torres was a military man by instinct. It is stated that before the engagement he showed the Indians, with a stick on the ground, how to deploy, in order to surround the enemy.[39] Be this as it may, his manœuvres were so successful that Villaseñor's division was shortly overthrown and almost destroyed, no less than 276 being slain.[40] So great was the shower of stones discharged by the Indians that the enemy's muskets were badly battered. The flower of the youth of Guadalajara who formed the newly recruited volunteer companies, deficient in training and unaccustomed to hardship, perished. Villaseñor and the captains of two companies were made prisoners, and Gariburu, a lieutenant of the regiment of la Corona, was killed.[41]

[37] Recacho, in his report to the viceroy, says that the enemy marched up to the cannon's mouth, and when fired upon with grape and canister closed their ranks and boldly charged again, 'avanzando con una temeridad increi- [illegible]

[38] [illegible] de la Barca volvió lleno de terror.' *Carta de Abarca*, [illegible] He states that [illegible] and that Recacho was completely [illegible]

[39] [illegible] 142.

[40] [illegible] the remainder creoles pressed in the [illegible] In an account of [illegible] from three natives [illegible] is stated to have been [illegible] upon the ground at [illegible] as possible. [illegible] two killed and [illegible]

[41] [illegible] that Calleja dis- [illegible] passed over to the [illegible] proposed to Villa- [illegible] to engage [illegible] Torres in [illegible]

er this tragical defeat, consternation prevailed adalajara. There was no thought of further re- ce. The bishop, in spite of his previous military , ignominiously fled to the port of San Blas, fol- l by most of the Europeans, who carried with what they could. The junta hastily dissolved, he warlike Recacho, with the oidor Alva, hur- with all speed to the same port, not forgetting, ver, to collect on their way the royal revenues. ca endeavored to reanimate the Europeans who ined, and induce them to take up arms in defence e city. "We are not soldiers," they said, "and nly duty is to take care of ourselves."[42] The force left at his disposal was 110 raw recruits. is hopeless condition he fell grievously ill, and on his bed the ayuntamiento surrendered the o Torres.[43] The insurgent forces entered Guada- on the 11th of November. Torres kept faith- the terms of the capitulation. Both the prop- and persons of the citizens were respected; the factors in the jails were not released, and to pre- violence he would not allow his troops to quarter selves in the city.[44]

th the exception of San Blas, the whole prov- of Nueva Galicia was now in possession of the gents; and the ease with which that port fell heir power is somewhat remarkable. José Ma- Mercado, the cura of Ahualulco, obtained from s a commission to go in pursuit of the fugitive peans; and raising forces in the villages on his o the port, he entered Tepic without opposition, was there joined by the garrison of the town. ado then hastened to lay siege to San Blas, and in to the comandante de la plaza, José de Lava-

rta de Abarca, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 401. e ayuntamiento petitioned the insurgent chiefs to grant Abarca re- m confinement in consideration of his ill health and advanced age. 28–9.

puesta al Papel, 19. The property of Spaniards was, however, em- and commissioners were appointed to attend to the matter. *Her- Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 229–30.

llen, a formal summons to surrender, accompanied with a threat to burn the town in case of refusal. His whole force did not exceed three thousand Indians and a few hundred mounted lancers, while all of his artillery were six cannon brought from Tepic. The position of San Blas was such as to render it most difficult of assault. It was defended, as well as commanded, by a castle mounted with twelve 24-pound guns. In the harbor lay a frigate, two brigantines, a schooner, and two gunboats; the place was well supplied with provisions; there were forty mounted pieces of artillery and 800 able men in the place, and yet such was Mercado's cool impudence[45] that Lavallen sent Agustin Bocalan, alférez de fragata of the royal navy, to capitulate. This was on the 29th of November, and Bocalan so reported the numbers and strength of the enemy on his return, that the comandante surrendered without further parley,[46] and the royalists had no longer a foothold in the intendencia of Guadalajara.[47]

In Zacatecas the news of the revolt at Dolores was known on the 21st of September, and the intendente Francisco Rendon at once took the same precautionary measures as those employed by Calleja and Abarca. He, moreover, applied for aid to those intendentes, but without success. From the governor of Colotlan, however, he obtained two companies of the militia dragoons, which he stationed at Aguascalientes, and shortly afterward the same governor

[45] 'Por tanto,' he says in his ultimatum to the comandante, 'esta es la última intimacion, y la falta de respuesta a ella será la señal segura del rompimiento, pero en la inteligencia de que cuando peleen de esa parte los niños y las mugeres, les tocarán diez soldados a cada uno; pero diez soldados decididos a vencer, y a avanzar hasta la misma boca de los cañones.' *Bustamante, Cuad.* [illegible]

[46] [illegible] Recacho, Alva, and the Europeans went on board the [illegible] San Carlos, and steered for Acapulco.

[47] Lavallen, Bocalan, and other officers who signed the capitulation were afterward tried for [illegible] surrender. After a tedious trial they were [illegible] A [illegible] copy of the proceedings as well as other documents is supplied by [illegible] i. 236–427.

t Zacatecas with four additional companies. ldon's position was even worse than that of The province was almost entirely without d he had to provide with lances even the who arrived. His call, also, upon the dif- stricts for recruits was almost unheeded.[48] this strait he received some partial relief rival of the conde de Santiago de la Laguna mounted men and some arms.[49] These the ced at the disposal of Rendon, and offered l his influence to maintain order among the On the 6th of October the intendente re- despatch from Calleja informing him of the f Guanajuato by the insurgents, and of the e danger which threatened Zacatecas, proba- ext place to be attacked. Rendon convoked junta, at which it was declared that the city defensible, surrounded as it was by command-

ame afternoon the Europeans, the members unicipality, and the employés in the different ent offices fled; and on the following morning rnor of Colotlan verbally informed the inten- at his troops had intimated to him that they followed him because he was a creole, but would take no action in the cause of the ns. Rendon allowed the governor to depart, elf remained. The same day the populace evolt, and only by the exertions of Laguna y prevented from sacking stores and murder- tionable residents. So violent were their ations, that the cura implored Rendon to save

más cabeceras de partido,' he says in his report to the viceroy of Jan. 1811, 'no me remitieron un solo hombre, y hasta el 6 de me llegaron 21 de á caballo, á quienes armé con otros (sic) tant *xposic. Rendon, Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 46.

de Santiago de la Laguna was the most opulent hacendado of , and much respected by the lower orders, over whom he had . After the death of Hidalgo, Laguna, who had been accused wing to his action during the events about to be related, was benefit of the indulto. *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, vii. 10, 258.

himself. Laguna offered to escort him beyond reach of danger, and on the morning of the 8th the intendente and his family left Zacatecas for Guadalajara. On the following morning Laguna returned to Zacatecas, having been appointed, by a popularly elected ayuntamiento, intendente ad interim of the province, which office he deemed it his duty to accept in the hope of preventing excesses. He left an escort of twenty men for Rendon, who continued his journey. On the 29th, although reënforced by a troop of twenty-five lancers and four dragoons sent to his assistance by Abarca, Rendon and his family were captured by a body of insurgents, who after appropriating their clothes, conducted them to Guadalajara, where they arrived after thirty-three days, and were delivered to Hidalgo, who in the mean time had reached that city.[50]

The revolt in Zacatecas was spontaneous, and not allied with the insurrection in other provinces. The latter were directed by the leaders either in person or by agents, to whom Hidalgo extended commissions of various grades. No such commissioner, however, had appeared in Zacatecas, and the outbreak was due to the excitement produced by news of the grito de Dolores. The people, after the first agitation, were moderate and tractable, and the conde Santiago de Laguna succeeded in suppressing pillage. About the middle of October, Rafael Iriarte,[51] styling himself lieutenant-general, appeared at Aguascalientes at the

[50] Rendon escaped the massacre of Europeans at Guadalajara in December following; and when Calleja entered that city after the battle of Calderon, he appointed him intendente del ejército del centro. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 138.

[51] Of Iriarte's antecedents but little is known. According to Mora, he had previously at different times been known by the names of Martinez and Laiton. *Mej. y sus Rev.* iv. 96. Zerecero and Liceaga state that in San Luis he went by the name of Cabo Leyton, and had been a scrivener in the secretary's office of the comandancia. *Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 385; *Adic. y Rectific.*, 151. His first commission as an insurgent officer, from evidence given later by Pedro de Aranda at his own trial, was to arrest and appropriate the property of the Europeans in the villa of Leon, situated between Guanajuato and Aguascalientes. In the execution of this commission he acted with great cruelty, 'prendia á los europeos de aquella villa, devoraba sus bienes y dejaba á perecer sus familias.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. app. 60.

a large body of insurgents, and having been
r the dragoons stationed there, proceeded to
ession of Zacatecas, which he occupied with-
sition.

s while Iriarte was at Aguascalientes that
ook action which brought his loyalty under
. He convoked a junta for discussing the
of communicating with Iriarte. At that
was decided to send José María Cos, cura of
ne, to inquire of the insurgent leader whether
then waging was without prejudice to re-
ing, and country; and whether any ex-
would be made in case they succeeded in
the Europeans; and if so, what. These ques-
e asked with a view to uniting the provinces
alliance in peace or war. Laguna, in a letter
e 26th of October, reported this to Manuel
, intendente of Durango, who forwarded it
a. The mere fact that Laguna entertained
vas enough for Calleja, and he cautioned
in his reply to avoid all expressions show-
of confidence which might drive Laguna to
he insurgent cause.[52] Cos, who will appear
tly later, was received by Iriarte with marked
ation, but greatly against his will was com-
carry the insurgent standard on his entrance
town. The explanation given by Iriarte of
t and plan of the revolution was equally un-
ory to Cos, and deeming himself compromised
art he had been obliged to play, instead of re-
o Zacatecas, he proceeded to San Luis and
Calleja, who listened to his statement, and
him to present himself before the viceroy.
his way to the capital, Cos was arrested at
o by the commander Rebollo and imprisoned
nvent of San Francisco.

ante supplies copies of the correspondence on this matter in
Calleja, 51–7.

Although Calleja took every possible precaution before his departure from San Luis Potosí to insure the preservation of that province, his efforts were unavailing. When Hidalgo at the opening of his career passed through Celaya, he was joined by Luis de Herrera, a lay friar of the order of San Juan de Dios of the province of Mexico. For some time this man followed the army in the capacity of chief surgeon; but being compelled to go to San Luis on private business, he was arrested as a suspicious person, and imprisoned in the jail, it not being known that he was a friar. Heavily fettered and with no prospect of release, he disclosed himself in order to escape from durance, and was removed to the Carmelite convent, in which Calleja had imprisoned suspected persons. Erelong Herrera prevailed on the comandante, Cortina, to allow him to retire to the convent of his order in San Luis, the prior and other conventuals becoming his sureties. Having thus secured comparative freedom, he conceived, in conjunction with Juan Villarias, a lay brother of the same convent, the daring scheme of getting possession of the city during a single night. With this intent they instigated Joaquin Sevilla y Olmedo, an officer of the San Cárlos lancers, to place at their disposal a few troops, and some arms which he had in his house. Sevilla entered into their designs, and on the night of the 10th of November, meeting a patrol of his own corps and another of the cavalry, he called on them to assist him in the execution of an order of the commander. With this small force he proceeded to the convent of San Juan de Dios, where he was joined by the two friars. The revolutionists then went to the Carmelite convent, and ringing the night-bell,[53] requested that a priest might be sent with them to confess a prominent citizen who was dying. The door-keeper opened the gate,

[53] In every convent was a door-bell called the campana de misericordia, which was rung by those who, during the night, sought the assistance of confessors for persons dangerously ill.

surgents rushing in seized and disarmed the
They then released the prisoners, many of
ily expected death, and supplying them
weapons thus obtained, proceeded with the
aution to the city jail, having first secured
elite friars, all of whom were Spaniards.
ual success they surprised the guard at the
their numbers being now greatly increased
risoners whom they liberated, they directed
rse to the artillery barracks. Here they met
mishap. Opposite the barracks stood the
the comandante, Cortina; and the guard,
lant than those hitherto encountered, fired
killing four. Undeterred, they rushed for-
l quickly made themselves masters of the
Ten cannon were immediately brought out
ed at the entrances of the plaza, one being
pon Cortina's house.
esperate design of Herrera was now all but
hed. The remaining barracks of the city
n in the power of the insurgents, and Cor-
e continued to offer resistance. Being
at last in the jaw, he was made prisoner by
uard, who had hitherto kept up a vigorous
ng sixteen of the assailants and wounding
re. After the insurgents had thus gained
n of the comandante's house, it was delivered
illage; likewise his store and storerooms;[54]
appears to have been the only excess com-
By seven o'clock in the morning the affair
. The usual arrest of Europeans—to the
f forty—followed their triumph, but order
quillity were maintained.[55] Miguel Flores,
e principal citizens of San Luis, was ap-

was one of the principal merchants in San Luis.
y violence occurred on the night of the 12th, when a patrol
ed on from the house of a European named Gerónimo Berdiez.
ed the officer in command that he forcibly entered the house
wounded Berdiez with his sword. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i.

pointed political chief and intendente, and the absence of popular commotion is sufficient evidence of the prudence which guided the revolutionists.

But the spirit of discord was at hand. Iriarte, who was at this time in possession of Zacatecas, and had been apprised of the successful coup d'armes at San Luis, despatched a courier to Herrera, proposing to recruit his forces at San Luis on his march to Guanajuato to join Allende. No objection to the reception of a brother-in-arms could be made, and Iriarte, with a disorderly rabble of several thousand Indians, armed, as usual, with clubs, slings, and bows and arrows, entered San Luis. The arrival was hailed with demonstrations of joy. The bells were rung and cannon fired. Festivities and balls for three days celebrated the meeting between these champions of the cause of independence.

In return for all this kindness, Iriarte deemed it his duty to give an entertainment, and do honor to those who had done honor to him. So he invited Herrera, Villarias, and Sevilla to a great ball, and when the merriment was at its highest a troop of soldiers rushed in and arrested them. Villarias managed to escape, and with fifty men fled to Guanajuato to inform Allende of the treachery. Herrera and Sevilla were thrown into prison; the barracks were taken by surprise; the artillery was seized, and Iriarte was master of the town. At dawn the cry was raised, "Death to the San Luis traitors!" Sack and pillage were proclaimed. The public treasury was ransacked, and the houses and stores of private persons were broken open and emptied.

One more turn of the wheel comes with the celebration of the occasion by a banquet to which Iriarte invites his captives. At first he gave them to understand that they were to die; even now they were going to execution. After thus amusing himself for a while, he embraced the victims of his sport, and seating them at the table, informed them that their imprisonment had

en effected only for the purpose of insuring their ety, as they would have proved an impediment to intention of sacking the city. He then appointed errera field-marshal, and raised Sevilla to the rank of onel. During his occupation of San Luis the wife Calleja fell into his power, and Iriarte, the treach- of whose future action makes it reasonable to sup- se that he entertained no serious intention of aiding lende, after loitering till it was too late to do so, urned to Zacatecas.[56]

[56] The above account of the revolution in San Luis Potosí is derived from tamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 95–9. That author's information was supplied to by a report of the affair obtained in the city. Alaman states that he was ful to verify the facts. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 23.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ROYALISTS RECAPTURE GUANAJUATO.

1810.

ALLENDE RETURNS TO GUANAJUATO—PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE—THE FIRST ATTACK—CALLEJA'S PLAN—HE TAKES ALLENDE'S BATTERIES—CALLEJA, THE AVENGER—HIS PROCLAMATION—AN EXECUTION SCENE IN THE ALHÓNDIGA—A GENERAL PARDON EXTENDED—THE GOVERNMENT REORGANIZED—CALLEJA MARCHES FOR GUADALAJARA—HIDALGO AT VALLADOLID—AND AT THE CERRO DEL MOLCAJETE—HIDALGO'S RECEPTION AT GUADALAJARA—ESTABLISHES A GOVERNMENT—RAYON'S BIOGRAPHY—LETONA'S MISSION AND DEATH—THE 'DISPERTADOR AMERICANO' AND PRINTING-PRESS—PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

WHEN Allende arrived at Celaya he found there a body of two thousand insurgent horsemen under Toribio Huidrobo, and about thirty dragoons of the regiment of la Reina. These troops were almost destitute of arms; but the importance of defending Guanajuato was so great that, uniting them with his other forces, he hastened thither. He took with him eight pieces of artillery; and as a number of cannon had been cast in the mean time, he hoped, by erecting batteries in commanding positions, to frustrate any attempt upon the city by Calleja, who would doubtless make its capture his first object. Allende, with all the forces he could muster, entered Guanajuato on the evening of the 13th of November, accompanied by the principal leaders, who preferred to follow his fortunes rather than cast their lot with Hidalgo, whose popularity with them was diminishing daily.[1] His

[1] Those who accompanied Allende were Juan and Ignacio Aldama, Mariano Jiménez, Joaquin Arias, Mariano Abasolo, and Juan Ocon. *Lizana*,

as celebrated by the intendente Gomez with
tic demonstrations. The bells were rung and
; but as in formal procession the authorities
ipal citizens entered the municipal hall to
ne insurgent leader a ghastly spectacle pre-
self. Allende's horsemen dashed into the
drawing up in front of the building, exposed
a hacked and blood-stained corpse lashed to
of a mule. An unfortunate creole, named
Salas, a native of Dolores, had taken part
eja when he passed through that town, and
llen into the hands of the insurgents had been
by them to Guanajuato and put to death at
nce of the city. Having given the mem-
ne ayuntamiento ample time to reflect upon
ficance of this portentous exhibition, the
paraded through the streets as a warn-
e ayuntamiento felt conscious that this ac-
llende was intended to intimidate them, but
in conjunction with the other authorities,
ers sallied forth to meet him, they claim to
served their dignity and allegiance by not
their procession the character of an official

e then made his preparations to engage
According to despatches written by him
go on the 19th and 20th of November, I
at when those leaders separated they made
ment that they should support each other
alleja. It was now no longer doubtful that
r would march against Guanajuato, and
strongly urged Hidalgo to come to his aid
s possible. He, moreover, sent instructions
, who was now at San Luis Potosí, to join
nce. The forces at Allende's disposal were
pects inadequate to cope with the royalists,

fic., 149. Negrete, however, doubts that there existed at this
eeling between Hidalgo and Allende. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 313.
ub. Vind. Ayunt., 43–4.

and deficient as they were in discipline and arms, he could only hope to maintain his position by means of his artillery if no assistance arrived.[3] But both Hidalgo and Iriarte neglected to come, and Allende's



PLAN OF BATTLE-FIELD.

[3] A. Positions occupied by the insurgents.
B. The royalist army before the attack.
— — March of column led by Calleja.
– – – – March of column led by Flon.
This plan is obtained from that formed by Calleja's staff according to his orders, and published by Torrente, being reproduced by Bustamante in his *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 100.

o the former show bitterness. His last com-
ion even charges Hidalgo with the intention
ting money at Guadalajara and escaping with
y of San Blas. But Hidalgo, informed of
esses in Nueva Galicia, had determined to
uadalajara, and had left Valladolid before
had written him.

while batteries were placed by Allende on no
ten different heights commanding the Marfil
sides two outlying points which occupied hills
ft at a place known by the name of Rancho
In the narrowest part of the road, with infinite
fteen hundred holes were drilled for blasts.
ere connected by a single fuse, the intention
fire it as Calleja's troops passed. The de-
wever, became known to the royalist leader
ved ineffectual.

a, whose movements were never marked by
left Querétaro on the 15th of November, and
through Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato, re-
ed obedience in those towns, and reorganized
overnments. On the 23d he arrived at the
le Molineros, distant four leagues from Guana-
d on the following morning advanced to the
of the cañada de Marfil, intending to recon-
but being interrupted by the batteries at
Seco, he decided to attack at once. Accord-
threw out on his left a strong body of cavalry
ntry under General Empáran, with the two-
ct of occupying the Silao road and executing
attack, while Captain Linares charged the
from the front. The assault was successful.
d and badly directed, the artillery of the in-
did no execution; indeed, so miserably had
on been mounted that they could only be fired
ne direction pointed; and the royalists, charg-
ne slope at places out of the line of fire, quickly
ne insurgents, capturing four pieces of artillery
mber of prisoners. The facility with which

this success had been accomplished induced Calleja to follow up his advantage the same day, it being as yet only eleven o'clock.

His plan was to assault in detail the ten positions occupied by the enemy on each side of the Marfil road, upon which they had trained their artillery. For this purpose he divided his army into two columns, one of which was placed under the command of Flon, who was instructed to dislodge the insurgents from the heights on the right of the road; while the other was led by Calleja in person against the batteries on the left. Both generals were successful, and one after the other the enemy's positions were taken with little loss to the assailants. Flon, though severely bruised in the left shoulder by a slung stone, gained the heights on the right, and finally drew up his forces on the hill of San Miguel and the height of las Carreras, both of which positions commanded the city. Meanwhile Calleja, advancing up the Marfil road some little distance, turned off to the left by that leading to the real de minas of Santa Ana, thus avoiding the defile where the blasts had been prepared.[4] While his infantry dislodged the enemy from their positions the cavalry scoured the glens and more level ground, cutting off the retreat of the insurgents, slaughtering them without mercy, and driving them in their panic over the precipices.[5] This series of assaults lasted for more than six hours; the difficulties encountered by the loyalists being from the steepness of the heights, rather than from opposition of the enemy, whose

[4] Bustamante states that information of this plan of the insurgents was given by a regidor of Guanajuato 'que merecia el mejor concepto entre sus conciudadanos,' and that his correspondence with Venegas was intercepted by Villagran, but too late to be of any benefit to Allende. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 100. Alaman reasonably assumes that the regidor intimated at was Fernando Perez Marañon; but throws considerable doubt upon the statement of Bustamante, remarking that, 'Sus noticias cuando no espresa de qué orígen las toma merecen muy poca confianza.' *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 47. Negrete considers it improbable that Marañon gave the information. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 320.

[5] 'La caballeria...cortaba á los enemigos en las cañadas y los persequia en su huida pereciendo muchos á sus manos, quedando el campo lleno de cadáveres, y otros precipitados en las barrancas de este pièlago de montañas.' *Calleja*, in *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 1057.

of arms rendered them incapable of making a . Shortly after five o'clock, Calleja encamped ıe night on the hill of Valenciana.

ıe result of the day's fighting was the capture of ty-two pieces of artillery,[6] the dispersion of a body ously estimated at 10,000 to 70,000 Indians,[7] and investment of the city on the north and south. he number of revolutionists slain it is impossible rm any estimate with certainty. The ayuntami- places it at 8,000,[8] but this is doubtless an exag- tion, and Alaman's estimate of 1,500 is probably wide of the mark.[9] The loss on the side of the lists was insignificant; according to Calleja's first rt to the viceroy it was limited to four killed and n wounded;[10] the casualties in the column led by raised the number of wounded to about a score, nvincing proof of the want of forethought dis- ed by the insurgent leaders in presuming that ja would necessarily march up the Marfil road, in mounting their cannon so as to be immovably ted.

ad Allende been supported by Hidalgo and te, and had Calleja been assailed in the rear ac-

ccording to the detailed report of Calleja, dated December 12th. In a is report, written at 12 o'clock on the night of the 25th, he states that es of artillery were taken. These cannon were made by order of Hi- during his campaign in the direction of Mexico; they were cast by the er Rafael Dávalos, who also assisted Casimiro Chovell, superintendent Valenciana mines and works, in sinking the blasts on the Marfil road. n, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 29.

lleja states that the inhabitants of Guanajuato estimated their num- 70,000. *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 1059. Alaman considers this a great ration, remarking that there could not have been even half the number, no concurrió á la accion mas que la gente reunida en algunos puntos anos, y una parte de la plebe de la ciudad y de las minas.' *Hist. Mej.*, Liceaga conjectures that the insurgents did not number more than *Adic. y Rectific.*, 154.

an. Pub. Vind. Ayunt., 54.

e bodies of a considerable number of the fallen were never recovered ıe barrancas, the shafts of old mines, and other inaccessible places. a of Marfil, who was charged with the collection and burial of the re- reports on the 10th of December that the total number interred was t thinks he succeeded in collecting only a small proportion. *Busta- Cuad. Hist.*, i. 108–9. Liceaga considers that scarcely 400 insurgents *lic. y Rectific.*, 154.

z. de Mex. (1810), i. 994.

cording to the plan proposed to Hidalgo,[11] it is not improbable that the royalists would have been defeated. As it was, Allende despaired of success from the first, and with unusual apathy assigned the direction of the batteries and troops to Jimenez, remaining himself in the city.[12] When the news arrived of the capture of the outlying batteries at Rancho Seco, he endeavored to arouse the inhabitants by ordering sounded the general call to arms; but this had the effect only to increase the consternation. The more respectable families took refuge in the churches and convents, or barricaded themselves in their houses, while a large portion of the populace betook themselves to the hills. Allende was helpless to awaken resistance. As height after height was stormed by the victorious royalists, and aware that all was lost, accompanied by his brother officers and a few horsemen, he fled from the city in the direction of San Luis Potosí, taking with him what treasure he had remaining.[13]

And now the Alhóndiga de Granaditas is again brought forward in the history of this unfortunate city as the scene of another appalling massacre. No longer restrained by the interference of military chiefs, early in the afternoon the populace throng the streets with demonstrations of mingled fear and anger. They collect in dense crowds about the alhóndiga, and with

[11] 'No puede ni debe V. ni nosotros pensar en otra cosa, que en esta preciosa ciudad... y así sin pérdida de momentos ponerse en marcha... y atacarlo con valor por la retaguardia, dándonos aviso oportuno de su situacion para hacer nuestra salida, y que cerrado por todas partes, quede destruido y aniquilado, y nosotros con un completo triunfo.' *Allende, Carta*, in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 37–8.

[12] According to Alaman; *Id.*, ii. 49. Negrete, on the other hand, asserts that Allende during the engagement passed from point to point as they were attacked, with the greatest activity. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 321.

[13] According to Liceaga he left about two o'clock in the afternoon. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 153. Bustamante states that Allende remained in the city till the following morning, directing the fire of a heavy piece of artillery placed on the cerro del Cuarto. This is denied by both Liceaga, *Ib.*, and Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 49. Calleja states that he left with about 40 followers. *Gac. de Mex.* (1810), 994. Negrete says that he could not have had more than 2,000. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 405.

ning gestures and inflamed eyes regard the
g in which the Spaniards left by Hidalgo are
ned, and for whose blood they are athirst.
, however, they are restrained by the presence
guard commanded by Captain Mariano Covar-

But as Allende and his party turn the corner
the road leading to the mines,[14] one of them
ut, "Why do you not finish with them?" in-
g the captives. The words act on the mob
e on saltpetre.[15] Under apprehension that
is already at hand, they think only of ven-
and with wild yells, and clubs and bran-
knives, they rush toward the gateway. All
to oppose them are useless. The soldier's
and the priest's entreaty alike fail. Mariano
a, after wounding several of them with his
s stretched senseless on the ground; the cura
le Dios Gutierrez and other ecclesiastics are
aside; the guard is overpowered;[16] and the
ned crowd throw themselves upon their victims.
ork begins, and the alhóndiga again becomes
s with mutilated corpses, stripped of every
of clothing. A few of the captives barricade
lves in some of the storerooms, and manage to
during the temporary dispersion of their assail-

lan of the alhóndiga and surroundings in previous chapter.
an is the authority for the statement that the crowd received this
ment. He refers to the evidence in the trial of Covarrubias, whose
nigno Bustamante, supplied him with the above particulars. Allen-
a, and Chico, however, in the declarations taken at their trials,
he massacre exclusively to the voluntary action of the populace,
ds to prove that they were unaware of the fury incited by their
who was probably riding in their rear. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 50. Busta-
ad. Hist., i. 100–1, followed by Liceaga, records that a negro named
tive of Dolores, incited the people to commit the deed by represent-
m that Calleja had gained the victory, and was advancing upon the
the intention of putting them all to death. Abad y Queipo states
de gave the order for the massacre—which is contrary to Allende's
efforts to suppress outrages—accusing him also of never placing
thin reach of a bullet. He forgets his own cowardly flight and de-
his flock. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 839. Compare *Anso-
nsa*, 17.
ga states that a portion of the guard took part with the assailants.
55.

ants from a cry raised that the royalists are upon them.[17]

While Calleja halted at Valenciana he confirmed the magistrate of that town in his office, although he had received his appointment from Hidalgo. He also supplied him with copies of the proclamation extending pardon to those who returned to their allegiance, and of the edict of the inquisition issued against Hidalgo, instructing him to publish them. Chovell and other residents, fearing for their lives, were meditating flight, but learning of these measures, they remained in their houses. At daylight on the following morning Calleja resumed his march against the city, but before doing so he had received intelligence of the massacre in the alhóndiga,[18] and had caused the immediate arrest of Chovell and other persons living in Valenciana. The insurgents had planted a heavy cannon on the cerro del Cuarto,[19] and during the evening of the 24th and early hours of the following day had maintained a vigorous fire with Flon, who replied from the hill of San Miguel. As Calleja advanced, the insurgents' gun was trained on his line of march, but the royalists, having placed two cannon in a favorable position, succeeded in dismounting it at the first discharge. This was the last effort at resistance; and Calleja and Flon entered the city simultaneously.

[17] Those who thus escaped took refuge in the convent of Belen and private houses. The number of those slain is not accurately known. There were in the alhondiga at the time 247 captives, many of them being creoles who favored the royalist cause. Of these, Bustamante states that a few over 30 escaped. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 101. According to the report supplied afterward by Marañon to Calleja, only 138 recognized bodies received burial, 'habiendo muchos que habiendoseles visto entre los presos, no se supo despues de ellos; por la que se supuso estar entre los muchos cadaveres que se sepultaron sin ser conocidos.' Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. app. 6–7. A list of the principal victims, as well as of those who escaped, is given in *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 156–7. Pedraza states that more than 200 were slain. *Cab. N. Indep.*, 1.

[18] Captain Linares on the previous evening, fearing that some such catastrophe might occur, had urged Calleja to march at once upon the city; Linares made this statement frequently to Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 53, believing that the lives of the captives might have been saved. But the massacre was perpetrated in the afternoon of the 24th, and Calleja did not arrive at Valenciana until after five o'clock.

[19] This battery is said to have been directed by a man from the U. S., 'estaba servido por un norte americano.' *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 161–2.

ged was Calleja at the barbarous murder of
ards that he issued orders to his troops to
ity to fire and sword, and numbers of the
ts were slaughtered in the streets. He
vever, countermanded the order,[20] recogniz-
many innocent persons would be put to
He did not, however, intend that vengeance
ead should terminate with this first ebulli-
ath; he would proceed with the punishment
deliberate and formal manner. During the
nade proclamation,[22] setting forth that al-
nfluenced by humanity, he had suspended his
extermination, such an atrocious crime could
ft without expiation, and he demanded all
be delivered up on the following day, under
ath. Other items of the proclamation were
fect that all persons were expected to give
on of secreted weapons, and of those known
avored the insurgent cause; persons congre-
the streets in greater number than three
dispersed by shot, and those who engaged
us speech would be punished with death
espect of person.

ile this proclamation might leave the inhab-
suppose themselves exempt from further pun-
Calleja was planning merciless retaliation.
uld now be a grand massacre on the royalist
e-extended and direful, such as would do
the cause. On the morning of the 26th the
s of Guanajuato were employed in erecting
all the principal thoroughfares of the city,
e plazas of the neighboring mining towns.[23]

garon à mandar á las tropas que entrasen á sangre y fuego en la
efecto muchos fueron acuchillados en las primeras calles; pero
timientos de humanidad...y que no pereciese una multitud de
adas que en confusion salieron á favorecerse del exército, mandé
Calleja, in *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 994.

others, Agustin Calderon, an uncle of Alaman's, and by no
an of the revolutionists, was killed in the calle de los Pozitos.
Mej., ii. 54.

f it is found in *Gaz. de Mex.* (1810), i. 997-8.

que hizo poner (á mas de la que está en la plaza mayor) en frente

While this was being done, from those arrested the previous day between sixty and seventy were drawn for examination.[24] These were sent to Flon, who had occupied the alhóndiga, and who was instructed to pass sentence upon them. Twenty-three were sentenced to death, among whom were the intendente Gomez, the unfortunate Rafael Dávalos, under whose directions the insurgents' cannon had been constructed,[25] and three military officers who had espoused the revolutionary cause. The examinations were of the briefest, and the executions immediate, the place being within the walls of the alhóndiga. The description of the scene as given by Manuel Gomez Pedraza, an eye-witness, is harrowing. After the sentence of death had been passed by the conde de la Cadena, the condemned were hurriedly shrived by a priest in one of the storerooms, then led to the doorway which had been bricked up by Riaña, and there blindfolded and shot. As victim after victim fell, their dead bodies being dragged aside to make room for their companions, the pavement became covered with fragments of skulls, scattered brains, entrails, and blood. By this human débris, progress was impeded, and before the horrible work was done the floor had to be cleared of its slippery and loathsome covering.[26] The gallows came into play next.

de Granaditas, en la plazuela de S. Fernando, en la de la Compañia, en la de S. Diego, en la de S. Juan, en la de Mexiamora, y una en cada plaza de las minas principales.' The plazas in Guanajuato were little more than streets, somewhat wider than the ordinary tortuous thoroughfares. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 104.

[24] Manuel Gomez Pedraza, who was captain of a company, states that Calleja placed under his charge, with instructions to deliver them to Flon, 60 or more prisoners, 'no hago memoria del numero.' *Celeb. N. Independ.*, 1.

[25] The temerity of Gomez and others implicated in the revolution in not effecting their escape is inexplicable. Davalos carried his rashness to such an extent as to walk in the street among the troops. He was arrested, and would have escaped but that, after having had the good fortune to obtain his release, a paper was discovered secreted in the sleeve of his coat, by the soldier who was untying the cord with which his arms were bound. The document was taken to a commanding officer, and proved to be an account of the cannon cast by Davalos. This discovery decided his fate. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 56.

[26] 'Para ejecutar esta operacion, se trajeron de la calle algunos hombres, y con sus mismas manos echaron la sangre y las entrañas despedazadas de los fusi-

n the economy of revenge, it will not do to
he benefits of spectacular exhibitions. So
fall following, eighteen prominent men are
out and hanged by torchlight in the plaza.
as if the curse of Sodom has fallen on the
Round this plaza, like an amphitheatre, the
tand tier above tier on the surrounding hills,
the people can sit in them and look down
tragedy as at a play. Are these cattle or
nat are being butchered for the market? Or
old Aztec rite been revived among these chris-
No, it is no mediæval or barbaric slaughter,
neteenth-century sacrifice of human beings
ltar of liberty! The air is thick with tyranny
d. The stillness of an unpeopled world per-
e scene, there being heard only the low-voiced
ion of the priest, or the cry of some faint-
wretch for mercy.[27] On the 28th eight
rsons, among whom was the hapless Chovell,
same fate in the plazuela in front of the al-
and on the following day four more were
to die. But the gloom of despair which had
pon the city, the spiritless state of abjection
the population had been reduced, and the
rrender of every article of use that might
a weapon pacified at last the avenger; and
ternoon the ringing of the bells announced
leja had proclaimed a general pardon. Too
vever, was the mercy extended for two of the
condemned, who had suffered but a few min-
ore; the remaining two, in the very act of
s they supposed their last look at earth and
the halters round their necks, were allowed
fit of the pardon, and released.

executions have been regarded by writers of

des bateas, hasta desembarazar el lugar de aquellos estorbos para
rible matanza.' *Celeb. N. Independ.*, 3.
says: 'Muchos años han trascurrido desde entónces, y nunca se
bilitar en mi espíritu la profunda impresion que en él hizo aque-
horror.' *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 59.

the independent party as acts of unmitigated barbarity, but I see little to choose between them and the doings of the revolutionists. If we condemn the massacres of one, we must those of the other. Even though Hidalgo fights for liberty and Calleja for tyranny, if we are disposed to overlook the barbarity of the former in letting loose his Indians on the Spaniards, we must not expect otherwise in regard to the latter than that he will retaliate as opportunity offers. Men are so made. It is idle to argue the point on which side of this war the greatest cruelty was displayed. So far there is not difference enough apparent to talk about; both sides were about as blood-thirsty as they could be.

The extension of the pardon was hailed by the people with demonstrations of joy. Crawling forth from their houses and hiding-places, they crowded into the plaza in front of the royal buildings in which Calleja had made his abode.[28] The royalist leader addressed them from the balcony, enlarging upon the great clemency which had been extended to them; the subjugated populace meanwhile sending forth loud acclamations of allegiance to the king and obedience to his general.

In reorganizing the government of the province, Calleja appointed Fernando Perez Marañon intendente ad interim;[29] he reinstated Miguel Arizmende in his office of alcalde, from which he had been deposed by Hidalgo, and caused a new election for another to be held. All other offices which had become vacant were provisionally filled by Calleja's nominees. This done, Calleja decided to march against Guadalajara, and

[28] *Guan. Pub. Vind. Ayunt.*, 56–7.

[29] The appointment of Marañon, approved by the viceroy, *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1810, i. 1001, and the high terms in which Calleja speaks of him, led some to think that he was in communication with Venegas. Alaman does not see sufficient reason for such conclusion. Calleja thus recommends Marañon to the viceroy: "A sus notorias circunstancias de honradez, fidelidad y patriotismo, agrega la de obtener la aceptacion y confianza de este insolente y atrevido pueblo." These expressions seem to indicate that Marañon gave information to Calleja of the insurgents' operations, as stated by Bustamante. Consult note 4 of this chapter.

juato with all his forces on the 9th of De-
aving previously despatched a convoy to
th the king's silver and that of private per-
inting in all to six hundred bars. He also
nachinery and dies of Hidalgo's mint, and,
y of his victory, the heavy piece of artillery
he cerro del Cuarto, which the insurgents
named El defensor de la América. With
y went most of the principal families of
o, deeming their future residence in that
, from the fact that no garrison or other
was left in the place, except a company of
ens. This abandonment of Guanajuato by
ealthy inhabitants completed its ruin. The
occasioned by war and typhus fever, which
ne city during this period, the departure of
nbers of the populace with the insurgent
d the flight of others, caused within a few
depopulation amounting to over 25,000.
g and agricultural industries were for years
thing, and stillness and stagnation reigned
e busy and thriving city.[30]

o, a town five leagues from Guanajuato,
lted his army for several days. While at
on the 12th of December, with the object
ing further atrocities, he published a singu-
After exhorting all to unite with the author-
, and honest citizens in preserving the peace,
d that in every town in which soldiers, ser-
he government, municipal and other author-
nest citizens, whether creole or European,
assassinated, four of the inhabitants, with-
ction of person, should be selected by lot
nan murdered, and without further formal-
to death.[31] It was but an idle threat, how-
ttempt being made to carry it out. From

Adic. y Rectific., 177.
Mex., 1810, i. 1063.

Silao, Calleja advanced to Leon, and proceeded by way of Lagos toward Guadalajara.

Except that Hidalgo was at Celaya on the 13th of November, nothing is known of his movements after the flight from Aculco until we find him at Valladolid, where he arrived on the 14th or 15th of the same month.[32] On the 14th he received intelligence of the late successes of Torres. The importance of this news, and the disagreements which had arisen between Torres and the other insurgent leaders, relative to priority of command, were undoubtedly the reasons which induced Hidalgo to abandon the arrangements made with Allende. During the few days that he remained in Valladolid, he published his reply to the citation of the inquisition already mentioned, and issued a proclamation exhorting sons of the soil to desert the European cause and take part with the independents.[33] On the 17th he left Valladolid for Guadalajara. But before his departure he issued orders which show how far the gentle priest was carried away by the spirit of his purpose. The royalists had glutted their vengeance; it was now his turn. At dead of night on the 13th of November, forty of the European prisoners, who were told that they were to be sent to Guanajuato, were marched to the barranca de las Bateas, three leagues from Valladolid,[34] and after being butchered, their stripped bodies were cast into the depths, and left as food for beasts and birds of prey. On the 18th another band of victims was under similar circumstances conducted to the cerro del Molcajete, and there met with the same fate.[35]

[32] *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 396.

[33] 'Si quereis ser felices, desertad de las tropas de los europeos, y venid á uniros con nosotros; dejad que se defiendan solos los ultramarinos y vereis esto acabado en un dia.' *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, ii. 259.

[34] This barranca was in the gaping crater of an extinct volcano. It was also called 'cerro pelon,' because destitute of trees. In that country hills reft with the cavity of an extinct volcanic crater were called cerro de la Batea, or cerro del Molcajete. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 40.

[35] According to Alaman, 44 Europeans were massacred on this occasion. Among the first victims was the asesor and acting intendente José Alonzo

vithstanding late reverses, Hidalgo was en-
tically received wherever he went. The hope
ty, once having been harbored in the breasts
people, could never be relinquished. The
to Guadalajara was triumphal; and at every
he people sallied forth to welcome the apostle
pendence and do him honor. At Zamora,
mass was held, thanksgivings were offered, and
utions poured into his coffer. During the few
remained in Valladolid he displayed a won-
energy. Besides the writing he had to do, and
itical matters to regulate, he organized a force
) cavalry and 250 infantry, with several pieces
lery. With these troops he approached the
of Nueva Galicia. On the 24th of November
ved at the hacienda of Atequiza, a few leagues
he city. Here all the authorities, municipal
tions, and distinguished citizens had made
tions to meet him. These, in twenty-two
es, arrived at the hacienda, and a duly ap-
commission offered him congratulations, placed
eva Galicia at his disposal, and invited him to

de Teran, who displayed great fortitude. *Id.*, 41. Hidalgo states
otal number was about 60. *Hern. y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 14. The
nder whose command the orders were executed were Manuel Muñiz,
the provincial infantry regiment of Valladolid, and Padre Luciano
who acquired an infamous notoriety for his cruelty. *Id.*, i. 839.
ecclesiastic also who made out the death lists, and thereby obtained
f Padre Chocolate, because he said the victims were going to take
that night. The intendente Ansorena, it is asserted by Alaman,
d his information from Mucio Valdovinos, conducted the arrange-
he departure and execution of the two bodies of Spaniards. See
Hist. Mej., ii. ap. Alaman's statements were replied to by the son
na, the licentiate José Ignacio de Ansorena. In this pamphlet,
n 1850, he defends his father's memory by maintaining that he was
f the purpose for which the prisoners were removed. He assails
dovinos with some acerbity, but his arguments amount to simple
tatements without the production of any evidence. *Ansorena,*
This met with a retort from Valdovinos, who produces some evi-
hardly to more effect than that the popular opinion was that An-
fully implicated. *Valdovinos, Contest.*, pp. 55. This provoked a
phlet, written by José Mariano Ansorena; and with it the tedious
lusive controversy ends. *Ansorena, Respuesta.* Negrete points out
ictions observable between Alaman's account and that of Valdo-
elieves that the butcheries were committed on one day, or two con-
ys, the 17th and 18th, and that Hidalgo was not in Valladolid at
lex. Sig. XIX., ii. 271.

the capital. Thence he proceeded to San Pedro Analco, about a league from Guadalajara, and was entertained with a sumptuous dinner. His entry into the city was arranged to take place on the 26th, and the joyful demonstrations and formal expressions of honor on that occasion soothed his greatly harassed mind and revived his hopes. Had he been a crowned monarch, his reception could not have been more brilliant. The streets, crowded with the inhabitants, were adorned with hangings and devices of bright colors; the troops of Torres were drawn up in two long lines reaching to the gateway of the cathedral, in the atrium of which was stationed the battalion of provincial infantry to salute the chief with military honors.

As the cortege entered the city and passed along the dense lines of people on either side, from thousands of voices rang the welcoming Viva! mingled with salvoes of artillery, the reports of soaring rockets, and the silvery sound of bells and soft-toned marimbas.[36] At the door of the cathedral an altar had been placed, beside which stood Dean Escandon in canonical robes to present Hidalgo with holy water. This ceremony being performed, accompanied by many of the chapter, the revolutionary leader proceeded to the presbytery, where a solemn te deum was chanted. Thence he went in state to the palace, and in the grand saloon, beneath a richly ornamented dorsel, received the authorities, civil corporations, and ecclesiastical communities.[37]

Hidalgo, thus installed, proceeded to decide existing differences between the military leaders, and to organize a formal government. The first having been arranged, he appointed two ministers to take charge

[36] For a description of this musical instrument, see my *Native Races*, i. 664. To defray the expenses of Hidalgo's reception, the ayuntamiento appropriated 1,000 pesos of the fondo de Propios. This sum the regidores were compelled by Calleja to refund. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 492–9.

[37] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 123–4.

affairs, José María Chico,[38] with the title of of grace and justice, and Ignacio Lopez with that of secretary general.[39]

io Lopez Rayon, who became a prominent onary general at a later date, was born at the own of Tlalpujahua, Michoacan, in the year At an early age he displayed a studious turn and his parents, who were in moderate circes, were enabled to cultivate his taste for His early education he received at the f Valladolid, where he concluded a course of hy. He thence removed to the college of fonso in Mexico city, where he studied juris- and took his lawyer's degree. Having suc- practised his profession for some time in the he death of his father recalled him home; he oted himself to mining operations. In August betrothed María Ana Martinez de Rulfo, a of one of the principal families in that dis- When Hidalgo entered the province in Octo- , Rayon espoused the revolutionary cause, he 24th issued a proclamation in Tlalpujahua, Americans to join the just and holy enter- After the first events at Guanajuato and id, he proposed to Hidalgo a plan for the e of similar excesses. His purpose had be- s been reported to Venegas, and a detach- soldiers was sent to arrest him, but he escaped came in sight. Hidalgo was at this time at ío, at no considerable distance from Tlalpu- d Rayon immediately repaired thither, openly is standard, and was appointed his secretary- He accompanied Hidalgo to the monte de

s also made president of the audiencia of Guadalajara. Chico e of Guanajuato, his father, although a European, being a sup- e revolution. Hidalgo made him his secretary, and was accompa- from Guanajuato all through the campaign. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*,

ario de estado y del despacho, lo que parece que le daba las facul- ministro universal.' *Ib.*
Mex., 1811, ii. 103.

Las Cruces, Aculco, and in the remainder of his movements to Guadalajara.[41]

Hidalgo's object was to establish a national independent government; and besides the appointment of ministers of state, he reorganized the audiencia by the appointment of oidores,[42] and nominated Pascasio Letona as envoy plenipotentiary to the United States, with the object of making, if possible, a treaty of alliance and commerce with that republic.[43] But these efforts were doomed to failure. The unfortunate Letona, having proceeded on his journey as far as Molango in la Huasteca, Vera Cruz, excited suspicion by trying to change a gold ounce, and was arrested. His baggage was examined, his credentials as a revolutionary ambassador were discovered secreted in his saddle, and the justice of the town sent him with his papers to Mexico. Letona, well knowing the fate awaiting him, took poison before arriving at the capital, and was buried at Guadalupe. It was indeed dangerous to serve Mexico at this juncture.

While Hidalgo remained in Guadalajara he issued several edicts which he deemed essential to the cause. He proclaimed the emancipation of slaves, the restoration of their lands to the Indians,[44] and prohibited pillage and all excess on the part of his followers[45]—all wise and humane measures, and proving that he did not delight in robbery and murder, as his enemies have charged.

[41] *Gallo, Hom. Ilust. Mex.*, iii. 395–8; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 146–7.

[42] The new audiencia was composed of Chico, president, and José Ignacio Ortiz de Salinas, Pedro Alcántara de Avendaño, Francisco Solórzano, and Ignacio Mestas, oidores. *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 172.

[43] A copy of Letona's credentials, dated Dec. 13, 1810, can be found in *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 79–81, and in many other works. Pascasio Ortiz de Letona was a native of Guatemala, and was a devoted student of the natural sciences, especially of botany. He was residing in Guadalajara as protégé of the royal official Salvador Batres, and was made a mariscal de campo by Hidalgo. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 83.

[44] Already mentioned in chap. v., this volume.

[45] In this proclamation he points out that these robberies were carried on without discrimination, the property of Americans, 'mis amados americanos,' being frequently appropriated. Copy of document in *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, ii. 399; *Mex. Refut. Art. de Fondo*, 25–6.

possession of Guadalajara supplied Hidalgo powerful means of advancing the cause of the ion by extending more widely and generally nciples upon which it was based, and by plac- hin reach of the reading public his replies to nations of the royalists, and his refutations of upon himself. For there was in this city ting-press. When the revolution broke out ere but few printing-presses in all New Spain, each of the cities of Mexico, Puebla, Guadala- d Vera Cruz;[46] and all being under the control government, the independents not only found difficulty in publishing accounts of their opera- but were also unable to contradict false repre- ons, issue appeals, or counteract the exhorta- to loyalty widely spread by Venegas. This e was now removed, and Hidalgo established a ical which he called the *Despertador Americano*, used it widely to be circulated.[47] Replies to ous proclamations, pamphlets, and other papers ad been issued by the opposite party were now ned, and among them Hidalgo's memorable one citation of the inquisition which he had lately in Valladolid.[48]

the while his attention was closely given to mili- reparations. The arsenal at San Blas supplied ith cannon and munitions of war, and he caused than forty-four pieces of artillery to be trans- thence with incredible labor over a most diffi- ad to Guadalajara. He ordered a large num- men to be recruited; and to supply the want of ms, quantities of grenades and iron-pointed rock-

one at Vera Cruz was worked but a short time. *Bustamante, Cuad.* iii. preface.

py of the first number is given in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, . It was issued on the 20th of Dec. 1810.

lgo states in his deposition taken at his trial that only two manifests in the *Despertador Americano* were written by him, the reply men- the text and another 'cuyo objeto es probar que el Américano debe por Américano, así como el Alemán por Alemán,' etc. *Hernan- alos, Col. Doc.*, i. 12.

ets were manufactured. Every preparation to meet Calleja in the field was energetically made; but there was still lacking the one great element of success, discipline. While the father-patriot is here striving to strengthen himself as best he is able with poor officers and worse soldiers, let us glance at the progress of the revolution in other parts.

CHAPTER X.

EAD OF THE REVOLUTION AND BATTLE OF CALDERON.

1810–1811.

OSILLO'S OPERATIONS IN SINALOA—SUCCESSES AT ROSARIO—HIS DEFEAT
SAN IGNACIO—SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION IN NUEVO SANTANDER—
OAHUILA AND NUEVO LEON REVOLT—VILLAGRAN'S DOINGS—BIOGRAPHY
CRUZ—PLAN OF CALLEJA—TUMULT IN VALLADOLID—CRUZ ENTERS
ALLADOLID—HE REORGANIZES THE GOVERNMENT—ENGAGEMENT AT
REPETIRO—ALLENDE JOINS HIDALGO AT GUADALAJARA—A COUNCIL OF
AR—HIDALGO TAKES UP A POSITION AT THE BRIDGE OF CALDERON—
LAN OF BATTLE-FIELD—CALLEJA'S DISPOSITIONS—FLON'S IMPETUOSITY
-THE REVOLUTIONISTS NEARLY TRIUMPHANT—THEIR FINAL DEFEAT—
EATH OF FLON—HIS CHARACTER.

N receiving intelligence of the occupation of Guaato by Calleja, Venegas regarded the suppression he insurrection as almost accomplished,[1] when in ity it was more widely spread than ever. We e seen how completely the provinces of Nueva icia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí were now in power of the independents; and it was not likely they would relax their efforts at this juncture. expedition into the provinces of Sinaloa and Sonora planned by Gomez Portugal, and placed under command of José María Gonzalez Hermosillo, mpanied by the dominican father, Francisco de 'arra, in the character of director and adviser.[2]

a letter to Calleja, dated Dec. 16, 1810, in reply to the brigadier's t that a medal might be presented to his soldiers, the viceroy, speaking ir toil, says: 'Contemplo próximo el fin y la coronacion de ellas, y en os dias que probablemente se terminarán, se arreglarán con aquella de- que hace apreciables los premios, los que deban concederse.' *Busta- Cuad. Hist.*, i. 118.

rra rendered the revolutionary cause great assistance. The charge of nting-press was intrusted to him by Hidalgo, and its expenses were

It set out with a force of about 2,500 men, and arrived at Tepic on the 11th of December, where it was still further augmented by volunteers.

On the 15th Hermosillo reached Acaponeta, the border town, distant 115 leagues from Guadalajara; and on the 18th engaged with Colonel Pedro Villaescusa, who was in command of the troops at the real del Rosario. The royalists were defeated, and the town remained in possession of the independents.[3] Hermosillo gave Villaescusa a letter of safe-conduct to rejoin his family, exacting from him an oath not to take up arms against the independents. Villaescusa, taking advantage of this clemency, retired from the town with more than seventy of his troops, and having recruited on his march all whom he could induce to join the royalist cause, reached San Ignacio de Piastla. He now sent information to the intendente of Sinaloa, Alejo García Conde, who resided at Arizpe, and who hastened to his aid with a company of Indians.[4] Meanwhile Hermosillo entered San Sebastian on the 27th of December without opposition, having been previously joined by the garrison of Mazatlan. His army now numbered nearly 5,000 men,[5] and on the 29th he took up a position on an eminence which commanded the town of San Ignacio de Piastla, a considerable river intervening. Misfortune here

temporarily defrayed by him. Hidalgo appointed him as leader of the expedition, with the rank of brigadier, Hermosillo being nominally the commander, as Parra did not wish this appointment to be made public, it not being in conformity with his position as a friar. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 379.

[3] Padre Parra relates that the alcabalero, a European, had made a final but unsuccessful stand with a piece of artillery and been slain, 'y para suciar mas los indios su corage, al Europeo artillero le cortan los genitales, que pendientes de una cuerda los paseaban por toda la poblacion, lo que infundio tanto terror a aquellos habitantes, y a los soldados realistas, que en un momento quedaron las calles limpias de toda gente enemiga.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 380. Hidalgo promoted Hermosillo to the rank of colonel for this victory, and promised him a brigadiership if he captured Cosalá. *Id.*, 24–28.

[4] 'Con refuerso de cuatrocientos indios Opatas de caballeria armados de fusil, lanza, rodela y pistolas, y un cañon de a seis.' *Id.*, 382.

[5] 'Se contaron 4,125 infantes, 476 caballos, 900 fusiles, algunas escopetas y carabinas. 200 pares de pistolas y mucho numero de lanzas...se condugeron tambien los seis cañones que se le quitaron a Villaescusa.' *Id.*, 381.

the insurgent chief. On the 2d of January, adre Parra, having discovered a ford, while it in company with five soldiers was taken [6] On the 8th Hermosillo, after fording the l into the hands of 400 royalists secreted in h on either side of his line of march. So as the fire opened upon him, that in less than utes more than 300 of the insurgents were d the rest fled panic-stricken. Hermosillo lost annon, baggage, and munitions of war, and edition so successfully begun was thus sud-ded.[7]

n another direction success attended the revo- In the eastern provinces it spread with ra- After San Luis Potosí had thrown off the e neighboring district of Nuevo Santander kened by the spirit of independence. The r, Lieutenant-colonel Manuel de Iturbe,[8] pelled to retreat to Altamira by the revolt of hich he had raised under the same delusive ion indulged in by Abarca and Rendon. The was now overrun by revolutionists. Span-re dragged from their homes and cast into s from which the vilest criminals had been ; their wealth was appropriated and their prop-troyed. The mines were deserted and enter-

the soldiers was killed, the other four escaped. Padre Parra gh great hardships. He was afterward sent to Durango and de-he asesor Pinilla Perez, who 'habia jurado no dejar en este suelo re Americano.' *Id.*, 383. Parra, knowing that he had little hope ived to escape, 'contrahaciendo en el pasaporte que fingio la firma' *Ib.* Bonavia was the intendente of Durango.

count of the Sinaloa expedition is taken from the narrative of ernandez y Dávalos, *Col. Doc.*, i. 378–83, and given in brief by , in *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 176–81, and in *Campañas de Calleja*, 62–8. document belonged to Bustamante, and Hernandez y Dávalos is it to José María Andrade. Alaman is inclined to discredit Bus-count relative to the dishonorable action of Villaescusa. *Hist.*

But the statements of Parra copied by Bustamante are corrobo-nother document, a despatch written by José Lopez, an officer osillo, and who makes the same statements. *Hernandez y Dáva-.*, i. 376–7. The total dispersion of Hermosillo's army may be m *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 173–4. Negrete omits all mention of defeat. *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 82–3.

icer married a sister of the historian Alaman. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 94.

prises abandoned. Many sought escape to the sea-coast, or a refuge in some principal town. Great numbers flocked to Saltillo from the mining district of Catorce and neighboring places. Colonel Antonio Cordero was at that time governor of Coahuila, and was organizing a body of troops for the purpose of marching against San Luis Potosí, according to the plan formed by Calleja.[9] The arrival of so many Spaniards at a time so critical might have been turned to good account by an able and energetic commander; but Cordero was not such a man. He was unable to harmonize differences, or secure unity of action, and his attempt to organize them proved a failure.

Hidalgo now appointed his lieutenant-general, Jimenez, to the command of San Luis Potosí and the adjoining provinces. At the close of 1810, Jimenez, at the head of some 10,000 men, marched against Saltillo, and met Cordero on the 6th of January, 1811, on the field of Aguanueva at no great distance from Saltillo. Cordero's force, which was well organized and armed, numbered 2,000; and had his troops remained faithful, he would probably have dispersed the army of Jimenez; but they deserted as soon as they came in sight of the enemy, and Cordero, who sought safety in flight, was made prisoner on the following day. Jimenez next morning entered Saltillo without opposition, and like Hermosillo at Acaponeta, he treated the captive enemy with every consideration.[10]

This bloodless acquisition of Coahuila was followed by the declaration of the governor of Nuevo Leon,

[9] The instructions Calleja submitted to the approval of the viceroy relative to the movements of Cordero's troops were the following; 'Las tropas de Cordero que se hallan, segun las últimas noticias, en las inmediaciones de Matehuala, distantes 35 leguas de San Luis Potosí, deberán bajar á esta ciudad á restablecer el órden y castigar los pueblos de Dolores, San Luis de la Paz, Sichú, etc., y manteniéndose en las inmediaciones de San Miguel, Guanajuato y Querétaro.' *Calleja*, in *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, ii. 408. The date of Calleja's despatch is Dec. 16, 1810.

[10] *Parte de Jimenez*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 332–4; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 94–6.

anta María, in favor of the revolution,[11] and
of that province acquiesced in his action.
, also, the royalist party for a time suc-
the independents. On the 22d of Janu-
Bautista Casas made himself master of San
le Béjar, the capital, capturing the governor,
le Salcedo, the lieutenant-colonel, Simon
commander of the frontier militia, and a
f officers and Europeans.[12] Thus without
odshed the whole of that portion of New
ich extends from San Luis Potosí to the
f United States declared for independence.
rings and indignities, however, to which the
aniards were subjected were in many cases
t, not even priests[13] escaping by reason of
n.[14]

after the grito de Dolores, Villagran, as the
l recollect, established himself at Huichapan,
d extremely troublesome to the royalists by
ng their communication between the capital
étaro. With him two others later associated,

aría was a native of Seville, but having arrived in New Spain
child, was regarded as a Mexican. *Id.*, 96.
Mex., 1812, iii. 1087–8. Western Florida, the present state of
l declared its independence on the 26th of Sept. previously, and
ned the viceroy of this event on the 21st of Nov., at the same
for reënforcements, since he feared to be invaded from the re-
ce. Salcedo considered the movement at Baton Rouge, where
on broke out as a sequence to the conspiracy of Burr, and the
h emissaries acting upon his suggestions, Burr having been in
he previous year. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 121–4.
at Saltillo not only left the Spaniards at liberty, but extended
s of safe conduct. Many availed themselves of this opportunity
otection of Calleja; contrary to promise, when near Cedral they
eaten, and stripped. Amid the maledictions and curses of the
were then conducted to Cedral, where they were kept impris-
nth, whence they were eventually conveyed to San Luis Potosí,
to the number of eleven, in the jail. By order of Herrera, they
ath with one exception, in March 1811, Juan Villarguide only
ng been left for dead. *Villarguide*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col.*
22.
of San Sebastian, José Mateo Braceras, a Franciscan friar, and
t Francisco Fraga were submitted to every kind of ill treat-
attempting to go from San Luis to Querétaro. They were sent
is, where they were imprisoned by Herrera, but were eventually
n, Hist. Mej., ii. 100–2.

Cayetano and Mariano Anaya. On one occasion Venegas despatched under a strong escort a quantity of stores to Querétaro, and with it travelled the newly appointed auditor de guerra, Ignacio Velez de la Campa. The insurgents, however, attacked it in the narrow defile of Calpulalpan, and killing the passengers and part of the escort, carried off the stores. A huge rock was rolled down upon the carriage of Velez, crushing his head, after which he was despatched. Venegas decided to send a force to Huichapan for the security of the highway. The brigadier José de la Cruz had just arrived from Spain, and to him the viceroy gave the command of the expedition, with Torcuato Trujillo, of Las Cruces renown, as his second.

José de la Cruz does not appear to have begun his military career before 1808,[15] when owing to the invasion of Spain by the French, he like many others abandoned his university for the profession of arms. His rise was rapid; and after two years' service under General Gregorio de la Cuesta he was made brigadier. His success in New Spain was no less conspicuous than it had been in the peninsula, but it must be attributed to accident rather than ability. He was truculent and cruel. His rapid promotion was owing to the jealousy with which the viceroy came to regard the successes of Calleja; and such was the influence of Venegas in Spain, that after his return thither and the accession of Calleja to the viceroyalty he maintained Cruz in the high position to which he had elevated him,[16] in order to mortify one whom he could never pardon for having succeeded him in his rôle of vice-king.

On the 16th of November, Cruz marched out of Mexico, his force constisting of the infantry regiment

[15] According to Fray Tomás Blasco, however, he was in active military service against the French during the years 1793–5. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 246.

[16] As the sequel will show, Venegas appointed him comandante general of Nueva Galicia and president of that audiencia—in fact, made him a second viceroy. *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 110–11, 231, 437, 440–2; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 135, and *Campañas de Calleja*, 58–9, 96, 107.

n, 250 dragoons, and two pieces of artillery, l reënforced by the provincial infantry regi- Puebla, and a battalion of marines com- by Captain Porlier, of the frigate *Atocha*. at Nopala on the 20th, he proceeded on the day to Huichapan, hoping to come in con- n the insurgents; but Villagran, timely in- f the danger, had retreated with all his follow- e sierra of the Real del Doctor and taken up n on the inaccessible heights of Nasteje or eca. Cruz on arriving at the town recovered handise and ammunition which had lately en by the insurgents in the Calpulalpan de- s reception by those of the inhabitants who led was joyful; but in order to prevent any surrectionary acts, he deprived them of every use that could be converted into a weapon, either the housewife's scissors, the laborer's ts, nor the artisan's tools.[17] He gave im- orders to the commander of a detachment sent out in quest of the Anayas, to put to e inhabitants of every town or hacienda in surgents might be found, or where they had shelter, reducing the places to ashes.[18] Be- departure from Huichapan, Cruz amply the death of Velez; pendent from the trees oadsides all through the defile where the perpetrated swung the corpses of victims n reprisal.[19] On the 14th of December, in

er to Calleja, dated Huichapan, 23d of Nov., he says: 'Los cu- nesa, las tijeras y todo cuanto pueda ser ofensivo recojo; instru- rreros, cerrajeros, etc., estoy encajonando.' *Alaman. Hist. Mej.*, egrete states that this letter, as well as the one mentioned in the e, was addressed to the viceroy. *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, ii. 250.

Hist. Mej., ii. ap. 18. The date of this letter is the 29th of previous day the Anayas had killed seven Europeans, and Cruz his correspondence had been intercepted, as he had received no om Mexico for four days, whereas he expected daily communi- expression he uses, 'Supongo que me han interceptado la cor- pues que hace cuatro dias que no tengo pliegos de Mexico, que todos los dias,' and the tone of the letters, lead me to agree that they were addressed to Calleja, and not to the viceroy.

who saw the bodies hanging in Dec., does not mention the num-

pursuance of the plan of military operations proposed by Calleja,[20] he left Huichapan for Querétaro on his march for Valladolid, having been joined by the reenforcement above mentioned.

Calleja at this time was at Leon, and the plan he had formed for conducting the campaign was such as would, he hoped, confine the insurgents to the province of Nueva Galicia. Cruz was instructed to march to Valladolid, reducing to obedience the disaffected towns on his way, and so regulate his movements that he would arrive at the bridge of Tololotlan near Guadalajara on the 15th of January, on which date Calleja, approaching by way of Lagos, expected to reach the same important point. Meanwhile Cordero, the governor of Coahuila, who was supposed to be at Matehuala, was to advance against San Luis Potosí, restore order in that district, punish the towns of Dolores, San Luis de la Paz, and others, and remain in the neighborhood of Guanajuato and Querétaro; and lastly, Bonavia, the intendente of Durango, at this time in Sombrerete or Fresnillo, was to descend upon Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, and keep in subjection the districts extending southward as far as Leon and Silao. The design was well conceived, and would enable Calleja and Cruz with their united forces to assail Hidalgo at Guadalajara with a larger and better appointed army than had yet been sent into the field by the royalists; but, as the reader has already been informed, Cordero's troops joined the insurgents; the projected movement from Coahuila upon San Luis Potosí was reversed; and the cordon around Hidalgo was rendered incomplete.

ber, but they were scattered at intervals from the hacienda de la Goleta to the pueblo of San Miguelito, and one of them was that of the Indian governor. San Miguelito was burned. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 71. Bustamante says: 'Cruz marcó muy luego sus pasos con torrentes de sangre, el rastro de esta y los cadáveres que dejaba á su tránsito señalaban al viagero la ruta que llevaba.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 137.

[20] Calleja submitted his plan to the viceroy by despatch dated Leon, Dec. 16, 1810, and it was approved. A copy of the plan is supplied by *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 304–5.

ving remained a few days at Querétaro, Cruz
n the 20th for Valladolid. His march was un-
ful; for although a hostile force threatened to
e his progress in the neighborhood of Acámbaro,
reated to Valladolid as he approached.[21] Pedro
tino Negrete, a naval officer, was sent with a
hment in pursuit, but was unable to overtake
retreating enemy. I mention this apparently
l circumstance because the name of Negrete,
afterward greatly signalized himself and contrib-
to the success of Cruz by his victories, appears
ne first time in history on this occasion. On the
passing through Indaparápeo, Cruz approached
dolid and bivouacked for the night on the
ts above the city.

the royalists drew near, the revolutionary inten-
e, Ansorena, convinced that the forces which he
t his disposal would be unable to cope with those
ruz, on the night of the 26th and 27th secretly
he city for Guadalajara, escorted by fifty chosen
and on the following morning the officials ap-
ed by Hidalgo also left, taking with them such
ures and archives as were under their charge.[22]
the 27th, as soon as the flight of the intendente
ne public, the populace rose in tumult, and led
blacksmith of Toluca, who was from the United
es,[23] raising the cry of death to the gachupines,
into the college formerly belonging to the Jes-
in which a number of Europeans were con-
[24] and put three of them to death before they

ne insurgents numbered 3,000 or 4,000 horse and foot, and had six can-
az. de Mex., 1811, ii. 17–19.
nsorena, Defensa, 16.
escribed by the viceregal government as an 'anglo-americano de na-
az. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19; and by Ansorena as 'un toluqueño, á quien
n el anglo-americano.' Defensa, 16.
ter the massacres at the Bateas and cerro del Molcajete the remain-
nish captives, to the number of 170, were distributed at the interces-
ecclesiastics in the convents and colleges. Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 19.
a's son, however, makes a different statement. His version is that
25th of Dec. the intendente convoked a junta, and stating that the
the city were inadequate to oppose Cruz, declared his intention of
to Guadalajara. He then proposed for the safe custody of the pris-

were restrained by the canon, the conde de Sierra Gorda, and other ecclesiastics, who, at the risk of their lives, quelled the tumult by elevating the host.

Cruz entered Valladolid on the morning of the 28th, having given orders to the officer in command of his advance guard to put all the male inhabitants to death, and set fire to the city if any further attempt should be made to take the lives of Europeans.[25] His entrance was signalized by the usual expression of welcome extended to either royalist or revolutionist when in power. The cathedral chapter, the ayuntamiento, and different corporations escorted him into the city, and in the cathedral te deum was chanted. The municipal and ecclesiastic cabildos vied with each other in representations of their past fidelity, and in the expression of their future zeal for the royalist cause.[26] The conde de Sierra Gorda, who two months before had removed the excommunication fulminated against Hidalgo and his followers, now gracefully annulled his former action, explained the reason of his unorthodox proceeding, and ordered the validity of the excommunication to be proclaimed throughout the diocese.[27] In order not to be behindhand in offering a sop to the royalists, the rector of the college of San Nicolás petitioned the bishop that Hidalgo's name might be struck off the books of that institution. Thus, as blew the political breeze, so turned like a weather-cock the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of Valladolid.

One of the first acts of Cruz after his entrance into

oners that they should be removed to the convents and clerical college. This proposal was carried out, though strongly opposed by the military officers. *Ansorena, Defensa*, 15.

[25] 'Si la infame plebe intentase de nuevo quitar la vida á los europeos, entre V. en la ciudad, pase á cuchillo á todas sus habitantes, exceptuando solo las mugeres y niños, y pegándole fuego por todas partes.' Such are his instructions, a copy of which he forwarded to Calleja. *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 59.

[26] See the alcalde Ramon de Huarte's proclamation to the inhabitants, and the address of the cathedral chapter to the viceroy, dated respectively Dec. 30, 1810, and Jan. 2, 1811. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 28, 31–3.

[27] A copy of his circular is given in *Id.*, 26–8.

was the extension of the general pardon, of any availed themselves. In reorganizing the ration, he appointed Torcuato Trujillo co- e general of the province,[28] whose associate, adier García Dávila, presently arrived in com- h the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, Merino, dente ad interim, and other officials, who, as er will recollect, had fled from the city at the roach of Hidalgo.

a in his plan of operations had calculated that uld be able to leave Valladolid on the 1st of ; he was however detained in that city until This delay necessarily interfered with the -out of Calleja's arrangements, but in addi- his, Hidalgo was forming plans for the pur- preventing the union of Cruz's forces with Calleja, and had instructed Colonel Ruperto ho was stationed at Zamora, to oppose the advance. Mier, therefore, at the head of or 12,000 men, with twenty-seven pieces of took up an almost impregnable position on ghts commanding the mountain gorge of ro, about four leagues to the south-east of and through which Cruz would necessarily pass.

he 14th of January Cruz, whose force num- 000, principally infantry, with eight pieces of approached the mountain pass, which he cupied by the revolutionary army. He forth- dered his advance guard to open attack by against the enemy's position along the banks am flowing down the gorge. The insurgents' , however, commanded the approach, and a tained fire being opened upon the assailants,

[28] had accompanied Cruz from Mexico as far as Huichapan, whence to the capital and rejoined Cruz at Valladolid Jan. 2, 1811. The ciated with him in his command the aged brigadier García Dávila, ntuviera su juvenil ardor.' *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 59. ribed Trujillo as a madman with a sword. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*,

the officer in command, in view of the extreme difficulty of the ascent, retreated. Cruz now threw out detachments on his right and left, with the object of occupying commanding heights above the road, sending two cannon with the troops directed against the enemy's right, and planting his remaining six pieces in the most advantageous position at the foot of the gorge. In spite of the ruggedness of the ground, both movements were successful. Meanwhile Mier, regarding the retreat of the advance guard as a flight, unwisely made preparations to pursue, and exposing his left, one of his batteries was assaulted and taken by Negrete, and the insurgent force in that part of the field dispersed. While Negrete was thus engaged, a vigorous attack, supported by the two pieces on Cruz's left, was made upon the insurgents' centre and right, which resulted in the total rout of Mier's forces and the capture of his artillery and ammunition.[29]

Although this attempt to arrest the advance of Cruz was unsuccessful, it contributed to the causes which prevented his taking part in the momentous battle fought on the 17th at the bridge of Calderon. At Zamora he was detained some time in repairing his gun-carriages; and when he arrived at the rio Grande de Lerma, although he met with no opposition, the transportation of his army was tediously slow, from the fact that at the crossing there was only one boat available for the purpose. When he arrived at the point of rendezvous the important battle had been fought and won.

Allende, after his flight from Guanajuato, hastened to Zacatecas, whither Iriarte had proceeded after his departure from San Luis. Although this city was occupied by a large body of insurgents, the command

[29] The insurgents lost [illegible] men, while the royalists had only two killed and one wo[illegible] of this engagement, see the reports of Cruz [illegible]

Allende could rightly assume in his position
n-general, he perceived that the assertion of
riority over Iriarte would in all probability
a mutiny. Of Iriarte's good faith he was
n doubtful; and his own prestige and popu-
d seriously diminished, owing to his late dis-
, as was indicated by the unsuppressed mur-
of the troops. He therefore decided to join
at Guadalajara, and on the 12th of December
t the city. Hidalgo went out to meet him,
y demonstration of friendship.
ight a band of captive Spaniards was led out
darkness, marched a few miles from the city
y spot, and there butchered. And on other
the same ceremony was repeated.[30]
hile Calleja was rapidly approaching. The
ich Hidalgo now had under his command
perior to any force which the insurgents had
brought into the field. It numbered no less
00 men,[31] 20,000 of whom were cavalry, with
e pieces of artillery, many of them of heavy
No exertion was spared by the revolutionary
render this large force as effective as possi-

in, in his testimony at the trial of Hidalgo, states that he assisted
e only, of these massacres, on which occasion 48 victims, more
put to death. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 41. Abad y
pastoral of September 26, 1812, says: 'Luego que se entronizó en
omenzó á degollar en la misma forma, esto es, en partidas diarias
0, los muchos europeos y algunos criollos.' *Id.*, 839. Says José
'Mandó varios asesinatos, y lo mismo es público y notorio que
dalajara, sin embargo de haberlo hecho con tal reserva.' *Id.*, 41.
instructions Hidalgo gives to Hermosillo Jan. 3, 1811: 'Depon-
idado á cerca de los indultos y libertad de europeos, recogiendo
ue alla (sic) por esa parte para quedar seguro, y al que fuere
urbador y seductor, ó se conosca otras disposiciones, los sepultará
ándoles muerte con las precauciones necesarias en partes ocultas
ra que nadie lo entienda.' *Id.*, 24. In his own declaration he
cutaban en el campo á horas deshusadas y lugares solitarios.'

he number given by José María Zabalza in a letter dated Jan.
ddressed to Mercado. *Id.*, i. 386. Calleja, followed by Alaman,
e insurgent army numbered 100,000, an estimate which I con-
ble. *Id.*, ii. 338, 342, 355; *Id.*, iv. 180. Calvillo raises the num-
. *Sermon*, 138.
44 brought from San Blas, a large number had been cast in
many of them very inferior.

ble. The enthusiasm of the troops was stimulated by encouraging addresses; the necessity of discipline urgently pressed upon them; and drills and manœuvres were daily practised on the plains outside the city. Though their arms were far inferior to those of the royalists, they were better than on former occasions; most of them were still only the sling and bow, but for the former great quantities of small grenades had been manufactured—missiles much more destructive than rough stones. A great improvement had also been effected in ridding the camp of hordes of unarmed hangers-on, who followed merely with a view to pillage.

With regard to the plan of operations, a diversity of opinion prevailed among the leaders. At a council of war Hidalgo expressed his conviction that the whole army ought to take up a position at the bridge of Tololotlan, and there engage Calleja, while Iriarte with his forces moving from Zacatecas should assail the royalists in the rear. Allende disapproved of this plan, and bearing in mind the disastrous results at Las Cruces and Guanajuato, expressed his want of confidence in directing their whole force against the enemy, and exposing their fortunes to the hazard of a single battle. He proposed that several divisions should be formed out of the army, that Guadalajara should be evacuated, and that Calleja should be attacked by these corps d'armée consecutively, thus avoiding the risk of a general rout. The debate was long and warm, but eventually Hidalgo's plan was adopted.[33]

On the 13th of January, Hidalgo was advised that Calleja was advancing by forced marches toward Guadalajara; and he immediately made preparations to occupy the bridge of Calderon, eleven or twelve leagues from the city. On the following day Hidalgo led out his host. As he compared his now com-

[33] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 185; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 114; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, ii. 413.

well organized force with the rabble he had
, he felt confident of victory.[34] At sunset
at the bridge of Tololotlan, six leagues from
and having received fresh information of
dvance, he again convoked a council, at which
questions were discussed with the same re-
oceeding on the following morning, he occu-
bridge of Calderon, and took up a strong
commanding the approach to Guadalajara.
p height on the left side of the river a bat-
xty-seven guns was planted. This position



BATTLE-FIELD OF THE BRIDGE OF CALDERON.[35]

st inaccessible in front, was protected in the
deep barranca, and nearly surrounded the
nd on which Calleja would have to advance
. Flanking this main battery, minor ones

muchas veces que iba a almorzar en el puente de Calderon, a
retaro, y a cenar en Mexico.' *Cavillo, Sermon*, 136. Negrete in
on of this boast remarks: 'Creo que esto no pasa de una vulga-
Sig. XIX., iii. 4. See also *Calleja*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos*,
360. This bridge is over a small affluent of the rio Grande
out five leagues to the north-east of the bridge of Tololotlan.
n is taken from the work of Torrente, who copied it from a draft
the war department at Madrid. Bustamante reproduced it in
t., i. 188–9. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 584.

were established on heights to the right and left of it, the latter one being on the other side of the river, the access to each being up steep and rocky ascents.

On the 16th the royalist army appeared in sight, and Calleja, finding this almost impregnable position occupied by the enemy, sent forward a reconnoitring detachment, which, becoming engaged with the outlying insurgent troops, succeeded in gaining possession of the bridge. Calleja thereupon ordered reënforcements to advance to its support in order to hold the point, and it being now nightfall, both armies encamped without further movements on either side. As the small army of the royalists bivouacked on the ground, the vast number of their foes was made apparent by the fires on the opposite heights, which Hidalgo caused to be built along the whole extent of his line, three quarters of a league in length.

Calleja's force consisted of 6,000 men,[36] one half of whom were cavalry; but although his army bore no numerical comparison with that of the revolutionists, it was perfectly equipped and disciplined. He had also ten pieces of artillery admirably served, and a magnificent supply of war material; while the insurgents had but few muskets, and many of their cannon were of no service, some being fastened to clumsy carts, and others being manufactured of no better material than wood bound with iron hoops.

Calleja decided to attack without waiting for Cruz. In the morning he formed his army into two divisions, one of which he placed under Flon, who was to assail the enemy's right, while he with the other attacked their left. The assaults were to be made simultaneously, in order that the two commands might fall at the same time on the insurgents' centre. A ford some little distance above the bridge had been found the night before, and Flon leading his force across it

[illegible] iv 180. Cal- [illegible] quatro mil y [illegible]

ly began to ascend the heights. Such was
osity that he would not wait for his artillery,
sisted of four field-pieces, and which owing
treme ruggedness of the ground had to be
p by hand. Perceiving that it could not be
vith the infantry, he led his men at once
ıe first insurgent battery, consisting of four
guarded by a strong body of the enemy.
was the deed, he was so ably supported by
that he drove the insurgents from their po-
captured their guns. Pursuing his advan-
ɔon as his artillery arrived, he succeeded in
the revolutionists from the minor batteries
ght of their main position, compelling them
k upon their centre.[37]

hile Calleja advanced with the rest of the
ard the bridge, supporting Flon's move-
h the fire of his advance guns, and sending
nforcement of pioneers of the grenadiers of
ıa. When Calleja arrived near the bridge,
survey the whole position of the enemy, he
l the danger of attempting an assault by
ction, and, wheeling to the right, occupied
cannon and a considerable portion of his
mall eminence, from which he opened fire
enemy's nearest left battery. At the same
ent forward on the old road, on the right-
of the stream, Colonel Empáran with a
of dragoons of Spain and the cavalry regiment
rlos, with the object of assailing the enemy in
Colonel Jalon, moreover, was sent to assault
of seven guns situated lower down the

these movements were being made by Ca-
, urged by his uncontrollable desire to win
of the day, exceeded his instructions,[38] and

n *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 356-7.
que Flon traspaso las ordenes de Calleja, para llevarse él solo
batalla.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 342. 'El resultado
habria sido mas feliz, si el Sr *Conde de la Cadena*, llevado de

without waiting until Calleja was prepared to act in concert with him, attacked the main battery of the insurgents with his division. The attempt was unsuccessful. The enemy was able to concentrate overwhelming numbers at the point assailed, and twice his troops were repulsed. His artillery ammunition at this crisis gave out; his men lost confidence, and began to retreat in great disorder.

At this moment victory inclined to the insurgents. The detachment under Empáran on the right had also sustained two repulses, he himself was severely wounded in the head, his horse killed, and the regiment of San Cárlos was already in flight.[39] Nothing but the ascendency of Calleja's presence, his coolness and military skill, saved the day. Jalon, who had successfully forded the river and captured the revolutionists' battery, hastened to the assistance of Empáran; and interposing his troops between him and the dense masses of the enemy in pursuit, restored this part of the field, resulting in great slaughter of the independents.[40] To restore the left was more difficult, and required immediate attention. A strong column of infantry, supported by two squadrons of horse with two field-pieces, was sent over the bridge to the support of Flon. This movement had some effect in arresting the disorder, but it was obvious to the leader of the royalists that his left division held their ground in front of the great battery with difficulty, and that an extraordinary and decisive effort must be made in order to dislodge the enemy. He therefore marched with all the available troops of his division over the bridge, and deploying into line, as soon

su ardiente espíritu, no se hubiese apartado del plan que me propuse y le fijé.' *Calleja*, in *Id.*, ii. 339.

[39] Owing, according to Calleja's report, to the want of courage of the colonel, Ramon Covallos, 'siendo causa de que su regimiento retrocediese por dos veces, y empezase á *huir* siguiendo el ejemplo de su coronel y poniendo en desórden á los demas.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 160.

[40] 'Me asegura,' says Calleja, 'su comandante no haber bayoneta alguna en todo el primer batallon que no esté teñida en sangre de insurgentes.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 358. Jalon's report is found in *Id.*, 361.

ound allowed his doing so, joined his forces
se of Flon. He then caused his ten pieces
ry to be collected on one point, and directed
he main battery of the insurgents. While
e playing vigorously upon the enemy at half
hot, a general charge along the royalist line
ed.

ow occurred an accident which overruled the
battle, and held back the cause of indepen-
may be, for eleven tedious and bloody years.
from the well directed artillery of the royal-
k an ammunition wagon of the enemy, and a
plosion occurred, scattering the dead and dy-
l directions. But this was not all. The
t that season of the year was covered with
atting of dry grass, and this taking fire a fear-
gration ensued. The wind blew full in the
ie revolutionists, and the fire spreading with
idity, they were soon enveloped in dense clouds
and roaring flames. Before the fiery blast
d not stand. Some fell asphyxiated; others
ribly burned. Flight was inevitable.[41] The
caused by this catastrophe and the firm ad-
he royalists, who were now encouraged by the
and intrepid bearing of Calleja, struck panic

makes no mention of this conflagration so favorable to his move-
Alaman—*Hist. Mej.*, ii. 132-3—generally partial to the royalists,
statement with such expressions of doubt as to leave the im-
ie reader's mind that he did not wish to believe in it. He does
ept the testimony of Colonel Villamil, who was sent with two
the assistance of Flon, and who says: 'Se empesó el fuego con
nes que llevaba hasta que este cesó por haberse incendiado el
andez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. But this royalist testimony
rroborative of statements more particularized. In the *Bosquejo*
de Calderon, I find this account: 'Una granada del calibre de á
ra la orden de que no se hiciese fuego, pego en su carro de
e los enemigos, lo inflamo y se observo una grande explosion.'
on: 'Se encontró con muchos cadaveres asi por el fuego de los
Flon como por el de la esplosion del carro y de los cajones de
bia dispersos en varios puntos.' *Id.*, ii. 342. Verdia, in *Id.*, iv.
ates in a great measure the disaster of the day on the side of
ents to the explosion of some ammunition wagons, caused by a
arged by the royalists and the spread of fire thereby through the
mante and Negrete take the view given in the text. Mora
fire in the camp to the simultaneous discharge of the 67 guns
llende. *Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 135.

into the insurgents. All along the royalist lines the charging troops pressed upward with but little loss, and cavalry, infantry, and artillery at last gained the height together.[42] But the enemy was in full flight, and their abandoned guns were found still loaded with grape-shot. A solitary battery of six heavy pieces, situated on the summit of an eminence on the insurgents' left, still maintained its fire. Thither had congregated great numbers of the dispersed army, but a detachment of the triumphant troops being sent against it, it was captured with little difficulty; and after a contest of six hours the royalist victory at the bridge of Calderon was complete.

Then followed the pursuit. Over the charred ground the horsemen urged their steeds after the flying bands. Foremost amongst the pursuers was Flon. Enraged at the unsuccessful part which he had played in the late battle, and eager for revenge, or determined not to survive his disgrace,[43] he outstripped them all, and plunging among the insurgents, fell covered with wounds. At night his absence was noticed and a party was sent in search of him, but it was not until the following day that his mutilated body was found.[44]

Of the military antecedents of Colonel Manuel de Flon, conde de la Cadena, little is known. His reputation as a public man was, however, well established in New Spain, and his character for honesty and integrity, as well as his ability in the performance of political and magisterial duties, universally recognized.

[42] 'Siendo obra de pocos minutos el acometer la batería y apoderarse de ella, no obstante el inmenso número de insurgentes que la defendian y la resistencia que opusieron sosteniéndose hasta el término de que las tres armas llegaron á un tiempo, y la artillería misma á tiro de pistola.' *Calleja*, in *Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 358.

[43] 'Parece se fue á buscar la muerte entre enemigos para no sobrebir (sic) á aquella desgracia.' *Id.*, ii. 342.

[44] Alaman states that a soldier of the provincial regiment of Valladolid slew him, remarking, as evidence in a foot-note, that this soldier produced in Guadalajara a pocket-book belonging to Flon, which he had taken from his dead body. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 130. But the condition of the corpse, covered with wounds and contusions inflicted by every kind of weapon, is sufficient evidence that he was overpowered by numbers, and that he did not fall by the hand of a single man.

etuosity and strong passions, it is true, not unly led him into errors, causing him to overividual rights and disregard law. He held political opinions as his brother-in-law Riaño. was about sixty years of age when he met his Calderon. Pedraza, who witnessed his acthe alhóndiga, says that he "was of ordinary with broad and arched shoulders. His counwas of a dark brown and wrinkled, the exof it being frowning and severe; his eyes ken, penetrating, and fierce, and his look proud lainful, while his long, heavy, gray eyebrows his features an imposing and unpleasing as- The portrait is not a pleasing one. His reere temporarily deposited in the neighboring nurch of Zapotlanejo, whence they were transo the cathedral of Guadalajara and there inith solemn obsequies.[46]

a on the following day rested his troops on the eld, and then pursued his march to Guadalaing with him all the serviceable cannon of the nts, after having destroyed and buried the rest. olutionary leaders fled by different routes to as, Rayon succeeding in carrying off the army hich amounted to $800,000.[47]

oss on the side of the insurgents, as on previsions, is unknown, but that it was very cone may be inferred from the fact that in the the field alone where Jalon went to the support áran more than 1,200 fell.[48] That sustained by alists was 49 killed, 134 wounded, and ten miss-

dad Independ., 2; *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 45–6.
os huesos de los españoles degollados en las barrancas cercanas á la his occurred on the 11th of Feb. following. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*,

a, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 386. Alaman says about os. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 127.
ndez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., ii. 361. According to a letter addressed to Mercado, 4,000 were calculated to have fallen, 'aunque sobre dato cierto.' *Id.*, i. 390.

ing.[49] This insignificant loss in the achievement of so great a victory was due first of all to the accident, and secondly, to the superiority in arms and discipline o the royalists. Henceforth the royalist cause was fo some time ascendent, but the principles of indepen dence were too deeply rooted ever again to be wholly eradicated.

[49] *Id.*, ii. 364. Calleja says 50 killed and 125 wounded. *Id.*, 359. Alama erroneously gives the numbers as 41 killed and 71 wounded. *Hist. Mej.*, i 129-30. Those given in the text are taken from the official returns.

CHAPTER XI.

HIDALGO'S CAPTURE AND DEATH.

1811.

CRUZ JOINS CALLEJA AT GUADALAJARA—HUMILITY OF THE AUDIENCIA, CHURCH, AND UNIVERSITY—CALLEJA ESTABLISHES A JUNTA DE SEGURIDAD—CRUZ REGAINS SAN BLAS—DEATH OF MERCADO—HIDALGO COMPELLED TO SURRENDER HIS COMMAND—THE INSURGENT LEADERS RETIRE TO SALTILLO—THEY DECIDE TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES—OPERATIONS IN SAN LUIS POTOSÍ—DEATH OF HERRERA—COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN TEXAS—CAPTURE AND EXECUTION OF IGNACIO ALDAMA—ELIZONDO'S TREACHEROUS PLOT—CAPTURE OF HIDALGO AND REVOLUTIONARY CHIEFS—IRIARTE'S DEATH—THE CAPTIVES ARE SENT TO CHIHUAHUA—THEIR TRIAL—ABASOLO'S DEPOSITION—EXECUTIONS—ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION—HIDALGO'S EXECUTION—HIS CHARACTER.

CALLEJA entered Guadalajara on the 21st of January. His reception was similar to that of Hidalgo a few weeks before. With wonderful facility these people could be royalists or revolutionists as occasion demanded. In their principles they were governed greatly by the weather. If Hidalgo rained his rabble upon them in the morning, the town—all that were left in it—was for the country; if Calleja's sun shone bright, it was for the king. And luckily so; else by this time, between the several retaliatory leaders, there had been few left. Yet there were many in Mexico firm enough in espousing the cause, and nobly enduring, pledging themselves irrevocably to it, knowing that such action was almost certain death.

The demonstrations on this occasion were unusually prolonged, from the fact that in the afternoon of the same day Cruz unexpectedly arrived. This leader,

after the delays which embarrassed his advance unti
he had crossed the Lerma, had hastened forward b
forced marches to join Calleja. Personally these tw
commanders were unknown to each other, but al
though latent feelings of jealousy might exist, thei
meeting was cordial in the extreme. Nor did Cruz'
seniority of rank as a brigadier interfere with an ami
cable arrangement as to their respective positions; h
waived his right to take the chief command in favo
of Calleja.[1] It was afterward agreed that each shoul
retain command of his own division, and that Cru
should march at once to San Blas to recover possesio
of that port, while Calleja remained in Guadalajara t
reform the government.

On the 22d and 23d Calleja issued two proclama
tions: the one congratulating his troops upon thei
late victory and exhorting them to abstain from ex
cesses; the other was addressed to the inhabitants o
Nueva Galicia, and was of the usual tenor, containin
threats of death in case of future disobedience, an
to all caught with arms in their hands.[2] Moreover
he caused ten of the prisoners taken at Caldero
to be shot as traitors.[3]

The late action taken by the audiencia and the ec
clesiastical powers on the entrance of Hidalgo int
Guadalajara was not likely to win favor for them i
the eyes of the viceroy; and they now hastened t
send to him protestations of fidelity and explanation
of their conduct. The former expressed its unbounde
joy at the late victory, and the restitution of its func

[1] This action of Cruz was highly approved by the viceroy, who writes: 'Co
lo que ha dado V. S. la prueba mas convincente de su conducta, y de qu
nada ama tanto como el buen servicio del rey.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 137.

[2] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 345, 349–50; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, i
107–9.

[3] One of these, Simon Fletcher, was from the U. S. He was one of Hi
dalgo's captains of artillery, and had commanded a battery at Calderon. Al
though severely wounded, Calleja caused him to be taken from the hospita
and shot. 'Era tal el deseo de Calleja de fusilar á alguno de los de aquell
nacion que andaban fomentando la revolucion.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 154–5
Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 104. The latter gives the names of thos
executed. They were all shot with their backs to the firing platoons.

tions, which had been interrupted during the occupation of the city by the "insurgent monster, Miguel Hidalgo;" while the ecclesiastical chapter drew a pitiable picture of the degradation its members had been subjected to in having been compelled to repress any utterance of their sincere loyalty and fidelity. The university, moreover, in all humility, declared that it had made no demonstration in favor of Hidalgo such as was offered to a legitimate government, informed the viceroy that a donation of $1,510 had been contributed by the members of the faculty for the benefit of the army, and said that certain of them had been commissioned to preach and write in refutation of the proclamations and pamphlets printed by the insurgents. The faculty, moreover, petitioned the viceroy to appoint Calleja president, governor, and captain-general of Nueva Galicia.[4] Venegas graciously received these explanations, and in his reply to the ecclesiastics, expresses the hope that time will prove that he has not been deceived in forming the high opinion which he entertained for them.

When Hidalgo departed from Guadalajara, the audiencia and other authorities had reëstablished themselves. President Abarca and others, who had lain concealed, as soon as Calleja's victory became known, issued from their hiding places and reassumed their previous positions. Nevertheless Calleja closely investigated the conduct of those oidores and other officials who had remained in the city,[5] and considering that the weak and vacillating character of Abarca

[4] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 109–12, 246–8; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 377. The viceroy, Jan. 19th, ordered Hidalgo's proclamations, his reply to the inquisition, and other seditious publications to be burned by the executioner in the plaza of Mexico. On the 26th the inquisition issued an edict pronouncing the greater excommunication against all who should keep such papers in their possession. Copies of both documents can be found in *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 85–97.

[5] The regent Antonio Villa Urrutia, feigning sickness, attended no session of the audiencia during the time that the city was occupied by Hidalgo, who, however, frequently visited him. He was reinstalled in his office, as also was Oidor Sousa, who had attended only once, and then under a public protest before the escribano Arroyo de Anda. Adrade was another member who had refused to join the sessions. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 140; iv. ap. 63–4.

rendered him unfit to fill the position he had held, made corresponding representations to Venegas. Abarca asked for a formal investigation, which, however, was denied him;[6] and his petition that he might be allowed to return to Spain having been granted, he departed, but died at Panamá some time afterward, on his journey thither. Besides reëstablishing the royalist authorities, Calleja formed a junta de seguridad, with Velasco de la Vara[7] as president, the prerogatives of which consisted in the right to try all persons suspected of treason. He also instituted a junta de caridad y requisicion de bienes europeos, the object of which was to protect the property and interests of Europeans who had fled or been put to death, and administer aid to their families. This court was also charged with the duty of collecting and interring the remains of the Spaniards lately slain.[8]

Having thus arranged affairs in Guadalajara, without waiting for the return of Cruz, who in the mean time had been appointed president in place of Abarca, and military commander of Nueva Galicia and Zacatecas, Calleja left for San Luis Potosí. His army was at this time much reduced in numbers by sickness, desertion, and excessive venery;[9] and when informing the viceroy of his departure from Guadalajara, he felt it necessary to remark that he observed a want of enthusiasm in his troops, and little inclination to engage in fresh campaigns.[10] His march to San Luis was conducted with all possible pomp, and with such assumption of almost courtly display as greatly to disgust the viceroy.[11] But while outriders pre-

[6] 'Es natural,' writes Calleja to the viceroy, 'que intente justificarse ante mí; pero yo no pienso oírle.' *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 102.

[7] Abarca had married one of the daughters of Velasco. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 138.

[8] On the same day on which these obsequies were held, viz., Feb. 11th, the executions previously mentioned in the text took place. *Id.*, 154.

[9] In a confidential letter to Cruz he says that 'las putas y el calor le acababan su tropa.' *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 105.

[10] *Id.*, 102. He moreover, in a letter to the viceroy dated January 28, 1811, accuses the Spaniards of want of patriotism and of criminal indifference. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 354.

[11] His action in this respect was the subject of conversation in Mexico,

ceded his carriage, and military music entertained the company at his table and evening receptions, want of provisions and pasturage made his march slow; and his long straggling line, composed of soldiers, women, camp-followers, and hungry beggars, presented an array far from military in appearance.[12] On the 5th of March he arrived at San Luis, which place had been in the power of Herrera until his approach.

During this time Cruz, who had left Guadalajara on the 26th of January, was successfully engaged in reducing the north-western portion of the province to subjection. On the 28th he entered Ahualulco, and there proclaimed the general pardon extended to all who returned to their allegiance.[13] With regard to Mercado, he even intimated that he would restore his benefice to him if he would avail himself of it.[14] As to whether it was the intention of Cruz to carry out to the letter these fair promises, I leave it to the reader to judge. Mercado had evidently no confidence in them. The disastrous news of the loss of the battle at Calderon did not deter him from making further efforts. He ordered the concentration of troops; issued a proclamation exhorting Americans to join his standard and fight for the cause of independence; and gave instructions to Captain Ibarra to scour the district and seize the funds and all available property belonging to Europeans. As Cruz approached, Mercado took up a strong position commanding the difficult pass at the barranca of Maninalco. But the royalist victory

and Venegas used to remark that 'Calleja corria con batidores toda la tierra dentro como si fuera un virey.' *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 105–9.

[12] 'Pudiendo decirse que caminaban tres ejércitos á un tiempo, á saber: uno de soldados, otro de meretrices y perros, y otro de vivanderos, mendigos, y arrimados.' *Id.*, 105.

[13] The pardon was extended to the inhabitants of Nueva Galicia by the viceroy on the 31st of Dec. 1810. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 315. The acceptance of the general pardon was vehemently protested against by the independent leaders, and proclamations were issued exhorting Mexicans not to avail themselves of it. *Id.*, ii. 133–4.

[14] Manuel Álvarez, a friend of Mercado's, writes to him to this effect, and strongly urges him to accept Cruz's clemency. The original document is in the possession of Hernandez y Dávalos. See his *Col. Doc.*, i. 394.

at Calderon, and the offer of pardon, had a bad effect upon his men. His troops broke and fled after firing some cannon-shots, and Mercado betook himself with a few followers to San Blas. Both in that port and in Tepic a reaction had set in. Francisco Valdés, who had been temporarily placed by Mercado in command of the first division of the coast militia, took the opportunity of exciting a counter-revolution at Tepic in favor of the government, and immediately apprised Cruz of the state of affairs. Cruz sent a detachment thither at once, and that important town fell into his hands without a blow.[15] Captain Salas, the commander of the troops sent to Tepic, was instructed to proceed thence to San Blas and occupy that port, where he was to make every effort to secure the persons of Mercado and other insurgent leaders, as well as to arrest Lavallen, Bocalan, and others implicated in the surrender of the port to Mercado.[16] But that town had already been lost to the revolutionists, and Mercado killed.

When, after his failure to arrest the advance of Cruz, Mercado had returned to San Blas, Padre Nicolás Santos Verdin, cura of the town, formed a plot with the royalists to seize him and the comandante Romero. On the night of the 31st of January they made the attack. Romero, however, with barred doors defended himself by firing from a window until he, Estévan Matemala, commander of the artillery, and one other were killed; the assailants having two of their party slain and four wounded. The particulars of Mercado's death are not known. On the following morning his body was found at the foot of a precipice, down which it was conjectured he had fallen during flight. But there is reason to suppose that he was killed while defending himself; and that those

[15] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 129–32. Cruz received the communication of Valdés on the 3d of Feb., being then at Iztlan.

[16] A copy of the original instruction is to be found in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 398.

who slew him, in order to avoid the opprobrium attached to priest-killers, threw his body over the cliff.[17]

Cruz, who had hitherto remained at Iztlan, having sent his officers in advance to conduct his military operations wherever any show of danger appeared, now fearlessly proceeded to Tepic, which he entered on the 8th of February. Here he remained for three days; during which time he issued a proclamation, unusually mild in expression, reorganized military and civil affairs, and hanged several adherents of the independent party, leaving their bodies suspended as a warning to others. On the 12th he marched to San Blas, where he arrived late at night. The activity he displayed here as elsewhere was surprising. Whatever his faults, he cannot be accused of indolence or want of administrative ability. The civil government was reorganized, the offices for the collection of the revenue were re-established, maritime and military matters put in order, artillery was mounted sufficient for the defence of the place—the superfluous guns being placed on board the frigate *Princesa*—and numerous directions were issued by him for the future guidance of officers left in command. He, moreover, convoked a council of war, at which the father of Mercado was condemned to be hanged, which sentence was carried into execution on the 14th.[18] The same day Cruz returned to Tepic, where he remained two days. On the 17th, having sent forward detachments to Sayula,

[17] Negrete says that a reliable witness testifies that he saw the wounds on the body, and that they were like those of a sword, or similar pointed weapon; and that a relative of Mercado is still in possession of the undershirt worn by him when he met his death. *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 77. Mercado was born in Teul and educated in Guadalajara, where he devoted himself to the study of theology and was ordained priest. He was afterward appointed cura of Ahualulco. When Torres gained possession of Guadalajara he joined the revolutionary party with enthusiasm. Mercado possessed both ability and determination, as is evidenced by his career, brief though it was, as an insurgent leader. *Verdin*, in *Id.*, iii. 383–93. Consult Verdin's account in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 142–4.

[18] It does not appear that any other of the captured insurgents was executed at this town. Cruz says to the viceroy, 'Todos los demás curas, frayles y demás cabecillas, no pudieron ser sentenciados, y vienen marchando hácia Guadalaxara para ser allí juzgados.' *Id.*, 181.

Zapotlan, Zacoalco, and other places threatened by the insurgents, and having arranged that the different divisions of his army should arrive at Guadalajara on the 27th and 28th, he resumed his march to that city.

After the dispersion of the insurgents at Calderon, Hidalgo continued his flight to Zacatecas, whither Iriarte had retired with a considerable force[19] and a large sum of money. But before reaching that city he was deposed. Overtaken by Allende, Arias, and other leaders at the hacienda del Pabellon, he was compelled by them to resign his position as generalissimo in favor of Allende. From the first, Allende had not been fully in accord with Hidalgo; he had constantly disagreed with him as to the conduct of the war. But Allende and the others could not draw people to the standard like Hidalgo. They were better soldiers, perhaps, but were not necessarily better men. Allende was a strict disciplinarian, a humane man as the times went, and honorable far above the average leader on either side. He and his fellow-officers were dependent on Hidalgo at the first more than now; at all events, they now conspired against his authority, and threatened him with death if he declined to surrender his command.[20] Henceforth he was little more than a prisoner in their hands. He was used as a figure-head; his presence was deemed necessary, but he was allowed no voice in the movement he had been the first to take part in. His presence with the army was still deemed necessary, but his influence with regard to future action was gone, his advice was not sought, and his authority a mere show. His movements, moreover, were closely watched, and he understood that orders were

[19] Bustamante, followed by Alaman, incorrectly states that Hidalgo joined Iriarte at Aguascalientes. Iriarte had retired to Zacatecas when Calleja passed through Lagos. *Calleja*, in *Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 355.

[20] The surrender was made only verbally in the presence of the chiefs. This informal action caused Negrete to disbelieve the whole statement. *Mex. Soc. XIX.*, iii. 53–4. But Hidalgo himself so stated it at his trial. *Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 8.

given to kill him if he attempted to separate himself from the army.[21] In all this Hidalgo cared less for himself than for the cause. Personal fame had never



HIDALGO'S FLIGHT TO MONCLOVA.

been his object. If they could better carry forward the revolution alone, he was content. But from the

[21] The same order applied to Iriarte and Abasolo. *Ib.* Of the former's conduct and supposed intentions Allende appears to have formed a most unfavorable opinion, and the latter had fallen under grave suspicion.

sequel we should judge that they could not, for destruction falls quickly upon them.

From Zacatecas Allende decided to retire with his forces to Saltillo, where, united with Jimenez, his position would be more secure than elsewhere. At this time a royalist force under the command of Melgares was threatening to attack Saltillo;[22] and Allende having received a letter from Jimenez dated the 17th of February, hastened to his assistance with a portion of his forces, leaving Hidalgo at Matehuala. Jimenez, however, had already engaged with the enemy and defeated them when Allende arrived.[23] The Europeans who fell into his power were put to death.[24]

The situation of the revolutionary leaders, however, daily became more desperate. Of all the host routed at Calderon only an insignificant number followed their chiefs, and the whole force that could be mustered at Saltillo did not exceed four or five thousand ill-armed men. Allende had hardly marched out of Zacatecas when it was assaulted and taken by Captain Ochoa,[25] and Calleja shortly afterward entered San Luis Potosí. Under these circumstances further action here would be useless. But they would not abandon the cause. The northern provinces were still in the hands of the independents, as they supposed, and they would go to the United States with their treasures, purchase weapons there, and solicit aid of that new and patriotic republic. Then they would return and meet the royalists in the field with

[22] Ochoa's despatch to Calleja, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 183.

[23] The battle, of which no particulars are to be found, was probably fought on the 18th of Feb., since Jimenez says in his letter to Allende: 'Me hallo á seis leguas del enemigo con quien me vatiré mañana seguramente.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 233.

[24] Villarguide states that the Spaniards in Matehuala and Cedral had their heads sawn off. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 150. Hidalgo supposes of course that the Spaniards thus disposed of on the march to Saltillo were executed by order of Allende, 'quien tenía yá todo el mando.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 14.

[25] On the 17th of Feb., according to Ochoa's despatch to Calleja. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 182. Ochoa had three days after the battle of Calderon [illegible]n defeated by Jimenez at the mountain gorge of Carnero. *Bustamante, Hist.*, i. 198.

equal arms and superior numbers. Delusive dreams! Far different was the fate in store for them. Already death had them in its horrible toils.

About this time Hidalgo received a letter from Cruz,[26] enclosing a copy of the general pardon extended to insurgents by the Spanish córtes,[27] and exhorting him to accept the clemency offered,[28] and avoid the further shedding of blood. But this was not for a moment to be thought of, and for two reasons: Hidalgo would not trust him or his promises, and he would never abandon the cause. Let him now recant, and what hope would there be for another? Perhaps his death would better serve the revolution than any action of his while living; if so, he would cheerfully die. He therefore not only emphatically declined to accept the present offer, but kept the matter secret among the leaders.[29]

Previous to the arrival of Calleja at San Luis Potosí, that city had been held by the insurgents under the leadership of Herrera. By directions of Iriarte, he had successfully attacked two royalist officers, Reyes and Ilagorri, at the hacienda of San Pedro

[26] Dated the 28th of Feb. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 322-3.

[27] Decree of Oct. 15, 1810. *Cortes, Col. Dec.*, i. 10; *Dublan y Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 336.

[28] Cruz prophetically remarks: 'Y quizá único instante de piedad que la suerte le prepara.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 322.

[29] His not having made public the indulto, of which his followers might have availed themselves, constituted one of the charges against Hidalgo. He answered, even if he had been so inclined, 'Yá no tenia autoridad ni carácter.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 11. The question was discussed by the other leaders, but rejected on the ground of restrictions in regard to themselves with which the offer came. *Ib.* Hidalgo wrote in answer—at least, so it is said—'In the discharge of our duty we will not lay aside our arms until we have wrested the jewel of liberty from the hands of the oppressor. We are resolved to enter into no arrangement which has not for its basis the liberty of the nation, and the enjoyment of those rights which the God of nature has given to all men—rights inalienable, and which must be sustained by the shedding of rivers of blood if necessary... Pardon, your Excellency, is for criminals, not for defenders of their country. Let not your Excellency be deluded by the ephemeral glories of Calleja; they are only so many lightning-flashes which blind rather than enlighten... The whole nation is in a ferment; these commotions have roused those who lay in lethargy... The agitation is general, and Mexico erelong will discover her mistake if these evils are not opportunely ended.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 237-8.

Piedra Gorda. Their force consisted of 700 men with eleven pieces of artillery. The two leaders were slain, and the Europeans captured were shot. Herrera then returned to San Luis, where the house of the intendente Flores was sacked, it being believed that he was in collusion with the royalists. On the approach of Calleja he abandoned the city, taking the direction of Rio Verde and Valle del Maiz. Under García Conde, Calleja sent a detachment in pursuit, and Herrera sustained an overthrow at the latter place, losing seventeen pieces of artillery, and a great quantity of ammunition, baggage, and plunder.[30] He however took revenge by ordering twelve Spanish captives put to death, one of whom miraculously escaped to tell the tale.[31] After this defeat Herrera retired to Agayo,[32] where he expected to be joined by the revolted troops of Iturbe. Venegas had, however, in the mean time despatched Colonel Arredondo with a force via Vera Cruz into the disaffected district; and his approach, together with the offer of pardon, caused a counter-movement in favor of the royalists. Herrera and other chiefs were seized in their quarters and delivered up to Arredondo, who summarily executed them.[33] Thus terminated the career of the lay-friar Herrera, charged by some with more than ordinary cruelty, yet whose high courage and ability in the field were second only to his love of country and devotion to the cause of independence.[34]

[30] *García Conde*, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 332–7. This action took place on the 22d of March, though Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 196, carelessly gives the 25th as the date. García Conde after his liberation at Aculco followed Calleja, and proved one of his most efficient officers.

[31] Mariano Calderon, the subdelegado of Valle del Maiz appointed by the insurgents, on the entrance of García Conde into the town, was shot, having been proved, according to García Conde's statement, to have given his consent to the massacre. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 334.

[32] The present city of Victoria, in Tamaulipas.

[33] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 356–7, 414.

[34] Alaman indulges in some rather severe strictures upon Herrera's character. 'Siendo su conducta una de las mas feas manchas de la insurreccion y tanto, que el congreso de Tamaulipas, que en 1824 cambió los nombres de casi todas las antiguas poblaciones del Nuevo Santander...no se atrevió por respeto a la decencia pública, á poner el de Herrera á ninguno de aquellos lugares.' *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 163.

While these events were taking place in San Luis Potosí and Nuevo Santander, changes, unfavorable to the independent cause, were also occurring in Texas and Coahuila. About the beginning of February, Ignacio Aldama had been elected by the revolutionary leaders as minister plenipotentiary to the United States,[35] Padre Juan Salazar being commissioned to accompany him and act in his stead in case of accident, sickness, or death. He took with him no less than one hundred bars of silver, besides a large sum of money for the purpose of purchasing arms and procuring the assistance of 30,000 auxiliaries. At the time when Aldama arrived at Béjar the action of Captain Casas was causing general dissatisfaction; and a counter-revolution was already in secret operation, headed by the subdeacon Juan Manuel Zambrano. Zambrano and his confederates took occasion to spread suspicions about the object of Aldama's mission. He was represented to be an emissary of Napoleon, as evidenced by his uniform, which was ornamented like those of French officers. If, indeed, he brought auxiliaries from the United States, would they not probably avail themselves of the opportunity to gain possession of the province which was regarded with such covetous eyes? On the night of the 1st of March Casas was made prisoner, while Aldama, Salazar, and their escort were detained under the pretence that their passports were not in order. A new government was then formed, with Zambrano as president. This at once proceeded to establish itself as firmly as possible; troops were organized, partisans of the revolutionists were deposed from office, and the imprisoned Europeans released. The unfortunate Aldama and Salazar were afterward conveyed to Monclova in Coahuila, condemned to death by a court-martial, and executed.[36]

[35] The certificate of the authenticity of the signatures on his appointment is signed on the 6th of Feb. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 231–2.

[36] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1087–91; *Id.*, 1811, ii. 741; *Hernandez y*

These momentous matters were wholly unknown t
Allende, as well as to the revolutionists at Monclov
which were destined to prove most fatal to himself an
his associates. Lieutenant-colonel Ignacio Elizond
had at first favored independence; but having taken o
fence at Allende's refusal to promote him to the grad
of lieutenant-general in reward for his services, h
secretly became disaffected, and cast about him i
search of means of revenge. When Zambrano ha
gained control at Béjar he sent two commissioner
captains Muñoz and Galan, to communicate with Ca
lleja and the viceroy; and these finding the conspi
acy ripe at Monclova, disclosed to Elizondo Allende'
intentions. He therefore determined to delay mat
ters no longer, but seize the persons of the revolution
ary leaders on their arrival. Accordingly, on th
night of the 17th of March, at the head of two hun
dred troops and armed citizens, he made the revolu
tionary governor Aranda prisoner, surprised suc
soldiers of the garrison as had not entered into hi
designs, and possessed himself of the artillery. H
then proceeded to establish a government council
which appointed Simon Herrera provisional governo
of the province on the 25th of March.[37] Measure
were now adopted for the seizure of Allende and hi
associates. Guile and perfidy were brought into pla
without scruple. The regulations of the more refine
civilizations have proper murder and improper mur
der, righteous and unrighteous robbery, holy an
unholy treachery, and the like; but these Spanish
royalists paid little attention to such rational and be
neficent rules. The utmost precaution was taken tha
Allende should receive no intelligence of what ha
occurred at Monclova, and remarkable as it may seem
that leader entertained not the slightest suspicion o
the trap which was being laid for him. Advised tha

Dávalos, Col. Doc., i. 198–226. The first authority supplies a copy of a mani
fest published by Aldama expressing his repentance.

[37] *Carta de Vela*, in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, iii. 137–9.

the revolutionists would arrive at the wells of Bajan on the morning of the 21st, Elizondo arranged to meet them with all due honors; and on the 19th sallied forth with 342 well appointed troops, having informed Jimenez that he would welcome them on the road.

Previous to starting on their ill-starred journey, a council was held by the revolutionary leaders in order to arrange about the chief command and the management of the cause during their absence. This was on the 16th, and in turn both Abasolo and Arias—who, as the reader will recollect, played a somewhat dubious rôle at Querétaro—declined to accept the responsibility. The command was finally given to Ignacio Rayon, the licentiate Arrieta being his second, and José María Liceaga his third officer.

All was now ready for their departure from Saltillo. Their road lay through a rugged desert in which water could only be obtained at long intervals and in small quantities, even when the occasional wells were not dry.[38] The thirsty men and animals would hasten to the wells of Bajan to refresh themselves; and there Elizondo waited for them. The ground was favorable for his design. Concealed in a recess, he left in his rear fifty of his men, and in his front placed an equally well hidden ambush. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st, Allende appeared in sight. He had left Saltillo with a force of nearly 2,000 men, twenty-four pieces of artillery, a great quantity of jewelry, and more than half a million of money. He was accompanied by all the principal leaders, who, to the number sixty, travelled in fourteen carriages. The march across the desert was most toilsome, and such was Allende's confidence that no military order was preserved, and a long straggling line enveloped in dust revealed to Elizondo how easily his design would be accomplished. The carriages and horsemen

[38] Mora, *Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 145, states that the wells were filled up by Elizondo's order. I see no ground for the assertion.

in different groups were far in advance of the main body,[39] the artillery being slowly dragged along in the rear.

Fray Pedro Bustamante with five soldiers was the first to approach. Passing through files drawn up by Elizondo to receive the chiefs, they were saluted and unsuspiciously continued their way till they arrived at the ambush in the rear, where they were compelled to surrender. Then followed a troop of sixty men, who were similarly made captive and safely bound. Hitherto no opposition was met. Presently the first carriage arrived, escorted by about a dozen soldiers.[40] These attempted to resist, but were overpowered, and three of them killed. And thus fell into Elizondo's hands the occupants of carriage after carriage, till all the chiefs were captured with the exception of Hidalgo, who was far in the rear. Allende, however, had not yielded without a struggle. Elizondo called upon him to surrender. "Traitor!" cried Allende, and fired. But the shot was without effect. Elizondo then ordered his men to fire into the carriage. Allende was accompanied by one of his sons, who was a lieutenant-general; also by Jimenez and Arias. By the discharge his son was shot dead and Arias mortally wounded.[41] Thereupon Jimenez surrendered himself, and Allende was overpowered. Both were securely bound and conveyed to the rear. The last to arrive was Hidalgo, who might still have escaped had any suspicion of these occurrences been excited, but even the firing created no alarm. When called upon to surrender, the stout old hero prepared to defend himself, pistol in hand; but his escort, composed

[39] This order of march had been suggested by Elizondo. He had sent to Jimenez a soldier of Monclova, named Pedro Bernal, who said that on account of the scarcity of water it would be better for the carriages and all the principal officers to go well in advance of the main body. If all marched together the supply in the wells would be quickly exhausted, while by this arrangement the wells would be replenished by the time those in the rear came up. Jimenez replied: 'Pues bien, así lo haré, me parece muy bien lo que vd. dice.' *Relacion*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 417.

[40] It was occupied by women. *Cavillo, Sermon*, 144.

[41] He died a few hours afterward. *Ib.*; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 146.

of a score of horsemen, intervened and entreated him to surrender, representing that resistance would be useless. Finding himself unsupported by his men, he laid aside his weapon, and with undisturbed serenity yielded himself a prisoner. Well might he have cursed Allende, and the want of watchfulness and generalship that brought them all to such a pass, after wresting the management from his hands.

So Elizondo's treachery triumphed. In his power were now all the great chiefs and originators of the revolution.[42] Never was plot more perfidiously planned, or more successfully accomplished. Leaving his prisoners securely bound and in charge of a strong force, Elizondo at the head of 150 men now marched against the main body, consisting of some 1,500, a league behind. The fighting was all on one side. The artillerymen in the van were slain, a portion of the troops which followed passed over to Elizondo, and the rest were dispersed. About forty of the revolutionists were slain, 893 taken prisoners, and all their guns, equipage, and treasure fell into the hands of the victors.[43]

The only person of note who escaped was Iriarte,[44] who fled at the first attack upon the artillery. This,

[42] The captured leaders consisted of four members of regular orders, eight of the secular clergy, and 49 officers of all grades. An official list can be found in *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 144–5, and *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 418–9.

[43] This account is mainly from the report of the provisional governor Herrera, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 360–3, the same source which supplied Calvillo, Alaman, and Negrete. According to Vela, the amount of treasure captured in silver bars and coin was about 2,000,000 dollars. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 321. Important documents in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 416–24, 489–90, 517–18, have also been consulted. Elizondo met with his death not long after. In 1813 he went on an expedition to Texas, and in Sept. was mortally wounded while in bed by one of his lieutenants, who, it is asserted, was losing his reason by witnessing the executions ordered by Elizondo. The name of this avenger of Hidalgo was Serrano. Elizondo died on the bank of the river San Marcos, and was there buried. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 349–50.

[44] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 320. Negrete, however, considers it doubtful whether Iriarte accompanied the retreating chiefs. 'Es punto, pues, que no se puede resolver con datos fehacientes si iria ó no.' *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 136–7. Rayon's statement, however, that Allende took Iriarte with him, and that the latter returned, removes all doubt. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 588.

however, only hastened his doom, for Allende, con vinced of his perfidy, had left orders with Rayon t have him beheaded if he returned, which was promp ly done.[45] The prisoners were conveyed to Monclova and every precaution taken to prevent their escap The principal chiefs were lodged in a house provide for the purpose by Herrera, the others being confine in the public jail. Great excitement prevailed in th city, and Elizondo, not considering his captives i safe keeping, sent to Ochoa, who was approachin Saltillo, requesting of him a reënforcement of 500 me which was immediately despatched to Monclova b forced marches.

As the capture had been made on territory unde the government of the comandante general of th interior provinces, it was necessary to send them t Chihuahua for trial, where resided the brigadier Ne mesio Salcedo, who then held that position. On th 26th of March the principal prisoners,[46] including H dalgo, Allende, Jimenez, and Abasolo, as also the reg ular and secular ecclesiastics, were led forth on the long journey to that city. Shackled hand and foo mounted on miserable beasts of burden, and escorte by a strong guard, these unhappy men painfull travelled the two hundred leagues of rough roa which connected the two cities.[47] Their suffering were painful in the extreme; even their halt by nigh afforded little relief to their strained muscles, as the

[45] *Manifiesto de Calleja publicado por Juan Martiñena; Alaman, Hist. Me* ii. 246; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 199. According to this last author, t reason for Allende's order was 'porque era señal de que habia jugádole ot nueva perfidia sobre las anteriores.' *Ib.* Negrete states that Iriarte's dea was determined upon because he had failed to attack the royalist army in t roar during the engagement at Calderon as ordered. Rayon distinctly stat why he was put to death, neglect to render aid in the engagements at Guan juato and Calderon, though summoned by both Allende and Hidalgo; h waste of the great treasure which he obtained at San Luis and Zacatecas; a the grave suspicions of treachery with which his conduct was regarde Rayon adds: 'Y volvió [illegible] de haber influido en la prision de l [illegible] v. 588–9.

[46] [illegible] 1811, ii. 365–6.

[47] As Parras the commander of the escort, Manuel Salcedo, the govern [illegible] deposed by Casas, sent all the ecclesiastics with the exception of H dalgo to Durango [illegible] i. 48.

fetters were never for a moment removed. On the 23d of April they reached their destination. The comandante Salcedo had already made ready for the occasion. It was not every day Chihuahua offered such a spectacle as Hidalgo and his generals conducted in chains through her streets! So on the 21st Salcedo issued a proclamation granting permission to all the inhabitants of the city to witness the entrance of the prisoners, and prescribing rules to be observed on the occasion, the infringement of which would be visited with severe punishment. Any expression of either sympathy or hate was forbidden.[48] Having passed through this ordeal, the prisoners were incarcerated without removal of their fetters, in the places assigned for that purpose.[49]

On the 25th Juan José Ruiz de Bustamante was appointed to draw up the preliminary proceedings for their trial; and on the 6th of May following a military court was established, composed of a president, auditor, secretary, and four voting members. The prosecution rested entirely upon the declarations of the prisoners, special judges being appointed to examine them and take their depositions. These were then submitted to the above-mentioned tribunal, which pronounced its verdict in accordance, and passed sentence. The members of the court were Manuel Salcedo,[50] president; Rafael Bracho, auditor; and captains Pedro Nolasco Carrasco, José Joaquin Ugarte, and Simon Elias Gonzalez, three of the voting members.[51] Angel Abella, the director of the postal service at Zacatecas,[52] was appointed on the same day on which

[48] No groups were allowed to be formed nor any weapons carried; the inhabitants were to take position in files, two or three deep, on each side of the streets, and return to their occupations as soon as the prisoners were incarcerated. *Salcedo, Bando*, in *Id.*, i. 5–6.

[49] Hidalgo, Allende, Juan Aldama, and Jimenez were confined in separate apartments of the college of the expelled jesuits. The other chiefs were lodged in the Franciscan convent. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 149–50.

[50] The late governor of Texas, who conducted the prisoners to Chihuahua.

[51] I have not been able to discover the names of the secretary and fourth voting member.

[52] He escaped with difficulty, through the assistance of the conde de San-

the court was formed to take the depositions of Hi dalgo, Allende, Juan Aldama, and Jimenez. On th 7th he commenced his duties. It would be out of plac to enter into the details of the numerous depositions Hidalgo and Allende, instead of favoring, rather op posed each other.

Allende had met with much to trouble him sinc his seizure of the general management and his fail ure.[83] It had been a fearful responsibility, for he wel knew that failure was almost certain death. Hidalg was mild and moderate in all his actions and expres sions. He could make allowances for the temper o the soldier, and for so good a soldier as Allende, an one engaged in so noble a cause; he could even forgiv the unjust reproaches of a friend, but he could no forget the sad failure, the lost cause—no! it was no lost. As sure as the sun continued to rise and set the grito de Dolores would never cease ringing throughout the land till Mexico was free!

The deposition of Abasolo displayed the characte of that leader as one of the most pusillanimous. H never had been greatly trusted by his associates During the latter days of disaster his lukewarm ness had been apparent, and now, in peril of hi life, he left no means untried, however dastardly, t save it, accusing everybody while shielding himself He had known nothing, he testified, about the revo lution until the grito de Dolores had gone forth; h had attempted to give Colonel Canal at San Migue information; he had wished at the commencement t separate himself from the rebellion—every one o which statements was a lie. Though he had bee made colonel, and after that major-general, he wa withal a coward. When Hidalgo attacked Guana

[illegible] from that city, when it fell into the hands of the insur [illegible]

[83] [illegible] at it was by order of Allende that the Europeans a [illegible] were killed, and Allende charged Hidalgo with [illegible] he confessed tha [illegible] *Declaraciones*, MS., i. 14–15, 39.

juato, he remained in the house of his friend Pedro Otero during the contest, and though he was present at the battle of Calderon, it was not with a willing heart, he said, and he was one of the first to flee!

His accusations against the leaders of the insurgents were villanous; he brought unjustly on Hidalgo's minister, Chico, a doom which otherwise he would have escaped.[54] Between Abasolo's inherent baseness and the high-minded conduct of his wife, Doña María Manuda de Rojas y Taboada, his worthless life was spared to him. Of all the principal promoters of the revolution, he alone did not hesitate to crawl away from a death which posterity will forever proclaim glorious. His property was confiscated, his offspring was attainted, and he was condemned to ten years imprisonment. He was sent to Cádiz and incarcerated in the castle of Santa Catarina, where he ended his days, attended and consoled to the last by his faithful wife.[55]

The trials were conducted with every possible despatch, and on the 10th of May three of the captives were led forth to execution.[56] On the 11th two more met the same fate, and on the 6th of June five others, among whom was Mariano Hidalgo, brother of the general. Allende suffered on the 26th of the same month, in company with Jimenez, Juan Aldama, and Manuel Santa María, the governor of Monterey;

[54] Chico had been regarded as a prisoner of minor importance, and was left in Monclova. When Abasolo testified that he transacted Hidalgo's cabinet business, and had been appointed by him in Guadalajara minister of grace and justice, orders to send him to Chihuahua were despatched to the authorities at Monclova. This sealed his fate; he was condemned and executed. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 186–7.

[55] He died in 1819. *Mora, Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 152. Negrete states that he was imprisoned for life, although producing an official document in which the term of his imprisonment is given as ten years. *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 263. See also *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 48, and *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 190–1. Abasolo's wife after his death returned to New Spain, where she devoted herself to the benevolent assistance of the unfortunate, and the education of her son Rafael. *Ib.*

[56] Ignacio Camargo, who had carried to Riaño Hidalgo's summons to surrender; Juan Bautista Carrasco, brigadier; and Agustin Marroquin, a criminal liberated at Guadalajara, and employed by Hidalgo to conduct the massacre of Spaniards there. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 76, 41.

and on the following day the unfortunate Chico and three others were put to death.[57] All these victims to the cause of independence were shot with their backs to the firing platoons as traitors, and their property confiscated.

With regard to the prisoners who had been left in Monclova and those who had been sent to Durango, the more prominent of the former were shot, the common soldiers being condemned to imprisonment. In the case of the friars and clergy, more formality had to be observed out of respect to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Six of them were condemned to death, but their clerical degradation was necessary before they could be executed according to established form. Doctor Olivares, the bishop of Durango, however, refused to degrade them, and angry passages were interchanged between him and the intendente Bonavia on the matter. The prelate was inflexible, but the intendente was not to be defeated. By his command the condemned priests were brought from their cells without their ecclesiastical robes, and so executed. Their bodies were then dressed in the habiliments of their respective orders and delivered to the cura for burial.[58]

The execution of Hidalgo was for some time delayed by these ecclesiastical formalities. On the 14th of May the bishop of Durango commissioned Francisco Fernandez Valentin, canon of that cathedral, to act as ecclesiastical judge in the case; and to him had been submitted by the military court the declarations taken by Abella. On the 14th of June they were approved by him and ordered to be returned to the auditor Bracho. The arrival of additional evidence, however, still protracted Hidalgo's trial, and it was not until the 3d of July that Bracho presented to

[57] Six others were sentenced to imprisonment for ten years, with one exception, Andrés Molano being sentenced for life. *Id.*, 76.

[58] *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 323–4. This author supplies a copy of Bonavia's order for the execution, which contains an injunction that the platoons were not to fire at their heads.

the court his opinion, advocating sentence of death.[59] But before this sentence could be either pronounced or executed, civil and canonical law required, as in the case before mentioned, that the prisoner should be degraded and formally handed over by the ecclesiastical judge to the secular authorities. Bishop Olivares was unable from age and infirmity to undertake the tedious journey in order to perform these ceremonies in person,[60] and a further delay was caused by the demurs of Dr Valentin, who hesitated to act upon the authorization first extended him by the bishop,[61] and suggested that Hidalgo should be sent to Durango. The prelate, however, explained his right to delegate his powers under certain difficulties to another, and confirming Valentin's previous commission, expressed the expectation that he would at once proceed in the matter.[62] Accordingly, on the 27th of July, with the cura, the chaplain of the army, and the local superior of the Franciscan convent as his associates, he pronounced the sentence of degradation against Hidalgo,[63] and on the 29th proceeded to carry it into execution by divesting him of his sacerdotal robes, according to the prescribed form of the church.

In clerical habit Hidalgo was conducted into the presence of the ecclesiastical commissioner judge, and for the first time since the day of his capture was released from the fetters which oppressed him. Then he was robed in the sacred vestments of his priestly

[59] A copy of Bracho's dictámen is supplied in *Id.*, iii. 192–8. No disgraceful death he considers would be too severe a punishment for the atrocities committed by Hidalgo. But he respects his priestly calling, 'pero es Ministro del Altisimo, marcado con el indeleble caracter de Sacerdote de la ley de gracia,' and as there was neither hangman nor gallows, he proposed that he should be shot.

[60] The ceremony of degradation of a priest could only be performed by the bishop, according to canonical law.

[61] 'Antorizo á U. en debida forma, para cuanto se le ofrezca en la causa del espresado cura Hidalgo hasta llegar en caso urgente y necesario á degradarlo.' *Id.*, iii. 199.

[62] His letter is dated July 18th. *Id.*, 214–16.

[63] A copy of the sentence is supplied in *Id.*, iii. 229–30, and *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 56–7.

calling, and, on his knees before the judge, heard him explain to the assembled witnesses of the ceremony the cause of his degradation. The sentence was now read to him, after which his sacerdotal garments were taken from him, and he was handed over to the secular authorities, an earnest appeal being made by the ecclesiastical judge that his punishment might be mitigated, so that neither the death penalty nor mutilation should be imposed.[64] When the ceremony was ended, Hidalgo was again fettered and conducted to his cell.

Before daybreak on the morning of the 31st of July,[65] Hidalgo was led forth from the prison in which he had been confined for more than three months. With his usual perfect tranquillity, he had received those sent to take him to the place of execution, and having finished his last breakfast,[66] he rose and indicated that he was prepared to accompany them. The place selected was an enclosed court in the rear of the hospital; and as he slowly proceeded thither, impeded by his shackles, his fortitude and serenity did not for a moment desert him. Remembering that he had left some sweetmeats under his pillow, he stopped and requested that they might be brought to him. These he distributed among the soldiers that composed the firing platoons, assuring them of his forgiveness. Aware that orders had been given not to fire at his head, and as it was not yet light, he told them that in order to guide their aim he would place his hand over his heart. After being bound upon the seat of execution, raising his hand without a tremor to his breast, he reminded the soldiers that it was the mark at which

[64] *Id.*, i. 57–8. This ceremony was called the degradacion verbal y real.

[65] This is the date given by Negrete. *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 339. The 27th, as reported in the official document supplied to Cruz and bearing date of Sept. 5, 1811, is obviously a mistake, since Hidalgo was degraded on the 29th. *Id.*, 263. Bustamante, followed by Alaman, states that Hidalgo was executed 'al tercero dia de haberse verificado la llamada degradacion.' *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 262.

[66] Observing that less milk than usual had been supplied him, he requested that he might have the same quantity as previously, observing that though it was his last, he ought not on that account to drink less of it. *Ib.*

they were to aim. Then the signal was given and the platoon fired. Though one bullet pierced his hand; it failed to touch the heart, and Hidalgo still remained erect in his seat, uttering words of prayer. A second volley was discharged, cutting the cords which secured him. He now fell upon the ground, but life was not yet extinct; and it was only after three more shots were fired, the muskets being held close to his breast, that he breathed his last.[67]

The heads of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Jimenez were sent to Guanajuato, and suspended in iron cages at the four corners of the alhóndiga. Their bodies were interred in the chapel of the third order of Franciscans in Chihuahua, where they remained till 1823, when, by order of congress, the remains were transferred with the skulls to the cathedral of Mexico, where they were deposited with solemn honors in the chapel of los Reyes, the former burial-place of the viceroys, and later that of the presidents of the republic.[68]

[67] *Escudero*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 603–4; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iii. 335–6; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 262–3. During his incarceration Hidalgo had been attended by a corporal named Ortega and Melchor Guaspe, a Spaniard of Majorca. These men treated him with great consideration, and in token of his gratitude, the evening before he was executed he wrote on his prison walls with a piece of charcoal two stanzas, which were preserved, with the exception of one line. They are as follows:

Ortega, tu crianza fina,
Tu índole y estilo amable
Siempre te har .n apreciable
Aun con gente peregrina.
Tiene proteccion Divina
La piedad que has ejercido
Con un pobre desvalido
Que mañana va á morir,
Y no puedo retribuir
Ningun favor recibido.

Melchor, tu buen corazon
Ha adunado con pericia
Lo que pide la justicia
Y exije la compasion;
. . . .
Das consuelo al desvalido
En cuanto te es permitido
Partes el postre con él
Y agradecido *Miguel*
Te da las gracias rendido.

Id., 270–1. This apophthegm was also found written on a wall of his cell: 'La lengua guarda el pescuezo'—The tongue is guardian of the breast. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 206.

[68] Consult official documents in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 605–11.

Since the beginning in 1810 of Hidalgo's short career, he has been held in varying esteem, at different times and by different persons and classes. He has been placed in about every category of humanity, and adjudged to be of every order of being, every shade of quality, from an angel of light to a bloody-minded and revengeful monster. A brief analysis of his character, from a standpoint intended to be impartial, brings the following results:

We will take it for granted that the cause in which he engaged was just, that the impulses prompting to it were noble; for it is not necessary to say at this day that it is right to overthrow tyranny, to achieve liberty, to deliver one's country, or that his memory should be held in holy repute who lays down his life for these things.

Before embarking in his high enterprise, Hidalgo was an humble priest, of more than ordinary gentleness of nature, and refinement of intellect and culture. Some have sought to besmear his fair fame with charges of conduct not consistent with strict morality; but nothing of moment has ever been proved against him in this direction; and were it so, those who hold such matters in such serious esteem will have little to say if they will examine into the state of society in the place and at the time he lived. It shows a small mind to attempt thus to belittle great men; and it is still worse when the charges brought forward are palpably false.

Almost without knowing it, and surely before he intended it,[69] this gentle priest found himself at the head of his people crying aloud to heaven for liberty, swearing to heaven that his country should be free! It has been said of him that he was not a great general; he never pretended to be one. He has been charged with extreme cruelty. From some stand-

[69] In his declaration he states that he decided to join the revolutionary party very suddenly, 'y que su inclinacion á la Independencia fué lo que le obligó á decidirse con tanta ligereza ó llámase frenesí.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 10.

points this, no doubt, is true; but the time and place must be remembered, and also that it was the cruelty of the surgeon to save the body rather than that of the savage who delights in torture. Hidalgo had his work to do; if cruelty could not be avoided, then there must be cruelty. He would purchase the highest benefaction within the reach of humanity; if robbery and murder were part of the price, still it must be paid. Yet for all this, judging the man fairly, passing under review his past life and his present purpose, his mind, heart, and disposition, and I do not think he can be called cruel, revengeful, and bloody-minded, as some would stamp him. War is a great wickedness; and if this species of robbery and murder may ever be justified, there is so little difference between the orthodox article and the quality of reprisal as practised in the present crusade that it is not worth discussing.

Some have said that Hidalgo's intention was to establish a republic; it may have been so, but it is nowhere shown. Zavala holds to the contrary opinion. There appears to have been no political or military plan adopted by the leaders of the revolution, hurried along as they were upon a tide of events which they could hardly control.

The large class in Mexico, of those who ever since the grito de Dolores have seemed to delight in gathering evidence and making charges damaging to the fair name of Hidalgo, is gradually becoming less. I would hide nothing in any historical character. I would not be blind to the faults of my hero. Neither would I magnify flaws of character until a little fault is made to appear larger than a great principle. Moreover, there has been much speculation as to what would have been the result had he pursued a different course. His firmness of purpose and opinion has been called obstinacy, because he would not yield to Allende and the others. Had he marched on Mexico; had he retired part of his force to the mountains

and drilled them, dismissing the great rabble and his army of pillagers; had he proclaimed a system of liberal institutions; had he been slower to rob and butcher Spaniards; had he better protected the creoles; had he done differently in a hundred other ways—the result would have been different. Doubtless. But the question is not what might have come to pass if the prime mover in Mexican independence had been a different man and acted differently. As it is, though not without his faults, Mexico may well be proud of her hero. Let his memory be honored! Let his name be enrolled among the world's champions of liberty!

His countrymen, grateful to one who, in the gloomiest hour of hope, stood forth so fearlessly as their defender, have rightly embalmed his memory; and his name, growing brighter and brighter as the ages pass, will be handed down unsullied to remotest generations.[70]

[70] On the 19th of July, 1823, a congressional decree was passed, declaring Hidalgo and the other principal leaders in the struggle for independence to be 'beneméritos de la patria en grado heróico,' and ordered a monument in their honor to be erected in Chihuahua. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 5 de Agosto, 1823; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 605. In 1863 Benito Juarez, having retired with the government to Dolores on account of the French invasion, passed a decree elevating the town to the rank of city, and ordering that a monument bearing a statue of Hidalgo should be erected in the principal plaza. He pronounced the house in which Hidalgo had lived to be the property of the nation, and provided that it should be protected and preserved in its original state so far as possible, at the expense of the government. *Id.*, ii. 611. In 1873 the congress decreed that the national flag should be annually hoisted on the 8th of May, Hidalgo's birthday, and raised half-mast high on the 30th of July in commemoration of his death. *Id.*, ii. 614–15. President Porfirio Diaz in 1878 ordered that the monument at Dolores, which had hitherto not been erected, should be built. The estimate of its cost was $40,000, which amount was covered by pro rata contributions levied upon the states. In the same year General Diaz decreed that a monument should also be erected in Hidalgo's honor on the spot where he was executed in Chihuahua. *Id.*, ii. 615–19. In the *Gazeta de Mexico* of August 3, 1811, was published an alleged copy of a declaration professed to be Hidalgo's solemn recantation of his errors, made some weeks before his death, and dated Chihuahua, May 18, 1811. This spurious statement was probably promulgated in order to turn independents against the cause. It is superfluous to deny such an assertion. No attempt which can properly be called such was ever made to establish its truth. He who for a moment could hold to such an opinion totally misconceives the character of the man. To death Hidalgo was indifferent; and he would be the last man on earth to uphold to his followers, according to the tenor of this declaration, the enormity of their crime in re-

belling against the government, and to entreat them to return to their duty. But this artifice was commonly employed by the royalists; to almost every prominent patriot chief who was executed during the war of independence such a recantation was attributed and published.

The documents which contain the alleged proceedings at the trial of Hidalgo, a copy of which is supplied by Hernandez y Dávalos in his *Col. Doc.*, i. 7–61, are open to grave doubts as to the authenticity of all the testimony produced. Much of the evidence is warped and garbled so as to represent Hidalgo in the most odious light possible. Many of the admissions appearing in the documents were never uttered by him, and most of the statements attributed to other declarants are not to be relied upon as genuine. I cannot, however, agree with Negrete, who endeavors to show that these documents are wholly apocryphal, and 'que esos documentos no pueden hacer fé en ningun sentido, ni considerarse como auténtico lo en ellos contenido.' *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, iii. 274. I have found many of the statements therein contained corroborated or supported by other authorities of reliability, and to ignore entirely the *Declaracion del cura Hidalgo* and the accompanying papers would scarcely be wise.

The official organs of the government naturally magnified the successes of the royalists and the reverses of the revolutionists. Pompous reports from generals narrating victories were invariably published, but many of their despatches which represented the true conditions of affairs were consigned to the secrecy of the government archives, from which they have been brought to light by different researchers, as Bustamante, Hernandez y Dávalos, and Negrete, and used by numerous authors. With regard to those published during the war, they are valuable and reliable in so far as they represent the movement of armies, the general results of engagements, and a broad view of the condition of the country. But in regard to the respective numbers of opposing forces, of insurgents killed and casualties sustained by the government troops, they are untrustworthy; while from the documents that were shelved a true picture of the position is obtained. The press being under the control of the government during Hidalgo's career, it teemed with productions laboring to advance the royalist cause and hold up to detestation that of the independents. Learned men printed heavy essays attempting to prove on philosophical and political grounds the illegality and want of justice in the movement; bishops issued pastorals and long dissertations arguing on the iniquity of the insurrection and proclaiming the perdition of the leaders; and poets sang the praises of the royalist commanders, comparing them with the heroes of antiquity and renowned Roman generals. Calleja was superior to Fabius Maximus, and Cruz the supporting pillar of the tottering nation. The adulation was truly affecting! In honor of Calleja Dr José Mariano Beristain composed a drinking-song drawing a parallel between him and Fabius; to which the older Melchor de Foncerrada replied with the following decastich, supplied by *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 394–5:

> Fabio ganó retirando,
> Calleja acometiendo,
> El Fabio triunfó cansando;
> Pero Calleja venciendo:
> Y á lo poco que yo entiendo
> En el arte militar,
> No se puede comparar
> Un Fabio con un Callejas,
> Allá hubo acciones perplexas;
> Todo aquí puro triunfar.

Effusions of minor genius, too, swarmed, scurrilous in abuse, vile in vituperation, against the one side, and sickening with flattery and sycophant homage offered to the other. But no language, however shameful, however fallacious, was unpalatable to government, if it brought odium upon the revolution.

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CHAPTER XII.

MORELOS AND RAYON.

1811.

STATE OF THE REVOLUTION AFTER HIDALGO'S CAPTURE—BIOGRAPHY OF MORELOS—HIS CHARACTER—HIS MEETING WITH HIDALGO AND COMMISSION—MORELOS IN MICHOACAN—THE ROYALIST PÁRIS DEFEATED—MORELOS MARCHES TO CHILPANCINGO—THE FAMILY OF THE BRAVOS—CAPTURE OF TIXTLA—DEFEAT OF THE ROYALIST FUENTES—A CONSPIRACY SUPPRESSED—RAYON RETREATS FROM SALTILLO—HE DEFEATS OCHOA—A TERRIBLE MARCH—THE PLATFORM OF THE INSURGENT LEADER—RAYON EVACUATES ZACATECAS—TRUJILLO'S DOINGS IN VALLADOLID—RETREAT OF THE INSURGENTS.

WITH the heads of the leaders cut off, many thought that the revolution was forever at an end. And so it might have been had the movement rested in man's hand—that is, had it originated solely with those men or with any one set of men, or had it been dependent for its final success on aught else than the mighty power of progress. Independence was not an accident. It had waited its full development in the womb of time and now its bringing-forth was certain. The birth of freedom in America had long been predetermined. Cut off the head of every revolutionist twenty times and twenty times new armies would arise until the great dragon was slain.

When tidings of the capture of Hidalgo, Allende and their army reached Mexico, the rejoicing of the royalists was great, as we may imagine. The first report was conveyed without particulars in a despatch from Ochoa; and though the viceroy could rely upon

the statement,[1] and caused the bells to be rung, and salvoes of artillery to be fired, the independent party in the absence of details was loath to accept it as true. Later information, however, confirmed the intelligence, and despondency prevailed among its ranks. Venegas, on the contrary, was jubilant, and regarded the suppression of the rebellion as essentially accomplished. But he did not recognize the extent and degree to which independent principles had pervaded the lower classes. It is true that from the sweeping disasters which had lately been sustained, the ordinary observer might wonder that the cause was not already abandoned. But during the year 1811, thus far, the insurrection had spread with surprising rapidity, which had carried it over the greater portion of New Spain. The aspect of the revolution was, however, materially changed since its incipiency, and the struggle had now assumed more the color of individual and predatory warfare. Without any form of government, or even a recognized head after Hidalgo's capture—for Rayon's commission as commander-in-chief was not generally acknowledged—each provincial leader acted independently according to his pleasure. Arms and money were wanting, as well as leaders; and owing to this lack of plan and principle, and the absence of cohesion, the successes which they repeatedly gained were but temporary. Too often, moreover, their chiefs knew little of the art of war, and many of them were wholly unlettered.

On the other hand, the royalists had among them leaders not only trained to the military profession, but of practical experience in warfare. They were in possession of nearly all the arms in the country; their troops were well disciplined; and above all, they held the ports, and could therefore supply themselves from abroad. Nevertheless, over a vast area detached bodies of insurgents sprung into existence, led sometimes by noble and patriotic men, but too often by desperadoes and escaped criminals, who carried on

[1] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 301–2.

little better than a guerrilla warfare in their vicini
Such bands generally kept themselves in impregn
ble positions, making descents upon unprotected tow
and desolating the surrounding country. Althou
the royalist forces occupied all the most importa
towns and the immediate vicinities, the revolutioni
gradually gained control over the country at lar
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Zacatecas, and lar
portions of Puebla, Vera Cruz, San Luis Potosí, a
Mexico at the close of 1811, were almost complet
in possession of the insurgents; and their enemi
confined to the fortified cities, were not sufficien
numerous to assail in all parts the numerous hor
which infested the country. The main efforts of t
royalists being directed against the better organiz
armies of the independents, they could send out o
detachments against such guerrilla bands, as, gath
ing strength, made themselves, from time to time, t
terror of particular districts. In these cases the
surgents were generally routed and temporarily d
persed with heavy loss, no mercy being shown to th
taken with arms in their hands.[2] It was, perha
the very best policy the revolutionists could have p
sued, although adopted without policy—these incess
diversions which weakened the efforts of the royalis
and rendered useless the concentration of their forc

There was at this time one man only who sto
forth conspicuous among the revolutionists as an
nitial chief, a leader round whom they might w
some degree of confidence rally, a fit successor of H
algo; and somewhat strange to say, this new m
was the friend and disciple of Hidalgo, like him

[2] On the 30th of November Venegas issued a proclamation to the ef
[illegible] was expired,
[illegible] to consider themselves
[illegible] and insurrection.
[illegible] begged that it mi
[illegible] part with
[illegible]

ecclesiastic, and like him a devoted lover of his country. His name was José María Morelos y Pavon. He was born on the 30th of September, 1765, on the rancho Tahuejo el Chico, near Apatzingan.[3] His parents were honest and respectable people, the father, Manuel Morelos, being a carpenter, and the mother, Juana Pavon, the daughter of a school-master in Valladolid. José's education was the most elementary, and on the death of his father, his widowed mother was in so straitened circumstances that she gave the care of her son to his uncle Felipe Morelos, who owned a mule train, and trafficked between Mexico and Acapulco. The young man sometimes followed the train, and sometimes looked after the stock on the rancho;[4] although his ambition, supported by his mother's wishes, had ever been a place in the church. At the age of thirty-two, by great effort and self-denial, he succeeded in gaining admission into the college of San Nicolás as a sizar, or servitor.[5] Here he studied natural and moral philosophy under the guidance of Hidalgo, who was at that time the rector, and for whom Morelos ever afterward entertained the greatest regard and veneration. Having been ordained, he was appointed temporarily to the cures of Churumuco and Huacana; and later the benefice of the towns of Carácuaro and Nucupétaro, in the department of Tacámbaro, was conferred upon him. The stipend of this curato was small, but the hardships of his early life had instilled into Morelos habits of frugality, and he managed to save enough

[3] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 408. It was generally believed that Valladolid was the birthplace of Morelos, and the name of that city was consequently changed in 1828 to Morelia, in honor of the patriot. Alaman, however, supports Bustamante. *Hist. Mej.*, iii. ap. 85. In *Id.*, iv. ap. 47–8, will be found a copy of Morelos' registry of baptism at Valladolid. The full name given to him was José María Teclo.

[4] On one occasion, while pursuing a bull, he was thrown senseless from his horse by coming in contact with the branch of a tree. The blow caused a permanent scar on his face. *Id.*, ii. 316.

[5] The Spanish expression for this grade of collegiate is *capense*. Some authors state that he entered the college at the age of twenty-five. *Negrete, Hist. Mil. Mex. Sig. XIX.*, i. 313.

of his income to purchase a modest house in Vall
dolid in 1801. This dwelling was the only priva
property he ever owned.

At the date of the grito de Dolores, Morelos w
about forty-five years of age. He was strong phy
ically, with plenty of brain power. Not above m
dium height, thick-set and solid, he was capable at th
time of great endurance. His complexion was of
healthy dark brown; eyes clear, dark, and brillian
with a glance now quick, searching, magnetic, no
stern and meditative, and again lapsing into profou
reverie. Yet he was no dreamer; he was more ma
of the world than Hidalgo, though in regard to lear
ing he would be almost called illiterate beside the sag
of Dolores. But he had sufficient education to a
swer every purpose of his genius, which must ev
be regarded as among the greatest of his age.

There was a whirlwind of energy in his face; t
very atmosphere about him seemed impregnated wi
the latent force emanating from his form and presenc
The eyebrows were heavy, and met, giving the cou
tenance an expression of invincible determinatio
The shape and size of the head also showed great me
tal power. About the mouth and lower jaw the cha
acter lines were deeply traced, features generally w
chiselled, the chin being rounded like Cæsar's on
Roman medal, here again displaying the presence
an indomitable will. He was grave and gay at onc
if you would dwell upon the former phase of his d
position, let your eyes rest on the upper part of t
face; if upon the latter, then look at the lower pa
There was about the mouth an expression at times
almost repulsive firmness, yet tempered always
frankness; there was about the whole face a harmo
and equilibrium always present in some form and
gave it great charm. His energy was of the devouri
type. In battle his eyes flashed with a sinister ligh
his voice assumed a depth of tone which his soldi
thought was like the thunder of a god; and he soo

nes became so hungry when thus aroused that he ould pause in the heat of fighting and call for some- ing to eat. He thought no more of danger there an when reciting prayers in the cloister. And not- thstanding all this, in the ordinary affairs of life he splayed a decided impassiveness, a countenance so rene as never in the slightest degree to reveal the orkings of the mind. Nor was he lacking in con- rsational powers, in courtesy, or even in sprightly od humor. Nature made him master of all her rying moods, and gave him the discretion to use them good purpose as occasion demanded.

He wore various uniforms during his military ca- er; before he became a soldier his dress was the ual habit of a cura, not the extreme priestly robe, t a long black frock coat, black vest, knee-breeches, ockings, and buckled shoes. He suffered constantly om headache, which was greatly relieved by a ker- ief always worn wound round the head, and usually pplying the place of hat or hood.

The character of Morelos will stand the most arching scrutiny. Under closest analysis, its strength d beauty shine brightest. His originality and und judgment command our highest admiration. ogether with great military ability, which enabled m to design wise combinations, he possessed excel- nt discrimination. He knew how to select his offi- rs and agents. Uneducated though he was both in e arts of war and policy, his marvellous instinct and evision, united with sound common sense, gained for m high renown, not only as war commander, but as litical chief. The most minute affairs and matters apparently insignificant importance never escaped s watchful eye. He recognized the importance of tention to trifles. It seemed as if everything re- ived his attention. A rigid catholic, he always con- ssed himself before going into action; and his relig- us scruples were such that after his first engagement e never personally celebrated mass, but delegated

the performance of that ceremony to an army chap lain. Like Hidalgo, he has been charged with cruelty but reiterated accusations of this kind seem silly a brought against one who makes it his business to ki and damage his fellow-creatures for the time as muc as possible. The difference drawn between the kin man-killer and the cruel one is little else than con ventional subterfuge.[6] Here in particular it was th exterminating system of warfare pursued which im posed upon revolutionary leaders severity and a rig orous system of death-sentences. The devotion o Morelos to the cause was unbounded, and his firmnes of soul held him to whatsoever course his judgmen marked out as the best. He was thoroughly consis tent; for the attainment of independence he spare neither himself nor his enemies. Serene withal an impassive, alike in prosperity and disaster, he neithe gave way to arrogant self-assertion nor yielded t dejection. But conspicuous among all his great qual ities was his perfect disinterestedness. No persona motive influenced him in his valiant struggle for lib erty. His own aggrandizement was what he leas thought of. To decorations and titles earned by hi victories he was wholly indifferent; he preferred th simple appellation of 'Servant of the Nation.'[7]

When Hidalgo moved toward Valladolid after his capture of Guanajuato, Morelos, whom the news o the insurrection had already reached, hastened thithe to learn what it all really meant. Hidalgo, however had left the city; Morelos followed the army toward the capital, and overtook Hidalgo at the town o Charo. Thence he accompanied him to Indaparapeo.

[6] 'Aquella crueldad calculada, con que friamente volvió sangre por sangre y pago á sus enemigos centuplicados los males que de ellos recibió.' Such is Alaman's unfair appreciation of him! *Hist. Mex.*, ii. 342.

[7] *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 284–9; *Bustamante, Elogio Morelos; Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 315–16, 342–4, 423–4; *Mex. Refut. Art. Fondo*, 12–15; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 154, 401; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 56–8, 63–4, 68–9; *Gallo, Hombres Ilust.*, iv. 7–16.

The cura told him that the only object he had was the independence of the country, which decided Morelos at once upon his course of action. He offered his services, and received a commission from Hidalgo to levy troops as his lieutenant on the southern coast, and further the cause of independence in conformity with verbal instructions.[8]

The preliminaries for the expedition having been concluded, Morelos bade farewell to Hidalgo and returned to his cure—bade him farewell for the last time, for these two friends and fellow-patriots never again met! When he arrived at his parish, Morelos, with all the stern enthusiasm of his nature, applied himself to the work in which he had engaged. Calling to him twenty-five followers, he armed them with lances and a few muskets, and then directed his steps to Zacatula. It was an humble beginning, but it led to mighty results. The want of military organization in the territory he was invading was favorable to his designs. The militia companies of the different towns were wholly undisciplined, were never assembled for the purpose of drill or other military instruction, and their arms were stored in the residences of the commanding officers, most of whom obtained their positions as a mark of honor, and had never seen the soldiers they commanded. On the arrival of Morelos at Zacatula, he was joined by Marcos

[8] These instructions were to the effect that Morelos in the towns through which he might pass should collect the arms and assume and reëstablish the government, reinstating under suitable guaranties those who had previously held office, provided they were not Europeans; in such cases, he was empowered to appoint others. Europeans were to be captured by him, and their property confiscated and used in the payment of his troops. The captives were to be sent to the nearest intendencia. Opportunity was to be given to such Europeans as were married to unite their respective families, in order that they might retire to their own country, or be removed to some island which would be selected for their destination. The main object of this expedition to the south was the capture of the port of Acapulco. *Declaracion de Morelos*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 18. Negrete, who evidently never saw the declaration of Morelos, quotes a long passage out of Alaman, who very clearly, and almost in Morelos' own words, recounts the particulars of this interview between the two leaders. The language of Alaman is mystery and confusion, however, to Negrete, who naively confesses that he does not understand him. *Hist. Mil. Mex. Sig. XIX.*, i. 317.

Martinez, captain of the militia cavalry of that port with fifty men well provided with arms.[9] Thence Morelos marched to Petatlan. Success again attended him. Gregorio Valdeolivar, the captain in command was in the city of Mexico at the time, and Morelos having surprised and captured his wife, compelled her to deliver up the keys of the quarter in which the arms were stored. By this procedure he obtained possession of fifty additional muskets, and as many lances. His forces were also increased by more than 100 men. Henceforward the progress of Morelos was rapid; and on his march to Acapulco followers



daily flocked to his standard. Passing through Tecpan, Zanjon, and Coyuca, he arrived at Aguacatillo, his forces now numbering 3,000, all well armed with muskets, swords, and lances. Unlike Hidalgo, Morelos would not permit the rabble to follow him; he would not have an army of undisciplined and refractory men; he confined himself to a small but efficient force. At Tecpan he won to the cause the Galeana family, whose chief members soon distin-

[9] Martinez accompanied Morelos during the first five months of the campaign, and was then sent back to Zacatula with the title of comandante of that port, to which the prisoners taken in future were sent. *Declaracion de Morelos*, 19.

guished themselves by their bravery and abilities, and were selected by Morelos as his principal officers. There were three brothers of them, Juan José, Antonio, and Hermenegildo, and they proved devoted followers of Morelos, and greatly assisted him with men and arms.

From Aguacatillo, Morelos advanced against Acapulco, whither Captain Antonio Fuentes, comandante of Tecpan, had fled on the approach of the insurgents. Sending forward a detachment of 700 or 800 men under Cortés and Rafael Valdovinos to occupy the height of Veladero, which commands the port, they engaged on the 13th of November, 1810, with a force of 400, which Carreño, the governor of Acapulco, despatched against them under the command of Luis Calatayud. The affair took a somewhat ludicrous turn. Neither royalists nor revolutionists had ever been in action before, and after some desultory firing, both threw down their arms, turned simultaneously, and fled from the field.[10] The dispersed royalists with others from Acapulco joined Morelos during the three following days to the number of 600.

Meanwhile, the rise of this new leader and the spread of the revolution southward caused the viceroy much uneasiness, the more so because all his best troops and officers were with Calleja and Cruz, and it was difficult for him to place in the field an adequate force. However, he ordered the Oajaca brigade to be got in readiness and the fifth coast division, under Captain Francisco Páris, to march against the insurgents. The first operations of Páris were successful. On the 1st of December he dispersed at the arroyo Moledor a body sent against him by Morelos, under Valdovinos, and succeeded in

[10] General Nicolás Bravo says that a drummer boy of the insurgents, in his effort to conceal himself, climbed a tree, and noticing the flight of the royalists reported it to the fleeing revolutionists, who thereupon rallied, and collected the arms of their opponents, which had been cast away in the panic. Bustamante asserts that the insurgents rallied at the cry of a parrot perched on a tree-top, shouting, 'Fuego! fuego!' when they began to run. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 319.

uniting his force with the sixth division of the coast, commanded by José Sanchez Pareja. At Tepango, also, the insurgents suffered a reverse, a detachment under Cortés and Martinez, who had been sent to attack the royalists at Chilapa, being defeated with some loss by Guevara.[11] With better fortune, however, Miguel de Ávila gained on November 23d a slight success over Fuentes, who had landed at the harbor of Marquez with 300 men from Acapulco; and on the 13th of December the same officer repulsed at a place called the Sabana, the united forces of Páris and Pareja, who in conjunction with Fuentes were advancing against Aguacatillo.

Hitherto the operations of Morelos in the field had been neither important nor brilliant; and piqued at the insignificant results, he determined to anticipate Páris' meditated assault upon Aguacatillo. The royalist leader had fallen back to Tres Palos, and Morelos decided to surprise his camp by night. Accordingly on the 4th of January, 1811, he secretly despatched Ávila with 600 men, who defeated the royalists, nearly 1,000 strong, with the trifling loss of five killed.[12] The result was most important to the revolutionists; 600 muskets, five pieces of artillery, including a howitzer and a large quantity of ammunition, and other war stores fell into their hands, while the reputation of their chief spread far and wide.

Morelos now directed his attention to Acapulco, in the expectation of gaining possession of the fort without difficulty, Carreño's assistant, an artillery officer named Gago, having secretly made offers to surrender it to him. With 600 men he marched in person from the Sabana, and on the night of the 7th of February secretly took up a position on the eminence of las Iguanas in front of the fort. Early next morning the

[11] Guevara was the father of General Nicolás Bravo's wife. *Id.*, ii. 321.

[12] *Declaracion de Morelos*, 20. Venegas, in his attempt to mislead the public, published a garbled account, saying among other things that the loss of the royalists was next to nothing, while that of the insurgents amounted to 200 killed. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 61–2.

preconcerted signal was seen at the appointed hour,[13] and Morelos, dividing his force into two divisions, placed one under a man from the United States named Elias Bean,[14] and the other under Ávila. These officers were directed to approach the castle from different points. But Gago's overtures were all a feint; and when one of the divisions had advanced within favorable range, the fort and vessels in the harbor simultaneously opened fire upon it. Morelos, realizing the treachery, quickly withdrew his men. He then concentrated his forces on the Iguanas hill, and laid siege to the fort. For nine days he kept up a steady fire with four pieces of artillery of light calibre, and a howitzer. Carreño, however, by a successful sortie on the 19th gained possession of the artillery with the exception of one gun.[15]

After this loss, and being threatened by Nicolás Cosío, who had been appointed by the viceroy commander in the south and had already joined Páris, Morelos raised the siege and retired to the Sabana, where he remained for a month, after which time, prostrated with sickness, he was conveyed to Tecpan, having left Francisco Hernandez in charge of the troops.[16]

During the two following months no operations of importance were undertaken. The insurgents, however, firmly held their position against Cosío, who, having approached the Sabana, was compelled by Hermenegildo Galeana, who assailed him at daylight

[13] A light was shown on the fort at 4 o'clock A. M. *Declaracion de Morelos*, 20–1.

[14] This man, called simply Elias by Morelos, with three others of his countrymen, whose names were David, Collé, and William Alendin, had been detected in mapping the country, and were imprisoned at Acapulco, whence they effected their escape, and assisted the insurgents in their night attack upon Páris at Tres Palos. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 9.

[15] Negrete says that Morelos mentions that only one piece was captured. The words of Morelos were: 'Quitado toda su artilleria, excepto una sola pieza.' See *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 195. See Orozon's account, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 285.

[16] The forces left under Hernandez numbered about 2,200. Of these, 1,000 were stationed in an intrenched position on the Sabana, the remainder occupying in detachments posts at Aguacatillo, Veladero, las Cruces, and a point at the foot of the cuesta. *Declaracion de Morelos*, 21.

on the 4th of April,[17] to retire to las Cruces, which had been occupied by Fuentes. The viceroy, in disgust at Cosío's want of success, and perhaps of loyalty being a Mexican, placed Fuentes in command. Again on the 30th of April and the 1st of May, Ávila successfully repelled an attack made by Fuentes, who fell back upon las Cruces and Aguacatillo, from which the insurgents had been compelled to withdraw.

In the mean time, Morelos, reëstablished in health had returned; and finding his position on the Sabana no longer tenable, owing to the difficulty in obtaining provisions, which were intercepted by detachments of the enemy, he abandoned it on the 3d of May. Determined to extend the field of his operations, he left Ávila well fortified on the Veladero, and at the head of no more than 300 men marched toward Chilpancingo. With this small force Morelos entered upon a campaign which shook Spain's power in Mexico to its foundation. After a march attended with much labor and suffering, during which he overcame all resistance offered by the royalists, he entered Chilpancingo without opposition on the 24th of May, his forces being now increased to 600 men well provided with muskets and arms taken from the enemy. But he received still more important support from the Bravos, one of the first families of that city.[18] These devoted patriots henceforth shared with the Galeanas the highest confidence of Morelos.

The royalist troops whom he had come in contact

[17] Hernandez had the cowardice to flee when Cosío drew near his position, and his soldiers selected Galeana to lead them. *Ib.*

[18] There were three brothers, Leonardo, Miguel, and Victor. Nicolás Bravo was the son of Leonardo, and had lately married the daughter of Guevara. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 334. Bustamante states that these brothers, in order to escape from the importunities of the comandantes of Tixtla and Chilapa, who persisted in requiring their services against the revolutionists, retired to their hacienda at Chichihualco, and secreted themselves in a cave called Michapa, where they remained for seven months. While here they received a letter forwarded to them from Morelos, describing the sufferings of his troops from hunger, and soliciting aid. They responded, and their help contributed greatly to the victory which a detachment of Morelos under Hermenegildo Galeana gained over the royalists in an action at the hacienda of Chichihualco. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 15–16.

with, and who were under the direction of Garrote, had retreated to Tixtla; and Morelos, without allowing Garrote time to repair his losses, followed with all speed. On the 26th of May the insurgents arrived before the town, and although the royalists were well protected by fortifications and provided with artillery, the attack was commenced without delay. The contest was long and obstinate, but after six hours hard fighting, during which a portion of the town was set on fire, the royalists were driven from the fortified points, and retreated to the church, where most of them were made prisoners.[19] Besides the prestige gained by this victory, the material results were of high importance; eight cannon, 200 muskets, and 600 prisoners being captured. During the two following months Morelos was actively employed in repairing and strengthening the fortifications of Tixtla, in augmenting the number of his forces, and above all in attention to their military instruction and discipline.

When these successes became known to Fuentes, he recognized that it was of paramount importance to arrest the progress of Morelos; and stopping preparations to attack Ávila at the Veladero, he concentrated his forces in his pursuit. Taking up a position at Chilapa, an important town four leagues distant from Tixtla, he made his dispositions for the recapture of the latter town. Meantime Morelos, having completed the defences at Tixtla, leaving there a garrison of 104 men under the command of Hermenegildo Galeana and Nicolás Bravo, returned to Chilpancingo, and on the 15th of August celebrated the virgin's ascension. Fuentes, duly informed of this division of the enemy's forces, and the diversion caused at Chilpancingo, hastened to avail himself of the opportunity, and vigorously assaulted Tixtla on the same day. Galeana and Bravo, however, resisted the attack with

[19] The cura of Tixtla delayed for some little time the entrance of the victors into the church by the elevation of the host at the entrance. *Id.*, ii. 17. This afforded an opportunity to the leading officers and a portion of the troops to effect their escape. *Mora, Mej. y sus Iiev.*, iv. 301.

unflinching bravery, and firmly maintained themselve in their positions. The assault was continued during the whole of the following day, and the garrison whose ammunition was almost exhausted, was now i a critical position. Morelos, however, was already hastening to their assistance, and on the 17th assailed the rear of Fuentes' force with 300 cavalry and 10 infantry, supported by three cannon. Galeana and Bravo immediately availed themselves of this diversion and sallied from the town. Fuentes, thus attacked in front and rear, ordered a retreat, which at first wa conducted with order and deliberation. A drenching rain-storm, however, commenced, impeding the move ments of the royalists, and rendering their ammuni tion unserviceable. Morelos now ordered Galeana and Bravo to come to close quarters with sword and bayonet, while he swept down upon them with the cavalry. The charge threw the royalists into confusion; completely routed, they fled in all direc tions, leaving on the field 200 killed, more than 30 muskets, two guns, and a quantity of other arms, a the spoil of the victors, who, moreover, captured 366 prisoners.[20] Three days later Morelos marched into Chilapa, whither Fuentes with a remnant of his scattered force had fled. The insurgent army was now over 1,500 strong, and the defeated royalist, as well as the Oajaca troops stationed there, abandoned the town on its approach, leaving two pieces of artil lery and a quantity of ammunition. At Chilapa, the artilleryman Gago, whose perfidious design had so nearly involved Morelos in disaster at Acapulco, was captured, together with José Toribio Navarro, who after having received from Morelos $200 with which to raise troops for the independent cause, had passed over to the royalists. The unfortunate men were sum marily executed.[21]

[20] *Parte de Morelos*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 337. The fig ures in this despatch addressed to Rayon the day after the battle differ some what from those given by Morelos in his declaration, four years later.

[21] *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 336–9; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 17–18

The position of Morelos was in the highest degree satisfactory. Venegas had immediately at hand neither troops nor an efficient leader to send against him, and the rainy season now approaching would assure him freedom from molestation for some time to come. He would thus be able to devote himself to the organization of his forces, while, whenever he chose to advance, Oajaca, Puebla, and Mexico, only defended by a few companies, lay open before him. But while all was thus bright overhead, the horizon was not without clouds. A conspiracy directed against his life and cause was at work in his own ranks, which but for his energy might have been attended with fatal consequences. His method of suppressing it was characteristic.

The first information received by Morelos of the capture of Hidalgo was by intercepted letters. Fearing the effect on his followers, he kept the matter to himself, but commissioned David[22] and Tabares, both of whom had rendered him good service in the attack upon Páris at Tres Palos, as his agents to solicit the aid of the United States.[23] On their journey thither they met Rayon, who informed them of his appointment by Hidalgo and Allende as captain-general of the revolutionary forces and ordered them to return, having conferred upon Tabares the rank of brigadier, and that of colonel upon David. Morelos, however, on their arrival at Chilapa, refused to recognize their commissions, and deeply offended they withdrew to Chilpancingo on the pretence of attending to private

Declaracion de Morelos, 21-2; *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 301-3. Both Bustamante and Mora differ with the statements of Morelos as regards the number of his forces and those of the prisoners and guns captured. On the 10th of Sept. Morelos issued a burlesque proclamation, announcing the disappearance on the 18th of Aug. of the junta patriotica, which had been established by Fuentes in Chilapa. He exhorts the viceroy and intendentes of the provinces to publish this announcement, in order that the whereabouts of the junta may be discovered and reported to him. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 358.

[22] One of the four men from the U. S. who had escaped from Acapulco and joined Morelos.

[23] 'Para negociar la alianza con los Estados vnidos.' *Declaracion de Morelos*, 43.

business. Thence they betook themselves to th coast, and in conjunction with one Mayo, who wa serving under Ávila at the Veladero, fomented an in surrection, the aim of which was the killing of th landed proprietors and all persons belonging to th white race. The populace of the coast towns eagerl joined in the project. Ignacio Ayala, who had bee appointed intendente by Morelos, was seized and con fined at Tecpan, but succeeded in effecting his escap While Ávila was absent from Veladero for the purpos of disarming David and Tabares, Mayo surprised th officer left in charge, made him and others captive, an attached the troops to the iniquitous undertaking.

The news of these proceedings soon reached Mo relos, who hastened with an escort of 100 men to th scene of danger. His presence sufficed to overaw the mutineers. The troops returned to their alle giance, Ávila was reinstated in his command, an David and Tabares were disarmed. With the prom ise of placing them in charge of an expedition int Oajaca, he brought them back to Chilapa, where b his orders they were secretly beheaded.[24] He als instructed Ávila to execute Mayo, who was accord ingly shot.

When news of the capture of the revolutionar leaders at las Norias de Bajan reached Rayon,[25] awar that Ochoa was marching against him, and that Eli zondo was making a similar hostile movement fron Monclova, he determined to abandon Saltillo and di

[24] *Ib.* Morelos feared a public execution might cause disturbance, as th conspirators had many adherents in the army. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii 20–2. This author omits to make mention of the deception practised o them by Morelos, who himself makes the admission in his declaration: 'Re sulto la muerte de aquellos dos que se les mando dar en Chilapa hasta dond los condujo con el pretesto de darles una expedicion para Oaxaca.' p. 2 He moreover seems to have been unaware that David and Tabares ha been despatched as commissioners to the U. S., asserting that they had bee sent to Rayon to inform him of the situation in the south.

[25] Bustamante states that at this time Rayon received an order, bearin the signature of Allende, to place at the disposal of Elizondo the troops un der his command. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 199. Rayon could only conclude that suc a command was a fabrication of the royalists, and paid no heed to it.

rect his course to Zacatecas, which was only defended by a small garrison. During the latter days of March he accordingly evacuated that town, his forces amounting to about 4,000 men.[26] Ochoa, duly informed of this movement, hastened to intercept him, and on the 1st of April an engagement was fought at the defile of Piñones. The action lasted six hours, and ended in favor of the independents, Ochoa retreating to Aguanueva.[27] This success, in the achievement of which the troops behaved exceedingly well, gained prestige for the cause. Rayon, without further molestation, continued his march to Zacatecas, but the difficulties with which he had to contend were so great, that had a more energetic commander been opposed to him he would have been overwhelmed. At Piñones a large portion of his pack-mules and provision and water-wagons fell into the hands of the royalists. The country was destitute of food and water, and the sufferings of his troops were fearful. Sickness broke out among them; many died, others went mad, and most of the animals perished. Maguey and cactus juice was drunk, producing burning pains.[28] If a well or insignificant stream was found, the men fought like wild beasts over it. At a place called Las Ánimas there were symptoms of mutiny. A council of war was held, at which it was resolved to petition for the grace extended by the general pardon. Rayon, compelled outwardly to acquiesce, nevertheless postponed taking the necessary action in the matter, and many deserted.

[26] According to *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 168. Ochoa in his report of the 3d of April states that Rayon's army amounted to 6,000 men, 2,000 of whom were cavalry. He had also 24 pieces of artillery and six culverins. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 1220.

[27] *Id.*, 1811, ii. 1200–3, 1218–22, contains a copy of Ochoa's detailed report of this engagement. The brigadier Ponce, who with four soldiers had separated from the main body of the revolutionists in order to observe the retreat of the enemy, was made captive after being mortally wounded. Before his death he communicated to Ochoa the plans of Rayon. *Id.*, 1220.

[28] José María Ansorena, who had been made intendente of Valladolid by Hidalgo, died in great suffering from the effects of this juice, at the colegio de misioneros de Guadalupe, about a league from Zacatecas. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 262.

The captain-general, however, bravely pushed forward. Aware that there was abundance of water at the hacienda of San Eustaquio, which was occupied by a royalist force under Larrainzar, he sent forward a detachment under the direction of Anaya to attack the place. Anaya succeeded in surprising the enemy and dispersed them. From this time the sufferings of the independents were mitigated. At San Eustaquio Rayon halted for two days, in order to refresh his exhausted men.[29] On the 11th of April he advanced to the hacienda of Pozo Hondo, whence he detached 500 men under Sotomayor to take possession of Fresnillo, which was done. As Rayon approached Zacatecas, he sent forward another detachment of equal number, under Anaya and Victor Rosales, to reconnoitre. They were attacked, and Rayon sent José Antonio Torres to their assistance, while he took up a position on the cerro de la Bufa, about a league distant from the city, with the rest of his forces, which amounted to little over 1,000. The royalist commander, Colonel Juan Zambrano, deeming his position in Zacatecas untenable, withdrew to the cerro del Grillo, and there intrenched himself. He was, however, surprised by a night attack conducted by Torres, with whose previous successes in Nueva Galicia the reader is already acquainted. The defeat of Zambrano was complete; his camp, artillery, ammunition, and baggage, with 500 bars of silver, fell into the hands of the assailants. Zambrano fled to Jerez, ten or twelve leagues distant, and on the following day, the 15th of April, Rayon entered Zacatecas without opposition.[30] Thus terminated the retreat from Saltillo,

[29] Bustamante gives a detailed account of Rayon's march from Saltillo, having obtained it personally from Rayon. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 200–4. Alaman, to whom Rayon also narrated the events, corroborates Bustamante in all main particulars. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 261.

[30] *Id.*, ii. 262; *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 170-2; Bustamante, quoting from the *Abispa de Chilpancingo*, no. 19, relates that in the attack on the royalist camp a small cannon was brought into play by the revolutionists. The gun-carriage being broken, a soldier voluntarily supplied its want by placing himself on his hands and knees and supporting the piece on his back. The recoil of the piece shattered his spine at the first discharge; this did not,

which the constancy of the generals and the fortitude of the soldiers who remained faithful have rendered famous.

During the time which Rayon remained in Zacatecas, which was less than a month, he occupied himself with indefatigable industry in augmenting and drilling his forces. He made cannon and wagons; and all the resources of the place in clothing, munitions of war, and money were put in requisition. The rich mine of Quebradilla[31] was thrown open to all who chose to work, one third of the metal to go to the laborers. With this incentive, thousands toiled night and day, and a large amount of metal was secured.[32] As far as it was possible, Rayon also organized the government of the province, retaining in their offices all those employés who gave satisfactory guarantees of their adherence to the cause. Moreover, having convoked a general junta of the municipal corporations, he laid before them his plans for the establishment there of a provisional representative government of the nation, independent of Spain.

At the same time he sent a communication to Calleja, who was already on his march against him from San Luis Potosí. This address, which reached Calleja's hands at the hacienda of Carro, sets forth Rayon's explanation of the cause and object of the revolution. The treacherous imprisonment of the Spanish monarch, he states, was no impediment to the establishment of a junta central or of provincial

however, deter one of his comrades from following his example, who being well covered with sacking sustained little injury. When the camp was taken, the first soldier, then at the point of death, asked if the shot which had been fired from his back had taken effect. Being answered in the affirmative, he exclaimed, 'Pues bien, ahora muero con gusto!' and soon after expired. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 205–6.

[31] The owners were Spaniards, the chief being Fermin de Apezechea, who had retired to Mexico. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 263.

[32] Rayon caused it to be coined. Although the coins were of inferior workmanship, they were preferred at Vera Cruz, their value being at the rate of nine reales to the peso fuerte. They bore the initials L. V. O., which according to Bustamante meant, *Labor vincit omnia. Cuad. Hist.*, i. 217. Negrete suggests another interpretation of the letters, namely, *Levantaos vivientes oprimidos. Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 86.

juntas in the peninsula; and the design of New Spai was also to instal a national junta, or congress, aft the precedents established in the peninsula. Whi Spain was being treasonably delivered up to th dominion of Napoleon, the rights of the crown bein alienated and the holy religion prostituted, the ob ject of this congress would be to put an end to th systems of appropriation of the property of corpora tions, and the exaction of so-called patriotic loan and donations which were ruining the country, th rights of Fernando, however, and the ecclesiastica government being maintained; and finally, to pre vent the surrender of New Spain to the French. This address was signed conjointly by Rayon and L ceaga, and dated the 22d of April. On the 29t Calleja despatched his answer, in which, after com menting upon the cruel and desolating system of war fare adopted by the insurgents, and the outside dan ger to which it has exposed the nation, states tha the government will hold no further correspondenc with them, and concludes by offering them for th last time the benefit of the general pardon, on th condition that all arms, ammunition, and funds b delivered up.[34]

On the receipt of this reply, Rayon, conscious of hi inability to resist the attack of Calleja, who continue his march without interruption, abandoned Zacateca with the intention of proceeding to Michoacan. I

[33] *Rayon y Liceaga*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 279–80. Th manifest was forwarded to Calleja by a commission composed of Rayon brother José María, a Franciscan padre named Gotor, who had formerly be Calleja's chaplain and had some ascendency over him, and three Spaniard the only ones who had remained in Zacatecas, and whom Rayon generously se in order that they might escape from insult or outrage at hands of his troop Calleja responded to this liberality by causing Rayon's brother to be arreste He was, however, liberated by the influence of the conde de Casa Rul, wh took this opportunity of showing his gratitude for the kind treatment he h received during the time he was a captive of Hidalgo with García Conde an Merino. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 207, 210.

[34] *Contestacion de Calleja*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 280– Bustamante makes the strange statement that Calleja offered to mainta Rayon in possession of the funds in his power, which amounted to ov $1,000,000. *Cuad. Hist*, i. 210. Not one word of such a proposal appears Calleja's reply.

order to retard Calleja, he left Rosales in the city, with instructions to hold out to the last extremity, and then effect his retreat by way of Jerez. On the night of the 1st of May Calleja, who had advanced to Ojocaliente, received information of Rayon's retreat, and immediately despatched Colonel Empáran with a strong division and six cannon to intercept him. On the 3d of May Calleja entered Zacatecas without opposition, Rosales having availed himself of the benefit of the pardon which was granted at his request to him and his troops.[35]

Meantime Empáran marched with great rapidity in pursuit of Rayon, and on the same day on which Calleja entered Zacatecas overtook him at the hacienda de Maguey. The engagement which followed was most disastrous to the revolutionists. Though occupying a strong position on the adjacent ridge, they were routed on all sides, the artillery of the enemy opening upon them with telling precision. Rayon's troops were dispersed, his demoralized officers carrying off a great part of the treasure.[36] Twenty pieces of artillery, and a quantity of muskets and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victors.[37] More than 100 prisoners were captured, all of whom Empáran released except five, who were executed.[38]

After this defeat Rayon, still maintaining his inten-

[35] *Parte de Calleja*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 282; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 424–5. Calleja, however, caused 13 of the insurgents to be shot. *Bustamante, Caud. Hist.*, i. 216.

[36] Empáran gives an exaggerated account of the number slain: 'Se vieron,' the insurgents, 'precisados á ceder el Campo con mil y ochocientos á dos mil Cadáberes.' *Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 283. Alaman, who received his information from the lieutenant-colonel, José María Bustamante, attached to the artillery of the revolutionists, states that the ammunition wagons being cased with tin, the glitter afforded an excellent mark for the enemy's gunners. One of the wagons struck by a shot caused great disorder. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 269. Negrete adds that the shot caused the explosion of the ammunition. *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 51.

[37] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 471–2. The ammunition was of such inferior quality that the greater portion of it was useless. This explains the insignificant loss sustained by the royalists, who had only four wounded. *Ib.* Bustamante's account intimates that Rayon only made a show of resistance in order to secure the retreat of his main body. *Caud. Hist.*, i. 214. This version, in view of the disastrous result, is not credible.

[38] *Id., Campañas de Calleja*, 112–13.

tion of entering Michoacan, retired to La Pieda unpursued by Empáran, who, little inclined to b subservient to Calleja's orders, under some pretex directed his course toward Guanajuato. At La Pie dad Rayon could not collect more than about 200 c his scattered troops and $30,000 in money. Not dis heartened, however, and having obtained in that tow a few arms and three cannon, he proceeded to Zamora where he organized a force of over 400 men, whon he placed under the command of Torres, with instruc tions to proceed to Pátzcuaro and unite his divisio with the troops under the revolutionary chiefs Padr Navarrete and Manuel Muñiz.[39] In the neighbor hood of Pátzcuaro Torres was vigorously attacked b a royalist force. The contest lasted nearly the whol day without the enemy being able to dislodge th insurgents from the position which they taken up o the eminence of la Tinaja. Torres, however, wa severely wounded in the arm, and his troops were s hard pressed that their defeat was imminent. A this moment Rayon arrived with reënforcements; th royalists were soon routed, even losing their baggage which they had left at Huiramba.

The conjunction of the insurgent leaders being thu accomplished, Rayon prepared to attack Valladolid After Cruz's departure from that city in January only a small force remained for its defence. Torcuat Trujillo, who, as the reader will recollect, had bee appointed military commander of the province, was s arrogant and tyrannical that he brought upon hi the hatred of the inhabitants. His conduct was no conducive to the pacification of Michoacan; in fact, th whole province, with the exception of its capital an the immediate vicinity, revolted. After the fatal da at the bridge of Calderon, Muñiz, and a number o other chiefs who had sustained defeat there or else

[39] These leaders were respectively the revolutionary commanders in th departments of Pátzcuaro and Tacámbaro in Michoacan. *Id.*, *Cuad. Hist.* i. 215.

where, took refuge in the rugged districts of Michoacan,[40] where even the insalubrity of the climate in a large portion of the province served as protection. Here they soon gathered strength, and finally, by the coöperation of their forces, found themselves in a position to assume the offensive. Rayon, therefore, formed his plans, in concert with the other leaders, for a combined attack on Valladolid, and on the 29th of May the heights adjacent to the city were occupied by large bodies of insurgents, whose numbers were estimated by Trujillo at seven or eight thousand.[41]

The besiegers without delay opened fire on the city with their artillery, which consisted of twenty-five pieces of different calibre. The effect, however, was insignificant, owing to the long range and poor gunnery. On the following day Antonio Linares, who had been sent from Guanajuato to the assistance of Trujillo, succeeded in entering the city before daylight. The royalists now attacked the enemy and inflicted some loss, capturing two cannon and dislodging them from one of their positions. With this success Trujillo began preparations for a general assault, but the insurgent leaders, aware of the reënforcement, and disappointed at the absence of any demonstration in their favor on the part of the inhabitants, secretly retreated on the night of the 1st of June to Tacámbaro.[42]

In the mean time events of great moment, which will be narrated in the following chapter, had oc-

[40] Trujillo, in a letter to the viceroy dated June 2, 1811, reports 'la reunion de mas de doce cabecillas, que por haberlos echado de todas partes las armas del Rey se han refugiado á esta provincia al abrigo de sus montes y recursos. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 502.

[41] 'Su total muchos lo hacen subir á doce mil enemigos, pero yo creo no pasaba, de siete á ocho mil, sin que sea exâgerado.' He also mentions the names of the chiefs opposed to him: el clérigo Navarrete and others of the religious order, and the captain-generals Muñiz, Torres, Rayon, Liceaga, Huidrobo, Salto, Carrasco, and Ramos, 'con otros de inferior jaez.' On their approach against the city the division under Torres was vigorously attacked, May 27th, by Captain Felipe Robledo, who after a contest of three hours was compelled to retreat with loss. *Id.*, 499–506. In this engagement the left arm of Torres was shattered by a grape-shot. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 284.

[42] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 500–6.

curred at Zitácuaro, and Rayon with a small esco had already proceeded thither. Previous to his d parture, he organized the military government of t various districts. To Torres he assigned Pátzcua and Uruapan; to Navarrete, Zacapo; to Maria Caneiga, Panindícuaro; to Muñiz, Tacámbaro; and the guerrilla chief Luna, Acámbaro and Jerécuaro.

The insurgents now for some time confined th operations against Valladolid to a mere blockad which though maintained at a distance effectually c off Trujillo's communication with the capital. Th inaction lasted nearly two months, during whi Muñiz occupied himself in increasing his forces a armament. Cannon were cast, muskets were co structed of bronze,[43] and every preparation made for more determined effort. On the 19th of July the ind pendent leaders, again reunited, appeared before t city, their forces now amounting to 10,000 or 12,0 men, with forty pieces of artillery.[44] On the 20 Muñiz sent to Trujillo a peremptory summons to su render if he would not see the city put to fire a sword.[45] To this communication Trujillo vouchsaf no reply. On the 21st the insurgents opened fire, b with little effect;[46] and on the following day, the ci being invested on all sides, the attack commence The principal assault was directed against the southe entrance, under the immediate command of Muñ Trujillo, however, successfully repulsed it, driving t enemy back upon their lines with heavy loss, and ca turing eight cannon.

[43] 'Que como los arcabuces del tiempo de la conquista, eran muy pesado se disparaban con mecha necesitando dos hombres para su manejo.' *Alam Hist. Mej.*, ii. 304; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 284.

[44] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 670–1. Bustamante states that the artillery c sisted of 22 guns. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 284.

[45] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 807.

[46] Bustamante states that a soldier of Trujillo, named Pelayo, observ that the elevation of the insurgents' guns was too great, sent a note to Mu informing him of the error. The messenger intrusted with the letter nounced Pelayo, who was immediately shot at the gallows, where his bo was left hanging with the letter attached to his back. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 2 *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 306.

On the other side of the city affairs went otherwise. Robledo was unable to maintain his position at the Santa Catalina Gate, and Trujillo hastened to his assistance. On his entrance into the city he was filled with consternation at the confusion which prevailed. Men, women, and children in wild alarm were rushing through the streets, shrieking and wailing, and proclaiming that the city was in the power of the insurgents. Soldiers were flying from their posts, and all seemed lost. Trujillo, however, displayed rare courage and presence of mind. Raising the cry of victory, and that Calleja was approaching, he succeeded in allaying the panic, and hurried forward to the Santa Catalina gate.

There the greatest disorder prevailed; the artillery was dismounted or in the hands of the enemy; the soldiers were fleeing, casting down their arms, and throwing off their uniforms. Arresting the flight with orders to kill all who did not rejoin their ranks, Trujillo sallied on to the plain and attacked the enemy. He was, however, compelled to retire; and although in a second charge he gained some slight advantage, his position was desperate. His troops were giving way at other points, and all was apparently lost. At this crisis, when the victory of the insurgents was no longer doubtful, to the inexpressible amazement of the royalists, the besiegers retired from the contest, retreating in good order, but abandoning twenty-two cannon to the enemy. Divers reasons are assigned as the cause of this extraordinary movement. Some attribute it to the miraculous interposition of the image of the saviour in the sacristy of the cathedral. Trujillo claimed that the valor displayed by a portion of his troops caused the insurgents to withdraw; but the more probable explanation is that advanced by Bustamante, namely, the failure of ammunition and the envy and jealousy of Muñiz, who, being the only one who had sustained repulse during the day, refused to furnish the other chiefs with cartridges when their

own supply became exhausted.[47] With criminal sel
ishness he refused to others the success in which h
could not share. The insurgents pursued their wa
unmolested to Acuicho, while Trujillo, bewilder
with astonishment, in the exuberance of his joy, w
so far forgetful of himself as to liberate more than 3
prisoners from the jails and dungeons of the city.[48]

[47] 'No quiso dar á los comandantes Anaya y otros ni un cartucho de mas
treinta cargas que salvó cuando fué derrotado: que se mantuvo especta
...por no contribuir á la gloria de las columnas...que tuvierón mejor dir
cion, ó mejor suerte que la de Muñiz.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 286.

[48] The particulars of the operations against Valladolid have been deri
from Trujillo's and other officers' reports published as quoted in the offi
gazette of Mexico, and from Bustamante. Other authors, as Mora, *Mex
sus Rev.*, iv. 235–9; Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 300–8; Torrente, *Rev. Hist. A
i. 242–3; and Negrete, *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 114–25, 151–2, 155–6, 159–75, s
ply no additional information, although in minor details some discrepanc
are observable in their several narrations.

CHAPTER XIII.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUNTA DE ZITÁCUARO.

1811.

CALLEJA'S NEW SYSTEM OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION—SUPPRESSION OF THE INSURRECTION IN NUEVO SANTANDER—PACIFICATION OF SAN LUIS POTOSÍ—DEFEAT OF INSURGENTS IN GUANAJUATO—PORLIER'S OPERATIONS IN NUEVA GALICIA—TORRE'S ACTIVITY AND SEVERITY—HIS DEFEAT AT ZITÁCUARO, AND DEATH—RAYON FORTIFIES ZITÁCUARO—EMPÁRAN RETURNS TO SPAIN—CONSPIRACY TO SEIZE THE VICEROY—PROCLAMATION OF CALLEJA—EVENTS IN MICHOACAN—CONDITION OF GUANAJUATO—SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION.

ON the day of his entrance into Zacatecas, Calleja proclaimed the usual pardon, adding the customary threats in case of non-compliance. All stragglers and strangers were ordered to return to their homes within twenty-four hours, under pain of being treated as insurgents.[1] Then, having purged the city by an appropriate slaughter of patriots, the royalist leader once more remodelled the government. For its future security he organized five companies of infantry, one of cavalry, and an artillery corps, and appointed Martin de Medina the governor of Colotlan, comandante and intendente of the province. On the 16th of May Calleja proceeded to Aguascalientes with an army greatly reduced in numbers. The separation of Empáran's division, and of another detachment under Miguel del Campo sent to operate against the insurgents in the Bajío of Guanajuato, had left him with little more than 1,000 men, while the revolutionists were again increasing in strength. This dismember-

[1] *Gaz de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 425–31.

ment of his famous army of the centre was a grievo
trouble to Calleja, the more so because he could s
that no durable results would be thereby attaine
In the abilities of his captains he had little confidenc
plan as he might, he foresaw under the present syste
only failure. While at Aguascalientes, he therefo
submitted to the viceroy a plan of military organiz
tion which he thought might hasten peace.[2] H
would arm all the towns in the kingdom for their ow
defence, and thereby avoid the crippling effect of d
viding and subdividing the standing army into section
The troops would likewise be relieved from long ar
fatiguing marches from one point to another. B
a judicious disposal of the regular troops in suit
ble localities, assistance could quickly arrive at ar
point attacked. Both Calleja and the viceroy reco
nized the risk incurred in placing arms in the han
of the people, and thus establishing a power whi
might turn against the government. Nevertheles
Calleja believed that such danger could be avoided, ar
the viceroy adopted the plan. Henceforth this syste
was pursued by the royalists to the close of the wa

The system was put into immediate practice as fa
as possible, and was methodically developed ar
extended as circumstances allowed. In each tow
companies of infantry and cavalry and batteries
artillery were raised, the strength of which was pr
portionate to the number of inhabitants. All hous
holders were compelled to take service in these corp
which were placed under the direction of a coma
dante de armas, in whom were also vested, wherev
practicable, the judicial functions. At each tow
from 100 to 150 of such troops were to be in consta
service and daily drilled. Arms were at first su
plied by collecting weapons in possession of th
inhabitants. All persons not enrolled in these mi
itary corps were forbidden to keep any kind of arm

[2] See copy of the plan, dated June 8, 1811, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, C*
Doc., iii. 289–90.

Only muleteers and others whose occupations so required it were allowed a hatchet, and knife without a point. In the country haciendas and ranchos, moreover, armed squadrons were organized, composed of members varying from six or eight to fifty, according to the relative importance of the places. This system, afterward adopted with some modifications by Morelos and the other independent leaders, resulted in placing all Mexico on a war footing; but it did not accomplish at this time exactly what Calleja desired. Practically it arrayed the nation against itself. At the commencement of the strife the creole regulars even could not be relied upon, and in the first engagements great misgivings had been entertained by the viceroy in regard to them. Their conduct at Las Cruces, and the subsequent skilful management by Calleja of the troops under his command, had greatly relieved this anxiety, and now by enforcing armed resistance in the towns against the attacks of the insurgents, friends and brothers were sometimes brought face to face as enemies.

Well aware that Zacatecas was still far from secure, and that Guanajuato was exposed to invasion at any time by the insurgent forces in Michoacan, Calleja made such dispositions for the protection of those provinces as the circumstances of his position admitted. As the northern and eastern provinces, called the provincias internas,[3] were now free from insurrectionary movements, the troops in those regions could be advantageously employed in securing Zacatecas and Guanajuato against hostile inroads, and at the same time protecting the frontier of Durango. Calleja accordingly addressed a letter to Governor Salcedo, urging him to instruct Lopez and Ochoa to occupy with their divisions the defiles of Colotlan, Tlaltenango, and Juchipila; at the same time he

[3] In May 1811 the provincias internas were divided into two comandancias generales, subject to the viceroy's authority, by an order of the Spanish government, which was confirmed by the regency in July 1812. *Prov. Inter. Carta del Ministro*, and *Id., Real orden Mayer*, MS., nos. 6 y 7.

made arrangements with Cruz to send a portion his forces in the same direction for the purpose coöperating with Empáran, whom it was his inte tion to despatch to Lagos.[4] Calleja's plan was occupy with the main divisions of his army the d trict extending from Lagos to Querétaro, thus kee ing in subjection the most important part of t country, and being in a position to hasten quick to the assistance of the forces operating on t north and south of this line. The carrying-out this plan was, however, frustrated to some extent the development of events which necessitated t employment of the heavy divisions of Empáran a Linares at other points, the latter being despatch to the relief of Valladolid, as already related, a the former being sent to Zitácuaro. The departu of these forces from Guanajuato exposed that pro ince, and even Querétaro, to imminent risk; a Calleja, ordering Diego García Conde to move San Felipe with the division he commanded at S Luis Potosí, and Miguel de Campo to station hi self at Salamanca, hastened to Leon, whence he pr ceeded to Guanajuato, entering the city on the 20 of June.

When Calleja returned to San Luis Potosí aft his victory at Calderon, he found himself in a vort of insurrection. No sooner had the army of t centre marched from Guanajuato for Guadalaja than a number of insurgent bands sprung into exis ence in various parts of the province. The mo prominent among their leaders was Albino Garc commonly called El Manco,[5] who in the neighborho of Salamanca and Santiago carried on hostilities wi such daring and skill that he became one of the mo celebrated guerrilla chiefs of the revolution. In t

[4] See Calleja's despatch of July 31, 1811, in *Gaz de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 747

[5] Garcia was a native of Salamanca, a town situated in the southern p of the province. He derived this sobriquet of Manco from being cripp in one arm by a fall from his horse. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 249.

district between Huichapan and Querétaro, Villagran was still harassing convoys and interrupting communication with the capital. The hilly region of the Huasteca, the mountains of the Sierra Gorda, and the plains of Apam to the north of the Mexican capital swarmed with predatory hordes. Nuevo Santander was in open insurrection; portions of San Luis Potosí were still unpacified; while the forces left in Zacatecas and Aguascalientes were inadequate, as the reader is aware, for the security of those cities.

While the events narrated in the preceding chapter were occurring in Zacatecas and Michoacan, the insurrection in Nuevo Santander, under the leadership of Villerías, was successfully suppressed by Arredondo. Having been invited by that chief to espouse the independent cause, Arredondo caused the communication to be burned by the hangman, and on the 4th of May marched from Agayo against the insurgents. Villerías, having sustained several successive defeats, fled toward Matehuala, where he was overcome and slain by a royalist force sent against him by the junta de seguridad of Catorce, under the direction of the cura Semper, Padre Duque, and Nicanor Sanchez.[6] The insurrection in Nuevo Santander was now confined to Tula and its vicinity. On the 21st Arredondo approached the town, and having routed the insurgents with considerable slaughter, entered Tula the following day with little opposition. All the leaders and principal men were hanged, and their bodies left suspended from trees.[7] Although the insurrection in this province was thus thoroughly crushed, Venegas, fearing that assistance to the revolutionists might arrive from the United States, dare not reduce the number of troops, the efficiency of

[6] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 493–7, 509–10. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, a cadet of the Santa Cruz regiment, was commended by Arredondo for his gallant conduct in one of the engagements alluded to in the text. *Id.*, 496. This is the first time that Santa Anna's name appears in print.

[7] *Id.*, 507–8. Arredondo tells the viceroy that at the mission of Ola shortly before his arrival an unfortunate prisoner was slowly roasted alive, from the feet upwards, by the Indians, and eaten!

which he even increased by supplying them with a considerable train of artillery. Iturbe was transferred to the governorship of Colotlan and Arredondo appointed to that of Nuevo Santander, which was shortly afterward increased in territory by the addition of the Huasteca.[8]

At this time, Matehuala again became the scene of an insurgent defeat. In June the unfortunate town was taken possession of by Bernardo Gomez de Lara better known by the sobriquet of Huacal. Lara, by birth an Indian, was the most ferocious of the insurgent chiefs who infested portions of San Luis Potosí. Captain of a band of half-savage Indians, he directed his hostilities not only against Spaniards, but against all who were not of his race. At Matehuala and in the vicinity he put to death a number of victims, and by compelling the inhabitants to join his band, raised his force to more than a thousand men. On the 21st of June he was simultaneously attacked by a company of Arredondo's troops under Antonio Elosúa, and a force brought up by Semper, the cura of Catorce.[9] Assailed on opposite sides, Huacal was routed with slaughter, between two and three hundred of his followers being slain and a large number taken prisoners.[10] He himself, though wounded, effected his escape and retired to the Bajío of Guanajuato. Somewhat later he entered San Miguel el Grande; but the inhabitants recovering from their first panic, surprised and captured him, with a number of his principal followers. Huacal was put to death in his prison, and his body exposed on the gibbet. This occurred about the end of the year.[11] By this success the northern

[8] 'Hasta la Sierra Gorda, confinando con el Mezquital y los llanos de Apan y las costas de Tuxpan en el seno mejicano.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 282.

[9] The combined attack was unpremeditated, as the royalist leaders were not aware of each other's movements. This nearly led to a disaster, as the soldiers of Elosua fired upon those of Semper before they discovered that they were friends. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 1235–6.

[10] *Id.*, 1811, ii. 744–6, 1234–6; *Iturribarría, Mem.*, in *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, vii. 291–2.

[11] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 292; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rect.*, 196.

portion of San Luis Potosí was reduced to obedience, and during August the operations of the royalists in the district of Rio Verde and the southern part of the province completed the pacification.

In Guanajuato and Michoacan the condition of affairs was far different, and the revolution was assuming alarming proportions. Calleja was fully alive to the grave difficulties of his position. In a letter addressed to Venegas from Guanajuato on the 20th of August, he describes to him in strong colors the inextinguishable vitality of the insurrection and its strong recuperative power;[12] and again on the 26th of September he reports that the forces of his division occupying the district between Lagos and Querétaro were insufficient to keep under control the ubiquitous guerrilla bands. Meantime, however, García Conde and Miguel del Campo were rendering good service in their respective localities. José de la Luz Gutierrez, at the head of 4,000 men well provided with arms, was signally routed at San Luis de la Paz,[13] and Albino García sustained a similar defeat in the valley of Santiago.[14]

When Cruz returned to Guadalajara after his successful recovery of Tepic and San Blas, he applied himself with his natural activity to the suppression of the rebellion in other portions of the province. The principal districts disaffected were those represented by the important towns of Zacoalca, Sayula, and Zapotlan, and on the 26th of February, Cruz despatched Captain Porlier with the greater portion of the troops

[12] 'La insurreccion está todavía muy léjos de calmar; ella retoña como la hidra, á proporcion que se cortan sus cabezas.' *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 127.

[13] The action took place on the 11th of July. Francisco Guizarnótegui, the officer in command of the royalists, received Calleja's highest commendation on this occasion. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 750. In subsequent operations several leading insurgent chiefs were captured and shot. Among them was Luz Gutierrez.

[14] On the 26th of June. García lost five cannon, and was prevented by this defeat from approaching Salamanca, where he had great influence. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 749.

against that region, instructing him to execute m
exemplary punishment upon the rebels.[15] At Za
alco and Sayula Porlier met with no opposition, t
insurgents retreating before him in the direction
Zapotlan; but on the 3d of March he fought th
at some little distance from that town and defea
them. No difficulty was experienced by him in
ducing to subjection the other towns which h
shown symptoms of revolt in that region.[16] Porl
now intended to advance farther southward, and s
forward Manuel del Rio to Colima, but the host
attitude of the Indians in the territory of Colot
and Nayarit forced Cruz to recall the larger port
of the troops. Calleja had despatched from Zaca
cas the cura of Matehuala, José Francisco Alvar
with a division of the troops of the provincias intern
against the revolted district; but on the 27th of Mar
the belligerent padre was repulsed near the town, b
ing badly wounded, and effecting his retreat with d
ficulty. Negrete was therefore sent with a force fr
Nueva Galicia, and more successful than Alvar
soon reduced all the towns in the region betwe
Colotlan and Juchipila.[17] Zapotlan, however, on t
withdrawal of the royalist troops, again revolted, a
Negrete proceeding thither inflicted a severe defe
upon the insurgents on the 5th of May.[18] Neverth
less, the revolution in Nueva Galicia was not cas
complicated, and Cruz and his officers were kept in co
stant occupation in one part or other of the provin
On the 21st of June, hoping to strike an effective bl
at the ringleaders, he issued a proclamation offeri

[15] [illegible] instructions to Porlier says: "No deve perdonarse la vid
[illegible]

[16] [illegible] and March of this y
[illegible]

[illegible] The [illegible] of the insurgents was
[illegible]

rewards for the delivery of insurgent chiefs, dead or alive.[19] These stringent measures, however, were not effectual. In order to correspond with Calleja's wishes, and coöperate with him in the protection of Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, Negrete and Colonel Manuel del Rio were despatched with considerable detachments against different bodies of the insurgents. These officers defeated the enemy in a number of engagements fought during the months of June to September, while two other divisions, respectively under the commands of Angel Linares and Colonel Pastor, did good service.[20]

During this period the rebellion developed to a great extent in the province of Mexico, and the proximity of the insurgent bands which soon infested it not only caused the viceroy increased anxiety, but exposed the weakness of the government in being unable to suppress hostilities carried on almost in sight of the capital. Although Hidalgo had been unsuccessful in rousing much enthusiasm during his brief inroad into Mexico, he had sowed well the seeds of revolution. His departure did not allay the agitation in the towns of the Toluca Valley, and it spread rapidly to those of Temascaltepec, Sultepec, and Zitácuaro. Although authority was quickly reëstablished in the city of Toluca, the country was soon overrun by guerrilla bands. Haciendas and the smaller towns were attacked and pillaged, communication between the outlying cities and the capital was almost closed, travel on the highways was impossible without strong escorts, and sentinels were lassoed at the very gates of the city.[21] The viceroy at first attempted the or-

[19] The rewards offered were proportionate to the military grades, the leaders being rated at $500 a head, their colonels at $300, sub-officers at $100, and an ordinary individual at $50. Cruz in the same proclamation enacted that in every town which had lapsed into revolt after the extension of the indulto to it, all the rebellious inhabitants should be put to death. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 715–18.

[20] *Id.*, ii. 759, 763–6, 811–14, 836–8, 967–70; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 287–9, 295–6, 324–5, 328–9, 330–1, 338–9, 363, 370–1.

[21] *Ward, Mex. in 1827*, i. 180.

ganization of volunteer troops of horse supported
subscription; but this force proved a failure.[22] H
then appointed Juan Bautista de la Torre, a capta
of the regiment of Tres Villas, military command
of Toluca, and assigned to him a strong body of reg
lars.[23]

To describe all the operations of Torre would
entering into monotonous details of similar even
He proceeded against the rebels early in Januar
and during that and the three succeeding mont
gained a number of victories,[24] by which he reduc
the valleys of Toluca and Temascaltepec. About t
beginning of April, however, the inhabitants of Joc
titlan again rose in revolt. The viceroy ordered Tor
to chastise them and clear the highway to Valladol
of guerrilla bands. On the 15th, after two hou
and a half of incessant firing, Torre entered Joc
titlan, "having had the particular pleasure of leavi
four hundred dead upon the field," which he believ
would act as a restraint upon "the enemies of God
the king, and the country."

Zitácuaro, in Michoacan, still remained in the pow
of the insurgents under Benedicto Lopez, who had su
tained various defeats at the hands of Torre. T
town, surrounded by lofty hills on all sides, can on
be approached by three deep and narrow cañon
namely, those of San Mateo, Tuxpan, and los La
reles;[25] and Lopez, driven from place to place
the less rugged valley of Toluca, had taken refu

[22] The name of *guerrilleros volantes* was given to this force. According
Mora, the outrages committed by it were worse than those of the insurgen
Méj. y sus Rev., iv. 182.

[23] Torre was a native of Spain, being born in the mountains of Santand

[24] Consult *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 43, 212–16, 221–7, 232–8, 265–75.

[25] Torre displayed a strange mixture of merciless severity and religi
faith in a merciful saviour. He persecuted the insurgents, not only
rebels, but as wretches cast outside the pale of the church by excommu
cation. His cruelty and fanatical piety are well illustrated in a proclam
tion which he addressed to the inhabitants of Temascaltepec on the 11th
March. While offering them the choice of the indulto or death, he c
cludes by wishing them, with the lord's grace, all happiness. *Id.*, 1811,
258.

[26] *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 137. See map previously given.

in the mountain wilds of Zitácuaro. Torre, having advanced during the night up the San Mateo cañon, at daylight on the 22d of April attacked the town, his force consisting of 700 men provided with artillery. At the opening of the engagement the infantry led by Ventura Mora, second in command, gained some advantage. By a gallant charge they made themselves masters of the hill of the Calvario, which commanded the town; but though they captured the enemy's guns, they were unable to hold their position against the immense numbers by which they were in turn assailed. Mora and Captain Piñera were slain, and the soldiers broke and ran to the artillery for refuge. Pursuers and pursued, however, were so intermingled that the artillerymen could not fire without inflicting heavy loss upon their own men; and the crowd rushing in among the ranks of the main body threw it into confusion. Finding it impossible to arrest the panic, Torre tried a retreat by the way he had come. When he had reached the narrow entrance to the cañon, however, he found that a breastwork of loose stones had been thrown up, behind which a host had collected to cut him off. His destruction was now certain. The soldiers lost all hope. A few only escaped to tell the tale. Torre prepared for death. He confessed to Padre Arévalo, the cura of Tlalpujahua, who accompanied him, and then under his guidance endeavored to escape from the trap he had entered. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he succeeded in extricating himself, and on the following day even passed Tuxpan without harm. On arriving at the hacienda of Xaripéo, however, he was captured with his companions by Benedicto Lopez and taken back to Tuxpan. As they crossed the bridge of that town Torre was killed by the natives, who showered stones upon him until his dead body was covered. The fruits of this victory were the

capture of all the enemy's arms, ammunition, guns and baggage, and more than 300 prisoners.

Rayon was at this time at Tusantla; and on receip of the important news hastened to Zitácuaro, wher he assumed command. With considerable skill h proceeded to put the town in a state of defence, recog nizing the importance of its position as a centra point of operation. A ditch was cut round it fiv varas wide and a league in circumference, which coul be converted at will into a moat by inundating i from an extensive dam with which Zitácuaro was pro vided. Behind the ditch a concentric barricade thre varas in width was erected, all the assailable portion of it being covered with cannon, the number of whic was increased as rapidly as guns could be turned ou of the foundry which Rayon had established. Th roads also leading into the town were closed agains hostile approach by ditches and breastworks of tim ber.

The defeat of Torre and destruction of his divisio almost neutralized the previous advantages gained b him. Communication between Valladolid and th capital was entirely closed, and the valley of Toluc left open to the insurgents. Venegas, in this extremity being unable to detach any more forces from thos retained in the capital, had recourse to those unde the command of Empáran, who, contrary to the order of Calleja, had approached toward Valladolid. Tha commander was, therefore, instructed to unite hi division with the forces under the lieutenant-colone José Castro, then at Tultenango, and proceed wit all possible despatch against Zitácuaro. This separa tion of Empáran's important division from the army of the centre caused Calleja great annoyance, and from this time date the differences which aros between him and the viceroy, and which afterwar developed into personal enmity. Empáran, who estimated more correctly than the viceroy the diffi culty of the undertaking, was not inclined to engage

in it without having first made every reasonable preparation. With this object he occupied himself for some time at Maravatío in putting in good order his artillery trains and arms, in collecting supplies of provisions, by informing himself through spies of the strength and position of the enemy, and making himself acquainted with the topography of the district. This prudent delay gave umbrage to Venegas, who, in face of Torre's late disaster, blindly regarded the capture of Zitácuaro as presenting little difficulty;[27] and in his communications with Calleja he expressed his dissatisfaction at Empáran's dilatoriness, wrongly attributing it to want of energy and inclination.[28]

Although Venegas was anxious to place the expedition under some other leader, circumstances prevented his doing so, and he ordered Empáran to advance against Zitácuaro without further delay. Empáran accordingly, though suffering in health, led out his division, composed of 2,000 of the best troops of Calleja's army, and by forced marches under drenching rains arrived on the 19th of June within six leagues of the town. Entering by the same cañon as that followed by Torre, for two days the royalist army with great difficulty pursued its march up the narrow and rugged bed, continually impeded by obstructions thrown in the way by the insurgents. Emerging from the gloomy ravine on to the more open ground of the glen in which Zitácuaro was situated, Empáran took up a position on the 21st, in front of the gently rising elevation of Los Manzanillos near the

[27] 'Siendo indudable,' he writes Calleja, 'que la reunion de Zitácuaro es despreciable, y que el suceso desgraciado,' that is, of Torre, 'fué efecto de haberse dirigido mal.' *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 123–4.

[28] Calleja had already forwarded complaints to the viceroy injurious to Empáran. Venegas thus influenced was not sparing of him, and told Calleja that it would be necessary for him to come and take charge of the expedition. Calleja, however, explained to the viceroy how impossible it would be for him to do so at the present time, and suggested that the command be given to Trujillo. *Id.*, 123–5. As the reader is aware, Trujillo's position at this time precluded the possibility of his leaving Valladolid.

town.[29] On the following day the royalists took po session of the hill without difficulty, and also rout a strong body of insurgents, estimated at 10,000 12,000, which assailed their rear; but all attemp to take the town were prevented by the ditch, whi was filled with water and defended by well train infantry under cover of the barricade.[30] After ni hours' fighting, during which the troops suffer heavy loss, Empáran withdrew to Los Manzanill where his soldiers bivouacked, comfortless and d spirited.[31]

When the dull morning came with its leaden, rai charged sky, the royalist leader recognized the hop lessness of any further attempt against Zitácuar The ground on which they had fought on the prece ing day was inundated and was, indeed, an impassab swamp. Lacking means of crossing the moat, ar without provisions or ammunition, Empáran curs in his heart the viceroy who had forced him fo ward against his better judgment. Retreat was th only course left; and mustering into line, he retir through the cañon to Toluca, his force reduced o half.[32] Here, prostrated by fatigue and exposure, th wound received on his head at the battle of Calder

[29] Bustamante says that Empáran sent out two detachments to forage, o in the direction of San Mateo, and the other toward the town of San Fra cisco, and that the first was entirely destroyed by the Indians, while t other only saved itself by flight. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 224. Mora also follows th account. *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 186. Empáran, in his report to the viceroy makes no mention of these reverses. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 598; nor do Alaman.

[30] Among the infantry were 200 soldiers of the regiment of Tres Villas a 100 deserters from the garrison at Valladolid. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 30

[31] Bustamante states that during the night great alarm was caused by stratagem of Rayon's, who fastened paper lanterns to droves of donkey which were then driven toward the royalist camp. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 225. Mo enlarges upon this story, and says that Empáran's soldiers were thus throw into panic. *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 188. Empáran, in his report, however, firms, 'en la noche no se advirtiò cosa que mereciera atencion.' *Gaz. de Mex* 1811, ii. 601.

[32] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 225. 'Logró por fin llegar a Toluca c poco menos de quinientos hombres, como consta de la revista que por órd del virey le pasó en esta ciudad el conde de Alcaraz.' *Mora, Mej. y sus Re* iv. 188. The accounts given by Alaman and Bustamante of this disast differ considerably. The former follows in the main the report of Calle given in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 597–604.

breaking out again, Empáran lay at the point of death. His condition did not, however, prevent Venegas from venting his wrath upon the unfortunate chief. The fault was altogether his own, but he, being ruler, must have some one to throw the blame upon. He sent the conde de Alcaraz to Toluca to investigate. Disgusted at the treatment, as soon as his health permitted, Empáran asked permission to return to Spain, although the result of the investigation left him without prejudice. His request was granted. On his arrival in the peninsula he retired from military service, and died shortly afterward. Thus ended the career of one of the few royalist chiefs who, while no less brave than competent, was able to temper success with mercy.

While these reverses—which were the more pronounced by reason of the coincident successes of Morelos in the south, and the aggressive operations of the insurgents at Valladolid—were causing Venegas great anxiety, an unforeseen peril was threatening him in the capital. As early as April a plot was formed to seize the person of the viceroy, and force him to give orders for the release of Hidalgo and his fellow-captives. The prime mover was Doña Mariana Rodriguez de Lazarin, a woman of great daring and devotion to the cause,[33] and with such energy and tact did she manage the matter that the plans of the conspirators were already arranged and the day appointed. On the evening before this day, however, one of them, José María Gallardo, mindful that he might lose his life in the coming adventure, bethought him to provide for the saving of his soul by confessing to Padre Camargo of la Merced, divulging therein the particulars of the conspiracy. Camargo immediately informed the viceroy, and Gallardo, who was

[33] When the ranks of the independent party were in despair at the news of the capture of Hidalgo, Doña Mariana at a meeting in her house proposed to seize the viceroy, and obtain the release of the captives or hang him. *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 359. This was the origin of the April conspiracy.

apprehended without loss of time, in abject terror dis closed the names of all concerned. A number wer arrested that night; and as further information wa gained, a great many persons of high position wer found to be implicated.[34] Doña Mariana and her hus band were confined in a dungeon till December 1820 when they were liberated by the exertions of Zere cero. Although it does not appear that any execu tions followed the discovery of this plot, many o those arrested languished for a long time in prison.[35]

The failure of this conspiracy did not, however, de ter others. Plots thickened in the capital, and whe the failure of Empáran's attack upon Zitácuaro becam known, the bolder conspirators, hoping to deal a fin ishing blow at royalist power in New Spain, again formed a plot to seize the viceroy. Their plan was t attack his escort on the 3d of August, while he wa taking his customary evening ride, in the paseo de l Viga, and having secured his person, to conduct hin to Zitácuaro, and deliver him into the power of Rayon There he would be coerced to issue orders consigning the government of the kingdom to Rayon.[36] But again a traitor marred the plot on the eve of its ac complishment. On the night of the 2d, one Cristó bal Morante, who had attended the last meeting of the conspirators when their plans were finally arranged, denounced the proceedings to Venegas,[37] who immediately gave orders for necessary precautions to be taken. On the following morning the principal conspirators were arrested, and in order to allay the agitation caused by the discovery and the military measures taken, the viceroy on the same day issued a proclamation informing the public of what had occurred.

[34] Among them Padre Belaunzaran, afterward bishop of Monterey, the marquis of Rayas, the counts of Santiago, Regla, and Medina, and several high officials in the service of the government.

[35] Consult *Bustamante, Martirol.*, pp. 51; and *Mex. Refut. Artic. Fondo*, 12. Zerecero was the author of the work quoted in note 33.

[36] *Gaz de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 780.

[37] Bustamante erroneously states that it was a woman who divulged the plot. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 299.

Proceedings were at once brought against the prisoners, and their trials conducted with the utmost haste. Six of them were condemned to death, and executed on the 29th of the same month.[38]

Among those arrested were three Augustinian friars, Juan Nepomuceno de Castro, Vicente Negreiros, and Manuel Rosendi. Castro was degraded by the ecclesiastical court, and handed over to the secular power; the other two were deposed from their religious dignities, and sentenced to confinement in the convents of their order in Manila. The criminal court, however, demanded the surrender of all three. This gave rise to disputes between the two jurisdictions, and the viceroy, deeming it impolitic to exhibit the spectacle of an ecclesiastic's execution in Mexico, finally sent them all to Habana, to be there confined. Castro, however, died on his way thither in the castle of Ulúa, where so many others under similar circumstances had been released from durance by death.[39]

[38] These were the licenciado Antonio Ferrer, Ignacio Cataño and José Mariano Ayala, subalterns of the commercial regiment, Antonio Rodriguez Dongo, in whose house the conspirators held their meetings, and Félix Pineda and José Mariano Gonzalez. The execution of Ferrer was little less than murder. The only evidence against him was the denunciation of one Manuel Teran, an official of the secretaría de cámara de vireinato, who stated that Ferrer on the morning of the 3d of August had invited him to go armed and on horseback that afternoon to the paseo de la Viga, and made him acquainted with the plans formed for the execution of the design. No other witness appeared against him, and he strenuously denied Teran's assertions, maintaining in his declaration that he knew nothing of the plot before that morning. So weak was the charge that the fiscal, José Ramon Oses, only ventured to propose the punishment of six years imprisonment. The Spanish party, however, were loud in their demands for his death. Ferrer was a lawyer, and too many of that class were attached to the cause of independence. The viceroy was importuned so urgently that he declared if the criminal court did not impose capital punishment upon Ferrer he would do so himself. The president of that court, the oidor Bataller, a Spaniard, wished to save his life, but the two alcaldes, Yañez and Torres Torija, both Americans, pronounced the sentence of death, and Bataller unwillingly signed the death-warrant. When Ferrer heard the sentence read to him, he fell senseless in the court, overwhelmed with the injustice to which he was victim. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 370, 372–3; *Zerecero, Mem. Rev. Mex.*, 424–8; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 300. A declaration asserted to be written by him 'sin sugestion ni seduccion de nadie,' before his death and recognizing the justice of his sentence, was published in the official gazette two days after his execution. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 784–5.

[39] Besides Alaman, Bustamante, and Zerecero, already quoted, consult *Rivera, Hist. Jal.*, i. 338–9; *Mex. Cabildo Metrop.*, pp. 14, in *Doc. Eccles. Mex.*, MS., ii. no. 4; and *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 435–6.

Notwithstanding the triumphs obtained by the i dependents at Zitácuaro, and the successful progre of Morelos in the south, Rayon recognized the wa of coöperation among the revolutionary leaders. E a union only could permanent advantage be gain over an enemy who could concentrate an overpowe ing force at any point and destroy them in deta With a view of centralizing authority, Rayon form the plan of a national junta, under some show of po ular election, and he corresponded with Morelos, wh indorsed his views. Then he convoked an assemb of as many of the principal inhabitants of Zitácua and land owners in the district as could be collecte and laid the matter before them. This meeting w held on the 19th of August, and an act was passe establishing a supreme national junta consisting three members, to be increased to five as occasio might require, and nominating for election Rayo José María Liceaga, and José Sixto Verdusco, t cura of Tusantla.[40] For the installation of this junt and the election of the members, the principal chie were convoked the same day to give their votes c the matter.[41] The act of the general junta was co firmed by them; the nominees were elected by a larg majority,[42] and took oath to maintain the rights the church and the king,[43] and shed the last drop blood for liberty. The electors then swore to obe the decrees and enactments of the newly created cou

[40] *Bando*, in *Hernando y Dávalos*, *Col. Doc.*, iii. 340.

[41] The names of those assembled were: Ignacio Rayon, minister of t nation; Lieutenant-general José María Liceaga; José Sixto Verdusco, as re resentative of General Morelos; the mariscales de campo Ignacio Martin and Benedicto Lopez; Brigadiers José María Vargas and Juan Albarran; R mijio Yarza, as representative of General José Antonio Torres; Colonel M guel Serrano, as representative of General Toribio Huidrobo; Captain Manu Manzo, for the commissioner Mariano Ortiz; the commissioner Tomás Orti the quartermaster Ignacio Ponce de Leon; and sub-inspector Vicente Iz guirre. *Id.*, iii. 403.

[42] Rayon naturally had great preponderance in this assembly, which most was only a partial representation of the independent leaders. A fe other persons present gained votes to the number of four, and two; and o was cast for Morelos! *Ib.* Alaman says of Rayon's intentions, 'siendo su pl que la autoridad recayese en él mismo.' *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 397.

[43] Even now they were not able to act wholly independent of royalty.

cil, which was styled the Suprema Junta Nacional, and a circular copy of the proceedings was sent to the different chiefs, calling upon them to take the oath of allegiance and exact the same from the troops and inhabitants in their respective districts.

The news of the establishment of a government was received with great joy by the revolutionists, and they now indulged in the most sanguine hopes of the accomplishment of their high aspirations. The result, however, fell far short of their expectations. The suprema junta failed to receive general recognition; many of the military leaders refused obedience to it;[44] others only acknowledged its authority when convenient, while the Villagranes even placed themselves in hostility to it. But what contributed most to its inefficiency was disagreement among its members. Some said it had no title to obedience, not having been convened by the nation. Morelos and some others did not like the idea of still holding on to the skirts of royalty; they thought it a species of deception ruling in the name of Fernando, when pure independence alone would satisfy them.[45] The members of the junta tried to soothe his scruples, and in a letter dated the 4th of September, defended their action on the ground of expediency. Although they aspired to independence with no less ardor than their colleagues, they found it advantageous to the cause to proclaim Fernando, inasmuch as many Europeans as well as wavering Spanish Americans had thereby been induced to join them.[46] But Morelos could not countenance a measure which he foresaw would lead to complications, and although he was appointed the

[44] Albino García, remarked, 'No hay mas rey que Dios, ni mas alteza que un cerro, ni mas junta que la de dos rios.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 298.

[45] 'No era razon,' says Morelos at his trial, 'engañar á las gentes haciendo una cosa y siendo otra, es decir, pelear por la independencia y suponer que se hacia por Fernando VII.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 381.

[46] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 489. This letter fell into the possession of Calleja, at the capture of Cuautla in May 1812, together with others papers of Morelos. Guerra maintains that this document was a fabrication of the royalists. *Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 420–1.

fourth member of the junta of Zitácuaro, he he aloof.[47]

The establishment of this junta, however, caus Venegas considerable alarm. He could not close l eyes to the fact that even the mere semblance of government would give impulse to the revolution, a afford a dangerous opportunity to the insurgent lea ers of uniting under the direction of rulers who we no more illegitimately constituted than had been t junta of Seville. Its destruction, therefore, was the first importance; and Calleja, who had alrea been ordered to proceed against Zitácuaro aft Empáran's repulse, was again urged to use all pos ble despatch. In order to counteract the effect fr the use of the name of Fernando VII. by the new organized junta,[48] Calleja proclaimed in Guanajua on the 28th of September that no junta was he recognized except the national congress of the córt in Spain, nor any authority as legitimate except th of the viceroy. He moreover placed a price $10,000 on the head of Rayon and those of his pri cipal associates.

While Calleja was making his preparations assault Zitácuaro with that unhurried leisurely sy tem always pursued by him, and which in this ca detained him till the end of the year, a variety events occurred. The danger to which Valladol had been exposed during July caused Venegas, soon as Empáran's troops had recovered from the fatigue, to despatch Colonel Joaquin Castillo y Bust mante with his battalion to the assistance of Trujil This officer, having joined Linares in Valladolid, pr

[47] Consult *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 399–403; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 293 *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 308–10; *Guerra, Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 402–10. Mo los, in a letter to Rayon dated August 13, 1811, had previously sanctioned proposed establishment of a supreme junta, and appointed Verdusco as representative. Zamacois, *Hist. Mej.*, vii. 559–62, supplies a copy of it.

[48] The proclamations and enactments of the junta bore this heading: Sr Don Fernando Septimo y en su Real Nombre la Suprema Junta Nacio Americana, etc. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 392.

ceeded on the 6th of September against Muñiz, who was posted at Acuitzio with 8,000 men and thirteen pieces of artillery; and on the following day defeated him and captured his guns and ammunition. He then marched to Pátzcuaro, which was occupied by Torres, who, however, did not await his attack, but retired to Zacapo, and uniting his forces with those of Navarrete, took up a position on the hills near Zipiméo, where he gave battle to the royalists. Torres was as unsuccessful as Muñiz; he was routed with great slaughter and the loss of twenty-one cannon. Extreme severity was exercised by Castillo after these victories; at Zipiméo more than 300 prisoners were put to death. And Castillo seemed to regard other kinds of butchery with favor, as he commended to the favorable notice of Trujillo a dragoon who, in the pursuit at Acuitzio, slew with his own hand a brother, saying, as the latter pleaded for his life, that he knew no brother who was a rebel.

On the departure of Castillo from Toluca with a considerable portion of the troops stationed there, Rayon determined to extend his operations into the province of Mexico, and sent detachments in the direction of Ixtlahuaca and Tenango. These made inroads to the gates of Toluca, and Venegas despatched Captain Porlier, who had returned to Mexico,[49] to take command of the force in that city. On the 16th of September Porlier marched from Toluca against the insurgents, and on the 21st made an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge them from a strong position on the hill of Tenango. The loss of the royalists was considerable, and Toluca being threatened, Porlier retraced his steps thither. Before his arrival, on the 10th of October, the city had been assaulted by the enemy, and was cannonaded for the five following days. Meanwhile the viceroy had despatched a force

[49] Porlier had passed through Guanajuato in August on his way from Guadalajara to Vera Cruz, and conducted to the capital a convoy of 1422 bars of silver placed under his charge by Calleja. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 310; *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 129.

of 500 men from the capital to the assistance of t besieged. Porlier, on the arrival of this detachme assumed the offensive, and drove the insurgents fr their positions with the loss of their artillery, ar and ammunition. Of 100 Indians taken prisoners were drawn up in file and shot, except one who w dismissed to bear the tidings to his countrymen.[50]

The viceroy now peremptorily ordered Calleja march against Zitácuaro.[51] Calleja, aware of the pe in which Guanajuato would be placed by his depa ure, was nevertheless compelled to obey these instr tions, and unwillingly left that city on the 11th November, having been frustrated in his attempts provide for the safety of the province by arrangemer with Arredondo and Cruz, who, indeed, were fu occupied in protecting their own territories. Th abandoned to its own resources of defence, the city Guanajuato lay exposed to the attack of numero bands of guerrillas who gathered round as soon Calleja was out of sight. On the 26th that indefa gable chief Albino García occupied the hill of S Miguel with some 12,000 men, and opened fire on t city. An attempt made by a party of royalists capture the enemy's cannon by assailing their r failed, nearly every man being killed; and the ins gents, taking advantage of their success, pushed f ward into the town, and attacked the plaza. He however, they lost a cannon which they had pla in the plazuela of San Diego, and Albino García, aw that reënforcements were approaching from Leon a Silao to the relief of the besieged, hurriedly wi drew to the hacienda of Cuevas, where a great nu ber of his followers dispersed.[52] But although t insurgents failed in their attempts against the capi

[50] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 957–60, 977–80, 1006–10; *Alaman, Hist.* ii. 392.

[51] The despatch of Venegas was concluded in such terms as to cause lleja additional offence. *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 132–3.

[52] *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, i. 424–7; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 44 Cruz had, moreover, instructed Captain Angel Linares, then at Lagos, to himself in readiness to assist Guanajuato. *Id.*, iii. 429–30.

and the principal towns, which were attacked in turn, the province was overrun by fierce bands of guerrillas and subjected throughout its length and breadth to the scourge of predatory warfare. In the neighboring province of Michoacan the aspect of affairs underwent no material change. Although the capital was relieved from immediate danger, it was the only place held absolutely in possession by the royalists. During the last three months of the year, various expeditions were sent into the districts of Pátzcuaro, Tacámbaro, Ario, and Uruapan, but though the government forces succeeded in driving Muñiz and other chiefs from place to place, destroying the founderies which they established and burning their camps, they made no permanent progress. In Nueva Galicia, Cruz was more successful. On the principle of Calleja's new system, military companies were organized in most of the towns, and by their coöperation in resisting the predatory attacks of the revolutionists, the province was gradually reduced to tranquillity.

The city of Querétaro, well fortified and garrisoned, was secured against attack, but the surrounding territory was no more exempt from civil strife than the neighboring provinces, and the comandante Rebollo sent frequent expeditions against the rebels,[53] who interrupted the communication between the capital and Querétaro to such an extent that only immense convoys strongly escorted could pass through the infested district.[54] In communication with the insurgent lead-

[53] These expeditions were generally commanded by Fernando Romero Martinez and Ildefonso de la Torre, both European Spaniards, and whose ferocity gained for them an infamous notoriety. The former indulged his bloodthirstiness by putting bound captives to death with his own hand, and the latter respected neither sex nor age in the butcheries which he perpetrated. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 405–6. Particulars of the engagements in Querétaro will be found in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 149–51, 381–4, 594–6, 699–702, 707–11, 719–21, 760–1, 1022–4, 1192–3, 1195–6; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 336–7.

[54] On the 14th of November a convoy consisting of 2,000 pack mules, under the conduct of Colonel Andrade, entered Mexico. Besides 600 bars of silver, it conveyed a great quantity of articles of consumption, and its safe arrival was a matter of rejoicing to the inhabitants of the capital. Andrade left Mexico some days later with a return convoy six leagues in length, escorted

ers in Querétaro were those operating in the Hu
teca and Mexico. The progress made by the revo
tion in the eastern part of the latter province
rapid and alarming. During August and the succe
ing months of 1811, the insurrection spread southw



EASTERN DISTRICTS.

by a body of troops 400 strong. On the 23d he was attacked by the Vi
granes, Anayas, and Correa, the cura of Nopala, who had declared for the
olution and had been made brigadier by the junta of Zitácuaro, and appoi
comandante of Huichapan and Jilotepec. Although the insurgents were
pulsed, they succeeded in driving off some pack mules, and the action wa
brisk that the bishop of Guadalajara, who was returning to his diocese, wa
danger of being captured. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 407–8; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 18
ii. 1108–11.

through the plains of Apam and extended across Puebla to the confines of Oajaca. Toward the close of the year the territory of Tlascala was invaded, the city attacked, and many of its towns and their districts devastated. The highway between the capital and Orizaba was almost closed to the royalists, and communication with Vera Cruz interrupted.

The first impulse to the revolutionary movement in the plains of Apam was given by José Francisco Osorno, a highwayman by profession, and so illiterate that he only succeeded in learning to scrawl his name when he became prominent as a leader.[55] Having collected a band of 600 or 700 men, he entered Zacatlan on the 30th of August without opposition. Here he was presently joined by Mariano Aldama—a relative of the Aldamas who had been the associates of Hidalgo—with the rank of major-general; and their rapid progress soon caused inconvenience in the capital by the stoppage of supplies from the haciendas situated in the plains. Venegas accordingly despatched an expedition against Zacatlan under the command of a naval captain named Ciriaco del Llano.[56] This officer gained a series of successes over the insurgents, but his sanguinary and oppressive proceedings, instead of extinguishing the insurrectionary spirit, only served to inflame it.[57] Thus Osorno, though repeatedly defeated and his followers dispersed, ever reappeared at

[55] Such is the statement of Calleja in his manifiesto supplied by Martiñena in his *Verdadero Origen de la Rev. en N. Esp.*, 16–7. Osorno was convicted in Puebla for robbery about the year 1790. He attained to the rank of major general and lieutenant general in the revolutionary service. Bustamante glosses over the criminal antecedent of this leader. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 358.

[56] At the beginning of the revolution the governor of Habana had sent to Mexico a number of naval officers who wished to take service in the royalist army. *Id.*, i. 359.

[57] An order which he issued to the effect that no one except a public character might ride on horseback caused great and general discontent, and many joined Osorno in order to save their horses, which were regarded with affection, from being taken for military work. Still more oppressive was Llano's system of burning the homes of the country people on the ranchos scattered through the plains, in order to compel the inhabitants to congregate in the larger towns and oppose the insurgents. *Id.*, i. 360–1; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 932.

some point distant from the scene of his late rever
at the head of his reunited men,[58] and his name becar
as celebrated in the plains of Apam as that of Albi
García in the Bajío of Guanajuato.[59]

[58] Aldama had been treacherously murdered by one José María Casa
who received him into his house under the guise of friendship and assassina
him while asleep. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 363. By his death Osorno s
ceeded to the chief command.

[59] Details of the royalist operations in the plains of Apam will be found
Gaz. de Mex., 1811, ii. 871–8, 931–6, 987–91, 1056–8.

CHAPTER XIV.

SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.

1811-1812.

DOCTOR COS JOINS RAYON—THE REVOLUTIONARY PRESS—PERPLEXITY OF VENEGAS—BISHOP CAMPILLO'S FAILURE AS A MEDIATOR—SECOND CAMPAIGN OF MORELOS—CALLEJA TAKES ZITÁCUARO—DESTRUCTION OF THE CITY—REVERSES OF PORLIER—ARRIVAL OF SPANISH TROOPS—TRIUMPHAL ENTRY OF CALLEJA INTO MEXICO—JEALOUSY OF VENEGAS—CALLEJA MARCHES AGAINST CUAUTLA—DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY—LLANO AT IZUCAR—CALLEJA REPULSED—CUAUTLA INVESTED—SUFFERINGS OF THE BESIEGED—MORELOS EVACUATES THE CITY—CALLEJA RETURNS TO THE CAPITAL.

WHEN Morelos returned to Chilapa, after the suppression of the conspiracy formed by Tabares and David, he found himself in a most favorable position to make at leisure and without interruption his preparations for another campaign. By the dispersion of the royalist troops sent against him, he held possession of the country about him. Protected from attack on the north by the river Mescala, and the deep pestiferous valley through which it ran, he was equally secure from molestation in the direction of Oajaca. The recent defeats of troops from that province had left it in alarm for its own safety, without either the inclination or means again to assume the offensive. During the next three months, therefore, Morelos devoted himself with untiring activity to the more thorough organization of his forces, and especially to the establishment of systematic order and harmony between castes, the correction of the abuses practised upon

Spaniards,[1] and to the collection, proper managemen
and legitimate application of public rents and churc
tithes within the territory under his control.[2] I
order to facilitate matters, early in October he forme
a new province, which he named Tecpan, out of th
southern portion of the territory which at that tim
comprised the intendencia of Mexico, and erecte
Tecpan as the capital, with the title of the city
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, while at the sam
time, as a punishment for the pertinacious oppositio
of the inhabitants of Acapulco, that port was degrade
from its rank and title of Ciudad de los Reyes to tha
of la Congregacion de los Fieles, the lowest grade
municipal communities in the Indies.[3]

The preëminence displayed by Morelos in abilit
to direct the revolutionary movement, continually ex
posed his life to other dangers than those of open wa
Dark and secret plans were formed for his destru
tion by poison or capture. In September 1811 h
received a letter from one Padre Alva,[4] warning hi
of a plot to poison him, and informing him that tw
men were already on their way from Mexico wit
that object. As Alva had minutely described them
they were arrested on their arrival at Chilapa, an
sent to Zacatula. About a year later a similar desig
was meditated, of which Calleja seems to have bee
aware;[5] and still later Rayon apprised him of th

[1] On the 13th of October he published a decree to this effect: 'Que an
siendo culpados algunos ricos Europeos ó criollos, no se heche mano de s
bienes sino con orden Expresa del Superior de la Expedicion.' *Hernandez
Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 402, 450.

[2] At the beginning of his career Morelos appointed commissioners to a
tend to these matters. See *Id.*, ii. 227–8; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. ap. 4
These commissioners were instructed 'á reconocer las existencias de l
estancos, alcabalos, como tambien las de bulas y nuevo indulto de carne, t
mando cuenta de ellos á las personas que los manejan.' *Ib.* On the 15th
Sept. he established postal communication with other independent centre
and between the revolutionary armies, by the organization of a service
mounted couriers. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 376.

[3] Alaman supplies a copy of this enactment. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. ap. 44–
The territory thus constituted a province by Morelos was afterward made
with an addition, the province of Guerrero.

[4] 'Con destino de Capellan de Coro ó otra ingerencia en la Colegiata d
Guadalupe.' *Declaracion de Morelos*, 38–9.

[5] Such is Alaman's opinion: 'En la declaracion muy especial que por órde

presence of a traitor among his most confidential associates, whose intention was to deliver him to the viceroy.[6] Morelos received these unpleasant communications with extreme indifference.

The rapid extension of the rebellion, despite his utmost efforts to arrest its progress, kept Venegas in embarrassment; and to add to his perplexity, the popularity of the cause was daily gaining ground in the capital and other large cities in possession of the Spaniards. Fostered by the circulation of periodicals and publications—the distributors of which the government in vain endeavored to discover—the principles of independence were being more widely disseminated and better understood. Prominent among the authors of these sheets was Doctor Cos, whom the imprudent action of the viceroy had driven to the ranks of the insurgents. Cos, as the reader will remember, on his departure from Aguascalientes had been detained in confinement at Querétaro. Having addressed a representation to the viceroy giving an account of the occurrences at Aguascalientes, and informing him of the instructions which he had received from Calleja to proceed to Mexico, Cos was released by order of Venegas and presented himself at the viceregal palace. The viceroy expressed himself satisfied with his explanations; but after a delay of many days, during which no notice was taken of him, Cos was peremptorily ordered to return immediately to his parish. Such a journey could not be undertaken by him at that time without imminent risk; two days after his departure he was captured by Correa's band and conducted to Zitácuaro, where, disgusted with the treatment he had received and the want of confidence in him shown by the viceroy, he offered his

del virey Calleja se le tomó en su causa, sobre otro conato posterior de envenenamiento, que da idea que Calleja tenia noticia previa del hecho.' *Hist. Rej.*, ii. 425.

[6] Rayon described the man as stout and big-bellied. Morelos' reply was 'no hay aquí otro barrigon que yo, la que en mi enfermedad queda desbastada.' *Id.*, ii. 425–6.

except on the basis of the establishment in Mexico a national government. Indeed, even their influen would have been unavailing to stay the current of i dependent principles now so deeply ingrafted in t minds of their followers, and an attempt to do would have endangered their own lives.[11] The co missioners, therefore, returned with the tidings their failure, and the two governments continu their preparations for future hostilities.



SECOND CAMPAIGN OF MORELOS.

About the middle of November Morelos again to the field and entered upon his second campaign. Pr ceeding to Tlapa, he entered that town without opp sition, the royalist garrison having retreated to Oaja on his approach. Here he was joined by Padre Tapi

[11] The commissioner Palafox, in his report to the bishop describing t public feeling in that part of the country which he visited, says: 'Ni se pien ni se habla, ni se obra, sino de la insurreccion:...todos, pero mas los indi estan resueltos à morir, y con hechos prácticos han probado que lo están ta bien à matar aun à los supremos gefes que han puesto el dia que se vuelv como ellos dicen "revelados."' *Campillo, Manif.*, 112–13. Rayon's reply

Victoriano Maldonado, an Indian of great reso-
on and intelligence. From Tlapa he marched to
utla de la Sal, where Mateo Musitú, a rich Span-
, had organized and armed at his own expense a
siderable force, fortifying himself in a strong build-
which had formerly been the convent of the Au-
tinians. Morelos, however, despite the vigorous
ence made, carried the place by storm, and cap-
ed Musitú and 200 of his men. Although Musitú
ered fifty thousand dollars for his life, he was
ated with the severity dealt to belligerents, and
ot with other Spaniards who were taken prisoners
th him.[12]

At Chautla, Morelos divided his force into three
visions, one of which he placed under the command
Miguel Bravo, with instructions to march against
ajaca; with the second Galeana was sent to attack
asco; at the head of the remaining division Morelos
dvanced to Izúcar, which he entered on the 10th of
ecember without opposition, and was there joined by
lariano Matamoros, the acting cura of Jantetelco,
ho afterward figured as a prominent revolutionary
hief. On the 17th, however, he was attacked by a
rce of over 500 men under the command of Mi-
uel de Soto y Maceda, a lieutenant of the navy, sent
gainst him by Llano who, in recognition of his ser-

ampillo is dated Zitácuaro, October 10, 1811, that of Morelos, Tlapa, Nov. 4, 1811. The latter chief, irritated perhaps by the upbraiding tone and omewhat acrimonious style of the bishop's letter, forwarded to him a sarcas-ic note which he had appended to two letters received by him from the curas f Tixtla and Chilapa relative to the protection of their flocks from abuses by nsurgents! The following is a translation of the document: 'Tlapa, Nov. 4, 1811. I certify in due form that those curas of the people who have de-lared in favor of the gachupines can kill and perform their religious func-ions without being liable to the charge of irregularity and to excommunica-ion, and that only the cura Morelos and the other American curas will be onsidered irregular, excommunicated, etc. Let the original be remitted to he bishop of Puebla for his information. Morelos.' *Id.*, 97–8.

[12] *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 429–30; *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 382. Morelos hile here attached to his service José Manuel de Herrera, cura of Huamux-tlan, who was found secreted in the church and brought before him over-helmed with terror. Morelos appeased his fears, and he was afterward dmitted into his closest confidence, and made a chaplain of his army. Cavo ys: 'Este es el famoso Ministro de relaciones de Iturbide, que tanto daño zo á la nacion.' *Ib.*

vices in the plains of Apam, had meantime been mad colonel, and afterward appointed military command of the province of Puebla.[13]

The assault was sustained with great vigor for fiv hours, but the royalists could make no impressio upon the plaza, the entrances to which were close by barricades. Soto, mortally wounded, at last gav orders to retreat, delegating the command to Captai Mariano Ortiz. The retreat was equally disastrou Ortiz was killed at the head of his men while endea oring to repulse the pursuing revolutionists, and th remnant of the division, amounting to less than tw hundred men, entered Puebla on the 19th, the re being killed, captured, or dispersed.[14]

Puebla now lay almost at the mercy of Morelo dependent as it was for its defence only upon the di spirited remnant of Soto's force. But he chose rathe to sweep clean the territory as he advanced, and leav no hostile force in his rear. He therefore proceede to Cuautla, and entered it without resistance on th 25th of December, the comandante Garcilaso havin fled at his approach. From Cuautla Morelos con tinued his triumphal march to Tasco in order to unit with Galeana, who had been equally successful in hi expedition against that town, which he took after vigorous defence maintained by the comandante Ma riano García Rios. Rios, after sustaining himself fo two days, capitulated on the condition that the live of himself and his troops should be spared, but More los, on his arrival on the 31st, pronounced the capit ulation null, on the ground that Rios had continue firing after it had been concluded, and he, with fi

[13] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 1056, 1214.

[14] Soto died the same day, and was buried on the 20th, in the cathedr at Puebla. His attack on Izúcar was regarded as rash by the governmen See the report of the alférez de navio, Pedro Micheo, who brought off the d feated troops, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 1209–14; also, *Cavo, Tres Siglo* iii. 382–3; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 431–4. From a fragment of a commun cation of the viceroy, dated December 20, 1811, it appears that on the 18t the royalists collected at Atlixco to the number of 150 only. *Hernandez Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iii. 456. About 70 prisoners were taken, nearly all whom were set at liberty. *Id.*, vi. 22.

en other prisoners, Spaniards and creoles, was shot the 4th of January following.[15] Thus terminated e second campaign of Morelos, by which he became aster of the territory extending from Chilapa to the ountain range which separates the valley of Mexico rom the tierra caliente of the south.

Meantime the junta of Zitácuaro was experiencing hat opposition to its authority already foreshadowed. Tomás Ortiz, a nephew of Hidalgo, and who had been appointed by him comandante of that district, made himself particularly obnoxious, both on account of his want of deference and his rapacity, which drew angry complaints from Morelos. In order to sustain the authority of the new government, the junta therefore caused Ortiz to be arrested, as well as several of its own commissioners who had displayed a similar disposition, and to whom Rayon himself applied the epithet of voracious.[16] Ortiz and two other delinquents were condemned to death; but in consideration of their services, execution of the sentence was suspended. When Calleja, however, approached Zitácuaro the junta, apprehensive that they might cause future trouble in case the royalists should prove successful, gave orders for their execution, and they were shot on the 31st of December.[17] Nor did Rayon meet with that subserviency to his wishes which he had expected from his colleagues, who soon began to regard his ambitious views of self-aggrandizement with jealousy. In his correspondence with Morelos he speaks of the disgust which he had experienced at their differences, of the puerile disposition which they displayed, and of their weakness of character.[18] Thus enmity

[15] *Morelos, Declar.*, 23. Rios had made himself an especial object of hate by his cruelty. Bustamante describes him as 'hombre pequeñito de unas entrañas diabólicas.' *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 28.

[16] *Oficio de Rayon á Morelos*, Enero 18 de 1812; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 444.

[17] *Oficio de Liceaga á Morelos*, Enero 13 de 1812.

[18] It was through Rayon's influence that Liceaga and Verdusco had been elected members of the junta. Mora says of them: 'Eran personas oscuras

sprung up between them; and though an appa reconciliation occurred in the face of a danger com to all, mutual confidence was never restored.

On the 1st of January, 1812, Calleja appeared fore Zitácuaro, the doomed city. He had left Gu juato on the 11th of November, and the slownes his movements marks at once the repugnance which he undertook the enterprise and his care to cure a successful issue.[19] Proceeding to Acámb he there conferred with Trujillo, who met him for purpose, and was joined by Castillo y Bustama García Conde, Meneso and other chiefs with t divisions, according to previous instructions. F Acámbaro he leisurely continued his march,[20] and rived at Ixtlahuaca toward the middle of Decem in order to open communication with Toluca combine his operations with these of Porlier.[21] H he received some reënforcements, and his army amounted to 4,900 combatants,[22] with twenty-t pieces of artillery of different calibre.

On the 22d of December Calleja marched from Felipe del Obraje, where he had concentrated troops, and on the following day entered the rug defile of San Mateo. The difficulties which he

y desconocidas en la mayor parte de las divisiones insurjentes...y se Rayon de haber intentado apoderarse de la autoridad suprema a la so de personas insignificantes y nombres desconocidos.' *Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 1

[19] After his departure from Guanajuato he received Venegas' instruc of October 31st, couched in such peremptory terms as to cause him muc noyance. He replied to the viceroy that 'no necesitaba usar de término estrechantes, pues bastaban las anteriormente recibidas para obedecer.' *tamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 133.

[20] Calleja was 16 days passing from Acámbaro to Maravatío, expecti receive instructions from the viceroy, which failed to arrive. *Gaz de* 1812, iii. 136.

[21] Calleja, considering that the previous failures to take Zitácuaro caused by the attacks being directed through the difficult cañon of Mateo, had intended to make his approach by that of Tuxpan, while P secured the San Mateo road against the retreat of the insurgents. He however, compelled to alter his plan and march through the San M cañon, while Porlier directed his attention against Tenango. *Ib.*

[22] Consisting of 2,761 infantry and 2,134 cavalry. His original force however, been reduced by 1,543 men from sickness and desertion. *Ala Hist. Mej.*, ii. 451–2.

ıntered in his approach to the city were so great
t he was eight days in accomplishing twelve leagues,
ıetimes advancing not more than half a league in
enty-four hours. In many places entirely new roads
l to be opened at the cost of immense labor, and the
ferings of the soldiers were excessive as they toiled
ler pitiless storms of rain, snow, and pelting hail
ich alternately descended upon them from the sun-
s sky. Had the royalists been assailed in this pass,
ıs probable that they would never have reached
ácuaro, but the insurgent leaders too confidently
ed upon their strong position, and their fortifica-
ıs, which had been elaborately completed under
direction of Ramon Rayon, brother of Ignacio.
ving surmounted all obstacles, Calleja, on the 1st
January, 1812, encamped before the town on a
ng ground just beyond reach of the enemy's bat-
es. Having personally reconnoitred the enemy's
s of defences,[23] he made his dispositions for attack
the following day. His plan was to assail the
ırgents' fortifications in the rear, while he threat-
d them with attack in front. With this object, he
ed a division of his forces under the command of
rcía Conde, who was directed to move round to
left toward the road leading from Los Laureles,
le Calleja with the main body made a detour along
heights toward the right. A strong reserve force
s placed in charge of the conde de Casa Rul. At
o'clock in the morning the royalist commanders had
en up their respective positions, and having placed
ir artillery on commanding eminences, opened fire.
a short half-hour the revolutionists replied vigor-
ly; but their fire then slackened before the superior

[23] It is narrated by Diaz Calvillo, that while Calleja was making his ob-
tions the figuration of a very perfect palm tree appeared in the sky, and
he exclaimed to José María Echagaray, who commanded the cavalry
t which accompanied him: 'Vea V. la palma; nuestra es la victoria.'
on, 154. Calvillo, moreover, gives a wood-cut of the miraculous appear-
which has so little resemblance to a palm that it has been thus criticised
marginal note: 'En verdad q^e parece á la Palma, como un burro á una
hi (sic).' *Ib.*

gunnery of the royalists, and disorder was obse
in their lines. Calleja had already made his
positions for the assault, three attacking columns
ing been placed respectively under the command
Castillo, Colonel José María Jalon, and Oroz
Meneso, the latter leaders being instructed to c
the right of the other columns, and occupying the
pan road, connect with García's division on tha
Los Laureles, thus closing retreat in those directio
These columns were now ordered to advance, w
García Conde, having crossed the moat by mear
a portable bridge provided for the purpose, wa
the same time forcing his way into the town.
simultaneous attack was successful at all points.
deed, the defence appears to have been lament
weak in comparison with the great preparations m
and by two o'clock in the afternoon the insurg
had fled from Zitácuaro as best they could, plun
into the ditches and escaping by the barrancas
mountain gullies.[25] The junta fled to Sultepec, w
it established a new seat of government.

The loss sustained in killed and wounded
inconsiderable in proportion to the importanc
the fall of Zitácuaro.[26] Forty-three cannon fell
the possession of the victors, besides a great q

[24] A deep barranca intervened between the position which Calleja
up and the town. He caused three mountain paths leading to this
well opened for the advance of his attacking columns under cover
artillery. Castillo moved along the one to Calleja's left; Jalon advanc
the central one; and Oroz and Meneso, whose forces were composed o
alry, on the one extending to Calleja's right. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii.

[25] 'A las dos de la tarde ya no habia en el recinto un solo enemigo vivo.
iii. 140. The account of the capture of Zitácuaro has been derived
Calleja's report to the viceroy in *Id.*, iii. 17–18, 135–42; *Bustamante*,
pañas de Calleja, 132–51; *Guerra, Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 413–19; *Mora*,
sus Rev., iv. 270–82; *Torrente, Rev. Hisp. Amer.*, i. 310–13; *Diaz Ca*
Sermon, 152–59.

[26] Though Calleja in his report wishes to give the idea that great nu
fell, he only vaguely states that many hundreds of the rebels perishe
Spaniard, however, writing from Zitácuaro on the 5th of January,
'Apenas moririan 200 y en el pueblo no pasarian de 20, porque estaba
permanece solo.' *Guerra, Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 419. Negrete says: 'La pé
de los independientes...fué corta: no pasó de cincuenta hombres,
mucho mayor la de los realistas.' *Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 369. Calleja
mated the number of the defenders at 35,000, of whom 12,000 were ca
'número sin duda muy exajerado,' as Alaman remarks. *Hist. Mej.*, ii

y of other arms and an immense store of ammuni-
n.[27] The casualties of the victors were insignificant.
emplary punishment must necessarily be inflicted
on a city which had twice witnessed the disgrace
the royalist arms. Most of the belligerents had
aped and the prisoners were few. Of these, eigh-
n were shot on the following day;[28] too small an
ering to appease the royalist gods; so the destruc-
n of the city was determined upon, and on the
Calleja published a proclamation, declaring that
Indians of Zitácuaro and its district were de-
ved of their property, all their immunities and
vileges forfeited, and that every building would be
ed to the ground or destroyed by fire. Six days
re given for the unfortunate inhabitants to leave
town.[29] The conde de Casa Rul was charged
h the execution of the sentence, which was rigor-
ly carried out, after the place had been well sacked
the royalist troops, the churches and convents
y being spared.[30] On the 13th Calleja departed
m Maravatío by the Tuxpan road, while in his
r ascended the flames and smoke from the burning
n, which had been dignified by the revolutionists
h the high title of Villa Imperial.[31]

Porlier in the mean time sustained a reverse in his
rations. According to the first plan formed by
leja, he was to have occupied the San Mateo road

Gaz. de Mex., 1812, iii. 155.

Seventy were set at liberty, 'miserables seducidos que tambien se hici-
prisioneros.' *Id.*, iii. 140.

The capital of the department was transferred to Maravatío. The lands
all except movable property were to be sold and the proceeds placed in
oyal treasury. *Id.*, iii. 156–8.

Ward says: 'I saw this unfortunate town in 1826. The situation is
y, but the place is still in ruins.' *Mex. in 1827*, i. 189. Diaz Calvillo
ds Calleja from the charge of having allowed the churches and religious
s to be pillaged. An inventory was taken of all ecclesiastical effects,
hey were sent to the bishop at Valladolid. Calvillo also reproduces an
of Calleja of the 13th of January, prohibiting his soldiers from sacking
ther towns, or haciendas and ranchos. *Sermon*, 173–4. Besides Zitá-
, Calleja reduced to ashes twelve pueblos in the vicinity. Bustamante
es a list of most of their names. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 323.

Calleja in his report speaks of it as 'la llamada Imperial Zitáquaro.'
de Mex., 1812, iii. 140.

leading to Zitácuaro; but having received orders fi
Venegas to move from Toluca against Tenango,
directed his march thither, and occupied the place
ing the 29th and 30th of December, meeting v
little opposition except that offered by its mount
ous position. Porlier then proceeded to Tenancin
which the revolutionists abandoned on his appro
concentrating themselves in the barranca of Tec
loya. On the 3d of January he drove the ene
from their position and took possession of the pue
But the troops of Morelos were approaching in fo
and about the middle of January the barranca
again occupied, Galeana having arrived with the
vance division. On the 17th Porlier attacked
insurgents, who had taken up the same position fi
which they had previously been driven. Though
royalists gained some advantage at first, and advan
to the pueblo which had been occupied by the ene
they finally sustained a repulse with considerable l
and retreated to Tenancingo. Here Porlier was
sailed by the combined forces of Morelos, who c
ducted the operations in person.[32] The attack beg
on the 22d, and the firing continued all through
night and the following day. Portions of the to
were set on fire, and the royalists, having lost seve
of their principal officers, were driven to their l
position in the plaza with no hope of maintaining
On the night of the 23d Porlier abandoned the pla
effecting his retreat with great difficulty and with
loss of eleven cannon to Tenango, whence he retur
to Toluca, with the remnant of his force in n
erable plight and thoroughly dispirited.[33] More

[32] His forces numbered about 3,200 men, commanded by Galeana, Nic
Bravo, and Matamoros. *Morelos, Declar.*, 23.

[33] The account of Porlier's operations has been mainly derived from
despatches in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1811, ii. 1231; *Id.*, 1812, iii. 18–19, 61–70, 139
Consult also *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 460–7; *Torrente, Rev. Hist. Amer.*, i.
16; *Bustamante, Compañas de Calleja*, 166; and *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 10–3
which last narration the author gives a very incorrect version. Ala
remarks that had Calleja obeyed the orders of the viceroy to march ag
Morelos as he approached the valley of Toluca, Porlier would not have

having remained three days in Tenancingo, returned by way of Cuernavaca to Cuautla, where he arrived on the 9th of February.

The continued successes of Morelos had so alarmed Venegas, that he reiterated orders which he had previously given to Calleja, enjoining him to march southward against that leader. So peremptory were his last instructions that Calleja had no alternative but to comply; and on the 23d of January he left Maravatío and proceeded to Ixtlahuaca, having, however, previously requested permission to resign his command. Venegas refused his consent, and Calleja again on the 26th pressed him in urgent terms to accept his resignation. The viceroy at this date felt himself less dependent than heretofore on the victorious general. On the 14th and 16th of the month two Spanish battalions had arrived at Vera Cruz,[34] and others were following. So Venegas, who would soon have over 3,000 peninsular troops at his disposal,[35] proceeded to appoint as Calleja's successor Santiago Irisarri, a Spanish commodore. Irisarri was unknown in the army of New Spain; and the dissatisfaction at the appointment was expressed by a representation addressed to Venegas by the principal officers, stating their unwillingness to serve under any other commander than Calleja. The viceroy was now in a dilemma; but he deemed it prudent to retract under such pressure, and by despatch of the 31st conjured Calleja not to retire.[36] To avoid

tained this reverse. But Calleja was bent upon returning to the Bajío of Guanajuato and opposed the movement. *Ut sup.*, 467, 470–2.

[34] Namely, the third battalion of the regiment of Asturias, and the first of that of Lovera. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 114. These were the first troops sent from Spain. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 469. On the 29th the first battalion of the Americano infantry regiment arrived from Cádiz. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 177.

[35] 'Se recibieron noticias de que pronto estarian mas de tres mil hombres en Vera Cruz.' *Bustamante, Camp. de Calleja*, 158.

[36] This despatch elicited a reply from Calleja, in which he enumerates his services and the sacrifices he had made for his country. Venegas had enclosed a copy of the representation he had received from the officers of the army. It was therein asserted that the ill health of Calleja, which he made his plea for resigning, originated in disparaging remarks passed upon his conduct. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 473.

further difficulties of the kind, Calleja was instruct
to march with his army to the capital, and the 5th
February was appointed as the day for his entrance.

The reception given to the victorious general, a
the army of the centre, was an imposing one. E
triumphal entry presented a spectacle never befo
witnessed in the capital on so grand a scale.[37] As t
van approached the gates of the city, a salvo of a
tillery announced the arrival to the immense mul
tudes which thronged the streets, eager to gaze wi
hate or admiration upon the soldiers of whose vict
ries they had heard so much. The city was gay wi
decorations;[38] salutes were fired, and the te deu
chanted with unusual sublimity in the cathedra
But this display was attended with an accident to t
hero of the occasion, which in the eyes of some w
foreboding of disaster to him. When near the gate
Mercaderes the horse of the mariscal de campo, Júd
Tadeo Tornos, who was riding by the side of Calle
became restive, and rearing struck the general on t
head, bringing him to the ground. Calleja was carri
into a house near by, and only recovered some hou
later sufficiently to be conveyed in a carriage to t
palace to present himself to the viceroy, having be
unable to attend the joyful ceremony at the cath
dral.[40]

Although the viceroy and Calleja maintained
outward appearance of friendship, their sentimen
toward each other were none of the kindest. T
jealousy with which Venegas had for some tir
regarded his general was increased by the flatteri
reception now given him. The applause with whi

[37] His forces consisted of 2,150 infantry, 1,832 cavalry, accompanied b
train of 1,500 loads of provisions and over 400 of munitions of war. *Bus
mante, Camp. de Calleja*, 167.

[38] The day was that of San Felipe de Jesus, on which a festal process
was made from the cathedral to San Francisco.

[39] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 133–4.

[40] *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 477. Bustamante states that the horse wh
Calleja rode was a stolen one, and recognized by its owner, Doña María G
trudis Bustos, sister of the marquesa de Rayas. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 324.

his deeds were rehearsed in prose and verse, and the enthusiasm with which his appearance at the theatre and in public was greeted, plainly indicated how high in royalist favor Calleja stood, and Venegas henceforth could only regard him in the light of a rival. The feelings, also, so lately displayed in the army in no way tended to lessen his uneasiness; nor did the conferring of rewards and promotions which he could no longer withhold[41] improve matters. Medals were distributed to the officers and troops;[42] and Calleja having been previously promoted by the viceroy to the rank of major-general, a corresponding advance in grade was extended to all officers in the army.[43] As this promotion was not confined to the army of the centre, but was extended to the officers of other divisions, and even to those of the marine who had arrived from Habana, and whose services had been very inferior, it did not meet with general satisfaction. The loyal Americans felt aggrieved; a party spirit was developed in the army, and it was said that the Mexican-born officers were even beginning to show signs of indecision in regard to their political faith, influenced by the revolutionary papers which had been issued from Zitácuaro. During the few days that Calleja remained in the capital the misunderstanding between him and Venegas increased; and had the stay of the army been prolonged, it is doubtful whether they could have kept up even a semblance of friendly intercourse.

[41] Venegas had always been sparing in his acknowledgment of the services of Calleja's army, though pressed by him to reward the troops with medals and promotions. See his letters to the viceroy of Dec. 12, 1810, and Jan. 18, 1811, in *Id.*, i. 118–19, 159–60. By despatch of May 30, 1811, the Spanish regency instructed Venegas to bestow upon the officers and troops such rewards as he might deem fitting. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, ii. 514. But nothing appears to have been done until this occasion.

[42] The medal bore the name of Fernando VII., supported by a dog and a lion, symbolical of faithfulness and courage, and on the border the words 'Venció en Aculco, Guanajuato y Calderon.' Alaman says: 'Este escudo dió motivo á mil chistes graciosos, por parte de los afectos á la revolucion.' *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 480.

[43] The names and grades of the officers promoted will be found in *Gaz. Mex.*, 1812, iii. 143–53.

But the proximity of Morelos afforded the vice
a pretext for hastening the departure of the troo
and on the 8th he issued orders for the army to mar
at the same time explaining why he was compelled
act with such promptness. The position of the roy
ists as described by Venegas[44] was, indeed, seric
The capital was surrounded by bands of revolutioni
commerce with the interior was destroyed; commu
cation with Vera Cruz and Oajaca was closed; tra
portation of quicksilver and gunpowder to the mi
was no longer possible; and all intercourse with
port of Acapulco was cut off, causing additional co
mercial distress and a loss to the revenue of 1,000,(
pesos in duties payable on goods brought by the v
sel from Manila. Scarcity of provisions and ot
commodities was severely felt in the capital, and
viceroy feared that even the roads to Texcoco a
Toluca, the only ones left open, would shortly
closed. It was therefore indispensable that a de
sive blow should be struck at Morelos, whom
regarded as the present head and front of the revo
tion.[45] The plan of operations which he gave
Calleja was based on the latest information.
arranged for simultaneous attacks on Izúcar a
Cuautla, conducted respectively by Llano and Calle

The necessary instructions having been sent
Llano at Puebla, on the 10th of February Calle
advance left for Chalco, whither troops of More
had already arrived, and on the 12th the main bo
moved forward. Pursuing the line of march in
cated in his instructions,[46] Calleja encamped on t
17th at Pasulco, two leagues from Cuautla. He
Morelos, duly informed of the movements of t

[44] See copy of his instructions in *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 159

[45] The viceroy's words are: 'Principal corifèo de la insurreccion e
actualidad, y podemos decir que ha sido en ella el génio de mayor firm
recursos y astucias.' *Id.*, 161–2.

[46] The army passed through Chalco, Tenango, Ameca, Ozumba, and A
tlauca. This route was selected as offering few obstacles to the passage of
artillery. *Id.*, 163–4.

royalists, had determined to make his stand, and accordingly had united the divisions of his forces distributed in the neighboring towns. He made every endeavor to render his position as impregnable as possible. Without attempting to erect exterior fortifications, he confined his attention to a limited line of defences within the city.

Cuautla de Amilpas,[47] distant about twenty-two leagues from the city of Mexico, is situated on a rising ground in a level plain. Its position, though not so strong as that of Zitácuaro, is suitable for defence, being commanded by no adjacent heights. At this date the town was an open one, surrounded by plantations of fruit trees and plantain patches growing close up to the houses. Its extent from north to south was about half a league, the main street running in a straight line in that direction, and connecting the plazas of the convents of San Diego and Santo Domingo. At the northern extremity is the chapel of the Calvario; on the east rise the hills of Zacatepec, between which and the town flows a rapid river in a channel 200 varas wide at the top, but contracting to twelve or fifteen varas in its bed. The portion of the town fortified by Morelos included the plazas and convents of San Diego and Santo Domingo, and was surrounded by trenches and ramparts, with embrasures and merlons.[48] The outside doors and lower windows of the houses on the line of defence were walled up, and communication between the interiors opened by breaking through the partition walls. Deep trenches were cut across the streets, and batteries placed in suitable positions.[49] The ac-

[47] The modern name of the city is Morelos. The Mexican word 'quauh' means eagle, and 'tlan' place. Cuautla therefore signifies 'place of the eagle.' *Molina, Vocabvlario.*

[48] This description is taken from Calleja's report of April 28, 1812, to the viceroy. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 445–6.

[49] Calleja states that the revolutionists had 30 pieces of artillery. *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 169. Morelos, in his declaration, says that he had one mortar and 15 serviceable cannon. *Declaracion*, 24.

companying plan will enable the reader to recogn
the relative positions of the opposing forces.



CUAUTLA AND VICINITY.

Positions of besiegers:
1 Headquarters and camp of Calleja on the estate of Buenavist
2 Batteries and intrenchments.
3 Positions occupied by Llano's troops.
4 Redoubts.
5 Battery of Juchitengo.
6 Redoubt of the Calvario.
Positions of besieged:
7 Plaza of San Diego.
8 Plaza of Santo Domingo.
9 Premises of hacienda of Buenavista.
10 Redoubt at spring of Juchitengo.
11 Plantations and redoubt of the Platanar.
12 Highway to Mexico.

Morelos' force at this time amounted to 3,300 me
of whom 1,000 were infantry and the remainder ca
alry,[50] and 100 Indians collected from the neighbori

[50] The cavalrymen also served on foot during the siege, their horses be
pastured outside the town; 300 of them had arrived from Huétamo un
Cano and Francisco Ayala. *Morelos, Declar.*, 24. Ayala had joined More
at Chilapa under peculiar circumstances. He was a lieutenant of the ac
dada in the valle de las Amilpas, and resided at the hacienda de Mapaxtl
near Cuautla. Being favorably disposed toward the revolution, he had
clined to enroll himself in the troops levied by Garcilaso, the subdelegado
Cuautla, and had thereby incurred suspicion. Some time afterward an ins
gent was killed in that neighborhood, and on his body was found a let
from Ignacio Ayala, who had been appointed intendente by Morelos of t
new province of Tecpan. The comandante Moreno, believing that Francis

villages. During the progress of the siege, however, his forces were increased to the number of 5,550 by the arrival of different commanders.[51] On the 18th of February Calleja moved forward his forces and encamped on the rising ground of Cuautlixco, after reconnoitring the defences of the revolutionists. During the day Morelos imprudently exposed himself to danger of being killed or captured, having gone out with only a small escort. He was attacked by a troop of cavalry, and was brought off with difficulty by Galeana, who sallied out to his rescue.[52] At dawn on the following day Calleja advanced his troops in four columns to the assault, directed principally against the intrenchments of the plaza of San Diego. The defence of this important point was intrusted to Hermenegildo Galeana, and that of Santo Domingo to Leonardo Bravo; while to Victor Bravo and the cura Matamoros was assigned the defence of the Buenavista buildings.

Galeana, at the post of danger, well sustained his reputation for cool judgment and personal bravery. The front column of the royalists was allowed to approach near to the parapet; but then so deadly a fire was opened upon it that it retreated in confusion; and Galeana, perceiving an officer endeavoring to rally his men, sallied out alone, engaged with him in single combat, and killed him. The act perhaps was rash, but it raised the spirits of his men to enthusiasm.

Ayala was the author, attacked his house, and opening fire upon it wounded Ayala's wife, who died a few days afterward. Ayala, believing his wife dead, and his house having been set on fire, effected his escape by great prowess, and offered his services to Morelos, who conferred on him the rank of colonel. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 35–7. Alaman verified this author's account by statements of reliable persons in Cuautla. *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 428.

[51] Miguel Bravo, who had been unsuccessful in his expedition against Oajaca, came with 400 men and three cannon; Anaya with 300 out of 700 sent by the junta at Sultepec, the rest having deserted; from Chautla the cura Tapia brought 300, instead of 1,000 expected by Morelos; and 250 arrived from Yautepec. *Morelos, Declar.*, 24–5. Calleja reported that the place was defended by 12,500 armados de fusil. *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 169.

[52] José María Fernandez, afterward General Victoria, first signalized himself on this occasion. The skirmish was a severe one, and he saved Galeana's life at the expense of a severe wound, which he received in protecting him. *Ward's Mex. in 1827*, i. 190–1.

Two lateral columns, by creeping from house to house along the street, now fought their way close up to the intrenchments, causing some disturbance among the defenders, whose confidence their leader, however, soon restored. The enemy was repulsed, and though again and again they returned to the charge, their efforts to storm the defences were vain. For six hours the combat continued. Many of the royalist officers were struck down; the conde de Casa Rul was mortally wounded, and the greater part of the ammunition was spent. The attempts against the plaza of Santo Domingo and the Buenavista buildings, though these points were poorly fortified, proved equally unsuccessful.[53] Troops accustomed to victory, and who rushed up to the trenches in full confidence, quailed at last; and though Calleja, in the final charge, led them in person,[54] his presence did not mend matters. Convinced of the impossibility of taking Cuautla by assault with his present force, for the first time in his victorious career he withdrew crestfallen.[55] That night he held a council of war, the result of which was that he determined to reduce the place by siege; and a despatch was sent on the following day to Venegas, informing him of the position of affairs. Cuautla, he says, must be destroyed, and its defenders buried in its ruins, so that in future no insurgent will find escape from death except by laying down his arms.[56] To effect this he shows the viceroy the necessity of an increased force, of large supplies of provisions and

[53] Calleja assaulted at four different points. In a letter to the viceroy dated April 18th, he says: 'El 19 de febrero asalté por cuatro diferentes puntos á Cuautla, que no estaba ni de mucho fortificada como en el dia.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 63.

[54] 'En la última fué necesario que yo mismo condujese á los granaderos acobardados.' *Id.*, ii. 64.

[55] Besides the conde de Casa Rul, who died shortly after his removal from the field, Colonel Nepomuceno Oviedo, of the patriots of San Luis, fell with four captains and eleven other officers of his corps. The loss of the royalists was over 300 men. *Mora, Mej. y sus Rev.*, iv. 342–3. Ward says 500 royalists were left dead on the spot. *Mex. in 1827*, i. 192. Calleja reported four officers killed and 18 wounded, and of the ranks 15 killed and 95 wounded. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 409. The loss of the revolutionists was insignificant.

[56] *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 170.

munitions of war, and above all of mortars and siege artillery of heavy calibre. In pursuance of his design, Calleja took up a position on the western side of the town at about a league distant, and began his preparations for a regular siege.

While Calleja was undergoing the mortification which attended his first defeat, a similar reverse was sustained by Llano in his attempt against Izúcar. That commander, in obedience to instructions, had marched from Puebla by way of Cholula and Atlixco, arriving about the 22d of February in front of Izúcar, distant sixteen leagues. His force consisted of about 2,000 men, 540 of whom were cavalry,[57] with eight pieces of artillery. On the 23d, having taken possession of the hill of the Calvario, he opened fire with his artillery upon the town, and under cover of it advanced two attacking columns composed respectively of the battalions of Lovera and Asturias, under Colonel Antonio de Andrade. The revolutionists who had fortified themselves in the plaza, and were commanded by Padre Sanchez, seconded by Vicente Guerrero and Sandoval, repulsed all attempts to storm their position, and Llano ordered Andrade to retire. The assault was again tried on the following day with no better result. The "invincible conquerors of the victors at Austerlitz"[58] were beaten by rustics fighting for their rights.[59] Llano was now in an unenviable

[57] It was composed of 631 of the infantry of Puebla, 400 posted at Atlixco, and the battalions lately arrived from Spain numbering 500. His cavalry, which only amounted to 240 dragoons, was increased by 300 horse detached from Calleja's army. *Id.*, 163.

[58] These troops on their arrival were called in the Mexican papers of the day 'los invencibles vencedores de los vencedores de Austerliz,' which words were printed in large type. *Guerra, Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 449.

[59] Morelos after his capture of Izúcar left Sanchez there with 200 men. Guerrero at that time was a captain in the revolutionary army. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 434. Ward narrates that Guerrero during the bombardment had a miraculous escape. While asleep, exhausted with fatigue, a shell came through the roof and rolled under his bed, where it exploded, killing or wounding every one in the room except himself. *Mex. in 1827*, i. 193. Llano states that the insurgents mustered 1,500 men armed with muskets, besides a multitude of Indians. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 523–4.

position, from which he was, however, unexpectedly relieved. Venegas had received Calleja's report with undisguised displeasure, but recognized the fact that Cuautla must be taken. He therefore despatched immediately all the munitions of war which could be spared from the capital, and ordered Llano to raise the siege of Izúcar and join Calleja. Accordingly on the 26th Llano retired from the scene of his failure and marched to Cuautla, harassed incessantly in his rear by the insurgents.[60]

Every preparation was now made for a determined siege. Llano took up a position opposite to that of Calleja; redoubts were thrown up, batteries erected, and the place invested as closely as possible. Morelos also improved his line of fortifications. The premises of the hacienda de Buenavista were strengthened, and a redoubt was erected in the platanar on the east side to defend the approach to the river. The revolutionary leader, encouraged by his late success, not only felt confident of maintaining his position but anticipated victory, with the capital itself as the objective point.

The bombardment began on the 10th of March, and for four days the iron shower fell upon the city. But the bursting shells and hurtling shot as they tore through parapet or house wall could not break the spirit of the defenders. Even the townspeople soon lost alarm as their children at play began collecting and making piles of the cannon-balls strewed about the streets.[61] Breaches in the defences made by day were repaired by night, and each morning the royalist general must begin anew. As the water supply was cut off, wells were sunk. Every privation was

[60] He was compelled to abandon an 8-pounder, the gun-carriage having become unserviceable. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 531–4.

[61] Morelos, whose stock of ammunition was not very plentiful, paid them so much a dozen for them. *Ward, Mex. in 1827*, i. 194. 'Pagaba á peso cada bomba, granadas á cuatro reales, bala de fusil á medio la docena.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 51.

borne with such a cheerful fortitude that Calleja soon saw that there was here no thought of surrender. And he dreaded to risk another assault. The unyielding attitude of the besieged made him fear for the result; and again he urged the viceroy to send him quickly more and heavier cannon, for there was work here which would tax his utmost endeavor.[62]

But it was all of no use. The place was not to be captured by cannonade; and recognizing this, or at least that to effect a breach with artillery of so light a calibre was not possible, Calleja reduced the siege to a mere blockade, and week after week passed by. The supply from the wells proved insufficient, and the besieged made daily sallies and fought for water at the springs and conduits outside the city. To stop even the supply thus dearly obtained, the watercourse of the Juchitengo spring was turned into another channel, and sixty varas of the old ditch filled in. But Galeana in broad day took possession of it, threw up a strong square redoubt around the spring, and connected it by intrenchments with the defences of the city. An attempt made the same night to take this fortification failed, and henceforth the besieged were in no want of water.[63]

Outside the line of circumvallation, too, the besiegers were continually harassed. Miguel Bravo and the cura Tapia hovered around with troops of cavalry; fierce skirmishes were fought, and convoys of provisions and ammunition intercepted or brought in with great difficulty. But hunger, a foe more terrible than musket or sword, began to press the beleaguered revolutionists. Morelos had not had time to provision the city for a lengthened siege, nor had he expected that Calleja would adopt so slow a method of warfare.

[62] He wanted the heavy artillery from Perote. In April the brigadier, Juan José de Olazabal, lately arrived from Spain, was ordered to bring it up. He was intercepted at Nopalucan by the revolutionists and compelled to return to Perote, losing a rich convoy, and with difficulty saving the artillery. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 513. See Calleja's letter to Venegas of March 13th. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 58.

[63] This occurred on the 3d of April. *Id.*, ii. 61.

There was no help for it, however, and so day by day the situation of his people became more distressing as the scarcity of food increased. But, as I have said, they bore their sufferings with heroic fortitude, and with every manifestation of unyielding purpose. The soldiers on their return from battle, whatever might be the result of their sally, were greeted with loud cheers; those who fell were buried to the sound of pealing church bells rung in celebration of their glorious death; enthusiastic joy marked any success, however slight; and death was proclaimed against him who dared to speak of surrender. Even Calleja could not suppress his wonder and admiration at such high-souled fortitude. "These people are heroes," he writes the viceroy, "and they would merit a distinguished place in history—if their cause were just"! Morelos he declared to be a second Mahomet.[64]

Nor was the situation of the royalists by any means an enviable one. The troops, reared in the temperate and cool regions of the table-land, suffered under the fervid sky of the tierra caliente. They broke down under their heavy fatigues by night and day; sickness came upon them, and toward the end of April 800 men were in hospital. The rainy season too was fast approaching—ought already to have come; then fever would strike them down by files, and the enemy, inured to the deadly climate, would fall upon them and complete their ruin. It was a question between time and nature which would win. Nature was this time on the side of oppression, to her shame be it said. The rains were unusually late this year. Day after day the fiery sun rose and set, and still no cloud appeared to the wistful eyes of the famished crowds in the beleaguered city. Their sufferings were awful.[65] When all else was wellnigh consumed, old, time-worn,

[64] See his letter to the viceroy of April 24th. *Id.*, ii. 59.

[65] 'A cat sold for six dollars, a lizard for two, and rats or other vermin for one. An ox which was seen one day feeding between the Spanish camp and the town nearly brought on a general engagement.' *Ward, Mex. in 1827*, i. 196–7.

weather-beaten hides, stripped from doors to which they had been nailed for years, were macerated and eaten; foul grubs and crawling insects were devoured;[66] and pest, the companion of famine, followed in her footsteps. The church of San Diego was converted into a hospital; from twenty to thirty died daily; gaunt, spectral forms moved wearily along the streets, and the children no longer, as heretofore, marshalled their bands in mimic warfare.[67] But still they yielded not, and still Calleja dared not risk a second assault.[68]

And all this time the junta at Sultepec remained inactive, the leaders in Michoacan with their numerous forces came not to the aid of these brave, long-enduring patriots. Morelos vainly endeavored to break through the besiegers' lines and introduce provisions. On the open plain the enemy was superior.[69] On the 27th of April a desperate effort was made, but failed.[70] After this an unusual stillness and inactivity was observed by the besiegers to prevail in the city. The last hostile sally had been made. No hope was left except to evacuate the town. Calleja's bloody intentions were too well known, and capitula-

[66] The house doors in Cuautla were protected with strong hides nailed to them, instead of sheets of tin. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 519. 'La espantosa escasez que la reduxo al término de comer insectos, cueros y quantas inmundicias se les presentaba,' are Calleja's own words. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 479.

[67] For an account of the children organizing themselves into companies, and of their capture on one occasion of a royalist dragoon outside the walls, see *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 55–6.

[68] He says to the viceroy: 'No convenia asaltar á un enemigo que lo deseaba.' *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 513–14.

[69] In one of these attempts directed by night against the redoubt on the Calvario, Gil Riaño, a son of the intendente who fell at the alhóndiga of Guanajuato, was killed on the side of the royalists. *Id.*, ii. 515.

[70] Matamoros and Colonel Perdiz sallied with 100 men on the night of the 21st and forced the enemy's lines on the Santa Inés road, Perdiz, however, and many others being killed. Matamoros succeeded in joining Miguel Bravo, who was stationed at Tlayacac near the Zacatepec range with a strong force and a large convoy of provisions. The design was to introduce it by the barranca Hedionda and the town of Amelcingo, and on the 27th, signals having been exchanged with Matamoros during the preceding night, Morelos attacked with the greater portion of his forces the royalists at several points. Calleja had, however, intercepted a letter which informed him of the plans of the besieged. He accordingly made his preparations. A sanguinary contest took place, the assailants being repulsed. Bravo and Matamoros were driven back with the loss of the convoy and their artillery. *Id.*, ii. 516–18; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 447–52.

tion would be certain death. And still, reduced as they were to the direst extremity, Calleja dared not attack them; and had he not been made aware of their dreadful condition by the numerous fugitives who daily left the city, he would probably have raised the siege. But they were his; he would have their blood, as he thought, if only the rains would hold off a little longer. So with redoubled vigilance he waited for his prey. On the 1st of May he sent to Morelos copies of the general pardon lately published by the viceroy.[71] As far as appearances went, this offer of mercy was received with joy by the besieged troops, and hostilities ceased on both sides.[72] It was but a ruse, however; Morelos had made his preparations to evacuate the town. His influence over his followers was unbounded, and whithersoever he went, or to whatever fate, they were ready to accompany him and die for him. That night the troops were silently marshalled in the plaza of San Diego, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 2d the march began, the lights being left burning on the ramparts.

Galeana led the van, consisting of over 1,000 infantry armed with muskets; then followed 250 cavalry, and a large number of troops whose weapons were slings and lances; after these followed a mixed crowd of both sexes and all ages. The rear was brought up by another body of infantry, with the baggage and two small pieces of artillery in its centre.[73] Morelos commanded in the centre with the Bravos, and Captain Anzures in the rear.

Calleja lay stretched in sickness on his bed, and

[71] The Spanish córtes had decreed on the 9th of November, 1811, a second general indulto. This was published by the viceroy on the 1st of April following, and appeared in the *Diario de Mex.* of April 3, 1812.

[72] Bustamante states that the indulto was brought by a royalist officer and was confined to Morelos, Galeana, and Bravo. The reply of Morelos was to the effect that he extended similar mercy to Calleja and his officers. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 71.

[73] Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 522, supplies a copy of the original of Morelos' instructions as to the order of march, which differs somewhat from that given in the text and taken from Calleja's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 479–80.

heartily wished himself away from the infernal place, as he called it.[74] He little imagined what the enemy were doing. With all his vigilance he was deceived; nor did he know till more than two hours afterward that he was being outwitted, so skilfully had Morelos made his arrangements. Directing its course to the river, so silently did the column move, that unperceived it approached the earth-works running northward from the Calvario redoubt, drove back the guard, and demolishing a part of the intrenchments advanced to the river, which was crossed by means of hurdles provided for the purpose.

But now the enemy was upon them. Llano's forces assailed them on the flank; their rear was attacked as the royalist troops rapidly came up. For a time the revolutionists sustained themselves under cover of the stone walls that surrounded the country haciendas, and for an hour a fierce contest raged. Outflanked at last, the order was given to disperse and fly,[75] but not before more than 800 had fallen. Morelos, after having two of his ribs crushed by falling with his horse into a ditch,[76] fled by way of Zacatepec to Ocituco hotly pursued. Here, while changing horses, the enemy overtook him. To save their leader's life, those around him fought until they died, almost to a man,[77] and he escaped wellnigh alone. Pursuing his flight to Izúcar he there met Victor Bravo, and thence proceeded to Chautla. Here, in safety at last, he remained for a month, and unbroken in spirit,

[74] He wrote a letter to the viceroy that same morning at half-past four, in which he says: 'Conviene mucho que el ejército salga de este infernal país,' and adds that his own health is such that if he does not attend to it at once all aid will be too late. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, iv. 438–9.

[75] Ward says that this was done with such promptitude that the Spanish troops which were advancing from opposite directions fired upon each other before they discovered their mistake. *Mex. in 1827*, i. 199. Bustamante makes the same statement.

[76] He was saved by José María Franco, who assisted him out. *Mex. Refut. Artic. Fondo*, 13.

[77] 'Opusieron alguna resistencia á las nuestras con sacrificio de sus vidas que casi todos perdieron,' is Calleja's testimony to their self-sacrifice. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 480–1.

hastened to repair his fortune, collecting his scattered troops and preparing for a new campaign.[78]

Meantime the slaughter of the unarmed crowd was horrible. Men, women, and children, old and young, were indiscriminately butchered by the royalists,[79] and for seven leagues the bodies of the slain lay strewn upon the road.[80] This cowardly vengeance of Calleja's was among the most dastardly doings in the war. Villanous as it was, and vengeance-satisfying, it was but poor comfort after all to the leader so long sure of his prey. This priest had worsted him and baffled him, had finally eluded his grasp—not a very happy reflection for so proud a soldier. Calleja's sickness was a serious bilious attack, and we may be sure that his temper was not improved thereby. Of the dreadful punishment which he inflicted upon the heroic inhabitants of that wretched city I shall give no further details. Let a veil be drawn over the frightful scenes of cruelty. "I have heard officers, who were present at the siege, speak of them," says Ward, "after a lapse of ten years, with horror."[81]

Having destroyed the fortifications of Cuautla—the siege of which cost the government 564,426 pesos, exclusive of munitions of war and other expenses—Calleja, with his military reputation by no means improved, and his troops in miserable plight, returned to the capital, which he entered on the 16th of May, there to meet the ridicule of the inhabitants who well knew that he had been outwitted, despite his glowing accounts.[82]

[78] He states that at Chautla 800 of the troops of Bravo and Galeana were reunited; that during the siege of 72 days he only lost about 50 men by the enemy's fire and 150 by the pest; that with regard to the number who fell on the evacuation of the town he could only say that Captain Yañez told him that he had counted 147 dead on one half of the road from Ocuituco to Cuautla. *Morelos, Declar.*, 25.

[79] Estévan Montezuma, afterward a general of the republic, on his return from the pursuit, killed with his lance the wounded women whom he came across on his road! *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 524.

[80] Calleja's words are 'Las siete leguas están tan sembradas de cadáveres enemigos que no se da un paso sin que se encuentren muchos.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 481.

[81] *Mex. in 1827*, i. 199.

[82] 'A comedy was acted a few nights afterward, in which a soldier was

introduced, who, on his return from battle, presents his general with a turban, and tells him in a very pompous manner, 'Here is the turban of the Moor, whom I took prisoner!' 'And the Moor himself?' 'O, he unfortunately escaped!' The passage was received with bursts of laughter, and the application readily made by the audience.' *Id.* 199–200.

The siege of Cuautla was a subject of public conversation in Cádiz. Wellington, at a banquet which was given to him in that city, asked the deputy for Mexico, Beye de Cisneros, what kind of a place Cuautla was. 'It is a place,' replied Cisneros, 'open on all sides, situated in a plain or valley.' 'That,' answered Wellington, 'is a proof both of the ignorance of the general attacking it, and of the wisdom and valor of the general who is defending it.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. Ind. viii.

The material for the history of the revolution is abundant, and the details of some parts of it have been fairly well presented by Mexican authors, though seldom without more or less bias, for and against persons and parties. Prominent among writers on this episode is Anastasio Zerecero, *Memorias para la Historia de las Revoluciones de Mexico.* Mexico, 1869, 1 vol. 608 pages. It is confined mostly to affairs during the time of Hidalgo, a brief sketch of the conquest being given as introductory. As the city of Mexico was occupied by the French at the time of his writing, the author pursued his labors at San Luis Potosí, and whether so intended or not, the result was little more than a series of recollections, the author evidently intending to carry them through the war for independence. Only one volume, however, was published. Zerecero was a strong revolutionary partisan. Thus while excusing the cruelties committed by the rebels, he denounces in strongest terms those indulged in by the royalists. He quotes freely from Alaman, and sparingly from Bustamante and Mendívil. The style is for the most part clear, yet without many distinctive characteristics. The last 150 pages are devoted to the biographies of Indians prominent since the conquest, and credited to Antonio Carrion.

Bustamante, Martirologio de Algunos de los Primeros Insurgentes por la libertad é independencia de la America Mexicana. Mexico, 1841, pp. 51. This short work gives a summary of the legal proceedings against those implicated in the plots of April and August 1811 to seize the viceroy. The particulars connected with the case of each ecclesiastic and layman are given, Bustamante having obtained them from the original documents of the junta de seguridad presided over by the oidor Miguel Bataller y Vasco. To these are added biographical notices of the subsequent fate of many of the conspirators. The names are given in alphabetical order, and among them appears that of Calleja. Bustamante deems it necessary to enter into an explanation of the reasons why he inserted the royalist general's name in a list of martyrs to the cause of independence and which he published to their honor. He, therefore, states that he did so in order that the indecent conduct of Calleja might be held up to view, who tried to pass over to the side of the insurgents when he found himself in disgrace with Venegas. Under such circumstances he ought to be regarded as one of the so-called insurgents. See also *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. passim; *Id.*, ii. 3–428; *Id.*, iv. 309; *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 89–178, passim; *Bustamante, Elogio, Morelos*, passim.

Diaz Calvillo, Sermon que en el aniversario solemne de gracias á María Santísima de los Remedios...Mexico, 1811; followed by *Noticias para la Historia de Nuestra Señora de los Remedios*...Mexico, 1812. The sermon which precedes the historical matter in this volume, was preached in the cathedral of Mexico on the 10th of October, 1811, by Juan Bautista Diaz Calvillo, at the anniversary celebration of the royalist victory at the monte de las Cruces! The author was prefect of the oratory of San Felipe Neri, and was apparently as credulous a believer in the marvellous and as unmitigated a denouncer of the revolution as can well be found among the ranks of the churchmen of that time. With regard to the sermon it is a fair specimen of the discourses delivered from the pulpit during the first years of the revolution. Abuse is plentifully heaped upon Hidalgo; the so-called victory of Las Cruces and

[illegible] *Gaceta de Mexico.*

[illegible] Other authorities consulted are: *Campeche, Verdad Vencida*; *Cumplido, Album Mex.*, ii. 97; *Torrente, Rev. Hisp. Amer.*, i. 46–7, 73, 229–51, 310–37; *Calderon, Life in Mex.*, ii. 179–89; *Consejo de Regencia, España é Ind. Amer. Esp.*, Cadiz, 1811, passim; *Proc. Id. Carta Mons. 24 de Jul. 1812*, in *Mayer MSS.*, no. 6; *Proc. Id. ... 4 Jul. 1812*, in *Mayer MSS.*, no. 7; *Rivera, Gob. de Mex.*, ii. 8, 33–46; *Id., Hist. Jalapa*, i. 345–8, 335–9, 394, 437; *Revilla Gigedo, Bandos*, no. 31, passim; *Iturribarria*, in *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, vii. 291–2; *Villaseñor*, in *Id.*, iii. 71; *Zamora*, iii. 188–9; *Zamacois, Hist. Mex.*, v. 618, 657; *Id.*, vii. passim; *Id.*, viii. passim, ap. 737–8, 743–7, 749–50, 757–85; *Id.*, 563, 820–1, 913–16; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 55–8, 61–4, 68–9; *Id.*, *Venerable Congreso. Neri*, passim; *Diputac. Amer. Represent.*, passim; *Juzgados de Hac.*, MS., passim, in *Doc. Ecles. Mex.*, MS., ii. no. 5; *Colegio*, etc., passim, in *Id.*, v. no. 2; *Chilpantzingo*, in *Id.*, ii. no. 3; *Sumario Criminal contra Tres Relig.*, MS., 1811, in *Disturbios de Frailes*, ii. 341–48, no. 9; *Disposic. Varias*, vi. 61–71; *Ximenez y Frias, El Fenix*, passim; *Mex., Cuad. de Formul.*, passim; *Diez y Seis*, passim; *Vega, J. S. G., Exhortacion*, passim; *Acapulco, Provision*, 6–31, in *Virey de Mex. Instruc.*, MS., 2d ser. no. 2; *Villaseñor, Theat. Amer.*, i. 178–90, 233–4, 237–40, 315–17; *Id.*, ii. 30–4; *Young, Hist. Mex.*, 89; *Walton, Exposé*, 281, app. 20–30; *Rebelion, Origen de la*, passim; *Rev. Span. Amer.*, 178–209, 318–21; *Revue Amer.*, ii. 552; *Romero* in *Soc. Mex.*, viii. 547; *Robinson, Mex.*, 41–56; *Id., Mex. Rev.*, i. 47; *Romero*, in *Soc. Mex.*, viii. 621; *Zelaa é Hidalgo, Querétaro Agrad.*, passim; *Pap. Var.*, ii. 36–68; *Exhort. Patriot. disting. Fernan. Sept.*, passim; *Payne, Hist. Europ. Col.*, 305–6; *Pedraza, Biog. Caudillos*, 38–59; *Perez, Dicc. Geog. y Estad.*, i. 31–7, 114–15; *Prov. Mich.*, 111–25, 143–202; *Puerto Convite*, passim; *Sastre, Constitut.*, pt ii. passim; *Quart. Review*, vii. 257; *Id.*, xxx. 175–7; *Relacion Christ.*, passim; *Bergosa*

y Jordan, *Exhort.*, passim; *Id.*, *Carta Pastoral*, passim; *Ober*, *Mex.*, 417; **Campillo**, *Edicto*, passim; *Id.*, *Manifiesto*, passim; *Olavarria y Ferrari*, *Junta de Zitàcuaro*, ix. passim; *Orizava*, *Ocurr.*, 3; *Tournon*, *Proceso*, passim; **Puebla**, *Mario Fiedo*, passim; *Inquisicion*, *Apol.*, passim; *Mex. Bosq. Rev.*, **10, 29, 34**; *Mex. Cabildo Metrop.*, 1–14, in *Doc. Eccles. Mex.*, MS., ii. no. 4; **Museo**, *Mex.*, i. 133; *Id.*, ii. 163–76; *Modern Travel. Mex. Guat.*, i. 109–15; **La Ilustr. Mex.**, iv. 229, 273–5; *Las Clases Product.*, Set^re. 15, 1878, in **Pinart Coll.**; *Lezama*, *Exhort de Paz*, passim; *Mayer*, *Mex. Aztec*, 256–7, **287–90**; *Martinez*, *Sinop. Hist. Rev.*, i. 58–66; *Id.*, *Parabien*, passim; *Manifiesto contra las Instrucc.*, passim; *Maillard*, *Hist. Tex.*, 17–19; *Linati*, **Costumes**, passim; *Diar. Imper.*, June 8, 1866, 559; *Gonzales*, *Col. N. Leon*, **213–28, 238–48**; *Pasatiempo Militar*, passim; *Borricon*, *Exhort.*, passim; **Alvarez**, *Estud.*, iii. 459–61; *Alm. Calend. Man. y Guia*, 1811, 45–102, 173–**206**; *Apunt. Hist.*, passim, in *Pan. Bol. Ofic.*, June 4, 1868; *Pinart Col.*; *Gaz.* **Mex.**, *Arévalo Compend.*, 7–104, passim; *Arrangoiz*, *Méj.*, i. 129–55, 161–70; **Arroniz**, *Hist. y Cron.*, 184–7, 387–9; *Azanza*, *Instrucc.*, MS., 92–4, 171; **Gallo**, *Hombres Ilustres*, iv. 7–171, 221–6; *Robles*, *Diar.*, in *Doc. Hist. Mex.*, **1st ser.** ii. **70**; *Domenech*, *Hist. Mex.*, ii. 16–21; *Dill*, *Hist. Mex.*, 292–329; **Descripcion de Amer.**, 119 et seq.; *Foote*, *Tex.*, i. 94–9; *Conder*, *Mex. Guat.*, **109–10**; *Chynoweth*, *Max.*, 6–9; *Mendibil*, *Res. Hist.*, 51–5, 61–72, 79–98, 103–**19, 141–60**, ap. vii. 391–4; ix. 396–7; *Narte*, *Clamores*, passim; *Niles' Register*, **ii. 238, 365**; *Niles*, *S. Amer. Mex.*, i. 142–54; *Noticioso Gen.*, Aug. 28, 1815, **1–2**; *Mex. Refut. Art. Fondo*, 3–15; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i. 102; *Id.*, ii. **666–8**; *Id.*, viii. 27; *Id.*, ix. 44–5, 68, 602–3; *Id.*, x. 77–80, 141, 474–5, 482–4, **522, 616, 636–7**, 911–12, 1102, 1120–8, ap. i. 57, 300–1; *Fronterizo*, Dec. 5, **1880**, 1.

CHAPTER XV.

WAR MEASURES AND MOVEMENTS.

1812.

FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND ARBITRARY MEASURES—INSURGENTS SACK HUAMANTLA AND CAPTURE TRAINS—THE SUPREMA JUNTA'S MOVEMENTS AND ACTS—DOCTOR COS' PLANS OF PEACE AND WAR—VICEREGAL COURSE—INDEPENDENT PRESS—BAD GUERRILLAS—ROSAINS AND HIS TROUBLES—CAMPAIGNS IN PUEBLA, MICHOACAN, AND BAJÍO DE GUANAJUATO—OPERATIONS OF GARCÍA CONDE, NEGRETE, AND ITURBIDE AGAINST ALBINO GARCÍA—CAPTURE AND END OF THIS LEADER—TORRES' EXECUTION—ILL SUCCESS OF LICEAGA AND COS IN GUANAJUATO—RAIDS IN SAN LUIS POTOSÍ.

DURING the siege of Cuautla the viceregal government had to resort to extraordinary measures to carry on the war. Public loans, voluntary and forced, were long since an old story; yet one more attempt was made to borrow two million dollars from the church and the wealthy men and merchants of Mexico, Puebla, and Vera Cruz, but without success. Then it was ordered that all persons should surrender their plate and jewelry, a promise in return being given that their value should be paid in one year with interest. As it was customary at that time to invest largely in valuables of the kind, many were stripped of their all, and a considerable sum was raised, but the people never received any pay. Another infliction was a tax of ten per cent on rents of urban property. In order to provide the army with horses, and prevent their falling into the hands of the insurgents, this quixotic viceroy ordered bought all in the country, except those of the troops, guards, dependents of the acor-

dada, and mail carriers, and such as might be found useless for military service.[1] This brilliant scheme failed, for when Venegas came to pay for the beasts, like Simple Simon, he had not the money. All this tended to the further disgust of the people, and to the advancement of the revolutionary cause. Nor were the continued offers of pardon emanating from the Spanish córtes sufficient to hold forever the good will of the Spanish Americans.[2]

There were several secret clubs in the capital at this time, one claiming special attention, called Los Guadalupes,[3] whose members, like others before mentioned, labored to spread discontent in regard to the viceregal government.

One of the richest towns of that period, now within the state of Tlascala, was Huamantla, situated on the line of trade between Vera Cruz and Mexico. The place was garrisoned by forty infantry of the line, 200 royalist auxiliaries, also infantry, most of them armed with lances, there being but few muskets among them, and sixty cavalrymen. Of artillery there were only three small guns. The commandant, Antonio García del Casal, having been apprised that a large force of insurgents meditated an attack upon the town, opened ditches and erected barricades. The insurgents, 2,000 strong, assailed the place on the 18th of March, 1812, and though repulsed at first, carried it next day, after nearly all the regulars and a number of officers had

[1] The owners of the last class were required to have a written license. And any one found riding a horse, unprovided with the license, fifteen days after the publication of the edict at the head town of his district was to be shot. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 174–7.

[2] This became evident in the reception given to the amnesty law of Nov. 8, 1811, published in Mexico in the *Diario* of April 3, 1812. In fact, decrees purporting to be for the general good were looked on, not as springing from a desire to benefit the colony, but as so many rights forced from the Spanish rulers. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 136–41.

[3] Established for securing independence, when and by whom has not been ascertained; but it existed prior to 1808; it was said that Viceroy Iturrigaray had relations with them; and that in the differences between Venegas and Calleja they made proposals to the latter which were not looked upon with displeasure. The labors of these clubs were very important. They were in constant correspondence with the independent chiefs. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 14.

been slain. Captain Casal and the rest of the garrison were made prisoners. The victors abandoned the town on the 20th, after having sacked it.[4] Death without quarter frequently awaited the prisoners in this war, as we have seen; but thanks to the influence of some priests, their lives in this instance were spared, and they were set at liberty a few days later. The same force of insurgents afterward made several assaults against Nopalucan, but were repulsed by the garrison under Captain Antonio Conti, finally losing three guns, a number of mules, and a quantity of supplies.

Shortly afterward, at Nopalucan, a train of imported merchandise valued at two million dollars fell into the hands of the independents,[5] under Osorno, Arroyo, Bocardo, Ramirez, and others. It was a rich prize, from which, however, the captors derived but little benefit, as it was quickly dissipated.[6]

When the revolutionary junta suprema, after its flight from Zitácuaro, had gathered its dispersed

[4] 'Han destrozado el pueblo...llevándose una cuerda de prisoneros.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 206, 337–42. Mendíbil, *Resúmen Hist.*, 95, states that Casal escaped; the insurgent chief celebrated the victory, never thinking of affording aid to Morelos at Cuautla. Huamantla became a very important place for the Americans, a mart for the free sale of tobacco being established there. The profits that might have been obtained, sufficient to meet the war expenses, were, however, squandered by the chiefs of guerrilla parties.

[5] It happened thus: The brigadier Juan José de Olazabal, a recent arrival, started for Perote on the 18th of April with 325 men, of whom 25 were cavalry, escorting a large train of merchandise belonging to the merchants, two pieces of siege artillery, and ammunition to be used against Cuautla. When near Nopalucan he sent forward for assistance, the place being beset by insurgents, who after a fight retired, and Olazabal entered the town. The mules of the merchandise teams, being then taken out of the town to water, were cut off by the enemey. All his despatches to Puebla had been intercepted; and the brigadier, leaving the merchandise in the town, returned to Perote with the artillery and ammunition, arriving there on the 30th of April. Meantime the independents captured Nopalucan and made a prize of the merchandise. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 505–7; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 570–3; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 183–5. Bustamante says that Olazabal spent his time in Nopalucan reflecting on the audacity of the 'citoyones de gamuza y rueda de cuerda,' as he called the men that wore buckskin and used the lasso. That author gives him the worst of characters, accusing him of ingratitude and scandalous theft. *Cuad. Hist.*, i. 415–7.

[6] No account was ever rendered of it. Among the spoils were some beautiful diamond rings, a pectoral for the bishop of Puebla, and a necklace of fine stones which was sent as a present to Morelos. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 417–8.

forces and established itself at Sultepec, matters on the whole for a time looked well for the independent cause. Calleja had suffered a signal repulse at Cuautla; near Izúcar were the forces which had placed Llano in so compromised a position; Atlixco was threatened, the provinces were overrun by revolutionary troops, and Calleja was at a standstill. About this time an idea became prevalent that the struggle would soon be terminated by a compromise favorable to independence, and it was even hinted at by an article in the government organ, which announced with satisfaction an arrangement entered into by Francisco Xavier Elio, viceroy of the provinces of Rio de la Plata, with the revolutionary junta in Buenos Aires.[7] This was the first time that the possibility of a compromise was broached; for hitherto, to speak of affairs in the other Spanish American possessions, was but to tell of royalist victories.[8] Some thought the viceroy leaned that way, but that was not so. No one knew better than he that in the present war there was no possibility of compromise. There must be either freedom or bondage. But the junta at Sultepec, under the impression that the time had come for making some such proposal, approved two plans or projects devised by Doctor Cos, which he respectively named Plan of peace and Plan of war. These, accompanied with a manifesto entitled "de la nacion americana á los europeos habitantes de este continente," were sent in the name of the junta to the viceroy, together with a letter dated March 16th. At the same time copies of the documents were distributed to the corporations and chief authorities in the country.[9]

[7] The arrangement was signed October 20, 1811, at Montevideo, with the view of establishing peace in those provinces. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 223–4; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 43.

[8] The fiscal of the tribunal de minería, at the meeting of that body in March, endeavored to prove that the only efficacious means to revive the mining industry was peace, such as had been made in Buenos Aires. *Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist.*, in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 555–6.

[9] Doctor Cos' ideas produced so strong an impression on Venegas that it was said he would allow no one to see the letter. It may be found entire in *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 88–90. Both plans were based on the principle

The corporations and authorities placed Cos' productions, unread by many of them, in the hands of the viceroy. The latter, though pretending to look

entertained by the ayuntamiento of Mexico in 1808, adopted by Hidalgo and followed by Rayon and the junta, of using the name of Fernando VII. only to aid in achieving independence. On that ground Cos founded his plan of peace; in the preamble he maintained that the sovereignty resided in the body of the nation; that Spain and America were integral parts of the monarchy, subject to the king, which parts possessed equal rights and were independent of one another; that in the absence of the monarch, America, having kept herself loyal to him, had a better right to convoke córtes, and to call thereto the few Spanish patriots who had not stained themselves with treason, than Spain to summon deputies from America; that the inhabitants of Spain had no right to assume the supreme power in the colonies, and authorities sent by them were illegally constituted, and that Americans, as a natural consequence, had the right to conspire against them; such action, instead of being treasonable, was on the contrary meritorious; and the king, if present, would certainly commend them. To reduce his principles to practice, Cos proposed in the plan of peace the creation of a national congress, independent of Spain, representing Fernando VII. and affirming his right. The European officials and the armed force were to resign their offices and powers into the hands of the congress, and remain as private citizens, with their lives and estates guaranteed; the employés retaining their honors and fueros, and a portion of their pay if they continued residing in the country. Past grievances should be forgotten, and the Mexican congress would then, as a token of fraternity, afford some pecuniary assistance to the Spaniards fighting in Spain against the foreign usuper and his allies. If that plan were not accepted, then the alternative of war should be recognized, and under it hostilities carried on according to the laws of nations, prisoners being treated as belligerents, and not as traitors, for both would be fighting for their national rights under the common banner of Fernando VII.

The doctor made a résumé of charges for violence, atrocities, and grievances, real or supposed, said to have been committed by the royalists, and concluded by trying to prove that it was in the interests of the Europeans, whom he called 'brethren, friends, and fellow-citizens,' to accept the plan of peace, and thus contribute to the general welfare. His plans acquired great celebrity. The difficulty with them was that the principles supposed to be therein established were the very gist of the trouble, about which there could be no compromise; for one party wanted an independent government, though under the name of Fernando, which the other party well understood the meaning of. As to the war plan, the insurgent junta was pledging more than it could fulfil, its authority not being recognized by all the chiefs at war with the viceregal government. *El Ilustrador Am.*, nos 2–6, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iv. 189–90, 193–5, 207–8, 222–4, 230; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 15–32; *Guerra, Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 548–63; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 133; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 389–406; *Mendibil, Res. Hist.*, app. ii. 375–83; iii. 384–5; iv. 385; *Ward, Mex.*, i. 183–5; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 202–14. The pretended allegiance to Fernando was a deception, a mere matter of policy, and so considered by Cos and the junta. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 556–61. This was an undeniable fact, recognized by Bustamante as such, and fully confirmed in a confidential letter of the junta to Morelos, dated Sept. 4, 1811, which contains these words: 'Habrá sin duda reflexado V. E. que hemos apellidado en nuestra junta el nombre de Fernando VII. que hasta ahora no se habia tomado para nada...nos surte el mejor efecto... Nuestros planes en efecto, son de independencia,...no nos ha de dañar el nombre de Fernando.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 405–6; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812. iii. 489–90; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, app. 5, 385–6.

on the manifesto with contempt, in reality gave it the greatest importance by decreeing on the 8th of April that the document should be burned in the public plaza by the common executioner, thus awakening in the people a desire to know its contents.[10] Another edict required that all copies should be gathered in; and the reading of the documents, except by special government sanction, was strictly forbidden.[11]

The sovereign junta continued the policy of giving publicity to its views by means of the printing-press.[12] The viceroy did what he could to counteract this influence by edicts and ecclesiastical injunctions. The circulation and reading of such productions were forbidden, and every copy called in. Priests at the confessional and from the pulpit were directed to enjoin upon the faithful obedience to these commands.[13]

During the siege of Cuautla a number of persons occupying good social standing hastened to join the revolution. Among them was a distinguished lawyer, Juan Nepomuceno Rosains, who had been deterred for a year past from such action by the bad character of some of the insurgent leaders.[14]

[10] He said that he could find no better means of showing the horror and abomination inspired by those proposals. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 90–2; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 373–4.

[11] Beristain, archdeacon of Mexico and influential with the viceroy, and Friar Diego Miguel Bringas y Encinas, guardian of Santa Cruz de Querétaro, undertook to defend the despotic order, and to impugn Cos' plan. Bustamante believed it beneficent. Of Bringas' character he speaks in high terms of praise, giving him credit for honesty of purpose in his effort, though based on wrong impressions. *Cuadro Hist.*, i. 401. Beristain gave his arguments in the journal *El Filopatro*, and in a pamphlet of 65 numbers, ending 15th October, 1812, dedicated to the tribunal of the inquisition. Bringas confutes the charges made against the royalists, and specifies the acts of atrocity by the insurgents which he saw or heard of. If he did not vindicate the royalists, he made it appear that the insurgents had excelled them in cruelty. *Bringas, Impugn. del pap. sedic.*, 176 and 143 pp. issued from the press of María Fernandez de Jáurequi, in Mex., 1812.

[12] Owing to the acquisition of the type as already narrated at this time, the *Ilustrador Americano* and the *Semanario Patriótico* had freer course, and exercised no small influence. *Rivera, Gob. Mex.*, ii. 39.

[13] The edicts were dated June 1st and 3d respectively. The ecclesiastical chapter said that the newspapers of the independents were 'una máquina infernal inventada por el padre de la discordia para desterrar del pais la paz.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 599–601.

[14] Such men had justly won the name of 'devorantes' given them by Morelos. Máximo Machorro, Arroyo, and Antonio Bocardo were of the

On the 3d of April Rosains raised the revolutionary standard, but with the resolve that all his acts should bear the stamp of order and true patriotism. He soon placed himself in contact with others holding like views, and within a fortnight there was thus gathered a force 800 strong, enlisted about San Andrés and Nopalucan, and between Quichula and Tepeyahualco.

Insurrection becoming thus rank throughout Puebla, the viceroy gave command of the province to Brigadier Santiago Irisarri, already mentioned, and sent him the first battalion of the Americano infantry regiment,[15] Major Gomendio, which with a small body of cavalry and the royalist auxiliaries, were all the troops at his command to defend that section. Every loyal town hereabout was in turn assailed,[16] including Atlixco, which was attacked on the 23d of April by a strong force from Izúcar, and saved from capture only by the arrival of troops under Colonel Ordoñez. At the end of April the viceregal authority, whose forces were all engaged in front of Cuautla, was recognized only in the city of Puebla, and a few towns, includ-

number. Machorro was like a wild beast, having plenty of physical courage, and indulging it in the way of murder and robbery without limit. Morelos tried to bring him under discipline, but failed. Bocardo was a little less brutal, a little more amenable to reason. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 132. This author uses similar language respecting other leaders whom he personally knew, and with whom he had to associate even at the peril of his life, men who were no better than bandits. His lamantations are touching. But on the other hand, he was inclined to judge more favorably of other leaders that he was not acquainted with, such as Albino García, the Villagrans, Osorno, and others, whom Alaman, *Hist. Mej.*, ii. 563–6, stamps with the same stripe. Such men gave Morelos and other respectable chiefs much trouble, and were the bane of the revolution.

[15] Arrived at Vera Cruz, from Spain, January 29, 1812. The second battalion remained at Habana. A little later the Castilla regiment came out. A fourth expedition arrived August 25, 1812, consisting of the Zamora infantry regiment, Colonel Rafael Bracho, a company of flying artillery, and the rest of the men to complete the Castilla and Lovera regiments. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 469–70; iii. 237; *Guerra, Rev. Mej.*, ii. 447; *Mendibil, Res. Hist.*, 94; *Bustamante, Camp. de Calleja*, 158–9; *Niles' Reg.*, ii. 71; *Zamacois, Hist. Mex.*, viii. 86–8, 236; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 349–50.

[16] At the foot of Popocatapetl was posted an insurgent party led by a monster called Vicente Gomez, nicknamed El Capador, recognizing no authority. As late as 1850, there was in Mexico, begging his daily food, an old soldier of the Asturias battalion, whom Gomez had mutilated. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 568.

ing the ever faithful Tlascala, and even this city was seriously threatened. Communication was so much interrupted that for several months Mexico knew not what occurred in Jalapa and Vera Cruz. Nevertheless, Rosains and his party had no faith in their ability to withstand an attack from the royalists at Puebla; and upon news of danger reaching them, the priest José Rafael Tarelo, who had prevailed on Rosains to join the revolution, wrote to Bishop Campillo that he and his companions would accept the royal amnesty if they were not required to perform humiliating acts. The bishop returned a letter of acceptance, and Tarelo with another priest, Amador, began their preparations, when, the affair reaching Rosains, he had the latter arrested and summoned a meeting, before which he laid the bishop's letter and signified his intention, now more confirmed than ever, of fighting for the national independence. On the same day came Rafael Argüelles, a lawyer from Orizaba, commissioned by a meeting called a few days before by the curate Montezuma, at Zongolica, to arrange coöperation with Rosains and Osorno. Tarelo's negotiations with Bishop Campillo caused much trouble, and almost brought about the destruction of himself, Rosains, Argüelles, and others.[17]

During the same period revolution raged in the provinces of its birth, left scantily garrisoned when Calleja abandoned Guanajuato. The chief towns were fortified, but had no available troops for distant ex-

[17] The report got out that Rosains and his friends intended to apply for amnesty. A rough, unbridled rabble, led by Machorro and the Franciscan friar Ibargüen, fell upon Rosains and Argüelles, severely maltreated them, and confined Tarelo, who, however, escaped. Ibargüen was of Arroyo's stamp, and even worse if possible. No arguments availed with such men, and Rosains and Argüelles were on the point of being sacrificed, but after much trouble succeeded in escaping and fled toward San Andrés Chalchicomula. Tarelo, who had joined the revolution for the sake of plunder and had taken a large share of the two million conducta captured at Nopalucan, sent men in pursuit. Rosains was taken and in shackles conveyed to Tepeaca, where he was saved only by the prayers of the people. But he was confined in a dungeon, and was in peril of his life till he escaped. *Rosains, Rel.*, in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 575–6; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 186–7.

peditions. Calleja, after taking Zitácuaro, sent a division of the central army against the parties overrunning the Bajío or plains of Guanajuato.[18] Colonel Diego García Conde, the chief commander, displayed great activity. He fortified his headquarters at Maravatío, a central point between Valladolid, Guanajuato, and Querétaro, and organized royalist companies.[19] His chief aims were to destroy Albino García, and to secure communication with Mexico and the safe passage of trains. Villalba went against Cañas and Ramon Rayon, and destroyed the artillery and foundry at Santa María Tismadé. Oroz and Iturbide were sent with a force as far as Indaparapeo to relieve Valladolid, and García Conde, after visiting Celaya, hastened to Acámbaro to be at convenient distance from Valladolid. Albino García kept the garrisons of small towns constantly alarmed, and forced other insurgent leaders to obey him.[20] At this time he formed a combination with Muñiz and Father Navarrete to assail Valladolid, on the 3d of February, which had a most disastrous result.[21] Trujillo defeated them in detail, captured their artillery, and destroyed their foundry at Tacambaro. This, however, did not improve

[18] It consisted of one battalion of the Corona, lieut-col. Villalba, another made up from several regiments under Captain Agustin de Iturbide, the Puebla cavalry regiment, and two squadrons of frontier troops, with some pieces of artillery.

[19] His report of Feb. 17th, from Salamanca. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 218–22, 225–8.

[20] As he acted with entire freedom from control, the junta, when at Zitácuaro, sent a certain Cajigas with troops and artillery to bring him under subjection; but he, caring no more for the junta than for the government at Mexico, fell upon Cajigas, taking his cannon and other arms, and sent him back to the junta. *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 430. The junta on the 18th of March, 1812, declared Albino García an outlaw, 'por su crueldad, y embriaguez, lascivia, latrocinios, escándalos y despotismo conciliándose el odio y detestacion general.' *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 198-200.

[21] The plan was for García to attack on the north; Navarrete on the west; Muñiz on the south; and Piedra with 400 men from his hacienda El Canario was to render aid. Trujillo and his subordinate, Captain Antonio Linares, made short work of the matter. The latter, with 100 foot, 200 cavalry, and 3 pieces, charged upon García, who had about 4,000 or 5,000 men, mostly mounted, and six pieces, on the heights of Tarimbaro, and after some fighting dispersed them and captured their artillery. Linares returned to Valladolid with the cannon and upward of 600 horses and mules, most of them saddled, and other spoils. Muñiz, not knowing what had befallen García, appeared before the city, and occupied the heights of Santa María with 10 pieces. Trujillo

matters for the royal cause in Michoacan. Muñiz soon managed to make more cannon; and though the insurgent guerrilla parties were not formidable, they so multiplied that Valladolid was for eight months without news from Mexico.[22] Albino García seemed to derive greater resolution and power of resource from every reverse. He soon gathered his dispersed forces, and returned to his headquarters in the valley of Santiago. He was joined there by the parties under

BAJÍO OF GUANAJUATO.

and Linares together made a dash against him and signally defeated him, capturing all his artillery. Linares went in pursuit as far as Tacámbaro, burned the town after removing nine cannon, and thereby destroyed the factory of arms that Muñiz had there. Navarrete, receiving timely advice, kept away and returned to his old position. Thus Trujillo in three days broke up, without losing a man, a combination of 8,000 or 10,000, taking besides about 25 pieces of artillery, and large quantities of supplies. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 589–95; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 426–8.

[22] Arechederreta saw a letter from the bishop elect, Abad y Queipo, to a friend of his in Mexico, which so stated. The official reports of Trujillo and Linares, dated Feb. 8th, of the actions opposite Valladolid, did not reach Mexico till the latter part of May or beginning of June, and they were the triplicates.

Escandon, the Gonzales, Tomás Baltierra Salmeron, Cleto Camacho, the negro Valero, and others. García Conde resolved to attack them in the valley, and succeeded in penetrating as far as the plaza of Santiago on the 13th of February, but was compelled to retreat in haste. He made a second attempt with all his forces on the 15th, with no better result, and then withdrew to Celaya.[23] It would be useless attempting to follow the repeated movements and counter-movements of the belligerents, as they reached no result other than to keep the country in a state of disturbance and suffering.

In March and April Guanajuato was reduced to the last extremity for the want of specie.[24] By request of the civil authority García Conde, now a brigadier, escorted the bullion on hand to Querétaro. On the 8th of April he started on his return with specie and merchandise, about 1,000 mule loads, for Guanajuato and interior towns; but encountering insurgents, he lost one load of specie and a large quantity of merchandise. He succeeded in taking to Guanajuato on the 17th only the specie of the royal treasury. The specie of private individuals and the merchandise that escaped capture he was forced to leave in Irapuato. However, Colonel José Castro started from this place soon after with the effects, and leaving in Silao those for Guadalajara and Zacatecas, marched on with the rest to Guanajuato, which he reached safely on the 21st.[25] García Conde now received orders from the viceroy to convey to Mexico

[23] He had to abandon the place on hearing that Pedro García had taken and sacked the villa de Leon, and slain its comandante, Manuel Gutierrez de la Concha. *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 428.

[24] Silver bullion was selling at very low prices, and work in the mines suffered accordingly. A deputation of the ayuntamiento went with a letter from the intendente to García Conde, then at Silao, requesting him to escort to Querétaro the bullion belonging to private persons—the royal treasury officials would not send the silver of the crown without orders from the viceroy—and bring back the coin and goods detained there. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 176–81.

[25] García Conde's official report to the viceroy from Silao, April 24th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 741–4; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 181–2; *Bustamante, Cuad Hist.*, ii. 299–301.

all the silver bullion in Guanajuato, together with that left at Querétaro, and a large flock of sheep; mutton being very scarce in the capital. To the people dwelling in the towns of the Bajío this news was anything but pleasing, and petitions poured upon him not to leave them at the mercy of the insurgent marauders. On the other hand, Cruz, deeming his own province in danger, also requested García Condé not to start with the trains till Albino García was put out of the way. The latter having overcome the insurgent chiefs, Escandon, Rubí, Gonzalez, and others who had been acting too independently of him, had increased his own force and become more dangerous. Under the circumstances, García Conde delayed his departure and decided to combine a plan of operations with the comandante general of Nueva Galicia.[26] The troops of this province since the opening of the year had been engaged in keeping at bay insurgent parties on the confines of Michoacan and Guanajuato; and if any of them set foot in Nueva Galicia territory they were forthwith destroyed. In these repeated encounters a number of notable guerrilla chiefs had perished, some of them killed in action, and some captured and shot.[27]

Among the most noted royalist commanders, both for activity and severity, was Pedro Celestino Negrete. Haughty and inflexible, he never spoke of the insurgents without applying to them some blackening epithet,[28] and not one that was captured by him escaped death. On the other hand, he did not spare his officers and men from hard work, though he looked

[26] He despatched Captain Iturbide with 60 Silao royalists to confer with Cruz and Negrete. With this small escort Iturbide traversed the region infested by insurgent parties, fulfilled his commission in a satisfactory manner, and in six days was back again at García Conde's headquarters. The time occupied by him was hardly more than the postman employed in time of peace. These facts and future operations appear in his report of May 18th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 733-9.

[27] Such was the fate of Colonel Vargas, Francisco Piña, El Seguidillo, Maldonado, Tomás Rodriguez, and others.

[28] Monsters, infamous rebels, wretches, cowardly assassins, vile canaille, and such like, were words constantly occurring in his official reports; and yet that man lived to serve the republic, and so did García Conde.

after their interests with the utmost care, and they had accustomed themselves to look up to him as a father as well as an invincible commander. His tenacious persecution of rebels had put an end to many obscure leaders, till at last there remained in the province only one insurgent chief who had acquired any considerable distinction. This was José Antonio Torres, generally called El viejo Torres, who had rendered good service to the cause in Nueva Galicia. His fate was a sad one. With his later operations against Valladolid the reader is already acquainted. From his stronghold in Michoacan he was wont to invade the region of Rio Grande, and in February 1812 he attacked Negrete near Tlasasalca. Torres was repulsed and, assailed in turn, was utterly routed. From the time of this reverse he was actively pursued from place to place, and on the 4th of April was surprised and captured at Palo Alto, near Tupátaro, by Lopez Merino, one of Negrete's subordinates. It was no small matter this capture of so noble a patriot, and the royalists made the most of it after their fashion. He was taken to Guadalajara and his arrival made a public spectacle. Wishing to heap every indignity upon him, his foes were about to fasten him by the neck to a wooden prop that his face might be well seen, but the old man told them to have no fear, he would carry his head high enough. He was tried by the oidor Velasco, and sentenced on the 12th of May to be hanged and quartered. The execution was carried into effect on the 23d. In the presence of the assembled crowd the head was severed from the body and raised upon a pole. One quarter of the body was sent to Zacoalco, the scene of his victory over Villaseñor; another was placed at the Mexicalcingo gate, by which he had made his triumphal entry into Guadalajara, and the remaining two at the gates of El Cármen and San Pedro.[29]

[29] At each place were posted these words: 'José Antonio Torres, traidor al rey y á la Patria, cabecilla rebelde é invasor de esta Capital.' The remains

Negrete's division could now be employed in the pursuit of Albino García. Orders were brought him from Cruz by Iturbide to march at once. It was arranged that on the 15th of May at ten o'clock in the morning he should attack Albino García, covering the roads leading from Parangues and Yurira to the valley of Santiago; and that García Conde should at the same hour come upon the enemy's camp from the Celaya side, thus cutting off escape. In order not to awaken suspicion, García Conde tarried in Silao,[30] where on the 1st of May he received information from Captain Esquivel, commanding at Irapuato, that he was surrounded by numerous parties of Albino García's. Conde at once despatched Villalba with one battalion, 100 dragoons, and two cannon. The rebel chief, who had been all day assailing the town with 4,000 cavalry and seven pieces of artillery, on learning of their approach retired to the hacienda de las Animas, a league distant, whence two of his lieutenants kept up a skirmish with Villalba's force.[31] Meantime Albino García marched against Celaya, and was repulsed.[32]

were incinerated forty days after. His house in San Pedro Piedra Gorda was razed to the ground and sown with salt. Thus we see what it was to be a patriot in those days. It must be confessed that in the city of Mexico more decency was shown. The execution took place the 23d of May, all the garrison being out under arms to see it. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 639–40; *Castillo, Negrete, Mex.*, v. 57–63, 78; *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, i. 145; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 185–90; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 185–6; *Mora, Mex. y sus Rev.*, iv. 439–43. At the time of his capture Torres had 400 men with him, all of whom perished, many of them being burned alive, Merino having ordered some barns in which they had sought refuge to be set on fire. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iv. 147–8.

[30] Official reports of May 11th and 16th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 733–9, 769–71.

[31] Villalba, being told by Esquivel that the people of the San Jacinto rancho were friendly to the insurrection, ordered Lieut. Gutierrez to put them all to the sword, an order which he afterward modified by sparing the women and children; but as all the men but one had fled, on him alone must fall the vengeance of the realm. *Alaman, Hist. Mex.*, iii. 188.

[32] The vecinos of Celaya, Irapuato, and other towns, instead of making so strenuous a resistance, would have joined the revolution if the junta soberana had been able to keep in check the guerrilla chiefs. The comandante at Irapuato, José Mª Esquivel, was decidedly in favor of independence. In after years he was several times a member of the legislature, and once vice-governor of Guanajuato, and died as one of the justices of her supreme court. *Id.*, iii. 189–90.

García Conde departed with the conducta of silver bullion from Guanajuato to escort it to Mexico, and conveyed it as far as Irapuato. From this place, where he incorporated into his force Villalba's command, without divulging his destination, he started at two o'clock in the morning of May 15th, so as to reach the valley of Santiago by ten, and occupy the points agreed upon with Negrete. But Albino García, if unlettered, was a shrewd military man. He well understood the royalists' movements, and easily disconcerted them. Not finding Negrete where he expected to meet him, and hearing a brisk firing from the direction of Parangues, García Conde inferred that Albino García had attacked Negrete, which was true. On García Conde's approach, the enemy retired, and, pursued by the cavalry, lost some men.[33]

[33] Among the slain was one of the most efficient officers of the guerrilla band. Conde and Negrete marched into the valley in three sections, one of which was under Iturbide, with the view of pursuing Albino if he returned. They failed to find him, however, only priests, women, and children being left in the town. Conde wanted to form other combinations with Negrete, but the latter had to return to his former positions to protect the Nueva Galicia frontier from possible invasion by Albino García. It was, however, agreed that Negrete should march by the Pénjamo road, Conde taking that of Yuriria, so as to place the enemy between two fires; but the latter eluded the hot pursuit of Conde and Iturbide, though owing to the fact of his being afflicted with gout, Albino had to journey in a carriage or on a bed. When the pursuers came near he would quickly mount a horse and escape by some side road, after hiding his artillery. Once his artillery carriages were captured and destroyed. At the end of this unsuccessful pursuit the royalists were completely exhausted. Conde gave up the chase, and returning to the valley of Santiago, took the sacred vessels and paraments and the priests of that town and of Yuriria to Irapuato. Conde, in his report of May 31st, speaks of Albino's force being all dispersed, and states that the chief had only 100 men with him; but, of course, that is a part of guerrilla warfare. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 749–55; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 191–3; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 431–2. Albino García's bands consisted of large masses of mounted men, mostly mestizos and mulattoes, some armed with spears, others with muskets and swords, ready for attack and still readier for running away. Their chief was the most active and dreaded guerrilla that the war produced. When he intended to assault a town or hacienda, a large number of Indian slingers assembled in the neighboring villages and fields, and with a few badly made and worse served pieces of artillery, rendered aid. The attack was made by surrounding the town with cavalry, which was, of course, useless against a fortified place. The most abusive epithets were hurled at the besieged, and a brisk fire of artillery and musketry sustained for hours, discharging perhaps 600 or 700 cannon-shots, which did little or no harm, the royalists returning the fire from behind their intrenchments. Finally, after having some men killed and wounded, the foiled assailants would retire either because their ammunition had given out, or some royalist force was approaching to relieve the town. In the retreat the guerrillas would sack every hacienda

The brigadier again started on the 4th of June with the conducta for Mexico; but hearing at Salamanca that the guerrilla chiefs were reorganizing in the valley of Santiago, he thought that as they believed him occupied with the conducta, it would be a good opportunity to take them unawares and even capture Albino García. The same evening he despatched his most efficient officer, Agustin Iturbide, with about 160 mounted men with orders to reach Santiago at moonrise. Iturbide was there at two in the morning of the 5th, surprised the guard at the entrance of the town, and pretending to be Pedro García, who had been called by Albino to join him, obtained the pass and countersign, and took possession of the place without arousing the sleeping revolutionists. At length they were purposely awakened by orders loudly issued for the grenadiers of la Corona to occupy a certain position, the battalion of Mixto another, and so on, several organizations being named, to each of which a few of Iturbide's men belonged. The insurgents believed the whole division of García Conde was upon them; they attempted, however, to defend the barracks which were taken by force. Some soldiers took possession of the roof of the house occupied by Albino García. This chief, his brother Francisco, known as El brigadier Don Pachito, his secretary, José María Rubio—who on presenting himself said he had been held in the insurgent quarters by force, which plea saved his life—

on their way, and then disperse, to meet again at some other place agreed upon. The good fortune of towns that thus escaped being plundered and destroyed was attributed to a miracle, and the te deum was chanted. If any prisoners had been taken on either side they were forthwith shot. In a field of battle the insurgents generally placed their artillery on some height, the infantry behind it, and the large masses of cavalry at the wings. The cavalry would charge upon the royalists, who easily drove them away with a few discharges of grape; they would then flee in all directions, throw their ill-disciplined and poorly armed infantry into confusion, and the artillery would fall into the royalists' hands after the first discharge. Albino García complained that his men were always more disposed to plunder than to fight. But this kind of warfare was excessively fatiguing for the royalist troops, constantly deprived of rest and food, marching and countermarching without being able to catch or strike the foe.

and a man named Pineda, a deserter from the royal service, were taken alive, together with some 100 or 150 more. About 150 guerrillas were killed; while Iturbide's only casualty, by his report, was the death of one grenadier. As Iturbide had to traverse on his return a region teeming with insurgents, and his force was too small to guard so many prisoners, he ordered them to be shot, excepting only the two Garcías, Rubio, and Pineda, whom he conveyed to Celaya. Three days later, after certain empty judicial proceedings, the Garcías and Pineda were publicly executed.[34]

The capture of Albino García was a great triumph for the royalists, none of whom had ever gained much advantage over him. It must be confessed that like the other side he was something of a scourge, the Bajío region having suffered greatly at his hands. García Conde could now proceed with his conducta. One of the Villagrans, however, attacked him in the sierra of Capulálpan, but was routed by Iturbide with heavy loss.[35] The same division on its return escorted from Mexico a large train of European and other merchandise and passengers to Querétaro.[36]

Meantime Liceaga had been sent by the suprema junta to assume the government of the northern

[34] García Conde's conduct toward his prisoner, according to his own report was dastardly, even for that day and place. He pretended to pay him honors as captain-general by bringing his troops out on parade, ringing bells, and firing salvoes of artillery. Albino and his brother being placed in the plaza opposite the brigadier's residence, the latter used insulting words to the chief prisoner, and then made a ribald speech to the crowd who had come to see the fallen hero. Notified of his death-sentence, Albino García wrote his parents, who were royalists and had formerly rendered service to García Conde himself on his expeditions, asking their pardon and blessing, and ordering the restoration of all property he had seized to the owners. His head was elevated in Celaya at the crossing of San Juan de Dios street, where he made his greatest effort to capture the city. The crippled hand, which made him known as El Manco, was taken to Guanajuato, and the other to Irapuato. Years after, when the country became independent, the skull was buried. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 640–4; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rect.*, 237–8; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 196–203; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 435–6; *Méj. Bosquejo Ligerís*, 14, 257–8; *Mendibil, Res. Hist.*, 132.

[35] Conde's report of June 16th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 645–6.

[36] 7,706 bales, 79 coaches with passengers, 632 mules, and 130 asses laden. Numbers of persons, including troops, passengers, and muleteers, 5,920. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 85–6.

provinces, and, accompanied by Doctor Cos, had entered the Bajío of Guanajuato. On the 24th of July the insurgents, who had again collected in the valley of Santiago, were defeated by Iturbide, sent in advance from Querétaro. Liceaga and Cos saved themselves by flight, and García Conde now proceeded with the convoy, but was attacked near Salamanca on the 7th of August, and lost 400 mule loads. Iturbide actively pursued the insurgents, and in September defeated them on several occasions, Liceaga and Cos narrowly escaping capture.[37] Cos, having been appointed his second in command by Liceaga, retired to Dolores, which place he made the centre of his future operations, while the latter remained in the vicinity of Yuriria. The lake, on the southern side of which this town is situated, has two islets or cays, the larger being about 1,000 varas in circumference, and the other somewhat smaller. They were 180 varas apart, and Liceaga joined them by a causeway three varas wide, protecting the cays as well as the bridge with a stone wall six feet in height, a moat, and a stockade made of prickly plants. In the larger cay there were 71 merlons, and 64 in the other.[38] To this fortress, which Liceaga deemed impregnable, he gave his own name, and it is called in the official reports Isla Liceaga. He established factories there for making cannon and ammunition, and a mint. García Conde deemed it unnecessary, and even imprudent, to undertake the capture of the place by main force, inasmuch as, holding possession of the shores of the lake, it must sooner or later surrender. But Iturbide resolved to attack it; and to this end he first cleared the surrounding country of insurgents. He allowed the enemy no rest from the 9th of September till he pitched his camp in Santiaguillo opposite the fortress.[39] His position

[37] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1014–17, 1095–1110.

[38] Iturbide's detailed report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 25–39. The town and lake have different names assigned to them by different writers; namely, Yurira, Yuriria, Yurirapándaro, Yuririapúndaro, and Yurirapúndaro.

[39] In 19 actions during 40 days he killed many, some of whom were chiefs

was within cannon-shot, but was protected by a small rise of ground. Liceaga, who never bore the palm for bravery, on seeing the approach of danger, left the island, the command of which, together with 200 men, was intrusted to Father José Mariano Ramirez.[40] Iturbide, having made eight rafts and brought two canoes from a long distance, attacked during the night of October 31st at four different points, placing Captain Vicente Endérica in command. A powder-magazine that caught fire disheartened the garrison, and the place was taken without resistance. Father Ramirez, José María Santa Cruz, the town major, Tomás Moreno, commandant of the artillery, Nelson, an English engineer under whose direction the fortifications were built, and Felipe Amador, who had received one of the minor orders of priesthood, were captured, conveyed to Irapuato with others, and shot. The royalist loss was small. Of the defenders none escaped; such as did not fall into the victors' hands perished in the lake.[41] The small number of arms found indicates clearly that the fortress, when assailed, was almost abandoned, and the garrison had been mostly removed.[42]

of renown, and took prisoners Colonel Francisco Ruiz, and lieutenant-colonel of artillery, Francisco Valle, known as the 'negro habanero,' both of whom it is hardly necessary to say were executed at once. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 241.

[40] Bustamante, calling him a sub-deacon, says: 'En quien siempre admiré buenas disposiciones para puntear una guitarra y divertio un estrado de damas, y no tenia otras.' *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 246.

[41] Iturbide, whose pedantry in his reports equalled his bravery and cruelty, broke out on this occasion into one of his peculiar bursts: 'Miserables, ellos habrán conocido su error en aquel lugar terrible en que no podrán remediarlo. ¡Quizá su catástrofe triste servirá de escarmiento á los que están aun en tiempo de salvarse!' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 27.

[42] Bustamante has it that Liceaga had taken out the troops, leaving his prisoners, who found ways to plot with Iturbide to secure their freedom. The latter says: 'Fué preciso valerse de muchos ardides, cuyo relacion no contemplo interesante para este lugar, y el resultado lo hará inferir á los entendimientos claros, imparciales y sin preocupacion.' For all that, Iturbide ordered many military executions there, and sent hundreds hence of whom he made no mention. It was his chief delight in this world to consign to hell the excommunicated. Ramon Rayon occupied the island several months later, and exhumed the bones of about 600 persons, whom he caused to be interred with funeral honors in the parish church, which Iturbide looked upon as a crime, prosecuting the priest that officiated, and holding much correspondence with Rayon on the subject. Iturbide put himself up for a sage, and

Doctor Cos at Dolores engaged himself in organizing and bringing together the armed parties of that region. With him was Rafael Rayon, one of the president's brothers, and Matías Ortiz, who from this time began with his brothers to acquire distinction, and were generally known as Los Pachones. With the force he had organized, Cos marched on the 27th of November against Guanajuato; but his movement was attended with no result, and he had to return to Dolores. He did not remain there permanently, however, as that town was on the line of transit for produce and other merchandise to and from the inland provinces; and when trains approached he usually abandoned the place for the purpose of attacking them. It often happened that reënforcements had to be sent from Querétaro to save the trains from capture.[43]

On the opposite side of the sierra of Guanajuato, separating on the north the bajío from the plains of Dolores and the province of San Luis Potosí, the operation of escorting live-stock from the latter place to Querétaro, and transporting merchandise from Mexico, furnished opportunities for repeated hostile encounters. One of the hottest of these took place on the 3d of February, at the Santuario de Atotonilco near San Miguel el Grande, on which occasion Ildefonso de la Torre, the royalist commander, who had advanced to that place to receive 500 silver bars from Zacatecas, saw a refulgent palm in the sky.[44] Another train was convoyed by the royalist priest

a loyal vassal of Fernando VII. *Cuadro Hist.*, ii. 246–7. Thus far in this history we find him both fanatical and murderous.

[43] Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 295–8, cannot reconcile Cos' statement on his attack against Guanajuato, appearing in *Diario de Operac.*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 626, with the report of Intendente Marañon inserted in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 207–9; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 167–8. The same difficulty occurs in comparing the false accounts of insurgent and royalist commanders. Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectific.*, 238–9, says that the invading force was repulsed.

[44] Torre's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 257–9. The palm phenomenon had become fashionable since Calleja pretended to have seen one at Zitácuaro. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 205.

Diego Bear with 250 men, who coming upon a small party of insurgents near Dolores on the 22d of March, killed a number and dispersed the rest. On that same side of the sierra the independents with three guns assaulted the hacienda of Villela on the 7th of April, but were repulsed with the loss of the guns. Colonel Nuñez and Major Molleda perished in the action, and Colonel Gutierrez was taken prisoner and subsequently shot by order of Colonel Tovar, comandante at San Luis Potosí. Father Zimarripa was also captured; he had once before been taken in Aculco and pardoned; now he was retained in irons pending orders from the viceroy.[45] About this time, owing to the defeat of the royalist Bengóa on the 16th of February, three leagues from Rio Verde, this place was at the mercy of the insurgents, who, according to the official reports, plundered it, and also the rancho Jabalí. Tovar despatched Captain Sanz with a force on the 23d of February, who recovered the town and the artillery the insurgents had possessed themselves of, but could not overtake the assailants. The latter were, however, defeated and dispersed by Arredondo, who pursued the governor of Sierra Gorda—as Colonel Felipe Landaverde was called, being represented to have been an honorable man—so hotly that to escape he threw himself down a precipice, abandoning his arms and horse.[46]

[45] Tovar's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 626–7, 669–75.

[46] Tovar's report and annexes, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 615–18, 625–7; Arredondo's report in *Id.*, 1812, 1111–15; *Mora, Mex. Rev.*, iv. 445–8.

CHAPTER XVI.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

1812.

CAPTURE OF TEHUACAN—MASSACRE OF PRISONERS—CURATES OF MALTRATA AND ZONGOLICA JOIN THE REVOLUTION—ORIZABA CAPTURED AND RETAKEN—REVOLUTIONARY PLANS AT VERA CRUZ AND PEROTE—COMMUNICATION REOPENED BY ROYALISTS—INSURGENT OPERATIONS—CAPTURE OF PACHUCA WITH IMMENSE BOOTY—CRUEL SHOOTING OF PRISONERS—TOWNS RECAPTURED BY ROYALISTS—ARREST OF LEONARDO BRAVO AND COMPANIONS—THEIR EXECUTION—NOBLE DEED OF NICOLÁS BRAVO—VENEGAS OFFERS PARDON TO PENITENT REBELS, AND A REWARD FOR MORELOS' CAPTURE—VENEGAS AND CALLEJA AT ENMITY—RAYON'S UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON TOLUCA—DEFEAT AT TENANGO—DISPERSION OF THE SUPREME JUNTA.

MILITARY operations had resulted more favorably for the royalist arms in the interior than in the eastern and southern provinces, owing, it would seem, to the fact that in the former locality the insurrectionary forces were in independent parties, more or less numerous, but nearly always acting without combination, which, though obstructing the public highways, interrupting traffic, and living by plunder, rarely attempted to assail fortified towns, or to confront their royalist foe in an open field. To the east and south of Mexico military affairs had been more skilfully conducted by the insurgent chiefs, who acted more in concert, and whose troops had been kept well in together and were better disciplined. Hence the rapid progress made by the revolution in these regions, and its strong and menacing attitude at the end of September 1812 toward the viceregal government. Prior to

His departure from Chilapa for Cuautla and Izúcar in the latter end of 1811, Morelos directed his active lieutenant, Trujano, to spread the insurrection throughout the Miztec country, and parties were accordingly despatched in all directions, appropriating to their own uses the grain, live-stock, and every other available thing belonging to the Spaniards or to those of royalist proclivities. One of these parties, commanded by Colonel Figueroa, paid a visit to Tehuacan, a rich city and the commercial centre of the provinces of Puebla, Oajaca, and Vera Cruz. The place had been abandoned by the Spaniards and authorities, and Figueroa entered it unopposed; but having no force to hold it, he went harvesting in the haciendas and farms of the surrounding country; upon which the Spaniards returned with seventy-five soldiers and two pieces of artillery, erected intrenchments, and organized volunteer companies. The insurgents, however, again made their appearance, and in February surrounded the city. The number of the besiegers increased rapidly, and the beleaguered in the latter part of April and beginning of May found themselves reduced to the last extremity. Their water supply had been cut off, and most of the garrison had perished. Despairing of any relief, the city capitulated under a guarantee that the lives of the Spaniards and other royalists would be spared; to which stipulation, according to custom, not the slightest attention was subsequently paid.[1]

[1] The insurgent chiefs commanding the besiegers were José Sanchez de la Vega, vicar of Clacotepec, the same who repulsed the royalist brigadier, Llano, at Izúcar, the cura Tapia, the Franciscan friar Ibargüen, Ramon Sesma, Machorro, Arroyo, and others. The parish priest and other respectable ecclesiastics were present at the signing of the stipulations. After the garrison laid down their arms, on the 6th of May, the Spaniards were confined in the public jail, and their shops and dwellings sacked. Hundreds of families were thus reduced to beggary. Next day the Spaniards were stripped of their clothes, bound in groups of three, and by the guerrilla Arroyo conveyed on foot to Tecamachalco, where three of them were shot, the son of the subdelegado Sanchez, one of the victims, being compelled to be present at his father's execution. Hearing that the people of Tecamachalco were on the point of rising to oppose these executions, Arroyo had the other prisoners, forty-three in number, taken out and shot. One of the unfortunates was a Frenchman named Basil Mazas, a man noted for his acts of benevolence and charity. A few days before, the Spaniards who capitulated in San Andrés

While the independents were concentrating around Tehuacan, Mariano de las Fuentes Alarcon, curate of Maltrata,[2] raised a force and declared for independence, having cast a cannon with the metal of the large church bell. Besides keeping a watch on Orizaba, he captured every passing train having merchandise for the royalists. He put men under Miguel Moreno,



PUEBLA AND SOUTHERN VERA CRUZ.

who with great activity began to plunder and desolate the neighboring haciendas, daily augmenting his force. Lieutenant-colonel Miguel Paz, comandante at Ori-

Chalchicomula had been shot by order of the priest Sanchez de la Vega. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 774–7; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 130–1; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 222–5.

[2] From its position between Tehuacan and Orizaba, where the hill of the same name terminates, it was at that time almost the only passage between Puebla and Orizaba, Córdoba, and Jalapa, the road over Aculcingo not having yet been made.

zaba, on being apprised of these doings, despatched a force to bring away from Aculcingo the church paraments and the frightened priest. His force was attacked by the insurgents, who dispersed the cavalry and compelled the infantry to retreat to Orizaba.[3]

Before long the villa of Orizaba found itself seriously menaced by the united forces of the curate of Zongolica, Juan Montezuma y Cortés,[4] and Alarcon. The place had a garrison of 400 or 500 men under Lieutenant-colonel José Manuel Panes. Its only defence was a stockade on the Santa Catalina bridge, half a league from the villa, manned by 100 infantry, thirty cavalry, and a few artillerymen to manage one gun. The independents attacked on the 22d of May, and again on the 28th. They had no difficulty in entering the villa by the Angostura gate. Panes at first concentrated in the Cármen convent, but having neither provisions nor water he evacuated the place and went to Córdoba, after destroying the ammunition he could not carry away, the Carmelites, who were mostly Spaniards, and the rest of the Europeans accompanying him.[5] The curate of Zongolica, now having the rank of colonel, tried to intercept the royalists on the Escamela bridge; but being attacked by the major of the Tlascala regiment, he fled to the Tuxpango sugar-mill, leaving with the custom-house guards his baggage. Marching by night, Panes reached Córdoba early next morning.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th Alarcon and Moreno entered Orizaba. Their men were poorly armed and had but little ammunition, which they consumed that night in salutes to the virgin of Gua-

[3] Paz's report to General Cárlos Urrutia, commander at Vera Cruz, on the 24th of March, *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 417–20.

[4] He held as a descendant of Montezuma a *cacicazgo* in Tepejí de las Sedas. Bustamante, who knew him well, says he was a perfect image of the emperor, but would make a better preacher than soldier. *Cuadro Hist.*, ii. 135–6. Alaman did not know how the descent came. *Hist. Mej.*, iii. 226. It was he who sent the lawyer Argüelles to confer with Rosains and Osorno.

[5] Panes' reports, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 781–8, 794–6; *Orizava, Ocurrencias*, 4–15; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 386.

dalupe. They were soon joined by Montezuma, Francisco Leiva, Padre Sanchez, and Arroyo, the total force being now 1,500 men. Hoping to capture Córdoba, a demand for its surrender was sent to Panes, and refused. Presently, however, the independents learned that a large force of royalist regular troops was coming upon them. A general retreat then set in, the curate of Zongolica, who was the first to move, returning to his town. The viceroy had ordered Llano,[6] on his return from Cuautla, to march from Puebla with 2,265 men, and attack the insurgents intrenched at Tecamachalco and Tepeaca, being specially desirous of securing 52,000 bales of tobacco which were at Orizaba and Córdoba.[7] In the morning of May 30th the independents tried to check Llano's advance at the town of Amozoque but were repulsed.[8] They made a second attempt on the Acatlan and Santiago hills, and a third on the parapets of Tepeaca, but were defeated with the loss of six guns. From Tepeaca, Llano advanced rapidly upon Orizaba, and took it on the 11th of June.[9] At first he resolved to put the population to the sword, but was prevented through the intercession of the friars of San José de Gracia. Without loss of time he advanced on Córdoba, and Panes returned to Orizaba, but being suspected of insurgent proclivities was superseded by Colonel Andrade.

On the 25th Llano started on his return to Puebla, having in charge 4,098 bales of tobacco. Several

[6] In order that Llano might attend to the campaign, the viceroy appointed the mariscal de campo, conde de Castro Terreño, a grandee who had come to Mexico for other purposes, military and civil governor of Puebla, a position that he accepted out of consideration for the viceroy. *Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist.*, May 25, 1812; *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 164.

[7] This was about all the viceroy had to raise revenue from at this time. The number of the royalist force as given in the text was found in the office of the viceroy's secretary. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 136.

[8] Llano's report to the viceroy is dated June 3d. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 711–16.

[9] June 10th he assaulted the batteries placed by the curate Alarcon on the hills of Huilapa, and dislodged the insurgents. The next day he met with the same success at the entrance of La Angostura. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 137; *Mendibil, Res. Hist.*, 131–2; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 387.

parties of independents, commanded by Father Sanchez, Osorio, El Bendito, Manchorro, and others, took up positions on the heights of Aculcingo to interrupt his passage and to capture the tobacco. Llano, however, dislodged them from every place, and arrived at Puebla without loss on the 28th. The tobacco reached Mexico on the 5th of July under a strong escort.

There were many thrilling adventures, many sad episodes, during the war for independence. In March of this year there was lodged in the castle of San Juan de Ulúa José Mariano de Michelena, who, though holding only the rank of captain, had much political influence, and in later years became a prominent statesman. At first he was immured in a dark cell dug out of the rock, and was given only a board for his bed; but his health becoming thereby greatly impaired, the comandante of the fort asked General Urrutia to allow him to be removed to the adjutant's quarters, the petitioner being responsible for his safety. The request was granted; and thus the prisoner came to be placed in relations with the officers of the garrison and with his friends. Among his visitors was a popular young treasury clerk, Cayetano Perez, an enthusiast on behalf of his country's freedom. Putting their heads together, Michelena and Perez soon hit upon a plan to get possession of the castle, and of the men-of-war. They would take a day when a heavy norther was blowing, so that the other ships could not get at them, but they could get at the other ships.[10] The plan appeared well conceived, and promised success; but alas! in the execution all was

[10] Michelena detailed on the 2d of Oct. 1830, the plan to Alaman, who also obtained a narrative from Manuel Perez, a brother of Cayetano. The scheme was to win over the most reliable officers of the Vera Cruz regiment, being sure of the artillery detachment, who would do what they were asked to by their commander, Pedro Nolasco Valdés, he being interested in the success of the plan. Perez's part was to seize the bastions and gate of the pier, for which he had made arrangements beforehand. The undertaking at this part was deemed practicable. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iv. 88–90, ap., 3–5.

lost. Being detected, Perez and several others were arrested on the 18th of March, and hurriedly tried. Perez and five others were sentenced to death, and executed on the 29th of July.[11] One Molina, to save his own life, accused Michelena, but was unable to prove his words, as Perez, the only one having knowledge of the details, had refused to divulge them. Michelena, Merino, and others, however, being suspected, were sent to Spain, where the first named continued his military career, and rose to be a lieutenant-colonel.

While the royalists were recovering Tepeaca, Tecamachalco, and Orizaba, the independents had been intent on some important places garrisoned by viceregal forces. A conspiracy was planned by a sergeant in Perote—where Olazábal had remained after his loss of the train at Nopalucan—to surrender the fortress. All the leading officers, with Castro Terreño and Olazábal at their head, were to be killed. The plot was detected on the 8th of June, and the conspirators being arrested and tried by court-martial, all were sentenced to death and eight days afterward shot in the castle moat.[12]

It was now midsummer, and at the capital no news had come from Vera Cruz for three months. Even the ingenuity of the merchants could not invent means to get a letter through.[13] Further than this, smokers were suffering. Paper was getting scarce at the cigar factory; and the viceroy finally ordered Llano to march with his division to Jalapa, escorting

[11] The five others were José Evaristo Molina, José Ignacio Murillo, Bartolomé Flores, José Nicasio Arizmendi, and José Prudencio Silva. Six years after the independence was secured, the state congress had a tablet placed in the town hall, commemorative of the event, and containing the names of the six victims.

[12] Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 144–5, gives the text of a letter found in the correspondence of the conde de Castro Terreño with Venegas, supposed to have been written in Jalapa to Gen. Dávila in Vera Cruz. Among those executed was Vicente Acuña, who had been banished by the junta de seguridad, and had returned under the general amnesty. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, ii. 233.

[13] Arechederreta, *Apunt. Hist.*, said early in July that the last advices were of April 10th.

a consignment of flour to Vera Cruz, and bringing back some paper. Llano deemed a small detachment sufficient for the merchandise service; and he would occupy himself meanwhile in bringing under viceregal subjection the towns in the vicinity of Jalapa.[14] Leaving Puebla on the 3d of July, on the way to Perote Llano was attacked at Tepeyahualco by insurgents, who were defeated and put to flight with the loss of five guns, by Lieutenant-colonel José Moran of the cavalry. Llano found Jalapa beset by the enemy, and provisions scanty. The whole province was in a state of insurrection, and communications so interrupted that in Jalapa, as in Mexico and Puebla, nothing was known of affairs in Vera Cruz. From some insurgent prisoners he learned that Vera Cruz was surrounded by foes, who swarmed up to its very suburbs; that a regiment of the Castilla infantry from Spain and another from Campeche had been unable to cut their way through to the interior, though they had made several sallies; and that a permanent court-martial had been established under Colonel Daoiz, recently arrived from Spain. Llano saw at once that he had to abandon his original plans, and in spite of the deadly season he must go on to the much infected seaport. Taking troops native to that region that he found in Jalapa,[15] he set out with the flour on the 24th of July, and after some fighting reached Vera Cruz the 30th. He found the once famous Castilla regiment reduced to a few dying men.[16] On his return to Jalapa, Llano escorted 2,000 mules laden with merchandise, a large number of passengers in vehicles, and forty boxes of mail matter from Spain. At Perote he was joined by Olazábal with a few detachments. From Ojo de

[14] Llano's reports of his expedition to Vera Cruz are in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 831–2, 921, 925–9; *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, ii. 142–6.

[15] Before setting out he marched against a rebel junta at Naulingo, which hurried away at his approach, on the 18th of July, leaving five guns and some other arms.

[16] It originally had 1,300 men, 500 of whom perished of the black-vomit; the other 800 reached Jalapa. From Campeche came also 1,300, of whom 500 reënforced the garrison of Orizaba, and the rest remained at Vera Cruz.

Agua, near Puebla, he sent to Castro Terreño on the 27th of August triplicates of his reports to the viceroy, nothing having been hitherto known of his movements owing to his despatches having been intercepted.[17] The expedition arrived in Mexico on the 5th of September.

The plains of Apam, common to the provinces of Mexico and Puebla, had been but scantily garrisoned since Soto's division marched to Izúcar in December 1811. Owing to this, Tulancingo was assailed, about the middle of February, by 3,000 cavalry and 300 infantry under generals Anaya, Cañas, and Serrano, and colonels Osorno, Olvera, and Guarneros; but the assailants were beaten off by Captain Las Piedras with his small force of a little over 100 men of regular troops, and the royalist auxiliaries.[18] The hostile parties extended their raids to the city of Tezcuco, whose small garrison made several sallies and prevented their capturing the place. Of all other places, however, most desired was Pachuca, a mining centre, having Spaniards to kill and silver bars to capture. On the 23d of April Serrano undertook the attack with 500 men, and two pieces of artillery managed by Vicente Beristain, a brother of the archdeacon of Mexico.[19] They soon had possession of all the houses but three, which were held by Madera, and the conde de Casa Alta, who commanded the royalist forces. During the whole of that day the three houses were under fire, particularly the one owned by Villaldea, a rich miner. Night came on, when some of the houses caught fire, and altogether the people were badly frightened. The religious of the apostolic college finally mediated to obtain terms of capitulation, which the insurgents

[17] His despatches were intercepted at El Cármen, and out of revenge he now burned the town. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 921.

[18] Olvera was shot dead by the chaplain. It is noticed that several priests joined hotly in the fighting. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 207–11.

[19] The place was in charge of Lieutenant-colonel Madera, who had brought a few men from Tulancingo. From the capital had been sent 25 dragoons under Sub-lieutenant Juan José Andrade, but he went over to the enemy. *Riofrio*, MS., in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 577.

granted.[20] Next day news came that Vicente Fernandez with a force from Tlahuelilpan was approaching to relieve Pachuca. With some difficulty Madera satisfied the insurgents that there had been no treachery on his part; and to convince them, he went with a priest of the apostolic college to request Fernandez to retire. But during the conference the latter chief noticed that insurgents were occupying positions in his rear; indeed, they had opened fire on his men. He therefore beat a retreat, and the insurgents used this as a pretext to arrest all the Spaniards and convey them to Sultepec.[21] The viceroy, in ignorance of the occurrences at Pachuca, on the 25th of April despatched 300 men with two howitzers to bring away the silver bars, and provide the place with coin and tobacco; but the force only reached San Cristóbal and returned on the 27th.

The repeated losses thus sustained by the royalists in the last two months greatly troubled Venegas, who in his correspondence with Calleja clearly intimated that the capture of Cuautla was a question of life or death. Had the insurgents acted together under one or more leaders, and on some uniform plan,

[20] The terms of capitulation were: All arms and valuables of the royal treasury, including upwards of 200 bars of silver, were to be surrendered, and in consideration thereof the lives of the soldiers and Spaniards were guaranteed, and passports were to be given the latter to go where they pleased. The troops were left free to join the revolution if they desired; many of the men and one Spaniard, named Videgaray, did so. *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, i. 369–73.

[21] Madera was left free and joined Las Piedras at Tulancingo. He was never again trusted with a command. The conde de Casa Alta, though carried to Sultepec, was suspected of having gone there not unwillingly because he was of the family of the late viceroy Iturrigaray, and had been his master of the horse. His subsequent conduct strengthened the suspicion. The count certainly remained with the independents till his death, which occurred shortly after from disease in a small town of Michoacan. The insurgents divided the booty; a portion of the bars were sent to Rayon, and a portion reserved for Morelos; some were coined by Osorno under Beristain's direction, at Zacatlan. It was stated that Serrano paid one silver bar for a pair of fancy shoes of the kind used by the country people at their feasts. The infringement of the capitulation at Pachuca, sustained by the junta at Sultepec, was an evidence that Doctor Cos' plan de guerra really had no weight with the existing powers. The Spaniards, with the exception of three who escaped, were shot. It was alleged that they had attempted to escape. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, ii. 577–81; iii. 152–3; *Zamacois, Hist. Mej.*, viii. 348–52; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 717–20.

while the government troops were kept so fully occupied by Morelos, the triumph of the cause would have been at once assured. But the men were not at hand for the emergency; that is, men capable of bringing that too watery mass into a state of concretion, such as to make it serviceable; and the result was that Calleja was allowed to take the place, dispersing the forces engaged in its defence, and leaving the royalist army free to operate in various directions, and to recover the lost towns. All this time that Morelos was nobly struggling for high principles, for liberty, humanity, freedom of thought, and independence of country, large numbers of so-called revolutionists were occupying themselves in labors little better than those of banditti, robbing, murdering, drinking, and gambling. The government was thus enabled to extricate itself from the painful situation late events had placed it in, and again to resume the offensive.

A few days after the siege of Cuautla had begun, there was a movement against the independent cause in the region known as tierra caliente del Sur, in the provinces of Mexico and Puebla. That part of the country had been occupied by Morelos after he defeated a number of royalist commanders, but his control of it was not continuous or assured. There were many towns still recognizing the viceregal authority; and as soon as Morelos found himself pent up in Cuautla, unable to detach any portion of his forces, his agents were soon expelled from the places where he had appointed them.[22]

The commander of the fifth division of southern militia, Francisco Páris, when on his way to reoccupy

[22] Most of the sugar estates in that country were owned by Spaniards, who, besides affording to a large number of inhabitants the means of earning a livelihood, had attached them by continued acts of kindness. Morelos had caused the seizure of estates, and placed in them overseers to receive the produce, whose value was applied to the support of the independent forces. But the employés and servants, when they saw that Morelos could send no support to the overseers, forthwith expelled them, and the control of the estates reverted to their owners. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, ii. 534–5.

the district of Tlapa toward the end of March 1812, was requested by Brigadier Bonavía, commanding at Oajaca, to keep within call, as the city was in danger, a large force of insurgents having entered the Mizteca country. That trouble being over, he again began his march, when a second detention occurred, caused by the insurgents having besieged Régules at Yanhuitlan. Caldelas was despatched to Régules' aid, but as the insurgents raised the siege and went to Huajuapan, those officers invested that town. March and April having passed, it was too late for the expedition to Tlapa, and Páris, aware that Régules and Caldelas had met at Huajuapan, concluded to take up a position at Ayutla, to watch the departure or flight of Morelos, who on being pursued must go by way of Tlapa if he retreated to the coast of Tecpan. He must pass, too, through Ayutla, and there Páris hoped to place him in check.[23] While there, the inhabitants of Chilapa, said to have been intensely loyal to the crown, on hearing of the approach of a royalist party from Ayutla, with the giant Martin Salmeron leading, struck a blow for the royal cause, seizing Francisco Montezuma, the subdelegado, and others of insurgent antecedents, and sent them as prisoners to Páris at Ayutla. Their example was followed at Tixtla, Mochitlan, Petaquillas, Quechultenango, and other neighboring towns; in consequence of which the independent chief Máximo Bravo, finding his position at Chilpancingo untenable, after the artillery and a few muskets had been taken to El Veladero, took refuge at the hacienda of Chichihualco, belonging to his family.[24] Páris placed Captain Manuel del Cerro in command at Chilapa, and Captain Añorve was also ordered there with a force to support him. Both officers at once organized

[23] See his report from Ometepec, April 11th, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 898–904.

[24] See Calleja's letter to the viceroy enclosing one of Máximo Bravo to his brother, the brigadier Miguel Bravo, of April 29, 1812, from Zumpango. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 491–4.

volunteer companies armed with the muskets that had been hidden when Morelos came. The same measures were adopted at Chilpancingo; indeed, immediately after Morelos escaped from Cuautla and his army became dispersed, there was a general movement throughout all that country in favor of the royal cause.

Among the officers thus dispersed were Leonardo Bravo, José Mariano de la Piedra, and Colonel Manuel Sosa with twenty men, whose whole armament consisted of seven muskets, three fowling-pieces, two pairs of pistols, and five sabres. Journeying south through the valley of Cuernavaca, they arrived, worn out with fatigue, on the 5th of May, three days from Cuautla, at the hacienda of San Gabriel, the property of the archroyalist Gabriel de Yermo, the greater portion of whose laboring men had been serving as teamsters and otherwise to Calleja's army. But the few left to take care of the hacienda were neither less loyal to the crown nor less attached to their employer. They had kept concealed, to meet an emergency, a four-pounder, some muskets, and ammunition for a few days' defence. Led by a Philippine Islander named Domingo Perez, or El Chino, they disarmed the few soldiers and fell upon Bravo and his companions. Bravo and Sosa attempted to defend themselves; the former was thrown down and bound and the latter killed on the spot. Piedra quietly surrendered.[25] The three were taken to the city of Mexico and there tried, their judge being that bitter enemy of the creoles, Oidor Bataller. Indeed,

[25]Calleja in his despatch of May 6th speaks of the capture of Piedra, Bravo, and Perez, the last named a lieutenant-colonel who with a small party of twelve, also fugitives from Cuautla, fell into the hands of the San Gabriel men a few days after the others. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 488, 722–4; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 13; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 73. An extract of the proceedings at the trial of Bravo and Piedra, published in the Diario de Méjico, Sept. 24th, shows the former to have been only a brigadier, and the latter to have had no military rank, though he had been employed collecting tithes under authority of Morelos, whose compadre he was. All the prisoners were sent to a place of safety in the barranca of Tilzapotla. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, ii. 535–7.

once consigned to his merciless justice, their fate was sealed; all three were shot on the 14th of September, in the campo del ejido.

Bravo's son Nicolás was the pride of his life. And the father was no less worshipped by the son. They were both men of a generous nature, no less lofty in their aims than self-sacrificing and brave in their methods of achieving them. Had they been anciently of Rome, they would have outdone all the Romans in deeds of true nobility. They were on the side of independence because they loved liberty, and would see their country delivered from this most hateful oppression. Gladly would the viceroy have showered on them his richest gifts had they been willing to serve Spain; but they preferred death with their country delivered, for they knew that some must die, and that thereby deliverance would come.

The viceroy desired specially to win to his side the chivalrous Nicolás, for there was no fairer specimen of youthful manhood to be found on the planet. He had already risen high as an insurgent leader, and enjoyed the fullest confidence and affection of Morelos. Venegas even offered Leonardo Bravo his life if he would prevail upon his son and brothers to abandon the revolution and accept amnesty.[26] But the Bravos were not the stuff slaves are made of. Leonardo spurned the offer. And so he died.[27]

It happened at this time that Nicolás Bravo had well secured in his camp three hundred Spaniards who were his prisoners. Some of them were officers

[26] Nicolás Bravo, though authorized by Morelos to save his father's life by accepting the proffered boon, declined, saying that he had lost faith in vice-regal pledges, for he remembered the brothers Orduña at Tepecuacuilco. The viceroy on his part refused the exchange tendered him by Morelos of a number of Spanish prisoners for Leonardo Bravo. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 259–61; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 140–1; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 161–2; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 191–5, 312–3.

[27] The Mexican government on the 19th of July, 1823, ordered a monument erected to the memory of the old patriot. The governor and ayuntamiento of the district of Mexico decreed Sept. 14, 1827, that the monument should be paid for out of the public funds; and the corner-stone was laid two days later by the junta patriotica of the capital. *Mex. Col. Ord. y Dec.*, ii. 149–51; *Cor. Fed. Mex.* (1812, Sept. 24), 2–3.

from Spain; some were wealthy hacendados; all of them loved life, as indeed had Leonardo Bravo. Nicolás Bravo's power over these prisoners was absolute. The humane Morelos, even, had told the young chieftain to have them shot, and so avenge his father's death. Venegas expected no less; and it shows at once the value placed upon a Bravo by the viceroy, and his indifference to human life, when he refused any number of captured Spaniards in exchange for Leonardo, as Morelos had offered.

But Nicolás could now have his just revenge; the custom of the war allowed it, and his general awarded it. Three hundred for one; and these not Indians or serfs, but good and pure blue-blooded Spaniards; after all, it was not such a mean price the cause would have for his dear old father's life. Calling them before him, he said:

"Your lives are forfeit. Your master, Spain's minion, has murdered my father, murdered him in cold blood for choosing Mexico and liberty before Spain and her tyrannies. Some of you are fathers, and may imagine what my father felt in being thrust from the world without one farewell word from his son—ay! and your sons may feel a portion of that anguish of soul which fills my breast, as thoughts arise of my father's wrongs and cruel death.

"And what a master is this you serve! For one life, my poor father's, he might have saved you all, and would not. So deadly is his hate that he would sacrifice three hundred of his friends rather than forego this one sweet morsel of vengeance. Even I, who am no viceroy, have three hundred lives for my father's. But there is yet a nobler revenge than all. Go, you are free! Go find your vile master, and henceforth serve him, if you can!"

The inhabitants of Tasco, who were royalists, following the example of the Chilapans, roused themselves to action for the king; those of Iguala and

Tepecuacuilco did the same. Royalist companies were hurriedly organized in the haciendas and towns of the cañada de Cuernavaca, who engaged in a hot war on the independents. Thus the whole country from La Cruz del Marqués to the approaches of the port of Acapulco now recognized the viceregal government. The Indians dwelling in the towns near Cuautla, after the place was occupied by Calleja, presented themselves with their curas, petitioning for amnesty, which was granted them.

Viceroy Venegas, with the view of winning the inhabitants of the south to the royal cause, proclaimed on the 11th of May that the course of Morelos at Cuautla, in preferring to suffer misery rather than surrender, was an inhuman act. He depicted him as a cruel man, who had forced the people of Cuautla to perish from famine. These and many other things did he say to blacken Morelos' character. The proclamation ended with a tender of general pardon and forgetfulness of the past to all who would forsake the independent ranks, together with a reward for the capture of Morelos.[28] It carried with it likewise the threat of certain and pitiless punishment to all who refused. The offer of amnesty was accompanied for greater effect with a pastoral letter of the ecclesiastical chapter ruling the diocese of Mexico after Archbishop Lizana's death. After the fall of Cuautla, there being no further need in this vicinity for Calleja and his army, he returned to Mexico, Llano's division going to Puebla. Fourteen days after his victory, on the 16th of May, Calleja, being quite ill, entered Mexico in a carriage. The artillery, standards, and other military trophies taken at Cuautla were carried in triumph. The prisoners were in the centre of the division. Notwithstanding the apparent satisfaction with the result of the Cuautla cam-

[28] 'Si hubiese alguno de vosotros que logre aherrojar la fugitiva fiera...el gobierno os ofrece una recompensa honrosa, útil, y proporcionada,' for liberating the world of 'uno de los mayores monstruos que ha abortado.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 503–5.

paign and the air of triumph given it, the acerbity existing between Venegas and Calleja became still more imbittered with the fiasco of Morelos' escape; and the former did not miss the opportunity to wound his rival's feelings.[29] The army of the centre was dissolved, and Calleja resigned. The troops were incorporated in the garrison of the capital, and thereafter were under the immediate orders of the mayor general, Conde de Alcaraz.[30]

Venegas now set himself about recovering the places the independents had seized; and to that end he formed a plan of campaign from which he expected brilliant results. But the point about which he felt particular anxiety at this time was Toluca. Soon after the supreme junta settled in Sultepec, leaving his colleagues Liceaga and Verdusco there, the president, Rayon, had placed himself at the head of a respectable number of troops, with his headquarters at the hacienda of La Huerta, and early in April appeared before Toluca with the view of taking the city. The comandante, Porlier, having only 700 men was forced to concentrate them in the town to meet the emergency, also putting the citizens under arms to aid in the defence. Rayon fortified the surrounding positions, cut off communications with Mexico, and constantly threatened the town, against which he made several vigorous though unsuccessful assaults.[31] The viceroy, as before stated, had not lost

[29] Venegas, answering Calleja's confidential letter wherein he exaggerated his victory at Cuautla, thus slurs him: 'Let us be thankful to that good-natured clergyman for having spared us the shame of raising the siege.' Among the imputations against Calleja, perhaps not the least well grounded was that of the enormous expenditures he incurred on his expeditions. The expenses of the Cuautla siege, according to official documents, amounted to two million dollars, an enormous sum, obtained in the usual way by exactions. *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 118–19.

[30] The viceroy, with the double view of utilizing the troops, and of depriving Calleja of their support, diminished the garrison, despatching many parties into the country. He was well informed of what was taking place in Calleja's house. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 13–14.

[31] On the 18th of April Rayon lost in one of his failures a portion of his artillery, and had to retire to Amatepec, between Toluca and Lerma, and set fire to the hacienda La Garcesa. *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 41–2.

sight of the place, and after allowing the army of the centre two days' rest, despatched about 1,500 men—of whom a number were taken out of jail, and others from among the insurgent prisoners—under Colonel Joaquin del Castillo y Bustamante, with seven guns. Castillo tried on the 19th of May to force the pass of Lerma, and failed. The city of Lerma was situated in the middle of the lake formed by the Rio Grande, communicating with Toluca on one side and with the road to Mexico on the other by means of two narrow causeways, one of which was defended by cuts and parapets supported by artillery. Throwing a bridge over the first cut, the assailants captured the parapets, when they encountered other intrenchments that Castillo had no knowledge of; and the consequence was a precipitate retreat with heavy loss to their encampment in the hacienda of Jajalpa.[32]

The insurgents gave this affair an undue importance, and Rayon was much censured for not taking advantage of his victory.[33] Castillo being reënforced with 400 men, two field-guns, and a howitzer, made a second attack, when Rayon abandoned the position in the night of the 22d of May, retreating with his force and artillery to the strong position of Tenango. Castillo tarried in Lerma only long enough to destroy its defences, reaching Toluca on the 26th of May. After driving away the prowling bands that kept supplies from the town, and having increased his force from the garrison, he marched against Tenango, camping on the 2d of June in the hacienda of San Agustin,

[32] This reverse was attributed to lack of skill on Castillo's part, his occupation prior to the war having been that of a trader. Porlier had written that the reënforcements should be sent him by another route, but his letters had been intercepted. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 142–5; *Mendibil, Resúm. Hist.*, 121-8; *El Ilustrador Americano*, no. 1, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iv. 174–5.

[33] The defenders of the pass were commanded by Juan Manuel Alcántara, a man who could neither read nor write, and who, according to Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 99, 122–8, sold to Canon Velasco for two horses the glory of having his name inserted in the newspapers of Sultepec as the hero of that action; evidently a false story that of the sale, Velasco's report to Rayon giving Alcántara full credit for his defence of the position.

from which he could see the hill surmounted with artillery and defended by a large army. Castillo then moved his camp opposite the town. During the night of June 5th he directed Enriquez with the cazadores de Lovera and the grenadiers and cazadores de Méjico and Tres Villas to ascend the hill by the Tenancingo road, while Calvillo distracted the enemy's attention by threatening to assail the town, and Aguirre feigned an attack on the Veladero, a point defended by the cura Correa. No precautions against surprise had been taken by the insurgents, and the first intimation they had of an attack was when they saw close upon their batteries Enriquez with his troops guided by Vicente Filisola at the head of the cazadores de Méjico. At the sound of the trumpets of the cazadores de Lovera, which the insurgents heard for the first time, a panic seized them, and without making the slightest resistance they turned and fled. Calvillo then occupied the town, and Aguirre captured the Veladero.[34] The insurgents sustained a heavy loss. Among the killed were colonels Camacho and Anaya. The royalist casualties were only a few wounded.

The defeat at Tenango deeply affected the friends of the revolution in the cities occupied by the viceregal government, and greatly lowered the prestige of the cause. Indeed, the members of the secret clubs had expected the forces at Tenango to march on the capital, and so end the struggle. Now all was bitter disappointment.

The victorious Castillo hastened to take advantage of the enemy's defeat, despatching next day José

[34] The insurgent account, not entitled to credence, says that only 500 men defended the hill and town, and that they lost barely 60 men from the 2d to the 6th. *El Ilustrador Am.*, 1812, June 13, no. 6; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iv. 232. The royalists found much war material and provisions; also a quantity of printed matter, and Rayon's correspondence. The latter fled down a ravine; but the young men, among them two lawyers that left Mexico to join him and had not yet learned to run away, were taken, and together with the other prisoners were shot. Among those thus put to death was the vicar of the place, Father Tirado, who being fond of hunting had a fowling piece in his house. *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, ii. 125; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 145–6; *Rivera, Gob. Mex.*, ii. 41.

Calafat to occupy the fortified towns of Tenancingo and Tecualoya. Calafat found them both abandoned, and was met by the curates and inhabitants, who manifested great joy at his coming.[35]

Other heavy blows the cause of independence suffered at this time, not the least of which was the discovery by the viceregal government that there were persons in the capital laboring against it. An insignificant party of royalist lancers, thirty-six in number, returning from Lerma to Cuajimalpa, encountered in the monte de las Cruces an insurrectionary party of 500 infantry and cavalry with two guns, commanded by a Frenchman named Laylson and three priests. The royalists made a dash and dispersed the party, slaying several and taking five prisoners, besides the guns, several muskets, ammunition, six mules laden with clothing, twenty saddled horses, and Laylson's papers, among which was Rayon's correspondence with the Guadalupe club.[36] Among Rayon's captured letters were a number revealing the political relations between members of that society and the chiefs of the revolution. Several persons were arrested on the 30th of June, but were released after a few days' imprisonment.

The royalist commander, Castillo y Bustamante, after taking Tenango rested a few days, and then returned to Toluca, where he began active preparations for a campaign against Sultepec, hoping to capture the members of the revolutionary junta. The district affording large resources, and the junta having no reason to fear surprise from the viceroy's troops, Liceaga and Verdusco had busied themselves in providing war material, while indulging in the formulas

[35] The Indians aided his men in taking down the intrenchments. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. no. 250, 665–8.

[36] The gallantry of the victors was highly appreciated in government circles, and a subscription of $2,793 was raised to give them a substantial reward. The lieutenant got $260; the ensign, $224; the sergeant, $108; the corporal, $88; each private, $57; two wounded privates, $87½ each. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 571, 596, 618–20, 668.

of government.[37] There was much dissension among the members, Rayon's failure at Toluca contributing to bad feeling; for Rayon laid the responsibility of the failure on Liceaga for not keeping him supplied with ammunition. Liceaga, on his side, in a letter to Rayon, showed much displeasure at the appointment of Cos as vicario castrense.[38] Rayon's defeat at Tenango still more increased the ill feeling, and tended toward the dispersion of the junta, which soon followed. Rayon, foreseeing that Castillo would soon come against them, prevailed on his colleagues at Tiripitío to separate, Liceaga going to Guanajuato as general of the northern provinces, and Verdusco to Michoacan as general of the western division, while Morelos should have command of the south, and Rayon himself retire to his own home, Tlalpujahua, to fortify it, and carry on thence operations in the province of Mexico.[39] All were to raise as many troops as possible.

These measures accomplished, they were again to meet at such place as should be agreed upon. Informed that Castillo had begun his march from Toluca on the 16th of June, Rayon departed next day for Tlalpujahua, taking with him the printing materials, artillery, and everything of value that could be trans-

[37] Padre Bringas, in his arguments against Doctor Cos' plans, says that Liceaga and Verdusco during the holy week observed the same ceremonial as the viceroy at the cathedral of Mexico; and that Verdusco presented himself to receive the communion in a general's uniform with a clergyman's stole. Alaman, on the authority of Father José María Salazar, a friar of San Diego, denies the statement, saying that Verdusco appeared simply in his ecclesiastical robe. *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 150. Among the junta's acts was one appointing Doctor Cos vicario castrense, who removed several priests from their parishes, arrested and sentenced to the chain-gang some ecclesiastics, and granted marriage dispensations. This brought out an energetic decree of the diocesan chapter of Mexico, declaring his acts null, and fulminating censures. This same body recommended to the viceroy the removal of Father Correa from Nopala, and the deprivation of his prebend in the colegiata of Guadalupe from Doctor Velasco. Both priests were excommunicated for having joined the insurgents. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 709, 711.

[38] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 122; *Bringas, Impugn.; Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, ii. 443–5.

[39] An act to that effect was adopted on the 16th of June, and published by edict, and in *El Ilustrador Americano* of the 20th of June. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iv. 280–1; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 260–2; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 149–53; *Rivera, Gob. Mex.*, ii. 41.

ported. Liceaga and Verdusco did the same soon after, the former bound to the bajío of Guanajuato, as before stated, and the latter to Huétamo. The enemy used every effort to capture them, but the natural difficulties of a march in the sierra, rendered still worse by heavy rains, greatly favored the revolutionists, as it took the royalists four days to travel forty-eight miles, the distance between Toluca and Sultepec; so that when they reached the latter place on the 20th of June, it was found abandoned. Several priests and a few citizens who had previously kept in concealment, fearing persecution, reported themselves to the royalists, and through their influence the population of the town returned. Castillo destroyed the factories of cannon and gunpowder; granted amnesty to all insurgents who petitioned for it; organized a military court; and had all prisoners sentenced by it shot. He reëstablished the local government; gathered a considerable quantity of artillery and other arms and ammunition that the independents had left, and sent them to Mexico. The trophies, showing the advantages lately gained, which included thirty-one pieces of artillery captured at Tenango and found in Sultepec, were conveyed in triumph through the capital.[40] Castillo then divided his force into several columns, one of which under Enriquez was sent in pursuit of the revolutionary junta, which having had so much the start could not be overtaken. Enriquez, however, succeeded in coming up with Rayon's artillery and capturing five guns.

One party under José Calafat went to Zacualpan, placed itself in communication with troops at Tasco, and kept that mining district well provided. Rafael Calvillo, acting with great activity, sent detachments to Tejupilco and places near Zitácuaro, and brought under subjection all the towns of the sierra. Aguirre and Pardo with other parties kept up an

[40] Particulars are given in the commander's report from Toluca, August 8th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 905–20.

active warfare against insurgents. Castillo himself extended operations in the direction of Ixtlahuaca, left garrisons in the important places, and returned to Toluca. Several unimportant encounters followed. It may be said, however, that from this time the whole valley of Toluca for thirty leagues as far as Ixtlahuaca, was subject to the viceroy's authority, and communication was open with Mexico.

CHAPTER XVII.

RAYON PRESIDENT. MORELOS IN THE SOUTH.

1812.

President Rayon at Tlalpujahua—His Relations with the Villagranes—Royalist Successes in the North of Mexico—Affairs in Michoacan—Father Salto and his Execution—Venegas' Sanguinary Decree—Insurgent Priests Deprived of their Immunity—Episcopal Interference—Excitement in Mexico—Second Anniversary of Independence Celebrated—Ramon Rayon's Profitable Movements—Attack against Ixmiquilpan a Failure—Rayon's Arrangements with English Traders—Fruitless Negotiations for Peace—Assault of Yanhuitlan—Siege of Huajuapan—Trujano's Brilliant Defence—Morelos Comes to the Rescue and Wins a Victory—Gates of Oajaca Opened to Him.

The president of the supreme junta, Ignacio Rayon, had meanwhile established his headquarters at Tlalpujahua, upon a hill called El Gallo, and fortified it. He raised troops, and extended his authority to the districts near and surrounding the province of Mexico, as well as to those on the east.[1] The town of Ixtlahuaca, to which the viceroy's sway extended, as before stated, became thus the frontier of the territory ruled over by Rayon from Tlalpujahua.

Having described the military operations which culminated with the restoration of the viceregal authority in the valley of Toluca and the regions near, as well as to the south-west of Mexico, I will now

[1] The Gallo hill near Angangueo, deemed impregnable, was further strengthened and a factory of arms established there. The president's four brothers greatly assisted him. Ramon Rayon had previously established another manufactory of arms in El Gallo, a post chosen by himself, at which many men were [illegible]

[illegible]

speak of those on the north of the capital.[2] Various columns of royalist troops having been concentrated under Domingo Clavarino,[3] he retook Pachuca without resistance on the 10th of May, 1812; after which he resolved to recover the neighboring places, such as Real del Monte, El Chico, and Atotonilco el Grande, after placing himself in communication with Colonel Piedras commanding at Tulancingo. Accompanied by Madera, former commander of Pachuca, he marched on Atotonilco the 21st of May, and broke up the insurgent force assembled there, capturing eleven guns, of which six were of brass, taken from the royalists at Pachuca and Real del Monte, one culverin made in Seville, and four of lead.[4] Clavarino published and granted the amnesty; and after destroying a factory of artillery at Real del Monte, established there by the tribunal de minería under the skilful Flemish machinist, La Chaussée, returned to Pachuca, where a garrison was placed. Meantime, while Piedras was aiding Clavarino in his operations against Atotonilco, the insurgents under Villagran, Serrano, Osorno, Cañas, Anaya, Espinosa, and Gonzalez attacked Tulancingo, and kept up a fire on the town for six days, causing much damage. But owing to the successful sallies made by the garrison, and to the approach of Clavarino, the assailants retired. A portion of them were overtaken, however, on the plain of Zacatepec by Llorente's cavalry, and a large number killed.[5] In Mexico Tulancingo had been considered

[2] The viceroy's authority was now in these regions paramount everywhere except in Zimapan and Izúcar; the latter protected from attack more by fear on the part of the royalists, who had been so often defeated there, than by the insurgent force existing in the place.

[3] Before this, one of his officers, Captain Rafael Casasola, on Palm-Sunday, March 21st, marched to Alfajayucan, where the people, whom he qualifies as rebels, were assembled on market-day, entered the place unresisted, killed 150 peaceable persons, took possession of all the coin and other effects which he distributed among his men, and then returned to Ixmiquilpan. See Casasola's report of March 24th, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 334–6.

[4] Clavarino's report of May 22d, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 557–61.

[5] Llorente's report says that the plain to the extent of two leagues was strewn with the slain; 164 prisoners were taken, among them many wounded; only 15 or 20 horsemen escaped. His casualties were, two privates wounded

as lost, and the viceroy hastened to send Clavarino the Guanajuato battalion to render that place and Pachuca secure. With this force Clavarino extended his operations to the plains of Apam, dislodged the insurgents from Calpulalpan, and defeated them at Irolo on the 24th of June. These advantages were counterbalanced by the defeat of Samaniego at Zacatlan, where he ran great risk of being completely undone. The insurgents were beaten in several other petty encounters; yet in the latter part of September, notwithstanding the loss of Pachuca, they were masters of the plains of Apam, and Osorno held Zacatlan, whence his soldiers overran the country in various directions.

Now, more than ever before, perhaps, this revolution, begun at Dolores by Hidalgo and Allende, and continued by Morelos, Rayon, and others, was assuming the form of a continual succession of minor battles and skirmishes. There was a fight in one province or another almost every day, and often in several provinces at the same time. As long as the revolutionists could not or would not concentrate, the royalists were obliged to scatter themselves throughout the land. And so all over Mexico war became chronic. In Michoacan the insurrectionary forces had become greatly increased, and frequently advanced to the gates of Valladolid, committing hostilities and stopping supplies as heretofore. The royalist commander, bent on their destruction, had detached several bodies of troops from the garrison to pursue them. Two of these detachments were commanded respectively by Manuel de la Concha and Juan Pesquera. Concha on the 17th of April occupied Cocupao, capturing there Father Vicente Ochoa, a mariscal de campo, whom he took to Valladolid. He also found in the place Colonel Caballero and fifteen other insurgents,

and four patriots contused: 'No habiendo quedado un solo individuo que no haya teñido en sangre enemiga su sable, lanza ó bayoneta.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 687–8.

whom he shot; after which he marched on to Tzintzuntzan and Pátzcuaro, where he ordered other executions.[6] Captain Pesquera approached the line of Guanajuato, where the combination was made for the capture of Albino García; and later, on the 7th of May, was directed to look after and bring in as a prisoner the clergyman José Guadalupe Salto, ex-vicar of Teremendo, who had found refuge in a cave,[7] at the entrance of which he was overtaken by Pesquera's soldiers. It is said that he then cried out, "Do not kill me; I am a minister of Christ," at the same time thrusting a lance into one of the soldiers, and began defending himself from the inside of the cave. The soldiers fired; and entering the cave found Salto on the ground with a bullet through his body, and by his side two women whom he had been holding as prisoners. Pesquera had the wounded man conveyed on a bed to Valladolid, where, by order of Trujillo, he was executed the next day.[8]

The revolution, having been begun by an ecclesiastic, had from its incipiency many members of the clergy, both secular and regular, among its leaders; and it may be said that at this time the war was kept up almost wholly by them.[9] There was hardly a bat-

[6] Concha's report, May 4th, to Col. Trujillo. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 604–6.

[7] Father Salto bore the reputation of a man of exemplary virtue, who was persecuted by the government because he had a brother who was a colonel among the independents, and early in April 1811 imprisoned. He was afterward pardoned and released, but fearing re-arrest concealed himself. At the end of five months he appealed in writing to Bishop-elect Abad y Queipo for protection, pleading his innocence and sufferings, which petition was unheeded. Salto was then commissioned as a colonel of the independent forces on the 1st of April, 1812. He was accused of horrid crimes, among them the murder by his instigation of forty wounded royalists, together with their attendants, in the hacienda del Tecacho. *Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist.*, in *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 211. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 155, denies that Salto ever committed any offence—'no era criminal, ni habia motivo para perseguirlo como á una fiera'—and charges Abad with sacrificing him to curry favor with Venegas and Trujillo.

[8] Trujillo notified Bishop Abad, and said that on no account would he extend the time. The bishop waived the formal degradation. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 607–14. The prisoner was carried on a bed to the scaffold, and garroted, and then shot. *Castillo Negrete, Mex.*, v. 47–57; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 213.

[9] Some of them bore nicknames significant of habits not the most exemplary; one was called Padre Chinguirito, or dram of rum; another, Padre Caballo flaco; a third, Padre Chocolate. *Zamacois, Hist. Mex.*, viii. 400.

tle in which priests were not found acting as leading officers. Notwithstanding this well established fact, Viceroy Venegas had hitherto abstained from publicly issuing any decree regarding them, though he had circulated orders to the commanders of royal troops to shoot all priests that fell prisoners into their hands. But these orders had rarely been carried out. In the case of Father Hidalgo, we have seen that his execution was pursuant to a regular sentence, after he had been tried and all ecclesiastical formalities observed. Some leaders, however, exasperated at encountering hostile priests everywhere, had disregarded their cloth, and without ado despatched them to their long home.[10] Others, among them Tovar at San Luis Potosí with respect to Father Zimarripa, had with their reports placed the viceroy under the necessity of decisive action. After consulting the real acuerdo, fourteen of whose fifteen members had expressed the same opinion, at the petition of the crown's counsel and with the concurrence of the military and naval auditores, the viceroy published an edict on the 25th of June, declaring amenable to the military jurisdiction all persons who had made or should thereafter make resistance to the king's troops, whatever might be their rank, status, or condition; and ordering that such offenders should be tried by the ordinary courts-martial composed of officers of the division or detachment that effected the capture, and referring the case with the proceedings had thereon to the viceroy for his final decision. This restriction, if faithfully carried out, would have averted many arbitrary acts; unfortunately it was nullified by the freedom allowed commanders to execute sentences without first obtaining the viceregal sanction, when roads were intercepted or circumstances demanded a prompt example.[11]

[10] Calvillo shot Padre Tirado at Tenango; and recently Trujillo did the same with Salto.

[11] The penalty of being shot to death was, according to this decree, to be inflicted, without giving more time than was necessary to prepare for death

As the provisions of this bloody edict had been all along practised in regard to insurgents generally, they would not have excited any particular attention but for the clauses touching the ecclesiastics, in whom they produced a deep impression;[12] the bishops being

as christians, on leaders, in whatever number; on officers from and including sub-lieutenants up; on all who engaged in mustering men to serve the revolution; ecclesiastics, whether secular or regular, who had taken part or served in the revolution with whatever title or office, that of chaplain inclusive; and the editors of gazettes or publishers of incendiary documents. Those who were not leaders, but had committed hostilities against the royal troops, without any excuse to screen them from capital punishment, were to be decimated; such as were spared by lot from death, and such as were not subject to capital punishment by the clauses of the edict, were to be sent to the viceroy, circumstances permitting it; but if there should occur any obstacle, then each commander was authorized to dispose of them as he might deem best without subjection to rules, which could not be prescribed for all cases. Ecclesiastics captured while in arms against the royal forces were to be tried and executed without the formality of degradation. These clauses were grounded on the principle set forth in the edict itself, that respecting the head men no risk was incurred of punishing the innocent, nor of inflicting excessive punishment, 'por ser todos verdaderos bandidos, anatematizados por la iglesia y proscriptos por el gobierno, á quienes por lo mismo puede quitar la vida qualquiera impunemente.' In regard to those who were to be decimated, it was stated that this was strictly in conformity with the military ordinances, and counselled by sound reason, when the number of guilty ones was large. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 685–7; *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, v. 98–101; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 134–5; *Puente, P., Reflexiones*, 1–243, etc.; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 41; *Cedulario*, i. 97.

[12] A representation, written by Licenciado Bernardo Gonzalez Angulo, legal adviser of the artillery department, was laid before the ecclesiastical chapter of Mexico, asking for its action on behalf of their fueros. The petition gave rise to meetings and discussions of the chapter; but all ended in nothing, owing to pressure from superior authority. The chapter had a full meeting on the 30th of June to discuss whether some step should be taken in defence of ecclesiastical immunity, but it was decided under present circumstances to be inexpedient to act. On this becoming known, 110 members of the secular clergy laid before the chapter on the 7th of July a demand for the protection of their rights; among the subscribers were nearly all the parish priests of the capital, many outside of it, several doctors of divinity, and other distinguished clergymen. The chapter referred it to Doctor Sanchez, the promotor fiscal, who pronounced it an asonada, or attempt at rebellion. On the viceroy hearing of the matter, he demanded the surrender of the documents, which were referred to the royal council, and from the latter to the crown's counsel, who called for the arrest of Gonzalez Angulo; he had concealed himself, and Villalpando, for having taken a marked part in the affair, was imprisoned. Of the priests who had signed their names, fifteen made a formal retraction. However, it was decided to present another representation that was to be drawn by Medrano; but Bataller, president of the junta de seguridad, wanted the signers to insert therein their hatred of Morelos and of the principles of the revolution. All refused their assent to a clause so entirely disconnected with the object of the representation. Much had been written on the subject, both for and against. The Spanish Franciscan friar José Joaquin de Oyarzábal, in *Notas sobre la representacion del clero*, ridiculed the representation, and was answered in *Vindicacion del clero Mexicano vulnerado* by J. J. Garcia Torres, and by Oidor Puente in a 4°

mostly royalists or time-servers made no move in the matter. In later years they showed more spirit in claiming their rights or privileges, even to the pitch of fulminating anathemas against measures that did not concern religion. The revolutionary authorities, it must be acknowledged, had not on their part shown much better treatment to priests whose leanings were toward the royalist cause.[13]

It is now time to return to Tlalpujahua, where we left the president of the supreme junta engaged in fortifying his camp and making preparations for an active campaign. From his headquarters he kept up a correspondence with the guadalupes in Mexico, and with Morelos and other military chieftains. With the double view of rousing the inhabitants of the territory under his sway, and of securing the obedience, heretofore doubtful, of the Villagranes, Rayon left Tlalpujahua on the 26th of August, taking with him printing material for issuing proclamations and other docu-

volume of 243 pages entitled *Reflexiones sobre el bando de 25 de Junio.* Venegas, to avert further trouble, allowed the matter to drop, and never had his edict carried out at the capital; so that no ecclesiastic was ever executed there till after the independence. The agitation in Mexico was great, and the junta de seguridad was the object of popular execration, which was made manifest in an attempt in open day to assassinate Bataller, and in many other ways. See *Arechederreta, Apunt. Hist.*, considered very reliable upon events occurring in the capital. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 214–20.

[13] A list of the cases of Fathers Bustamante, Estavillo, Flores, and others appears in *Bringas, Impugn. Manif. Dr Cos*, 47–8. From this time we have an insurgent source to draw from, in the form of a *Diario de gobierno y operaciones militares de la secretaría y ejército al mando del Exmo Sr presidente de la suprema junta y ministro universal de la nacion, Lic. D. Ignacio Lopez Rayon.* It begins on the first day of Aug. 1812, and ends on the 6th of Sept. 1814, and seems to have been kept by Rayon's secretary, José Ignacio Oyarzábal. The original is supposed to have been in the possession of Licenciado Ignacio Rayon, the general's son, and a full copy of it appears in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 614–84. The first event therein recorded, on the 5th of Aug., is the destruction of a town called San Agustin, near Actopan, for its leanings to the viceregal authority. Captain Rosillo with 50 men attacked the royalists, killing 53 in the action, and capturing two leaders, whom he shot, and finally destroying the place by fire. A royalist commandor, Fernandez, reported that a Captain José Antonio Zamora had been on the 1[illegible] at the town, and shot 13 loyal Indians before the eyes of their f[illegible] he, Fernandez, pursued Zamora and his party, overtook th[illegible] Zamora and fourteen others, taking 25 prisoners, most of who[illegible] anded. Three had already died. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 843–4.

ments to fire the hearts of the people. After inspecting the fortifications and manufactory of arms on the Nadó hill he continued his march, being the object of popular ovations everywhere. In Huichapan, where he arrived the 13th of September, the marks of respect and loyalty were such as a king might have been proud of. At all his public acts he was accompanied by José María Villagran, generally known as El Chito, whom he had recently commissioned as a mariscal de campo, giving at the same time to his father, Julian Villagran, who kept himself in Zimapan and the surrounding country, the rank of lieutenant-general. Rayon resolved to celebrate here the second anniversary of Mexican independence, September 16th, in a manner worthy of the occasion, and as well as the resources of the place would permit.[14] In this connection there was published, not on the 16th of September though bearing that date, but shortly after Rayon's return to Tlalpujahua, a manifesto sent him already prepared from the city of Mexico.[15] It purported to be a picture of the situation, and a narrative of the events that took place in Mexico from the beginning of the struggle to the day of its date. It may have served its purpose to awaken the enthusiasm of the masses in favor of the cause of independence, and to inspire courage in its defenders for further sacrifices of blood, treasure, and the enjoyments of home life; but as a historical document it is worthless, every statement in it being inexact, and evidently dictated by the spirit of partisanship. And indeed, in this respect it is about on an equality with hundreds of writings issued at this time by the viceregal government, its servants, partisans, and sycophants, none of which are entitled to the slightest

[14] There was a high mass attended by Rayon and his officers and guard of honor. The sermon was preached by the brigadier Reverend Doctor Francisco Guerrero. After the religious ceremonies there [illegible] public amusements, ringing of bells, firing of guns, and in the [illegible]d ag[illegible] [illegible]ions.

[15] Issued from the Palacio Nacional de [illegible]so[illegible] [illegible]gned by Lic. Ignacio Rayon, presidente, and countersigned by Jose [illegible]lyarzábal, secretario. Full copy in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 307-15, [illegible]-57.

credence, as systematic lying was a part of the governmental policy.

The president's brother, General Ramon Lopez Rayon, commanding the district of Tlalpujahua, had been no less active, often making excursions to the country lying between Querétaro and Mexico, or between the former and Valladolid. In one of those excursions he signally defeated an archroyalist captain named Mariano Ferrer[16] at El Salitre, and took him prisoner. Immediately afterward he marched on Jerécuaro and took the place, together with two guns, a large number of muskets, ammunition, and nearly 100 prisoners, all of whom were conveyed to the hacienda of Tepustepec, where the president then was. Ferrer and five others were shot on the 4th of September. The rest joined Rayon's force, and a few of them who afterward deserted and were captured paid the penalty of the desertion with their lives. That same year Ramon Rayon attacked at San Juan del Rio 600 royalists, who were escorting a large herd of sheep and cattle bound to Mexico, dispersed them with some casualties, and captured the whole property.[17]

Most favorable results were obtained in some quarters that will be given at length. They were in a great measure due to the spirit of union, unselfishness, and surbordination to their commanders shown by the officers and men. But in other parts, where rivalry, arising from personal ambition and leading to bickerings, divided counsels, and a wanton disregard of all superior authority existed, disappointments and disasters naturally followed.

[16] This man's life was saved by Abasolo's wife at Dolores, Sept. 10, 1811. He was a brother of the lawyer José Antonio Ferrer, who had on the 29th of Aug. of the same year been put to death by the garrote in Mexico, for being mixed up in the plot against Venegas. The two brothers had different political views. The one who was a royalist was active in his operations, and had done considerable harm to the independents, having caused many of its supporters to be shot.

[17] If we are to believe the account as recorded by the independent government, Rayon killed 27 of the enemy, wounded a number of them, and took ten prisoners, besides 20,000 head of sheep, 200 of cattle, a quantity of laden pack-mules, and some arms. *Diario de Operac.* (1812, Dec. 11), in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 628; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 155.

I have already spoken of the friendly reception extended by Villagran at Huichapan to the president of the junta, which led the latter to believe that his orders would be respected and obeyed in that quarter. Acting under this conviction, Rayon resolved to attack Ixmiquilpan, a wealthy town, and quite friendly to the viceregal government, whose garrison consisted of a small detachment of line troops and the companies of patriots, all of whom were determined to fight to the last. Their commander was Rafael Casasola, in whom they had full confidence. Rayon started from Huichapan on the 15th of October with a regiment of well equipped infantry, whose colonel was José María Lobato.[18] The cavalry was under Epitacio Sanchez, a brave man; and the artillery, consisting of four pieces, was in charge of a competent officer, with the requisite number of skilled men to manage it. Together with these troops were Villagran's men; and at the hacienda Astillero they were joined by the forces of Father Correa and Polo. Rayon appeared before Ixmiquilpan on the 18th of October, and occupied the most convenient points for attack. From one of these points, the Media Luna hill, Casasola endeavored to dislodge the independents, but was driven off with heavy loss. Rayon demanded surrender within two hours, under guarantees of life, liberty, and property to all, including the Spaniards, if they took the oath of allegiance; otherwise he would take the town by assault and put the inhabitants to the sword. The royalists, remembering the violated pledges of five months before to the prisoners of Pachuca, turned a deaf ear to Rayon's proposal, Casasola returning a haughty answer.[19] Early next morning the inde-

[18] He had been a corporal of the royalist regiment Tres Villas, and being made a prisoner at Zitácuaro joined the independents, and was promoted from time to time till he attained his present rank. Later he became a general, and figured in the early years of the republic.

[19] He had brave men with arms and ammunition to defend their lives and homes; he would never surrender to 'bandidos indignos de merecer ni aun su

pendents made vigorous assaults; Correa and Lobato in the afternoon succeeded in possessing themselves of two parapets, where they waited some time, under the heavy fire of the royalists from the third line of defences, for reënforcements under Villagran that would enable them to advance farther. But as none came, and night was approaching, they retreated in good order. During the night silence reigned in the independents' camps. But Casasola, apprehending it might be a ruse to draw him out, kept a watchful eye within his intrenchment. The next morning no enemy was in sight; and news soon was brought to the town that Rayon and his army were fairly on the way to Huichapan.[20] On arriving at this place in advance of his division, Rayon seriously reprimanded Villagran for his violation of orders. The latter made no reply, but resolved to avenge forthwith what he deemed an insult from one whose authority he held in contempt. He ordered the drawbridges to be raised, and called his men to arms to seize the president and his escort before his troops arrived. But Rayon, mistrusting the movements around him, visited the barracks at once and managed to have his superior authority recognized and his orders obeyed. Villagran seeing his designs frustrated fled with twenty of his accomplices. The failure to capture Ixmiquilpan and Villagran's mutinous course filled the president with grief, and he returned to Tlalpujahua.

The Chito did not abandon his purpose of wreaking vengeance on Rayon and his friends. He relent-

firma entera. Casasola.' This answer and Rayon's demand appear in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iv. 633; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1131–2.

[20] Bustamante expressed the belief that Rayon's retreat was caused by the receipt of a letter summoning him to a conference with envoys from Venegas at the Tultenango hacienda. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 235–9. He is evidently mistaken. Correa's report attributed their ill success to Villagran's failure to coöperate, and the precipitate retreat of his men, which is also alluded to by Rayon's secretary. Rayon certainly went to Huichapan, which carried him away from Tultenango. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 345–8; *Diario de Operac.*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 298, 622–3. Whatever the cause of the retreat, it was fortunate for Casasola, who had lost about 100 men of the garrison.

lessly persecuted the latter, and Cura Correa, who for his gallantry had been promoted to mariscal de campo, had to flee to Nopala, and thence to Chapa de Mota. From this time the Villagranes were again masters of the whole country extending from San Juan del Rio and Cuesta de Tula to the sierra de Zimapan; from which we must conclude that the elder, who had been supposed to disapprove of his son's course on the 22d of October, had taken no pains to check his unjustifiable career.[21] The younger, however, in due time thought over the matter, and

SEAT OF WAR.

concluding that nothing was to be gained by going counter to recognized authority sought reconciliation through the agency of two clergymen.[22] To this Rayon was well disposed; but he answered that Villagran's future good conduct would be accepted as his

[21] Rayon's secretary, at the time that both father and son were given high military rank, recorded that they were rewarded for good service rendered the national cause in the north; now El Chito was called an 'alevoso, ingrato á los beneficios recibidos,' who had acted as he did 'para entregarse sin estorbo á su libertinaje, arbitrariedad y escesos con que ha desolado estos contornos.' *Diario de Operac.*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 614, 623; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 161–2; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 348–51.

[22] The secretary says the priests made a warm intercession. *Diario de Operac.*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 629–30.

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* [illegible] of Indians of [illegible] The sec- [illegible] He [illegible] Bus- [illegible]

Juanico Teposcolula, whom he defeated, capturing their guns and a number of prisoners, whom he ordered shot. He also caused to be destroyed all the grain and other provisions stored in the town.[27] While these events were taking place, the independent chiefs Miguel and Nicolás Bravo, Father Mendoza, and Valerio Trujano met at Tamasulapan, and resolved to assault Yanhuitlan a second time and punish Régules and his fellow-royalists. They besieged the



MIZTECA IN OAJACA.

place, and in a few days had possession of nearly the whole town, placing their guns in the street crossings. Régules defended himself in the cemetery, occupying at the same time a few buildings. From the 11th to the 15th of March the assaults were constantly repeated till the besieged were in a desperate condi-

[27] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 261–2. These acts were avenged by Colonel Valerio Trujano, an extraordinary man, who had been an humble muleteer, but a born soldier, said to be originally from Tepecuacuilco, who had begun with small parties which by his courage and successes soon acquired the proportions of an army. *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, i. 381–2.

[illegible]. The success of the besiegers was assured, when they suddenly raised the siege and retired. The royalists could not understand it, but seeing the independents march away in perfect order, they did not venture out to pursue them.[illegible] The cause was an order from Morelos to the Bravos to hasten to his relief at Cuautla. Regules after this supposed that the independents had entirely abandoned the Mizteca, but he soon discovered his error; the day when he must atone for his many cruel acts was not far distant.

Trujano continued his excursions in the Mizteca country for some time, his field being chiefly the road from Yanhuitlan to Cuicatlan. After defeating Manuel Guendulain, a rich man of Oujaca who had armed his negroes, killing the leader and many of his men, and capturing their arms,[illegible] Trujano established his headquarters in Huajuapan, the chief town of the Mizteca, important for its large trade in dried goat's meat and grease with Puebla. He availed himself of the resources the place afforded to augment and support his force. Bonavia, the royalist commander at Oujaca, on his part concentrated all his available men at Yanhuitlan, to employ them in dislodging Trujano from Huajuapan. The force thus gathered together exceeded 1,000 men,[illegible] with 14 pieces of artillery and a good supply of ammunition. The chief command was given to Regules,[illegible] who on

[illegible] Regules sent the viceroy a long report [illegible] He claimed to have [illegible] damage to the enemy [illegible] 30 other fire-arms, and 20 prisoners, besides [illegible] As to his own [illegible] they were [illegible] slain and 42 wounded. [illegible] Mex., 1812, iii. [illegible]

[illegible] One of Trujano's lucky hits on that road was the capture once of 100 good muskets, a most important prize at a time when fire-arms were so scarce. [illegible] Cuicatlan [illegible] made up of clergymen and friars, [illegible] and the garrison of Yanhuitlan [illegible]

[illegible] He was [illegible] the same stamp as Arroyo on the independent side. [illegible] the news of striking terror in the hearts of those who were [illegible] and had rendered aid to the independents when they besieged him, before leaving Yanhuitlan he mutilated a number of Ind-

the 5th of April appeared before the villa of Huajuapan where Trujano had erected fortifications. The day being Sunday enabled the revolutionary commander to augment the number of defenders with Indians from the surrounding country who had come to market and whom he detained. The royalists took up their positions, the gallant Caldelas with the coast negroes occupying the Calvario cemetery, a commanding point on the north of the town.

For some days the royalists were engaged in perfecting the siege and cutting off the communications, and on the 10th of April opened bombardment. Trujano, having no artillery, had three guns made from the town bells, and for balls used the rounded cobblestones picked up out of the rivulet close by, besides the shot fired at him by the enemy. The guns and ammunition were defective, but the decision and courage of the besieged made amends. The besiegers made several assaults, and once entered the place by boring their way through the houses; but were beaten back. In one of the assaults a Dominican friar perished on the royalist side, and in another an Augustinian fighting for the independents. Bonavía sent Régules reënforcements and two more pieces of artillery. Trujano had provisions for some time, a large quantity of dried meat having been discovered in the warehouse of the tithe gatherer; and to prevent waste, he personally served out the rations, as well as the ammunition, which was limited.

The situation of the besieged was becoming precarious. Trujano managed to make it known to Father José María Sanchez, who was with his men at Tehuacan. Sanchez and the cura Tapia forthwith started with a considerable force, nine guns, and a supply of provisions to his relief. Caldelas, on hearing of their approach, concealed his coast negroes

ians; 'mandó cortar las orejas á veintitantos indios,' and kept the victims pilloried a whole day under the gibbet. Previous to this horrid act of barbarity he caused a large number of natives to be hanged. *Ib.; Carriedo, Estud. Hist.*, ii. 18.

[illegible] It was the [illegible] of May. The [illegible] in a careless manner, [illegible] were [illegible] attacked by the [illegible] Sanchez and [illegible] all their artillery [illegible] a number were [illegible] except a few [illegible] Weeks [illegible] Trujano [illegible] in getting [illegible] a most difficult task. The [illegible] of N[illegible] who shot the Dominican friar [illegible] a message to Morelos, [illegible] the lines, to send [illegible] rockets. Trujano waited [illegible] he saw the rockets, and his [illegible] The Indian found Morelos in Chi[illegible] whither he had proceeded from Chautla, and the [illegible] of the south [illegible] marched with a strong force [illegible] Huajuapan. The same Indian brought back the glad tidings.[2]

Regules, judging from the manifestations that succor was at hand, summoned a council and advocated raising the siege, but was opposed by Caldelas. Morelos detached Miguel Bravo with the force that Sanchez and Tapia had again gathered, with orders to pass along one side of the town. Bravo did so, and was suddenly assailed by Caldelas and his negroes, losing his guns and having to retreat. On the 23d of July, in the afternoon, Morelos with his whole force appeared before Huajuapan. One of the bodies of his troops was commanded by Hermenegildo Galeana.

[2] It is said that both times he went through the royalist lines disguised as a [illegible] His arrival occurred under circumstances that were attributed to a special providence. Trujano had ordered a novena to the image of the Señor de los [illegible], or Lord of Hearts, [illegible] in the town praying for divine protection. It was on the 9th day that the Noy [illegible] returned with the news that relief was on the way, which convinced all that their prayers had been granted. Joy followed the [illegible] and it was manifested by the ringing of bells, firing [illegible] and rockets, illuminations, and music. The besiegers could not understand such a proceeding, but Regules' suspicions of the truth were awakened. [illegible]

A battle ensued, which for its fierceness was one of the most noted of the war. Trujano made a vigorous sally, while Morelos charged at the front. The royalists were thus between two fires; but they made a stout defence, Caldelas particularly with his 400 coast negroes. He perished pierced by the enemy's lances.[33]

All was now lost. Régules and his subordinate Esperon fled. In the escape Régules struck his head against the branch of a tree and was thrown down, vomiting blood. One of the cavalry soldiers picked up his senseless commander and conveyed him to Yanhuitlan,[34] the place he had so lately left flushed with pride and hate. Trujano pursued the fleeing royalists to the very gates of Yanhuitlan giving no quarter. Canon San Martin then assumed the command of the place; but when the soldiers that had been left behind saw their beaten comrades returning panic-stricken, they began to hasten from the impending danger; and the officers, after holding a council of war, departed with the troops for the city of Oajaca.[35] Morelos' triumph was complete; all the royalist artillery, a large quantity of muskets and other arms, ammunition, and baggage fell into his hands, together with 170 prisoners, some of whom joined his service, and the rest were sent to the prisoners' pen at Zacatula.[36] The siege of Huajuapan

[33] It was said that Caldelas, indignant at finding himself neglected at the moment of greatest danger, was seeking Régules with pistol in hand to slay him. Caldelas was a Spaniard, had been a resident of the southern coast, and was much esteemed by his neighbors. Morelos, though a foe, admired his gallantry and other high qualities, and regretted his death. Bustamante calls him 'el bravo Caldelas;' and Alaman says of him: 'Fué uno de los oficiales mas bizarros que hubo en esta guerra.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 99–100, 180–4; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 249–52; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 367; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 121–3; *Zamacois, Hist. Mex.*, viii. 436–45.

[34] *Carriedo, Estud. Hist.*, ii. 20. Bonavía did not hold him in high esteem. He recovered and continued his services at Oajaca.

[35] One hundred prisoners of the jail were offered their liberty if they would take care of 60 wounded on the journey, which service they rendered, but on arrival at Oajaca the pledge was violated.

[36] Bustamante gives the number of slain at 400. Morelos in his declarations merely says there were some killed on both sides. Rayon's secretary's record has it that Trujano held the place two months with only 100 men; that Régules had upwards of 500, of whom 100 were slain and 300 captured, together

[illegible] damaged[5] by [illegible] to [illegible] made by [illegible] his army [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] of which was given to [illegible].

The [illegible] Morelos the [illegible] by Trujano and [illegible] he declined. It was [illegible] a strong resistance, [illegible] plan of capturing [illegible] Llano, at that [illegible] to Vera Cruz, [illegible] wished above all to [illegible] placed under [illegible].

We [illegible] Morelos after his victory in [illegible] and the [illegible] commanders campaigning in [illegible] and Vera Cruz, to devote [illegible] parliamentary matters in Spain, which are intimately connected with the events of that period in Spanish America.

with [illegible] muskets, [illegible] cannon, and other things. *Diario de Operac.*, in *Her-* [illegible]

[illegible] who saw the town soon after, states that it 'quedó hecha un harnero.'

[illegible] because they had been exposed to fire on all sides; named after Saint Lawrence who was put in a hot gridiron and slowly broiled. *Rivera, Gob. Mex.*, ii. 54.

CHAPTER XVIII.

AMERICAN AFFAIRS IN SPAIN.

1811-1812.

GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN—THE CÓRTES AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY—CHARACTER OF THE MEMBERS—THE DIPUTACION AMERICANA AND ITS POLICY—ITS DEMANDS AND CHARACTER OF CONCESSIONS—DEPUTY PEREZ FROM PUEBLA—DEPUTY CISNEROS ASKS FOR MEXICAN AUTONOMY AND EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE—ARIZPE—MIER—FORCED LOAN—REPRESENTATION OF THE CONSULADO OF MEXICO—BRITISH OFFERS OF MEDIATION—NATIONAL CONSTITUTION AS ADOPTED—ITS PUBLICATION IN MEXICO—THE PRESS—ELECTION OF AYUNTAMIENTOS—ANIMOSITY OF THE NATIVES TOWARD THE SPANIARDS—CONSTITUTION PRACTICALLY SUSPENDED.

THE Spanish córtes, all Spanish America being represented therein, were installed as a single chamber at the island of Leon, in southern Spain, on the 24th of September, 1810. One hundred and two deputies were present. Of their number, nineteen were chosen by natives residing in Cádiz as representatives of such provinces as were then under control of the French troops, and which for that reason could not freely hold elections, and twenty-nine were elected by natives of America and the Philippine Islands then dwelling in the same province. These forty-eight representatives sat in the chamber for the time being as substitutes, or suplentes as they were called, until regularly chosen deputies from their respective provinces could appear. Those called to represent New Spain were Andrés Sabariego, lawyer; Francisco Fernandez Munilla, a retired captain; José María Couto, parish priest from Puebla; José María Gutierrez de Teran, a retired officer of the royal garde-du-corps; Máximo Mal-

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The viceregal government, since the fall of Cuautla, had, as we have seen, kept its troops engaged in operations within the provinces of Puebla and Vera Cruz, to the neglect necessarily of the south and of Oajaca. To enable the reader to arrive at a clear understanding of the coming events in those regions, I must revert for a few moments to the occurrences of November, 1811. Morelos had sent Valerio Trujano to occupy Silacayoapan, which was effected without opposition, and the revolution spread throughout Mizteca, the portion of Oajaca bordering on Puebla.

[24] Bustamante speaks of this negotiation and gives Liceaga's answer to Rayon on the project. He and Mendíbil are the only ones that mention the subject. Rayon's secretary says nothing of it in his diary. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 315–17; *Resúmen Hist.*, 154–5, 162.

[25] On the day fixed for the commissioners to meet, no representative from Venegas appeared. The viceroy had changed his mind when he heard of Villagran's mutiny, and now expected to derive the advantages he desired from discord and anarchy. Intrigues were accordingly set in motion to create ill feeling between Rayon and Morelos, and between the former and his colleagues of the junta. Rayon, however, conducted himself with much circumspection.

estancos, was also postponed; the only important one being that of tobacco. The ninth and tenth were reserved for action after the constitution should have been enacted. The eleventh, calling for the reëstablishment of the Jesuits, was rejected almost unanimously. A different result could hardly have been expected from a chamber constituted as that was. Indeed, a number of the American deputies had objected to the proposition, and had affixed their names to it only in deference to its author, Deputy Duarez; and one actually refused to sign it.

About the time this discussion terminated, there arrived at Cádiz on a British line-of-battle ship a number of deputies regularly elected in New Spain. They were mostly ecclesiastics, canons of divers cathedrals, the deputy from Vera Cruz being one exception; and their credentials being approved, on the 27th of February they took their seats. A few days after, the venerable Doctor José Beye de Cisneros, one of the representatives for Mexico recently come,[14] presented a memorandum on the origin of the insurrection in New Spain, attributing the movement to the great love of the people for Spain, and their fear of being turned over to France.[15] Cisneros wanted the provinces of America to have a certain autonomy, and proposed measures toward this end, namely, the creation of a provincial legislature, and a supreme legislature in each dominion, the latter to represent the government of Spain,[16] and the eventual declaration of the independence of Spanish America—that is to

[14] He had an allowance of $12,000 a year from the ayuntamiento of Mexico, and being frank, hospitable, and generous, his house was at all times open to his colleagues. Whenever the American deputies were offended by some occurrence in the córtes, he would say, 'Esto, amigos, no tiene mas que un remedio, que es el P. Hidalgo,' alluding to the revolution begun in Mexico, which he strongly approved of. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 61.

[15] *Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 655. The diarios de córtes make no mention of this document; possibly it was considered in secret session. I have already, in connection with Cos' plan de paz y guerra, and with Rayon's letter to Morelos, given the real reason of the revolutionists' use of the name of Fernando.

[16] To which he said, 'estuviesen sujetos los vireyes y togados despóticos.' *Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 665; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 52–3.

say, in the event of Spain becoming subjugated. The ultramarine committee approved the plan; but it lay on the table eight months or more, the European deputies opposing its reading on the ground that it was revolutionary.[17]

Next it was resolved to extend to America a forced loan decreed in Spain on the silver plate of the churches and private persons, excepting only that in the churches of Indians, that of the church of Guadalupe, and that of the parish churches.[18] This decree was never published in New Spain, but the viceroy did seize the plate of private persons, as I stated, but as his own measure, and with a promise of reimbursement. No silver plate was taken from the churches. Other minor measures affecting America followed, most of which I allude to indirectly elsewhere. Other deputies arrived from time to time, and so the number of American members was completed. Among the suplentes of New Spain the most remarkable was José María Gutierrez de Teran, not only by reason of his eloquence, but also for his sterling character and energetic speech. But among American representatives, many of whom were an honor to their country, there was one particularly bright man, the deputy from the 'provincias internas de oriente,' Doctor Miguel Ramos Arizpe, parish priest of the villa of Borbon in the colony of Nuevo Santander, now state of Tamaulipas. He was a native of Coahuila, and began his professional studies in the seminary of Monterey, finishing in Guadalajara. He was full of spirit, fond of talking, and one would never suspect, either from his manner or dress, that he was a priest. He thought his countrymen too patient and gentle, and he would often say, "I am not a Mexican; I am a Comanche;" and he came to be known in the córtes by that name. Alaman assures us there were some

[17] 'A revolutionary plan!' cried Cisneros, 'they are a pack of fools who will drive America to independence.' *Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 656.

[18] On the motion, in the order given, of Perez, Guride, and Gordoa, deputies respectively from Puebla, Tlascala, and Zacatecas.

marks of the Comanche in his face; a mixture of candor and malice, of energy and suspiciousness. His nose was small, round, and flat, hardly affording prominence enough to hold his spectacles, which, when not concealing a pair of small flashing eyes, were suspended on his heavy black eyebrows. His round face became exceedingly animated when his mind was occupied with public or social affairs. His small, thick, muscular form went well with the face; when he spoke his movements were those of an athlete rather than of an orator. Careless of dress, prodigal in his habits, generous with his friends, relentless as an enemy, knowing little of European politics, but understanding well men and human nature, speaking seldom in public, but carrying his measures by skill and cunning, he was far in advance of the average American representative in Europe. And Arizpe was not only the most prominent American deputy in Spain, but in later times, in republican Mexico he became one of her most distinguished statesmen.

The American deputies made quite free use of the press for the support of their principles. Cisneros, Iturrigaray's lawyer, replied over the signature of Don Facundo Lizarza, to the pamphlet of Juan Lopez Cancelada,[19] former editor of the *Gazeta de México*, entitled *Verdad sabida y buena fé guardada*, giving a narrative of Iturrigaray's arrest, together with the causes that led to it. Cancelada was at the same time publishing a newspaper called *El Telégrafo Americano*, which though issued in Cádiz was supported by Spaniards residing in Mexico, and had been established for the express purpose of upholding the views and interests of the 'partido español.' In opposition to that journal, the deputy from Tlascala, Doctor Guride y Alcocer, established another, under the name of *El Censor*, which was a Spanish American organ, and had a number of prominent Americans residing in Cádiz

[19] One of Iturrigaray's bitterest enemies; he was sent away to Spain 'bajo partida de registro,' by Viceroy Archbishop Lizana.

among its contributors. Two of the ablest were Pablo de La Llave, and Doctor Servando Teresa de Mier y Guerra. The first named was a clergyman, and a native of Córdoba, in the province of Vera Cruz; a man of solid instruction, who in Madrid devoted himself to botany. He figured later as a minister of state in Mexico. We shall meet Doctor Mier again in Mexico, both before and after her final separation from Spain.[20]

[20] Mier was a man of remarkable ability. His birthplace was Monterey, in Nuevo Leon, having descended from one of the families that settled there in 1599. His father had been governor and captain-general of Nuevo Leon. After completing his studies he professed as a Dominican friar in Mexico, and afterward was made a doctor of theology. In a short time he became noted for his eloquence and sound reasoning in the pulpit, and particularly on his preaching the sermon on the 8th of Nov. 1794, at the solemn obsequies of Hernan Cortés, which were attended by the viceroy, the courts, prelates, and the élite of Mexican society. Another great discourse that he delivered in the colegiata of Guadalupe on the 13th of Dec. of the same year was the beginning of the series of misfortunes which he experienced during his life. In that discourse he denied that there had been an actual apparition to the Indian Juan Diego, as had been reported and was believed by so many, of the so-called vírgen de Guadalupe. *Gomez, Diario*, 422. The effect of the sermon was at first a great triumph for the orator, and for a few days he enjoyed the praises of his friends; but in the mean time the ecclesiastical censorship took the matter into consideration by order of Archbishop Haro, and the end of it was that Mier was arrested, and sentenced to be confined ten years in one of the most austere convents of his order in Spain. His sufferings were such, even before sentence, that nature gave away, and he offered to retract his statements, and even to prepare and publish a discourse against that sermon, but nothing availed him. Some days later was published 'Inter missarum solemnia,' an abusive edict that may justly be called a defamation of character. He was allowed no defence, no appeal, none of the tutelary forms of justice. The sermon originating this infamous treatment was in 1799 referred by the council of the Indies to the Academia de la Historia, when it was decided, in Feb. 1800, that the author had not actually denied the apparition of Guadalupe; and that his sermon contained nothing in any manner worthy of theological censure or note. It was added that the archbishop had exceeded his authority, and all that had been done in Mexico, as well as the sentence, was illegal and unjust. 'Un hombre de honradez y de mérito cayó maniatado en mano de sus verdugos.' *Payno, Escritos Dr Mier*, 5–7. This is a work containing the memoranda incomplete of Dr Mier's adventures from the time of his arrest in Mexico, and in Europe, and particularly of his sufferings in Spain.

Mier travelled in Europe; and in Rome, to escape the persecutions of his order, had himself secularized. At the breaking-out of the insurrection against the French he became the chaplain of a Spanish regiment and served some time till he was taken prisoner, but escaped when being carried to France. On his return to Cádiz he was promised a prebend. Meantime he wrote vehement letters on American affairs to *El Español*, published in London. Whether it was from fear of persecution, as he alleged, or that Iturrigaray allowed him a stipend to write in his defence in that city, he went there and published, under the name of Doctor Guerra, his second surname, his *Historia de la Revolucion de Nueva España, antiguamente Anáhuac*. London, 1813, 2 vol. 8vo, i., liii. and 364 pp. 8 l.; ii. 365–778 pp., and app. of pp.

The Spanish American residents in Cádiz were not content with discussions in the córtes and polemics in the press, and at times resorted to more direct hostilities. With the increase of their number, the aid of the press, particularly of *El Español*, and the progress made by the revolution in nearly all Spanish America, the deputies assumed a more decided tone in the chamber. On the 1st of August they presented an address, reiterating the demand contained in the eleven propositions, and insisting upon their adoption. They also added another demand, providing for the establishment of provincial juntas similar to those in Spain, to hold the government of their respective districts, and thus restrain the despotism of the rulers.[21] The signers of this address asked the córtes to rise superior to prejudice, and treat the matter with fairness and liberality. The address was read in secret session, and caused much discussion, but no action was taken

i.–xlvi. This work, of which mention has already been made, treats of the events in the years 1808–13; the first volume covering the period from July 15, 1808, to January 17, 1811, and giving a synopsis of the origin of the insurrection, as also a full account of Hidalgo's revolution, campaign, etc. The second volume contains political events from Jan. 1811 to March 9, 1813, principally Morelos' campaigns; it also furnishes lengthy debates in the Spanish córtes, with comments thereon. The author tries to appear impartial, but at times allows himself to be carried away by passion in speaking of the Spanish oppressive colonial system, and of the events connected with the French invasion of Spain. His bitterness reaches the highest point at the mention of certain names that are supremely hateful to him. Hidalgo is his hero, and other revolutionary leaders receive their meed of praise. His historical and statistical illustrations, as well as his comments on affairs in general, prove a cultivated mind, and evince great study; and those on European policy in particular show his familiarity with it. The style is elegant and full of spirit, abounding in opportune witticisms, which reveal the author's clear mind, erudition, and sound judgment. Mier continued writing till Iturrigaray noticed that the work was becoming an apology for Mexican independence, which did not enter into the ex-viceroy's views, and the allowance to meet expenses was stopped. The author still continued writing, but when his means gave out and he could not pay the printer, the latter attached the copies on hand, and caused Mier to be put in the debtors' prison, where he might have remained but for the arrival of the first envoys from Buenos Aires, who paid the printer and took the books, all of which they sent to their own country; but the vessel on which they were shipped was wrecked and the books lost. Only a few copies that were distributed during its publication exist.

[21] The paper was drawn up by Doctor Guride, deputy for Tlascala, and signed by 33 deputies; the signature of Maniau, deputy for Vera Cruz, does not appear on it. *El Español* published it March 1812, iv., no. 24, 370. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii., app. no. 2, 5.

beyond referring it to a committee. All the points embraced in it were afterward considered as settled by clauses in the constitution when adopted.

The committee on the constitution[22] laid before the chamber on the 18th the chief part of its labors, namely, the organization of the legislative and executive powers, and the 24th was fixed for further deliberations. There were other measures before the congress more closely connected with this history. One was a petition from the consulado of Mexico respecting the representation which America should have, according to the state of civilization of the several classes constituting her population.[23] The consulado complained that the elections of deputies had not been according to law, being carried by ayuntamientos at capitals composed mostly of creoles; so that the deputies chosen were exclusively of that class. The consequence was, that Spaniards in New Spain, a wealthy and influential class, were left unrepresented. It therefore petitioned that the consulados of Mexico, Vera Cruz, and Guadalajara, representing the merchants of each district, and embracing almost all the Spaniards in the country, should each be represented in the córtes by two deputies, and all further discussion on American affairs should be suspended till those six representatives had been admitted to their seats. In the mean time, the consulado asked that the deputies Evaristo Perez de Castro, Manuel

[22] Composed of the most prominent members of the córtes, several of whom were Americans. Among them were Antonio Joaquin Perez and Mariano Mendiola. The chamber was at the time presided over by Juan José Guereña, canon of Puebla and deputy from Durango.

[23] Bustamante, *Suplem.*, in *Cuvo, Tres Siglos*, iii. 336–77, gives the document, which bears date April 17, 1811, and another on the same subject dated May 27th. They had the signatures of Diego de Agreda, conde de casa de Agreda, prior, Francisco Chávarri and Lorenzo Noriega, consuls; and were drawn up by Francisco Arámbarri, a Basque from Guipúzcoa, who had lived many years in South America. Basilio de Arrillaga was the secretary of the consulado, but being a native of America, he was kept in ignorance of the contents. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 76–7, v. app. 100. The electoral law of Aug. 20, 1810, published in Mexico Dec. 19th, said that it embraced all Spaniards, whether born in America or Asia or elsewhere, that were domiciled in these countries, the Indians, and also the sons of Spaniards and Indians.

García Herreros, and Agustin Argüelles should be recognized as provisional defenders of the European Spaniards residing in New Spain.

Another representation, of May 27th, took up the history of America from its first settlement, assuring the córtes that the accounts given by the conquerors were grossly exaggerated. After praising the institutions, the wisdom of the government, and Spanish good sense, and representing the castes in the country in the darkest colors, the consulado explained how the desire for independence was awakened, accusing the Spanish junta central of having greatly promoted it by its proclamation. All the political errors, which according to the consulado's opinion the junta committed in the system adopted toward America, proceeded from the example set by the constitution formed by the junta de notables called by Napoleon at Bayonne. The consulado believed it a 'solemne disparate' that Spain and the Indies should be governed by the same code of civil, criminal, mercantile, and fiscal laws. The petition concluded by asking that the representation from New Spain should not exceed twenty-one deputies, namely, one from each province, and the six chosen by the three consulados.[24] This brought on much irritation. The American deputies deemed themselves and their countries grossly insulted.[25] Morales Duarez then offered a resolution that the paper should be denounced by the córtes and burned by the common executioner. He further proposed that the port of Cádiz be closed, so that no vessel could carry away information that such a measure was before the córtes without its being accompanied by its denounce-

[24] The second petition was sent to a merchant who was a relative of the deputy García Herreros, secretary of the córtes, to whom he delivered it. The latter kept it in his possession, as the American deputies suspected, till the 16th of September, on which day, the congress being engaged in the discussion of the article in the constitution excluding from representation the negroes born in Africa, he laid it before the president, who reported it to the house, and the latter, believing it would throw light on the point under discussion, ordered it read in public session. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 76-7.

[25] The discussions may be found in *Córtes Diario*, viii. 338 et seq.; and in *Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, i. 285-7; ii. 674-5.

ment. Further than this, the Spaniards of Mexico kept sending letters to the government and private persons which were printed in the Spanish journals, and translations of them inserted in foreign papers. A prominent London journal was subsidized by them. Such letters were filled with abuse against the natives of America.[26]

The representation of the consulado was referred to a committee of three Americans and two Spaniards. The majority reported pretty much the form of decree that was proposed by Morales Duarez; but one of the Spaniards, Gutierrez de la Huerta, dissented. The subject gave rise to violent words, which coming to nothing, it was formally buried. In Mexico they had but a confused idea of the consulado's representation by an extract from it that was circulated in November, which gave rise to an edict published on the 11th by the viceroy, prohibiting certain seditious papers that were in circulation on rivalries between European and American Spaniards, and even forbidding conversations on these matters. A mail ship that left Cádiz the 2d of October brought advices toward the end of December of the occurrences in the córtes, which added to former anger, and sent many into the ranks of the revolutionists. Indignation was still further aroused when by royal order the consulado was thanked for its representation, its zeal and patriotism being praised, and fault found only with a few of its expressions.[27]

[26] The insurgents were represented as bandits and assassins; and the Spaniards as so many saints, who only took life in retaliation to check the hordes of malefactors. *Guerra, Revol. N. Esp.*, i. p xi.; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 78.

[27] 'Una reprehension que fué un elogio.' The Spaniards carried their point. *Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 674–5. The ill feeling grew worse when the people saw Chávarri, one of the signers of the offensive paper, appointed to succeed the conde de Casa de Agreda, whose term had expired. Arechederreta's manuscript gives all the facts, and a quartette that circulated at that time as follows:

Francisco, Lorenzo y Diego
Sin salir del consulado
Hicieron mas insurgentes
Que Allende y el cura Hidalgo.

Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 84.

Among the several incidents that the discussion on the constitution gave rise to, one of the most important was brought about by deputies opposed to liberal ideas, who advocated placing the regency of the Spanish dominions in the hands of the princess Carlota Joaquina, Fernando's sister, who with her husband, the prince of Brazil, was at Rio Janeiro, whence she had addressed letters to the córtes and authorities demanding that her son, the prince Don Pedro, should be recognized as regent. The córtes refused the demand, and the affair ended in the appointment of a new regency, with five members, in place of three.[28] Another important matter was an offer made by the British government to mediate between Spain and her American possessions, which was declined through fear that England would get them all.[29] It finally became the practice to choose the president of the chamber from the American deputies every other month.[30] And they well deserved it, no less by reason of their talents and learning, than for their honesty and patriotism. The great reputation and influence that several of them enjoyed in their respective countries after their independence were first won by them in the córtes at Cádiz.

[28] Duque del Infantado, a councillor of state and native of Carácas; Vice-admiral Juan María Villavicencio; Ignacio Rodriguez de Rivas, of the council of Castile; and Lieut-gen. O'Donnell, conde del Abisbal.

[29] The offer was at last accepted, but accompanied with impracticable conditions. In 1812 England repeated the offer, with suggestions to serve as a base for negotiations, namely, 1. cessation of hostility by land or sea; 2. general amnesty; 3. confirmation of rights and American representation in the córtes; 4. free trade, with certain advantages given to Spaniards; 5. offices of viceroy, governors, etc., in America to be given without distinction to Americans and Europeans; 6. the internal government of America and the administration of all its branches to be in charge of the ayuntamientos conjointly with the chief of the province. European Spaniards to be equally eligible. America to recognize Fernando as her sovereign, and give him money. *Correio Braziliense*, no. li.; *El Español*, Sept. 1812; *Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 703–4. Offer of mediation rejected by 101 to 46. According to *El Español*, the mediation was not refused as regarded Carácas, Santa Fé, and Quito; but there being no revolutionary government in Mexico, it was deemed improper to treat with rioters.

[30] The first American president was Canon Antonio Joaquin Perez; others followed, and Morales Duarez having died suddenly on the 2d of April, 1812, whilst holding that office, the córtes paid his remains most distinguished honors. The deputy from Zacatecas, Gordoa, was the last president of the extraordinary córtes. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 102.

At last, on the 18th of March, 1812, after months of labor, the córtes gave to the Spanish monarchy the much desired constitution. It was divided into ten titles, which I epitomize in a note.[31] It was liberal enough in its provisions. To the monarch was not given undue authority. The provinces were guaranteed in the córtes equality of representation with Spain. Negroes and their intermixtures were excluded from citizenship, which in Mexico was deemed a political mistake, giving rise to much discussion.[32] Eighteen deputies from New Spain and

[31] Title I. declared that the sovereignty was in the nation, and told what constituted a Spaniard. Title II. defined the Spanish dominions, including therein all American and Asiatic possessions; established the catholic religion to the exclusion of all others; form of government limited hereditary monarchy, with powers divided into legislative, executive, and judicial; and told what constituted a citizen. To descendants of negroes, born in wedlock of parents who were born free, and married to free-born women residing in the Spanish dominions and exercising some profession, trade, or useful industry with sufficient capital of their own, was left open the door of virtue and merit to become citizens. It was enjoined on the córtes to grant letters of citizenship to men or women of color who rendered good services to the country, or distinguished themselves by their talents, industry, and good behavior. Title III. constituted the córtes in one chamber formed of the deputies from the Spanish dominions in Europe, America, and Asia, the basis of representation being the same everywhere, namely, one deputy for every 70,000 inhabitants, and another for an excess of 35,000; every province was to have at least one deputy. The election of deputies was to be made by three successive orders of voting. To have a vote it was necessary only to be a domiciled citizen within the parish, and after 1830 the voter must be able to read and write. Titles IV. and V. treated respectively of the king's powers, and of the organization, etc., of courts. Title VI. suppressed the ayuntamientos, to be superseded by others popularly chosen, which were to have charge of the local police of their towns, of the municipal revenue, public instruction, benevolent establishments. The new ayuntamientos were to be under the supervision of other corporations of higher rank, called diputaciones provinciales, one of which was to exist in each province, and be presided over by the superior chief appointed by the crown, and composed of the intendente and seven members, chosen by the same electors who were to choose the deputies to the córtes. The next three titles referred to civil, fiscal, and military administration, including freedom of the press already established by a law; and the tenth to the observance of the constitution. *Esp., Constituc. Polit., Cadiz*, 1812, 8vo, 1 l. 52 pp. 4 l.; *Id.*, Cadiz, 1812, 16mo, 1–134; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 104–12; *Zamacois, Hist. Méx.*, viii. 550–4; *Córtes, Colec. Dec.*, ii. 158–64; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, i. app. 100; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 232–3.

[32] The exclusion was represented to the crown as an injustice, in a paper signed by Bishop Friar Antonio de San Miguel of Michoacan, but drawn up by Abad y Queipo, his successor. The ayuntamiento of Guadalajara, though composed of European Spaniards, had instructed the deputy Uria to speak in favor of the African race. The córtes failed to see that the negroes and mulattoes, deprived by the constitution of the rights of citizenship, not only formed the 'batallones de pardos y morenos,' organized for the defence of the burning region of the sea-coast, but had actually rendered most valuable service

the provincial interims signed the constitution. Had she done it then, and in the right way, her colonies might have been saved to Spain. But it was too late. Justice and humanity were now not enough; she must pay the penalty of her past iniquities. The cost of such an immense representation, and the transportation of the deputies from 2,000 to 3,000 leagues every two years, were points not without consideration.[a]

The cortes proceeded at once to carry out the constitutional clause that created a council of state, making the appointments of councillors, however, only one half the number. Among the American appointees were José Mariano de Almansa, of Vera Cruz, and Melchor de Foncerrada, of Mexico. The constitution, with the order to proclaim and carry it into effect, reached Viceroy Venegas on the 6th of September in the correspondence brought by Liñan's expedition from Vera Cruz. After the subject had been duly considered by the viceroy, council, and several corporations called upon for their advice, it was on the 25th published by royal edict with the usual solemnity. On the 29th the viceroy, audiencia, and other authorities residing at the capital, assembled in the reception-hall of the palace; the constitution was read by one of the king's secretaries, and all officials present made oath to keep it. Then followed salvoes of artillery and ringing of bells, while a concourse of people filled the plaza. Religious ceremonies in the cathedral and other official acts fol-

to the royalist cause, fighting with remarkable zeal against the insurgents. Moreover, a number of descendants from negroes had been ordained as priests; there were others filling honorable positions, and the majority of them were useful men tilling the soil and working the mines.

[a] The consulado of Mexico said that the 'desamparo de las casas, la molestia y peligros de largas navegaciones,' would keep in constant distress a number of the best families. It also refers to the enormous expense that the transportation and support of the deputies must entail. Mier, whose computation was rather low than exaggerated, sets down the deputies from the ultramarine provinces at 148, besides one third that number of suplentes; the consulado, including the castas, gave 250 deputies and eighty suplentes, costing yearly $1,500,000, besides the expense of transportation.

lowed, including that of reading the new fundamental code aloud to the people, among whom it produced a deep impression. The occasion was duly celebrated with commemorative medals, public amusements, illuminations, and largess to the lower classes. The oath of recognition of and allegiance to the new regime was administered, on the 4th and following days of October, to the people at large, the lower courts and officials, the religious orders of both sexes, and the troops, all manifesting a lively pleasure with the establishment of a system that was to do away with the old despotism; and indeed, hopes were awakened that the troubles of the country would be thereby terminated. Never had allegiance been sworn to the kings with so much solemnity or zeal. The army was not behind others in its manifestations of joy. The batallon primero Americano threw the gibbet to the ground; but the most surprising spectacle of all was that of the battalions, mostly made up of the very mulattoes that the constitution deprived of citizenship, taking the oath with as much joy and gratitude as the rest.[34] Orders were issued to adapt everything to the forms and language of the new system. Thus the 'plaza mayor' had its name changed to 'plaza de la constitucion,' and a commemorative stone was placed therein. The custom-house, mint, revenue, etc., had the adjective 'nacional' attached to them in lieu of 'real,' as had been formerly the practice.

The amnesty decrees of the córtes were published, and the viceroy with the audiencia visited the prisons to release all persons therein detained that were entitled to the boon; but none held for insurrection were liberated. The constitution called for many changes in the administration of justice and revenue as well as of government. The civil and military authorities were not to be vested in the same person; the audi-

[34] *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 279–81; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 374; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1029, 1038–42, 1054–1246, passim; *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 34–91.

encia was reduced to nothing more than a superior court, and ceased to be the viceroy's council; all privileged courts must go out of existence; the special administrations of certain branches, such as drainage of the valley, were to be given in charge of the 'diputacion provincial.' Not the least important of these changes was that which placed the administration of justice exclusively in the ordinary courts, thus doing away with the junta de seguridad which had had exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings for treason. All these novelties would be fraught with serious consequences even in times of peace; it may well be imagined what the effect was with revolution raging throughout the land.

The most important innovations were yet to be put in practice, namely, freedom of the press, and election of the popular ayuntamientos to supersede the perpetual ones hitherto existing. Liberty of the press had been proclaimed, and a regulation decreed therefor by the córtes as early as the 10th of November, 1810, but the measure had not been carried into effect in Mexico. The regulation provided the appointment of a board in each province composed of five members, two of whom were to be ecclesiastics. From that board an appeal was allowed to a supreme board residing near the supreme government and composed of nine members. This supreme board had the power to nominate the members of the respective provincial boards, and its decisions were final.[35] It may easily be conceived how inconvenient this arrangement was of one single board for all Mexico, and how tardy must be the recourse to the supreme board in Spain. The revolution having broken out in Mexico when the law was issued, the viceroy, fear-

[35] To constitute the board in Mexico, the following persons were appointed: Archdeacon Beristain; José M. Fagoaga, a native of Spain, but in favor of Mexican independence; Pedro Fonte, who later became archbishop of Mexico: Guillermo Aguirre, regente of the audiencia; and Fernandez de San Salvador, some of whose writings about the revolution had been energetic, and others low and scurrilous. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 281–5; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, iv. 899–901; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 374–5.

ing that freedom of the press would be a powerful agent to spread the insurrection, availed himself of a petty circumstance, the death of one of the members appointed to form the board, to postpone its installation till there was a full board. No appointment was made to fill the vacancy in seven or eight months. Meantime all the authorities in Mexico, civil, military, and ecclesiastic, were consulted, and with the exception of one bishop, expatiated on the dangers of having a free press under the existing circumstances. However, Arizpe pressing the subject and the córtes acceding to his demands, the fiscales of the audiencia in Mexico reported that the publication of the law could no longer be delayed. It was accordingly made public on the 5th of October, 1812, and the board, or 'junta de censura,' was formally constituted and qualified, with Archdeacon Beristain for its president, and José M. Fagoaga vice-president. It is not necessary to recapitulate here the restrictions and formalities that the printing and publishing of books and periodicals had been subjected to. Of the almost unlimited freedom now granted, writers scarcely knew how to make avail, it was all so new and strange.[36] After all, it was but a fleeting blessing, as we shall see.

The reader doubtless remembers what has been said in an earlier volume of this work on the jealous care the government took under the old legislation of the Indies,[37] to prevent all popular assemblages, unless they were approved of by the superior representative of the king's authority, and presided over by an official of his appointment. The constitution purposed

[36] Cárlos M. Bustamante, one of the earliest to enter the field, begins the first number of his journal *El Juguetillo*, asking 'Conque podemos hablar?' He was followed by *El Pensador Mejicano*, by Joaquin Fernandez Lizardi, till then an obscure, unknown man, but who was afterward given for a surname the title of his publication. The editor of the *Diario* now ventured to freely express his thoughts. Several loose papers were circulated on the ecclesiastical fuero; there were very few evidences, if any, of a disregard for the decencies of society. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 286–7.

[37] *Recop. de Ind.*, i., iv., 25.

to do away with this system with the inauguration of popular elections, which offered as great a contrast as between a free and a restricted press. According to the census, the capital was entitled to twenty-five electors, assigning two to the most populous parishes, and four to that of the Sagrario, dividing the latter into four sections, with an electoral table at each, but without fixing the respective number of voters. The result was that the triumph of the American element was complete; not a single European was chosen as an elector. In fact, the electoral law was violated in the most barefaced manner. The American ticket contained the names of those known for their revolutionary proclivities; and the Spanish had those of the most noted Spaniards, and of a few creoles partial to them. No effort was made to qualify the voters, and thus were polled many illegal votes. In some parishes more votes were cast than there were vecinos. The count of the votes being concluded at 8:30 P. M., and the triumph of the creole party established beyond a doubt, the victors gave themselves up to rejoicing. The people rushed to the cathedral towers and rang the bells during a great part of the night, and ceased only when the viceroy's secretary came out and stopped it. Some asked to have the artillery fired, but the viceroy refused. On the following day there were still more marked manifestations.[33] The viceroy fearing a riot kept the troops in their barracks, and caused the corregidor to issue orders for the people to retire to their homes, or the patrols would use force. The populace obeyed, and by night quiet had been fully restored. In Toluca, Puebla, and other places, the result of the elections was the same. Animosity toward the

[33] There were masses of thanksgiving at the several parish churches, which were attended by the electors chosen. From the carriage of one of them, Jacobo de Villaurrutia, the people unharnessed the mules and pulled him to his house amid much applause. The same was done with a canon and two ecclesiastics. With a man of the rabble as their leader, the crowd seized a carriage and conveyed in it to the parish church of San Miguel Cárlos M. Bustamante and Doctor Sartorio, electors chosen for that district.

European Spaniards was manifest everywhere. The principles of the insurrection predominated. This popular movement was not certainly a concerted revolutionary plan; but there can be no doubt that it was prompted by some persons for ulterior purposes.[39]

The elements placed by the new constitution in the hands of the revolutionists rendered it almost impossible to expect a favorable result of the war for the royalist cause. Till lately the rebels had been able to use the press in a very limited degree only, but now the constitution placed every printing-press in the country at their disposal. Seditious writings were, it is true, subject to the action of the junta de censura, but this was after they had been circulated and had their effect. The public peace in the capital and other large cities had been preserved by great vigilance on the part of the royal authorities. It had been much imperilled during the recent municipal elections; but the greatest danger was not over. The election of deputies to the ordinary córtes in Spain was soon to take place, and the government reasonably feared that its enemies would profit by the late experience.[40] The city of Mexico heretofore had been divided into a number of districts and subdistricts. The former were in charge of the alcaldes de corte, corregidor, and alcaldes ordinarios, under whose supervision were the officials placed over the

[39] Francisco Galicia wrote President Rayon a narrative of the occurrences, saying that the people had given proof of their enthusiasm, uttering vivas to America, the supreme junta, and each one of its members, and crying, 'Mueran los gachupines,' not completing the work for the want of arms. He asked Rayon to approach the city with his forces, in which event he (Galicia) with his people would ask the viceroy for arms to defend the place; if given they would be used to aid Rayon, and if refused he would endeavor to take them forcibly, and then sally out to join Rayon, as he had 14,000 or more Indians in the capital that would follow him. Rayon was so much pleased that he suggested to Verdusco the expediency of fitting out a force to take advantage of so good an opportunity. *Rayon's letter to Verdusco, from Tlalpujahua*, Dec. 9, 1812, captured by the royalists with Verdusco's baggage in the attack of Puruándiro, of which an account will be given.

[40] An attempt was made to nullify the last elections, and to make an investigation into the popular disturbances; but the fiscales of the audiencia advised that no further steps should be taken in the matter, in order to avert all occasion for more popular meetings.

subdistricts, all of whom the government could have reliance on. But under the constitution the system was reversed; it behooved the ayuntamiento to aid the alcalde in protecting life and property and preserving public order. The difficulty now was this: how could the preservation of order be left to the very persons most interested in disturbing it? This state of suspense lasted till the 3d of December, the viceroy's saint's day, San Francisco Javier, when the recently chosen electors, taking to themselves undue importance, called on him to present their congratulations, and he received them with marks of displeasure. The *Pensador Mexicano*, of which mention was made before, had been declaiming in several numbers against the government. It had extensively expatiated on the complaints of the Americans, demanding an armistice, in order to let those who had taken up arms be heard, and then wait for the decision of the national córtes. In the number of December 3d, while pretending to felicitate the viceroy, it was insulting;[41] and speaking of the edict of June 25th, justly called the sanguinary edict, it ended by asking in the name of the clergy and their flock that it be revoked. The viceroy hesitated no longer. He summoned the justices, fiscales, and alcaldes del crímen[42] to a consultation, which lasted several hours, and was advised by twelve of the thirteen functionaries that he should suspend the freedom of the press.[43] In the edict published on the 5th of December were given the grounds for the suspension, and the old laws and regulations were restored, the

[41] 'Es un miserable mortal, un hombre como todos, y un átomo despreciable á la faz del Todopoderoso; las suele torcer la malicia, la ignorancia, ó la lisonja.' *Id.*, 294.

[42] According to his own words, 'resolví celebrar Acuerdo pleno de señores ministros de esta Real Audiencia con mi asistencia.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1292–3. This of itself was unconstitutional, for after the constitution was put into effect the audiencia was no longer an acuerdo, having been limited to judicial functions.

[43] Villaurrutia, who had been appointed oidor of the audiencia of Seville, was not present. The fiscal Osés dissented; he recommended the creation of a supreme junta de censura in Mexico.

junta de censura being charged with the duty of examining every writing intended to be printed, and the viceroy reserving to himself the right of restoration of the liberty of the press when the present extraordinary circumstances should have ceased.[44] Another edict of the same date prohibited, under the penalty of ten years in the chain-gang, the ringing of bells without an order of the government, and the forming of groups, which the armed force was enjoined to disperse.[45]

The government had now a knowledge of the persons that might be included in the dangerous class and persecuted. Without observing any formalities, the junta de seguridad, which still exercised power, though the press had clamored for its suppression, arrested Fernandez Lizardi of the *Pensador Mexicano*. He was, however, soon after released, and continued the publication of his paper till he had completed the number subscribed for, but in quite a different tone.[46]

Venegas said nothing at this time about the elections to be made for deputies to the córtes, and for those to constitute the diputacion provincial;[47] but when asked about the matter, toward the end of December, by the outgoing ayuntamiento of Mexico, and by some of the electors, he declared them suspended, directing the old ayuntamiento to continue acting as theretofore till further orders. In fact, everything prescribed in the constitution to be done was left unexecuted. Thus was that instrument in a

[44] Bustamante, *Notic. Biog.*, 12, 13, speaks of the revolutionary spirit of the press. *Torrente, Revol. Hisp. Am.*, i. 341; *Bárcena, Manif.*, 13.

[45] The decree about ringing of bells is qualified with the words 'á vuelta de esquilas.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1293–4.

[46] Cárlos M. Bustamante, editor of *El Juguetillo*, fearing arrest absconded, and finally joined the insurrectionary chief Osorno at Zacatlan. Another elector named Martinez was imprisoned on the charge or suspicion of carrying on correspondence with the insurgents. Several others were persecuted later. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 296; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 186–90; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 234.

[47] In the new territorial division for the intendencias, there was one province formed with those of Mexico, Puebla, Oajaca, Vera Cruz, Michoacan, and others, all of which were to be under one diputacion provincial residing in Mexico. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 364.

little more than two months from its most solemn promulgation suspended by an act of executive volition; and yet they continued administering the oath to obey it to all authorities and corporations that had not been sworn.[48]

The constitution, both by its promulgation and subsequent suspension, gave a great impulse to the revolution in affording legal pretexts for its support. At first the insurgent sheets said that the only bonds existing between the American and Spanish people lay in the sovereignty recognized in the kings. But as the constitution had now changed the foundations of Spanish society, placing the possessions of Spanish America on an equal footing with the mother country, the former had acquired rights that demanded respect, and if they were violated, they had a right to dissolve the connection. At the suspension of the constitution it was claimed that the people of Mexico should resort to arms, because the laws on which depended the pacification of the country had been wantonly set aside by the government; they alleged that those laws, if they did not end the revolution everywhere, could certainly have brought calm and peace to the greater portion of the country. Such were the remarks of the *Correo del Sur*, nos 20 and 31. Morelos wrote Rayon on the 15th of January, 1813, that they now had the evidence of Spanish rascality. The Spanish authorities had called for elections to lay a heavy hand afterward on the electors; they had granted liberty of the press to imprison the writers.[49] The córtes had really armed the revolutionists with a double-edged sword. The whole matter went before the supreme government in Spain, and was taken into consideration by the regency and council of state, by

[48] Venegas continued exercising more powers than he had before the publication of the fundamental law. Notwithstanding the marked infringement of it, he still published the decree of the córtes, to the effect that 'infracciones de la constitucion se vieran de preferencia por los tribunales correspondientes.' *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 409.

[49] He ended in his usual way with a Latin quotation, 'quid adhuc desiderare possumus.' *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 297–8.

order of the córtes at the instigation of the American deputies, with Arizpe at their head, who wanted to see Venegas and the audiencia impeached for their suspension of the constitution; but nothing came of it. As it was a measure intended to subjugate the rebels of America, it was deemed just, and its author was not punished, but on the contrary, commended. The opinion finally given by the council of state was that in Mexico nothing but a military regime should rule until the revolution was quelled. Both the córtes and regency arrived at the conclusion that further concessions would be out of place, and the rebellion must be quelled by force of arms with the utmost energy, to which end the government would detach as many troops as possible from the army in Spain.

CHAPTER XIX.

SUCCESS OF MORELOS.

1812-1813.

MORELOS' THIRD CAMPAIGN—CHILAPA RETAKEN—REOCCUPATION OF THE COUNTRY TO ACAPULCO—MATAMOROS AT WORK IN IZÚCAR—NICOLÁS BRAVO'S VICTORIES—VICEREGAL TRIBULATIONS—PUBLICATION OF DECREES OF THE SPANISH CÓRTES—DEATH OF TRUJANO—MORELOS' VISIT TO OZUMBA—HE ATTACKS A ROYALIST CONVOY—TAKES ORIZABA—DEFEAT ON THE HEIGHTS OF ACULCINGO—CAPTURES OAJACA—ENORMOUS BOOTY—ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT—VICTOR AND MIGUEL BRAVO'S CAMPAIGN TO JAMILTEPEC—MORELOS' PLANS—VENEGAS SUPERSEDED—REVIEW OF HIS RULE.

WE will now return to Morelos and follow his operations subsequent to his remarkable escape from Cuautla in the early morning of May 2, 1812. It has been already stated that he went from the town of Ocuituco to Chautla where he tarried one month gathering the dispersed forces of Galeana and Bravo to the number of about 800. Of this small army Morelos took command and marched to retake Chilapa and Tixtla, which, during the time he was in Cuautla, had been reoccupied by the royalists. The commandants Añorve and Cerro resolved not to wait his coming, but to retreat to Ayutla. The insurgents under Galeana on the 4th of June encountered part of them and took a number prisoners besides 200 muskets. They finally succeeded in reaching Ayutla, timely reënforcement having been sent them by Páris who was stationed there.[1] The royalist prisoners were

[1] Páris' report from Ometepec of July 11, 1812, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 901-4; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 120-8.

taken to Zacatula. Morelos entered Chilapa unresisted. The parish priest, Rodriguez Bello, a stanch royalist, for whose head a reward had been offered, had disappeared. The vicar came out to intercede for the inhabitants. Morelos received him affably, but deemed it necessary to punish the people who had taken so prominent a part in the imprisonment of the subdelegado Montezuma. He accordingly allowed his troops to sack the town, and caused the prisoners to be decimated, despatching the rest to Zacatula, among whom was the giant Martin Salmeron. Three months later he had the giant brought back and mustered into his guard of honor, and issued an order of general amnesty.[2] This triumph of the revolutionists produced a deep impression in government circles, and gave renewed encouragement to the friends of independence. The secret clubs bestirred themselves. Calleja's friends charged the loss of the Chilapa region to the viceroy's failure to have Morelos pursued after his flight from Cuautla, which might have been done, they said, had there been a force at Tixtla or Chilapa.

Meanwhile the independents were planning for new expeditions. Victoriano Maldonado resolved to take Ometepec with the force he had on the Metlatonoc hill. It was not a difficult undertaking, as Caldelas had gone with his forces to the siege of Huajuapan. Páris, hearing of Maldonado's movement, left Ayutla, where he did not feel safe, and went to Ometepec before Maldonado approached the place. This change of base on Páris' part opened the way for Morelos to occupy that portion of the country to

[2] Salmeron was born near Chilapa in April 1774. When 22 years of age he was presented to the viceroy, and at that time, according to the *Gaz. de Mex.* of Nov. 11, 1796, his weight was 270 lbs., and his height 'dos varas y tres cuartas y dos pulgadas,' equal to 7 ft 7½ in. Humboldt saw Salmeron and says that his true height was 2.224 metres, or 7 ft 3½ in. *Essai Pol.*, i. 88. After serving some time in Morelos' guard, he was taken ill, and returned to his birthplace, Chilapa, where he died in 1813. *Nicolás Bravo's letter of Feb. 21, 1850*, in *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 248, app. no. 5, 27; *Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX.*, v. 287–90.

the very gates of Acapulco, which port was besieged by the independent leader Ávila from the Veladero hill. Notwithstanding these advantages of Morelos' forces in the south, Iguala, Tasco, and the whole country on the right of the Mescala River were held by the royalists. It is true that the latter were constantly assailed, but they had been victorious at every encounter. One of their most noted victories was won by Rionda on the Santa Rosa height, near Jamiltepec, in the Costa Chica, when attacked the 31st of October by Victoriano Maldonado, who was defeated with the loss of his artillery.[3]

The timely victory of Morelos at Huajuapan, the subsequent capture by his forces of upper and lower Mizteca, and his refusal to march against Oajaca have been already related. With 3,600 men, including the garrison of Huajuapan, he started for Tehuacan, a most important position which he occupied on the 10th of August and made his general headquarters.[4] Thence he could watch and send expeditions to Oajaca, Orizaba, and Vera Cruz, without losing sight of Mexico. He could also from this centre, well provided with food and ammunition, give an impulse to his cause throughout that region, whose inhabitants had repeatedly shown a disposition to throw off the Spanish yoke. In the event of a large force coming against him, or of defeat, he would have a way open to the interior.

The comandante at Oajaca, Antonio Gonzalez Saravia, fearing that Morelos' objective point would be the capital of that province, called on the viceroy to reenforce him, the troops he had with him, in their demoralized condition after the recent defeats, being

[3] The official despatch calls Maldonado 'el indio Victoriano de Metlatonoc, coronel de insurgentes.' He is reported to have lost many men, seven cannon, all his muskets, powder, etc. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1233–4.

[4] *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 129–30; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 252–4; *Carriedo, Estud. Hist.*, ii. 20; *Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX.*, v. 297–8. A Spaniard wrote a letter which was published in the *Redactor General* of Cádiz, Feb. 13, 1813, that Morelos destroyed an immense quantity of tobacco and took 500 prisoners. *Guerra, Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 465.

inadequate for a successful defence. Venegas was unable to aid him, having all he could attend to at home. Indeed, Orizaba was in no less peril than Oajaca, its people expecting Morelos any moment. As to Puebla, and the road to Vera Cruz, these places were not much safer, it being in Morelos' power to employ detached parties in waylaying trains and cutting off communications, thus preventing the government from moving tobacco and other merchandise, its only means of raising money at this time. In order to keep the roads open a large force, much needed elsewhere, must be stationed there. Again for a time, while watching closely events throughout the country, Morelos busied himself in forming his men into regiments, battalions, and cavalry squadrons, and drilling them for active work. Matamoros did the same, first in the hacienda of Santa Clara, and then in Izúcar. It was here that the latter heard of Venegas' famous edict of June 25th, depriving priests serving in the insurrectionary forces of their ecclesiastical immunity. This raised yet higher his priestly wrath; and he formed a new body of dragoons, which he called San Pedro, the standard being black with a large red cross in the centre, and on which appeared the inscription "Morir por la inmunidad eclesiástica."[5] Morelos followed the example, and thus many of the regiments came to have saints' names.

With the assistance of Mier y Teran, some excellent artillery was cast. Morelos was opposed to brigandage, and empowered Rosains to persecute all who were wont to prey upon rural property and small defenceless towns.[6] The vigilance of the revolutionists along the Vera Cruz road prevented the royalists from gaining any intelligence from that quarter. Flour had be-

[5] They proved to be good fighters. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 149; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 129–38; *Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX.*, v. 309–10.

[6] His orders were very severe. Any soldier convicted of stealing to the value of one peso was to be shot. If a party committed depredations, the men were to be decimated; the rest, and also thieves stealing the value of half a peso, were to be sent to the chain-gang. *Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX.*, v. 322.

come very scarce at the port, and as there was a large amount of mail matter collected there, Governor Dávila, in union with the merchants, despatched an expedition of 300 infantry of the Campeche regiment, 70 cavalry, and three mountain howitzers, under Juan Labaqui, captain of one of the volunteer companies of Vera Cruz, who had seen military service in Spain in 1793, against the French. Labaqui took the Orizaba road, and on his march several times encountered the independents, coming off victorious. He passed the heights of Aculcingo, and having reached the beautiful plain which stretches off to the southwest, he halted to rest at the town of San Agustin del Palmar, nineteen leagues from Puebla. Morelos, by Sesma's suggestion, sent a force to attack him, under Nicolás Bravo, whom he had appointed general-in-chief of all forces operating in Vera Cruz. Bravo took 600 men, of whom 200 were coast negroes, left the guerrilla chief Arroyo with a small party in the cañada de Iztapa to prevent surprise from Orizaba, and came up with the enemy. After a long and fierce struggle, Labaqui was dislodged from two points, and had only one protection left, a building which he defended as his life. After forty-eight hours of fighting, the independents, led by Captain Palma, a negro of the coast, fell on the enemy at close quarters. Labaqui fell mortally wounded, and his men surrendered. This was on the 20th of August.[7] Bravo sent the prisoners to the province of Vera Cruz, and went himself to Tehuacan. But five days later he routed near the puente del Rey a royalist force escorting a train to Jalapa, and took ninety prisoners.[8]

[7] The royalists had 48 killed and many wounded. There were captured 300 prisoners, 60 horses, 3 pieces of artillery, 300 muskets, some ammunition, and the whole mail from Spain. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 176–9; *Id., Elog. Morelos*, 13; *Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist.*. 144–5; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 203–4. Guerra, *Hist. Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 465–6, on the authority of a Spaniard who wrote a letter Nov. 19th, published in the *Redactor General* of Cádiz of Feb. 14, 1813, places Labaqui's arrival in San Agustin del Palmar on the 19th of Sept. with 350 men and three pieces of artillery, and says he was attacked by 4,000 rebels, losing 150 men in killed and 200 prisoners.

[8] Bustamante and Mora speak of prisoners shot by order of Morelos; but

Naturally, from such a man as General Nicolás Bravo we should expect to hear much during these stirring times. Since his signal victory at San Agustin del Palmar his military prestige had increased. Civilians flocked to his standard; soldiers deserted from the enemy to serve under him. Spaniards, as well as Mexicans, came to regard him as less an enemy than a patriot; for his conduct, whether toward friend or foe, was always marked by that honesty, magnanimity, purity of sentiment, and austere virtue which were part of his nature.

Bravo now determined upon a campaign against Jalapa,[9] a point of the highest importance to the viceregal government, on account of its proximity to the chief seaport, and its fine climate, which was free from the deadly vómito of Vera Cruz.[10] Accordingly he appeared before the town in good force on the 11th of November. The inhabitants, being stanch royalists, brave and well armed, prepared for defence. The comandante of the garrison was the major of the Vera Cruz regiment, named Antonio Fajardo. At this time there were in the place Brigadier Porlier, with his marines, and Colonel Francisco Hevia, with the Castilla regiment. Fajardo tendered the chief command to those officers as of higher rank, but both declined, promising him their best aid. In command of the independent troops besides Bravo was Mariano Rincon, who since his disaster at Coatepec had again organized an efficient force; also Utrera, Martinez, and the brave Veracruzan mulatto, Francisco Zuzúnaga, who occupied the avenues leading to the city, and the adjacent heights. At two o'clock in the

Bravo's letter to Alaman, before quoted, makes no mention of such executions. Bravo was certainly opposed to killing prisoners.

[9] Detailed royalist accounts of events at Jalapa for the period from Oct. 1811 to June 1812 may be seen in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1271-8. Further on Bravo in *Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist.*, 135-6; *Torrente, Hist. Rev. N. Esp.*, ii. 402.

[10] From 1780 to 1810 Jalapa had been the place of residence of the wealthy merchants of Vera Cruz, and a fair was held there on the arrival of the fleets from Spain. The town lost its importance after the independence, and declined still more after the railroad was made from Vera Cruz to Mexico.

morning they attacked with vigor on all sides. The garrison received the onslaught with cool and determined resistance. All assaults they repulsed; and the independents after eight hours of hard fighting retreated. Bravo then took up a position at San Juan Coscomatepec. Next to taking Jalapa he believed he could most advance his cause by occupying the puente del rey, later known as the puente nacional, a position deemed impregnable,[11] and which gave him control of the road from Vera Cruz to the capital via Jalapa, then the route for passengers and merchandise between the coast and the interior. For damaging the enemy and securing spoils and supplies, no point could be better. He did not begin by seizing and appropriating all—a course which would soon have stopped traffic—but he contented himself by levying a tax on every bale passing to or from the coast. The cargoes being numerous, the tax yielded largely. In vain the viceroy forbade the merchants from holding any intercourse with rebels; the interests of commerce always found a way to attain their ends. Moreover, Bravo's integrity of character rendered such operations comparatively safe for the merchants.

It was a time of tribulation for the viceregal government. Morelos' daring and energetic efforts were being crowned with success, and the means to pay the royal troops, or even to keep them together, were wanting. No revenue entered the treasury from the ports; the silverware of private persons had been exhausted; the church had even contributed large sums; and the tax on urban rents was insufficient. Venegas must have money; $700,000 would do, but nothing less. He called a meeting of merchants and officials. The former proposed lowering expenses by reducing the salaries of the latter one third. To this,

[11] The bridge is a fine piece of architecture, built by José Rincon, at the cost of the consulado of Vera Cruz, on the river emptying at La Antigua.

of course, these devoted servants of their country objected. At a second meeting a plan suggested by Crespo Gil and the consulado to place a tax on staples was tried and failed; whereupon the viceroy resorted to the old method of a forced loan.

Several decrees of the Spanish córtes were made public in Mexico about this time, one of which did away with the old feast of the *perdon*, which had been held every year on the 13th of August to commemorate the capture of the capital by Cortés.' This was done by way of conciliating the Mexicans. Another measure tending in the same direction was the substitution of the garrote for hanging, the latter being a "spectacle repugnant to humanity and to the generous character of the Spanish nation"—a refreshing sentiment, assuredly, considering the wholesale slaughter in which the Spanish nation was everywhere indulging! How comforting to the son of Leonardo Bravo that his father should be so humanely killed for devotion to his country! Another law allowed persons of African descent admission into the universities and religious organizations, as well as the privilege of ordination as priests.

On the whole, matters were improving somewhat in Spain and South America, but not in Mexico. The viceregal government, it is true, by its army of the centre, had recovered many places formerly occupied by the rebels, and put to death Torres and Albino García, the formidable chiefs of the central provinces; but on the other hand, the revolution had extended on the gulf coast, and Morelos, with greater prestige than ever as a military leader, and with an efficient army, held a central position threatening the points that the government had the greatest interest in defending. The revolution now possessed only one powerful leader, and only one army; but armed parties overran almost the whole country. Not a road but was intercepted by guerrillas, nor a district where some chief had not become notorious. One great

difficulty the government had now to contend with was a lack of connection or coöperation between one insurgent leader and another, none of them recognizing any superior, and all deriding the junta suprema whenever it attempted to bring them under control. Had there been among them a central authority any conquest over which would have ended the rebellion, the probability is that with the victories already won the royalists could quickly have achieved such conquest. As matters stood, victories only served to multiply insurgent bands and extend the war over a still broader area. Revolution everywhere faced the viceroy. His troops were at times defeated, but were usually victorious. Still they could not be divided and conquer. Experience had, however, formed some officers fit for command, and Venegas himself directed army operations from Mexico, while watching enemies at home.

Morelos continued to annoy the enemy as best he was able. He sent Trujano with 300 men to remove from the haciendas that supplied Puebla and the royalist garrison of Tepeaca all the grain and live-stock, which he was to convey to Tehuacan for his own troops. On the 4th of October he reached the rancho de la Vírgen, situated between Tlacotepec and Tepeaca, on the road from Tehuacan to Puebla, and established his headquarters there. Lieutenant-colonel Samaniego, who was at Tepeaca, determined to attempt his capture. Setting out at two o'clock in the morning of the 5th with 300 men of the vanguard division of the royalist army of the south, and having a small mountain howitzer, they silently approached and attacked the place. Trujano managed to keep his force together, and in the house of the rancho made a stout defence. Samaniego then set fire to the building, which drove out the inmates, and Trujano, his friend and most efficient officer Gil, and many of the men were slain. Samaniego having received a wound in his leg which lamed him for life,

perceiving a large force of independents approaching, retreated toward Tepeaca. The band proved to be Galeana's, which had been hurriedly despatched to the Vírgen rancho by Morelos.[12]

It will be remembered that of the silver bars captured by Osorno at Pachuca, a portion had been allotted to Morelos, which, as Osorno never sent as prom-



CAMPAIGNS IN PUEBLA AND VERA CRUZ.

ised, Morelos resolved to go after them. Leaving Tehuacan on the 13th of October, he proceeded by the way of San Andrés Chalchicomula, and reached

[12] Galeana carried the bodies of Trujano and Gil to Tehuacan, where Morelos had them interred with military honors. Trujano was a mulatto, and before the revolution had been an arriero, or muleteer in Tepecacuilco his birthplace. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 304–6. Llano transmitted from Puebla on the 6th of October Samaniego's verbal report, which says that this officer received two balls in one of his legs, and that Trujano and 80 more were killed. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1079–81; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 180–4.

the hacienda of Ozumba, distant one and a half leagues from Nopalucan, where he received one hundred and sixteen bars of silver. The movement had been effected with the utmost secrecy, as was the custom of Morelos. It happened at this time that a convoy had been formed at Amozoc, just out of Puebla, under Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Rivas, to escort a mule train of ammunition, money, and other effects, and artillery detained in Perote, and also to set in motion the Zamora and Castilla regiments recently arrived from Spain, but which for want of those supplies had been unable to move from Jalapa. The artillery and troops were intended for laying siege to Morelos in Tehuacan. A large number of passengers and a quantity of private merchandise were also there to make avail of the military escort. Brigadier Porlier, who with the remainder of the marine battalion, now reduced to less than half its original force, had gone to Puebla on his way to Vera Cruz to embark for Spain, having in his charge official despatches, also joined the convoy, which on the 15th of October started from Amozoc. Llano, on hearing of Morelos' movement, sent the convoy back to Amozoc, and reënforced it with the Asturias battalion, ordering at the same time that Luis del Águila, should take command of the vanguard stationed at Tepeaca, and divert Morelos' attention in the direction of San Andrés, while the train could pass.[13] On reaching Nopalucan it was learned that Morelos was in Ozumba preparing to attack the convoy. When the latter had passed the sanctuary of San José Chiapa, in the morning of the 18th, Morelos was in its rear marching against it in three columns.[14]

[13] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1135–42. Alaman in describing Morelos' operations relies a great deal on that chief's own statements at his subsequent trial. But as they are not quite so minute as it would be desirable, other sources must be consulted. *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 306–10.

[14] The train consisted of 1,500 laden mules, nine coaches, and five litters; it was placed on a hill of easy descent, close by the road, by the side of which was a cornfield, and the mules were protected from a cavalry attack by an Indian fig field; the whole was guarded by the Union battalion.

The Spanish forces, excepting one battalion detached to protect the train, occupied the road along which Morelos was coming. Galeana's column by a long detour made a diversion against and attacked the rear, but was repulsed. Meantime, the action had begun at the front. One of Morelos' columns made a vigorous charge, but was met by Otero and routed. The insurgents fled, leaving three pieces of artillery, one being loaded, which the royalists turned against the fugitives, killing the reverend Colonel Tapia.[15] The convoy continued its march to Ojo de Agua. Morelos got together his force and went back to Tehuacan.

Upon the arrival of the convoy at Perote, Porlier went on to Jalapa to open communication with Vera Cruz. The supplies to be obtained at Perote were taken to Puebla by the Zamora infantry regiment, under Colonel Rafael Bracho. Aguila, whose force was guarding the train on the left, approached San Andrés Chalchicomula to observe the enemy, and being falsely informed that Morelos had fled, rejoined the convoy at Ozumba. Meantime, Tepeaca, which had remained with a small garrison, was assailed by insurgents, but with timely relief under Colonel Echeagaray, sent by Llano, repulsed the assailants.[16] Morelos now saw his opportunity—Oajaca being free from possible assaults, and Aguila gone with the trains—to fall upon Orizaba, then defended by a small garrison, and whose inhabitants he believed to be friendly. On the 29th he appeared before the garita del Molino of the villa with 2,200 men, and occupied the Carnero hill, a commanding point. The garrison made a two hours' defence, during which many were slain. Colonel José Antonio Andrade, the commandant, then retreated to Córdoba, abandoning six guns and a quantity of other

[15] The independent loss was light, though Aguila reported 600 slain. Morelos passed the night in Ozumba, where Tapia was buried. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 184–6; *Id.*, *Elogio Morelos*, 13–14; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 323–4.

[16] Llano's report of Oct. 25th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1141–2.

arms, being closely pursued till midday. Some of his men who were captured enlisted in the independent service.[17]

Morelos had no intention of remaining at Orizaba; so after seizing the government tobacco, he took a portion for his own army, and returning to the planters such part as they claimed, he ordered the rest destroyed, and leaving there a small garrison under Rocha, took his departure. Soon after starting he saw the smoke rising from the burning tobacco. The loss to the government was considerable, but by no means so great as Morelos represented it in a letter to Rayon.[18] As soon as the news reached Puebla of Morelos' expedition to Orizaba, Águila marched after him with 1,250 men, and three pieces of artillery. At the same time Llano sent Águila the Zamora regiment, 150 dragoons, and three guns, leaving Rivas at Tepeaca with 300 men to keep the way open. Águila by forced marches reached the cañada de Iztapa the 31st, on the same day Morelos had left Orizaba. Both parties continuing their march, neither knowing the position of the other, they came together on the 1st of November, Morelos being on the heights of Aculcingo in an advantageous position, with his men in two lines, his artillery enfilading the public road. He opened fire as soon as Águila was within reach. The latter, who was with the right column,

[17] The officers taken were shot; among them was young Santa María, a native of Vera Cruz, and brother to Miguel Santa María, who in after years was Mexican minister to Spain, and with the Spanish minister of state, Calatrava, signed the treaty by which Mexico's independence was formally recognized. The young man had been one of the San Agustin del Palmar prisoners, and to escape death pretended to be a partisan of Morelos, being employed by him to instruct his troops, but at the first chance escaped and rejoined the royalists. Being now recaptured, a young woman to whom Santa María was betrothed presented a petition on his behalf to Morelos, who coolly wrote upon it, 'Let her choose a more decent swain.' The clergy and chief citizens interceded for the prisoners. Morelos gave an evasive answer, and during the mass, himself being in attendance, the prisoners were shot in the adjoining plaza. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 190–3; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 310–12; *Gaz de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1184–6; *Guerra, Revol. N. Esp.*, ii. 469; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 151; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 388; *Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX.*, v. 324–6.

[18] He said that by the burning of fourteen million cigars the government had been deprived of resources to carry on seven years of war.

without waiting for the left, ordered his cavalry, supported by the grenadiers, to charge. The left column soon came up, and the independents, abandoning their first line and the artillery there placed, retreated to the second. The fight here became very hot; the dragoons of Mexico were forced to give way, and their lieutenant-colonel, Moran, had his horse killed under him. Manuel Flon, a son of the conde de la Cadena, who commanded a squadron of Puebla cavalry, met with a like adventure. Whilst this was going on, mules, men, and women were all making their escape with as much tobacco as they could carry, all taking the side road toward Tehuacan. Morelos and his soldiers were finally forced to do likewise. The scattered revolutionists came together again by previous appointment at the town of Chapulco, on the way to Tehuacan. Galeana, whose horse was killed, escaped capture by hiding himself in the hollow trunk of an old cork tree. Aguila reported him among the killed, and Morelos had also given him up as lost till he reappeared the next day.[19]

Morelos remained in Tehuacan only seven days. With 2,500 men from Izúcar under Matamoros, 2,000 from the Mizteca under Miguel and Victor Bravo, and 500 collected at Chapulco, he had about 5,000 soldiers, with whom, and 40 pieces of artillery of various calibre, he started for Oajaca,[20] making slow

[19] Aguila's report of Nov. 5th from Orizaba, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1186, 1211–15. This account, Alaman says, was corroborated later by Benigno Bustamante, who in this action was Aguila's aid. *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 312–16. According to Morelos' declaration at his trial, he then had only 800 men, and lost 40 of them, together with four or five cannon, besides some ammunition, a few muskets, etc. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 184–6; *Id., Elogio Morelos*, 13–15; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 26. The royalist force was much larger, and had seven killed and 25 wounded. Aguila said Morelos was completely routed; and it was even rumored that he had been wounded and Arroyo killed. But the result was really unimportant; Morelos got together the next day 500 of his scattered men and returned to Tehuacan in good order, having saved nearly all his muskets, a matter of no small importance to him. Aguila went to Orizaba, whence he sent some assistance to Andrade, who was greatly beset by the insurgents at Córdoba.

[20] He kept the utmost secrecy respecting his destination. There were various surmises, and he aided to keep up the doubt with a letter of Nov. 1st from Cuicatlan to the cura Sanchez, left in Tehuacan with a small number of men, saying that the great heat and scarcity of provisions compelled him to go

marches. He encountered little difficulty on the way, and on the 24th of November established his head-quarters in an hacienda distant only three leagues from the city. In approaching the hacienda there was some skirmishing with royalists, who were easily driven within the city's defences. These had been built on a plan approved by the superior government. An intelligent Catalan had made thirty-six fine guns of various calibre, and a large quantity of shell and other missiles. Ammunition, much of it from Guatemala,

OAJACA PROVINCE.

was abundant. The garrison was not under 2,000 men, made up of Spaniards residing in and about the

back to Tehuacan, whence he would march against Puebla. This letter was found in Tehuacan by Aguila when he entered the place on the 21st, Sanchez having made a timely exit. Izúcar was also retaken by the royalists. Llano attributed the abandonment of the two places to the royalist victory on Aculcingo heights; but he was mistaken, though it is not likely that the independents could have held them long. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1231–3, 1260–1. Morelos promoted Matamoros and Galeana to mariscal de campo, making the former his second in command, as the latter could not read or write. The chief had at this time no little trouble with Martinez, the visitador sent by Rayon; nor was his disgust less with other insurgent chiefs for their bad conduct and inordinate pretensions. All appears in his correspondence with Rayon. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 329–36; *Negrete, Méj. Siglo XIX.*, v. 331; *Mora, Revol. Mex.*, iv. 373–4.

place, Bergosa's sacred legion, and the remnants brought by Régules from Huajuapan and the Mizteca. The place, therefore, did not lack for means of defence, though the comandante general, Gonzalez Saravia, had, as I said, used his best efforts to get still more.

Bishop Bergosa, now archbishop elect of Mexico, on hearing of Morelos' approach, stole out of the city at night with his family and valuables, and started for the capital by way of Tehuantepec, Tabasco, and Vera Cruz. He had been virulent toward Morelos and the revolutionists, and deemed it prudent not to remain. His flight greatly disheartened the royalists. The frightened women sought refuge in the nunneries, and many hid their money and jewelry in the same sacred places. On the 25th Morelos demanded the surrender of the city within three hours, and receiving no answer, approached it and made preparations for the attack. He made of his army six divisions, two of which were to prevent the garrison's retreat by the road to Guatemala; to one was intrusted the duty of guarding the baggage and protecting the rear; of the remaining three divisions, the first, under Ramon Sesma, was to assail the fort in the church and convent of La Soledad commanding the town; the second, under Matamoros and Galeana, was directed to enter the city by Marquesado street; and the third Morelos retained under his immediate command as a reserve.

All being ready, operations began. Sesma with the San Lorenzo regiment quickly dislodged the garrison in the Soledad fort, their commander Régules fleeing to hide himself in the Carmelite convent. This fort communicated with the city by a drawbridge, the defence of which had been given to Colonel Bonavía, who together with his officers fled, leaving a sergeant to prevent the bridge from being raised as long as possible. But Mier y Teran seized the bridge, and placing on it a gun swept the opposite street. Matamoros and Galeana simultaneously entered the city,

the other columns advancing and meeting but little resistance. Mier y Teran advanced to the plaza, driving before them the fugitives who were still firing from behind the pillars. Galeana proceeded against the Santo Domingo convent, which was very strong and suited for a long defence. After a slight opposition, the place was surrendered with upward of 300 men



PLAN OF OAJACA.

1. Cathedral.
2. Santo Domingo Convent.
3. Palace.
4. Plaza.
5. El Instituto College.
6. Mint.
7. Town Hall.
8. Monte Alban Ruins.

and three guns. Matamoros attacked the Cármen, which was soon taken, though hotly defended by the Spanish friars, particularly Friar Félix, one of the captains of Bishop Bergosa's ecclesiastical militia. Lieutenant-general Gonzalez Saravia sallied forth with the cavalry of European Spaniards to meet the independents that were coming in from all quarters, but his men quickly fled, leaving him alone, and he sought refuge in a house. The whole affair lasted but two hours.[21]

The city being thus taken, pillage and punishment followed, the houses and shops of the Spaniards receiving the chief attention. The convents as well as the effects deposited in them were, however, respected; but Morelos afterward took out every thing belonging to the Spaniards, and applied it to the uses of his army. He also issued an edict commanding the surrender of all effects that had been concealed by Spaniards. Next those were looked after who were to die. Five hundred prisoners came with the city's capture, two hundred of whom were fine old Spaniards.[22] The notorious Régules Villasante was found in the Carmelite convent, hidden behind some coffins. Among the royalist officers taken

[21] The main facts relating to the attack and capture of Oajaca have been taken from Morelos' own declarations at his trial. According to his statement, 'se apoderaron de la ciudad despues de solo dos horas de fuego, en tales términos que á las dos de la tarde ya el declarante estaba en la Plaza Mayor, y á las tres comiendo en la Casa de un Europeo apellidado Gutierrez.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 630; vi. 26–7. A minute account of the affair, and one that he obtained on the spot soon after its occurrence, is given by Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 206–26; *Id., Elogio Morelos*, 15–16; *Mora, Rev. Mex.*, iv. 396–400; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 320–4, 329; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 201–2. Among the independents in the attack figured Manuel Félix Fernandez, who in after years gave up his name, assuming that of Guadalupe Victoria. He had thrown himself, full of enthusiasm, into a moat, intending to swim across it. Mier y Teran saw him floundering in the mire, but offered no assistance. When in later years he told Mier his intention of changing his name, the latter jocosely approved it, proposing that of Américo Triunfo, which made the other very angry, and brought ill feeling between them which afterward caused their country much misery. Alaman says he obtained this information from Mier himself. *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 323; *Mayer's Mex. Aztec.*, 291–2.

[22] Besides sixty pieces of artillery, 2,000 muskets, and a large quantity of ammunition.

the first day were Colonel Bernardino Bonavía, and Captain Aristi. Lieutenant-general Gonzalez Saravia was captured three days afterward attempting to escape by the Guatemala road, disguised as a man of the lower class with a sheet round his person. On seeing that he was to be confined in a building generally used for common criminals, he asked Morelos to treat him as befitted his rank, and offered forty thousand dollars for his freedom and leave to embark for Spain, which proposition was declined. He was a man of mettle, generous, chivalrous, and when the auditor de guerra appointed by Morelos to try his case went to interrogate him, he called Morelos and his soldiers banditti, offered them amnesty, and refused to answer any questions. This hastened his doom, though perhaps only a few days. On the 2d of December, Saravia and Régules were shot in the plain of Las Canteras, the same spot where early in the revolution Lopez and Armenta, messengers of Hidalgo, had been executed. Bonavía and Aristi suffered death in the plaza de San Juan de Dios, where the royalists had wreaked their vengeance the previous year on Tinoco and Palacios for conspiracy in favor of independence. A young Guatemalan servant of Saravia was also put to death, because he tore from a wall and burned an edict of Morelos. The death of Régules was well deserved. The lives of the other prisoners were spared.[23] But notwithstanding this and many other acts of kindness and magnanimity, Morelos, like Hidalgo, has been called cruel; but only by royalists and their sympathizers.[24] This was a war without quarter, and with far greater strictness than the in-

[23] Canon Moreno, who had been Morelos' teacher of Latin grammar, and other members of the clergy, together with the families of the prisoners, interceded for the Spaniards. Upward of 200 were released on bonds; 31 of whom he was distrustful were despatched to the prison at Zacatula. Among the prisoners were 300 native Mexicans, of whom he mustered the able-bodied and efficient into his own force.

[24] One of those referred to uses these words: 'No era posible que Morelos dejara de llevarse de sus feroces instintos.' *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, i. 196. Cancelada, *Tel. Mex.*, 274–5, 281–2, in speaking of the capture also charges Morelos with cruelty.

surgents the royalists awarded death to every independent chief falling into their hands. We may be very sure if the situation at Oajaca had been reversed Morelos and all his officers would have been killed. The revolutionists made some little distinction in regard to the men they executed; the royalists made none whatever.[25] Had Morelos refused entirely to execute notorious prisoners it would have laid him open to suspicion and perhaps have brought on mutiny. Undue magnanimity would hardly have been appreciated. When Mariano Jimenez became a prisoner, his kindness toward the governor of Coahuila and other Spaniards in the internal provinces was all forgotten. The Spanish authorities made no distinction between him and the infamous Marroquin, the butcher of the barrancas near Guadalajara.

Morelos despatched Father García Cano in pursuit of Bishop Bergosa, hoping that he might be overtaken in Tehuantepec. Cano's orders were to extend to him every kindness; but the bishop had already gone to sea. Cano's expedition was not fruitless, however, as he gathered on the road a large quantity of cochineal and other property that the Spanish merchants had sent out of Oajaca. Lieutenant-colonel Vicente Guerrero, who had begun his military service under Galeana in 1810, was directed to seize in the bights near Tehuantepec the tobacco and cacao landed from Acapulco.[26]

To the remains of Tinoco, Palacios, and others sacrificed in Oajaca by the royalists, Morelos caused funeral honors to be paid. He released the revolutionary prisoners confined in the convent of

[25] It is said that afterward, better informed, Morelos acknowledged the shooting of Saravia to have been an error, and regretted it till his death. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 217.

[26] Morelos wrote Rayon on the 15th of Jan. 1813, that Guerrero 'limpió los bajios de Tehuantepec, Puerto Escondido y el de Santa Cruz.' The quantity of cochineal that fell into Morelos' hands was 800 bales, the value of which, added to that of the tobacco, cacao, jewelry, silver plate, etc., formed a total of about three million dollars, with which he resolved to give the greatest impulse to the revolution. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 328.

the hacienda of Ozumba, distant one and a half leagues from Nopalucan, where he received one hundred and sixteen bars of silver. The movement had been effected with the utmost secrecy, as was the custom of Morelos. It happened at this time that a convoy had been formed at Amozoc, just out of Puebla, under Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Rivas, to escort a mule train of ammunition, money, and other effects, and artillery detained in Perote, and also to set in motion the Zamora and Castilla regiments recently arrived from Spain, but which for want of those supplies had been unable to move from Jalapa. The artillery and troops were intended for laying siege to Morelos in Tehuacan. A large number of passengers and a quantity of private merchandise were also there to make avail of the military escort. Brigadier Porlier, who with the remainder of the marine battalion, now reduced to less than half its original force, had gone to Puebla on his way to Vera Cruz to embark for Spain, having in his charge official despatches, also joined the convoy, which on the 15th of October started from Amozoc. Llano, on hearing of Morelos' movement, sent the convoy back to Amozoc, and reënforced it with the Asturias battalion, ordering at the same time that Luis del Águila, should take command of the vanguard stationed at Tepeaca, and divert Morelos' attention in the direction of San Andrés, while the train could pass.[13] On reaching Nopalucan it was learned that Morelos was in Ozumba preparing to attack the convoy. When the latter had passed the sanctuary of San José Chiapa, in the morning of the 18th, Morelos was in its rear marching against it in three columns.[14]

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[16] Llano's report of Oct. 25th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 1141–2.

tition[31] that caused him to despatch Montaño to occupy that city, not being able to go himself till the whole southern coast was secured. He had the idea that by holding Tlascala he could beyond a doubt possess himself of Puebla, and even of Mexico. To accomplish this, he invited Rayon, and through him the other members of the junta, to draw the attention of the viceregal commanders in the direction of Toluca, so that they might not bring their whole strength upon him as was the case when he held Cuautla. If this should prove too difficult, he would direct his operations against Orizaba and Córdoba. Both of these plans were bold, for neither were his troops adequate for such undertakings, nor could he promise himself the coöperation of the president and his colleagues.[32] Further than this, he placed but little reliance on the accounts of victories their chiefs reported to have won.[33] Before he had fully decided he thought of another plan, which was to conduct in person the siege of Acapulco. It was not altogether a good idea. It must be a slow, tedious undertaking, and of doubtful success; but even allowing that everything should turn out as he desired, it could aid but little, if at all, his great aims; the acquisition of that port would not compensate him for the time he must spend in securing it and which his enemies would employ in regaining strength and in preparing better plans for the next campaign. It was clear that the viceroy was making his arrangements, though he did not choose the best instrument to carry them out, for he intrusted the command of his army of the south to Brigadier Olazábal.

Let us again look in at the capital. I have elsewhere mentioned the bitter feeling existing between

[31] According to his own letter of Jan. 21, 1813, to Rayon. *Id.*, iii. 338.

[32] He acknowledged himself advised of the progress claimed to have been made by the president and the others. As for himself, he said, 'Por acá voy poco á poco, porque así larga la gallina el moco.' *Id.*, iii. 338.

[33] Padre Ramos, 'no me contesta á los oficios, pero sí me cuenta sus aventuras ó hazañas de D. Quijote.' *Ib.*

Viceroy Venegas and General Calleja. The latter, since his surrender of the command of the central army, lived in retirement, having declined the position tendered him of comandante general of the provincias internas de oriente. That ill feeling was well known, and had been the subject of many public comments, Calleja being charged with fomenting by his remarks a spirit of hostility on the part of the royalists toward the viceroy. Nevertheless, on the 29th of December, without any antecedent to explain his change of feeling, Venegas appointed Calleja military governor of Mexico, conferring on him at the same time the commission of lieutenant-colonel of the royalist or patriot military organization bearing the name of Fernando VII.[34] A few days later, on the 7th of January, 1813, having suppressed the junta de seguridad and created in its stead, at each provincial capital, a military commission for the trial of persons arraigned for treason,[35] he gave the presidency of the commission at Mexico to Calleja. It was one of the duties of the military governor of Mexico to receive every day at the palace the parole and countersign. On the 28th of February, the last time that he performed this duty, he had already received his commission as viceroy of New Spain, and Venegas, going to the outer reception-room to meet him, tendered him his congratulations.

The removal of Venegas from his high position resulted from the representations made by the merchants of Cádiz, whose influence with the government was very great, to the effect that the continuance of the insurrection was mainly owing to the viceroy's inefficient measures.[36] His was the fate of many

[34] It consisted of three battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery of artillery; the viceroy being ex officio its colonel.

[35] The new court consisted of seven officers of high military rank, with whom was associated an ecclesiastical judge nominated by the respective ordinary, who was to exercise jurisdiction in cases of ecclesiastics brought for trial before the military court. This was a modification of the famous decree of June 25, 1812. *Id.*, iii. 375–6.

[36] The despatch announcing his relief, and the appointment of Calleja as

another occupying high responsible place in a time of great peril, when complete success only can save him from obloquy. Venegas, at the time he assumed the viceregal office together with the chief command of the forces, was hailed by the Spaniards as their liberator; there can be no doubt that his timely arrival and prompt measures saved New Spain to the crown in 1810; later he became an object of censure to the different parties, as their passions or interests prompted. The insurgents hated him because he prevented the consummation of their purpose, calling him cruel and blood-thirsty—and it must be confessed that these accusations were borne out by facts. The clergy hated him for attacking their privileges. The royalists, on the other hand, found fault with what they called his excessive benevolence to the rebels, to which as well as to the absence of a well conceived plan of military operations they attributed the recent advantages obtained by the revolutionists. Venegas thus found himself without the good opinion of either party, who, if they did not actually feel pleased at his removal from office, certainly looked upon it with indifference. At this distance of time it is easier to judge the man with impartiality. Justice demands of us to say that his character for honesty was irreproachable; even his bitterest enemies concede him that.[37] He never resorted to reprehensible means to enrich himself, and even went beyond ordinary honesty in refusing to receive presents which a long-established custom had authorized the acceptance of. He went back poor to Spain; and but for a loan of $25,000 from his personal friend, the conde de Casa de Agreda, he would have found himself without money for his journey. His constant attention to the duties of his office

his successor, bears date at Cádiz, Sept. 16, 1812; and the reason alleged for that action was that his military services were needed in Spain. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 242.

[37] 'Venegas no robó un peso: ¡ojalá que pudiera aparecer á los ojos del mundo tan piadoso, como fué limpio de manos!' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 251.

allowed him no leisure except for a ride occasionally in the afternoon. An able financier and ruler, he had generally managed to procure resources to meet the enormous expenses of the war, and to organize armies to oppose the insurgents wherever they appeared in force.

His resolution to enter the struggle with so many odds against him was certainly that of a man possessed of undaunted courage; and when he made preparations to resist Hidalgo and his host of 80,000 men, with a handful of soldiers in whom he could not then have much confidence, the most he might expect was an honorable death. Even certain weaknesses in his relations with the other sex, attributed to him, he made use of for the benefit of his cause—the insurgents of Mexico were always of the opinion that to female gossip he owed the discovery of the August conspiracy. The war allowed Venegas but little opportunity to attend to the duties of the viceregal office proper, but he did not neglect them entirely. It may be truthfully asserted that if peace had reigned during his incumbency he would have been one of the best viceroys New Spain ever had.[38] On his return to the mother country he was given the title of Marqués de la Reunion de Nueva España,[39] and was also treated with the utmost consideration in other respects.

[38] Bustamante, who shows little charity to Venegas' military record, uses this language, however, 'Creo que si le hubieran cavido tiempos pacíficos, habria gobernado bien, pues amaba las ciencias.' *Suplem.*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 55. The same writer accuses the late viceroy of having 'un genio áspero,' and of being given to the use of profane language when angered, relating that upon one occasion on learning of a scanty supply of ammunition when he expected to find an abundance, 'votó y juró como el mas renegado carromatero (segun tenia de costumbre y era su lenguage).' He also charges him with haughtiness toward the poor clerks who had to approach him, whom he would hardly look in the face. This is probably an exaggeration. *Cuev. Hist.*, ii. 46–7. Venegas once slipped and fell on the steep staircase leading to his private apartments, for which reason he had it removed and a more suitable one erected. There were not wanting some to attribute the fall to drunkenness, which was unfounded, for he was noted for his sobriety. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 380.

[39] *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, ix. 37. Alaman has it 'Marqués de la Concordia de Nueva España.' *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 380. Bustamante says: 'Conde de la Union,' adding that it was 'burlezco é insultante.' *Supl.*, in *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 55.

When Ferdinand recovered his throne he showed his esteem for Venegas by conferring on him the highest titles of honor.[a]

[a] In the preparation of this and the preceding four chapters, the following [illegible] 1810–11, i. ii. 273, 316–17, [illegible] 1811, ix. 7–8, 354, 358; *Id.*, [illegible] 1812, xii. 72, 122, 213; *Id.*, 1812, xiv. [illegible] 1813, xix. 66, 339; *Id.*, 1813, xx. [illegible] *Hist.*, ii. 25, 44–5, 158–64, [illegible] *Extr.*, viii. 1822–3, 7–8; [illegible] i. 323–8, 384–406; *Id.*, ii. 4–7, [illegible] 122–3, 158–62, 175–8, 202–4, 253–9, 251, 299–301, 307–15; [illegible] 158–9; *Id.*, *Noticias Biog.*, [illegible] ii. 443–5, 469–70, 534–[illegible] 87–7, 114–32, [illegible] 179–204, 204–38, 245–68, 272–6, [illegible] 37–8, 50–2, app. 3–6, 45–6; *Ib.*, iv. 724, app. 3–5; *Cancelada, Ref. Mex.*, 1–8; [illegible] 274–5, 281–2; *Gac. de Mex.*, iii. passim; *Id.*, iv. 24–5; *Ensayo Hist. Rev.*, iv. 184–2; *Ib.*, vi. 844–81; *Id.*, ix. 219–22, [illegible] x. 87–8, 114–16, 202, 641–1, app. i. 58–9; *Carrillo, Estudios Hist.*, ii. 16–2, [illegible] 24–44, 46–5, 354–44; *Calleja*, i. fol. 97; *Herrera*, i. 542, [illegible] 84–8; *Ib.*, iv. 884–901; *Id.*, v. 188–96, 298, 615–84, [illegible] 2–7, 32–5, 41–1, 9–22, 245–6, 251–2, 1036–8; *Liceaga, Adic. y Ref.*, 227–42; *Ib.*, [illegible] *Amer.*, 319–42; *Arróniz, Biog. Mex.*, 2.4–17; *Alamán, Mex.*, i. 155–88; *Ib.*, app. 100; *Museo Mex.*, ii. 163–7; *Mex. Mex.*, i. 118, 161, 8, 232; *Mex. Rev. Mex.*, iv. 201–14, 336–412, 417–8, 443–8; *Mex. Rev. Rev.*, 17–19; *Mex. Col. Leyes Fund.*, 34–9; [illegible] 84–7, 124–45, 151, 154–5, 161–2; app. ii. 373–8, iii. 584–5, iv. 385, v. 58–9; *Mayer, Mex. Aztec.*, i. 289–93; *Niles' Reg.*, iii. 71, 248, 361; *Ib.*, iii. 64, 144, 272; *Perez, Dicc. Geog. Estad.*, i. 1–[illegible] *Rev.*, xvii. 542–8; *Ib.*, [illegible] *Pol.*, i. no. 7; *Id.*, no. 9; *Mex. El Iris*, *N. Rev.*, 1–8; [illegible] *Hist.*, Madrid, 1820, passim; *Cor. Fed.* [illegible] Sept. 24, 1827, 2–6; *Sp. Const. Pol.*, Cadiz, 1812, reprint Mex. 1820, passim; *S. Amer. and Mex.*, 117–66; *Ib.*, in *Span.-Amer.*, 312–44; [illegible] *Hist. N. Espan.*, i. iii. passim; *Ib.*, *Hist. Jalapa*, i. 349–50, [illegible] 4–5, 4.6, 4.9; *Ib.*, *Mex. Rev.*, i. 44–69; *Id.*, ii. 321–8; *Rockwell, Span. and Mex. Law*, 308; *Alamán, Mex. and Mex. Zurt.*, 7; *Constit. Polit.* [illegible] *Espan.*, Cadiz, 1812, passim; *Gac. Hist. Ultras*, iv. 7–171; *Ib.*, *Mex.*, 28 April, 1850, passim; *Kendall's Mex. Walker*, MS., 23–7; *Kendall*, [illegible] 170–71, 175–6; *La Ilustr. Mex.*, i. 99–110, 457–9; *Long*, *Narr. in Mex.*, 424; *Oaxaca, Ocur.*, 4–15, 165; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 188–5, 202–26; *Wilcox, Letters*, 3.2–3; *Young, Hist. Mex.*, 89–91, *Zamacois, Hist. Mex.*, viii. passim; *Ib.*, ix. 5–9, 125, 225–31, 503–5, 568, 609–20, 775–6; *Ib.*, x. 273–7; *Ib.*, xi. 643, 845; *Id.*, app. 789–91; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 185–5, 185–40.

CHAPTER XX.

VICEROY CALLEJA AND HIS PLANS.

1813.

CALLEJA'S CHARACTER AND APPEARANCE—HOW THE APPOINTMENT WAS RECEIVED—CONDITION OF AFFAIRS—FRESH TAXES AND LOANS—REFORMS—INSURGENT HEROINE—CONSTITUTION OF 1812 ENFORCED—INQUISITION DISAPPEARS—INCREASE OF CRIME—PROTESTS AND COUNTER-APPEALS—EXTENT OF INSURRECTION—CALLEJA'S CAMPAIGN PLAN—ROYALIST POSITIONS—VERDUSCO'S FIASCO—RAYON'S TOUR OF INSPECTION—QUARREL BETWEEN THE LEADERS—ITURBIDE'S VICTORY AT SALVATIERRA.

THE feeling in New Spain at the appointment of Calleja was by no means of unmixed delight. Spaniards naturally welcomed one from whose proved skill, energy, and experience they hoped to reach a speedy conclusion of the protracted civil war and attendant disorders, and the inhabitants of the capital could not object to a man whose fondness for ostentation promised to sustain the splendor of the court and the allurements of the metropolis. Society spoke of him besides as elegant in manners, with a conversation that revealed both wide reading and taste. Here the praise stopped, however, for there was something strongly repelling in his haughty disposition and sinister aspect, stamped by cold calculation and vindictiveness. Much of this was due to a bilious temperament, reflected also in his jaundiced complexion and cat-like face, with its greenish eyes and lowering glances.[1]

[1] Bustamante compares his eyes to two boiled tomatoes. His beard terminated in a point. The portrait in *Alaman*, iv. 77, shows no beard. Otherwise the former gives him a fine figure, 'agestado, elegante, airoso en los movimientos.' *Campañas de Calleja*, app. 17.

As a soldier he had distinguished himself less for [illegible] execution of cautiously [illegible]. This at least inspired confidence [illegible]; and he supplemented the same [illegible] discipline, softened by prudent attention [illegible]; so that while his cold formality [illegible] and studied methods repressed enthusiasm, he nevertheless enjoyed good repute among his [illegible] who manifested their deference and gratitude by calling him Amo Don Felix.[2]

Respect was indeed the only feeling evoked by his positive qualities; it hardly warmed into admiration. Fear and distrust rose as a barrier; and those who ventured near him did so with a motive, prepared with concession or flattery. And Calleja was content; for he loved to be flattered and looked up to as a great man, and that without a too searching or microscopic analysis of the qualities comprising his character. Devoid of magnetism, and with a temperament hardened by sanguinary warfare on the border and by comparative isolation of life among rude soldiers and colonists, his ambitious spirit had come to regard fear as the sweetest of homage and the strongest of influences.

Acknowledged as the foremost soldier in New Spain, his appointment failed not to inspire the army with a wholesome confidence, and the insurgents with a corresponding awe, while the people at large coupled his name only with relentless cruelty. Yet even among the creoles there was a clique which had begun to look upon this new Tamerlane, as Bustamante calls him,[3] as a possible liberator. He had more than once allowed to escape the utterance that independence would benefit the country.[4] Encouraged

[2] Amo, meaning the master of an estate, or factory.

[3] *Compañas de Calleja*, sup. 2. Pages 177–8 are laden with choice epithets against him.

[4] Even in a private letter to the viceroy, in January 1811, he had written: 'Sus naturales y aun los mismos Europeos están convencidos de las ventajas que les resultarian de un gobierno independiente.' *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, i. 163.

by this and by the late ill feeling between him and the viceroy, the guadalupe society, in active sympathy with the insurgents, had approached him, holding forth in alluring colors the fame and position he might acquire by casting his talents and influence with their party, and achieving the independence of an empire. Whether Calleja seriously entertained the proposition or merely sought to keep himself informed of the enemy's plans, remains uncertain; for just when the guadalupes regarded him as won, his appointment came as viceroy, and satisfied the ambitious craving which alone could have induced him to turn traitor.[5] Jealous of the general, and aware to some extent of his leanings, Venegas had not neglected to throw out hints against him to the government in Spain, but the representations of Spanish residents proved stronger. Perhaps it was thought well to secure so able a man with the irresistible bribe of a viceregal sceptre.

While each was watching the other and awaiting the result of their machinations, Venegas had astonished his rival by the appointments lately conferred upon him. Some saw in these acts a desire to humiliate the general by obliging him to appear daily at the palace for orders; others, a mark of confidence and conciliation in view of the foreshadowed change. Though Calleja had refused the position of comandante general of the provincias internas de Oriente,[6] it suited his plans to accept these positions in the capital.

[5] Unaware of the extent of the negotiations, Alaman would not believe that he could have proved false. *Hist. Méj.*, ii. 348–9. But Zerecero states that the society used often to meet in the house of his family, and he as secretary knew that the day was fixed when Calleja should join the revolution. Sanchez de Tagle and Licentiate Cristo y Conde, the persecuted asesor-general of Iturrigaray, were those who treated with him. The day after Calleja received news of his advancement they came to confer with him as usual. 'If you were not my friends I would have you shot,' was now the startling reply. 'You speak to the viceroy of New Spain.' *Mem.*, 257. Calleja did not abuse the secrets of the society, although availing himself to a great extent of what he knew. Letters by O. Lizana in *Adalid, Causa*, MS., i. 2–3, hint at Calleja's leanings to independence.

[6] As explained by Arechederreta.

After his reception at the palace the last of February, Venegas visited him at his house,[7] and arranged for the surrender of the command. On the 4th of March, 1813, Calleja was conducted in state to the palace, there to receive the staff of office and to take the oath. The attendant ceremonies were celebrated with all the pomp so dear to his heart, manifested further in the formation of a guard in flashing uniforms;[8] but no popular applause greeted his ears.[9]

Among his first acts was a proclamation wherein, alluding to the civil war and its ravages, he pointed out that no further cause existed for discontent, as the new constitution had gone forth enabling the people to choose their own guardians of civil economy and delegates to the national congress, and so prevent abuses. They knew that he could form armies and lead them to victory, but for this he needed funds and expected the necessary aid and temporary sacrifice which would procure the restoration of peace and prosperity. As he had shown himself ready to promote their welfare, so would he prove firm in chastising obstinacy and malevolence.[10] The latter sentence was thoroughly characteristic, and the whole document appeared stamped with the energy expected from a general who had so severely criticised the policy of his predecessor. Nor was he wrong in his condemnation, to judge from the condition of affairs, with the administration in disorder, exchequer empty,

[7] He lived in the same house, hotel de Iturbide, where the liberator Agustin I. received his proclamation as emperor.

[8] Called 'dragones del virey.' Orders from Spain soon changed the term to 'del rey.' His consort, Francisca de la Gándara, moved the same night to the palace, where the usual *besamanos* receptions took place.

[9] There was no lack, however, of felicitations, addresses, and celebrations, as at the university and other institutions. Lizardi joined with a eulogistic address in his *Pensador Mexicano*, sup. pt iii. Cancelada expressed delight in his *Telégrafo*, 269, and loyal addresses were sent in. See also *Torrente, Revol.*, i. 425-6; *Mendibil, Resúm. Hist.*, 168. Portrait and autograph are given in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iv. 77, 724.

[10] This was the characteristic closing sentence. The opening alluded to his appointment as unexpected and unsought. The clergy and other classes were urged to promote restoration of peace. For full text, see *Calleja, á los Habitantes*, fol. 1-8, dated March 26, 1813; *Pap. Var.*, xxxvi. pt vii.; *Gac. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 355-62; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 6-10.

army neglected, insurgents in greater force and control than ever, and public opinion growing more hostile. The reliance in Calleja was based also on his long experience in the country, with which he had in a sense grown up, imbibing lessons from different administrations.

The intimation for funds produced most unpleasant apprehension; for Calleja was as unceremonious in levying contributions as he was prodigal in expenditure. Not long after, indeed, he came forth with a woful complaint. There was a debt of more than thirty millions and a monthly deficit of $260,000, and the sources for revenue were insufficient, the best ones being, moreover, hypothecated for advances.[11] The first necessary step for relief, he declared, was to liberate trade, and mining and other industries, from the crushing weight of oppression by the rebels, who ravaged and kept in perpetual alarm the settlements, and blocked the roads in every direction. To this end funds were above all required wherewith to organize forces; and as the interests of merchants would receive the earliest benefit, he appealed first to the tribunal del consulado for a loan of a million and a half. Although the demand was not fully complied with, the prompt response revealed a flattering confidence in Calleja, united perhaps with a wholesome fear, which proved stronger than the feelings evoked by his discouraging revelation of affairs.[12]

The loan itself drew attention to the main issue, which was means to increase the revenue, a problem intrusted to a council of representatives from different

[11] Manifesto dated April 17, 1813. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 421–2. Many condemned it as dangerous to reveal the condition so publicly, but it was well enough known, from the frequent recourse to forced loans.

[12] The interest offered was five per cent, and the security half the revenue of the city custom-houses from Jan. 1814, but which received no corresponding application. In the list of subscribers, published in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 11–12, are found the names of prominent local nobles, Basoco, Cortina, and others, for sums of $50,000 downward. At the same time the *Gaz. de Mex.*, Jan. 5, 1813 et seq., continued to exhibit respectable donations for Spain.

[illegible] were assisted by reports from [illegible] governors on the economic condition. [illegible] was a continuance of the five per [illegible] rents, and the impost on articles of [illegible] a levy of one per cent on money in cir- [illegible] and an additional fifty per cent on tobacco. [illegible] measures proved so onerous that they were [illegible] and instead of them was placed a direct con- [illegible] property and income. Fixed without [illegible] and affected by the long reign of dis- [illegible] proved difficult to collect, [illegible] arbitrary exactions,[14] before which [illegible] shrank. Indeed, in December he again [illegible] for a loan, this time increased [illegible] The struggles of the finance depart- [illegible] to carry out the prom- [illegible] and repayment had created a [illegible] the first appeal elicited only a paltry [illegible] Pressure was thereupon applied [illegible] with a doubling or treb- [illegible] assigned.[15]

[illegible] to these dispositions was [illegible] in government depart- [illegible] salaries, contingent [illegible] those granted in cam- [illegible] were also made among [illegible] Leon,[16] for one, being

[illegible] the appointees, representing [illegible] departments. [illegible] de Mex., 1813, iv.

[illegible] meeting of Nov. 15th, and proclaimed [illegible] the 50 per cent tax of July [illegible] that the repeal had to be [illegible] print i. doc. 15. Men- [illegible] with. The gov- [illegible] coinage, and hypotheca- [illegible] on ecclesiastic corpo- [illegible] For regulation of [illegible]

[illegible] 433.

[illegible] salaries, but the increased [illegible]

[illegible] Spaniards ever since the time of

replaced by Patricio Humana, and a special war department was created and intrusted to Joaquin Pelaez.[18] All army men and provincial officials were sent to their posts, and impressment was called into action to enforce the levies for recruits. These had to swell the regular army; and in order to leave it free to take the field against the insurgents, Calleja resolved to form a militia for the garrison duty and local defence, as vainly recommended by him to Venegas. Country proprietors were required to join in raising companies, and at the capital even prominent nobles had to swell the ranks.[19]

The military councils lately inaugurated received orders to watch the observance of regulations, and persons suspected of favoring the rebellion. Even women were not spared from their rigorous ferreting, the celebrated wife of Corregidor Dominguez of Querétaro being arrested and arraigned, although the state of her health averted punishment for a time.[20] A prominent young lady of the capital, named Leona Vicario, sent not only information but funds and other aid to her insurgent lover, a law student serving under the banners of Rayon. Betrayed by a servant, she was arrested, and notwithstanding the influence of her family, it would have fared badly with her, for she boldly avowed revolutionary sympathies, had not her friends come to the rescue, and one night

[18] Who escaped the first massacre at Guanajuato by proclaiming to the Indians that Hidalgo had promised to give 500 pesos to any one who should deliver him alive. *Bustamante, Guad. Hist.*, i. 43.

[19] The leading persons who at first formed the battalions of the patriotas de Fernando VII. had gradually substituted paid men, or left the ranks altogether. Although severe pressure was now applied, large numbers managed to escape duty.

[20] The reëstablished constitution led to the removal of corregidores, and accusations now grew stronger against her, Archdeacon Beristain declaring 'que la corregidora es una Ana Bolena, y añado, que Gil [a cura at Querétaro] es su Wolsco.' Letters of Dec. 14th, 23d, 29th. She was hurried away one day without warning, and placed in the convent Santa Teresa at Mexico. The husband was also charged, but vindicated. Being enceinte she enjoyed comparative liberty; indeed, she was even sheltered by a suspicion of insanity. Reports and charges connected with the case may be consulted in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 370 et seq. Other arrests in Querétaro are noted in *Id.*, 345–6. Decree against rebel sympathizers in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 697–8; *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 96–104.

[illegible] where she was [illegible], [illegible] in the [illegible] as his [illegible] to every [illegible].[1]

[illegible] measures for crushing the [illegible] effect to the [illegible] above all in [illegible] of 1812, [illegible] of malcontents [illegible] among the priv- [illegible] for town govern- [illegible] and representatives, which [illegible] The requirement for a [illegible] of a thousand [illegible] to the igno- [illegible] of the authori- [illegible] and white settlers [illegible] The curas naturally [illegible] of men, and de- [illegible] also interfered, and [illegible] a strong effort to pre- [illegible] as had happened at [illegible] but all was vain, for the [illegible] carried everything here and at most other [illegible].[2]

[1] Her [illegible] were confiscated, although she was a minor. Her indict- [illegible] Arechederreta speaks at length of [illegible]

[2] [illegible] in Cortes, *Diario*, 1813, xxi. 152, [illegible]

[3] [illegible] April 4th were Conde de Medina [illegible] the other trader, assisted by [illegible] The audiencia reported [illegible] the result of rebel sympathy. [illegible] iv. 95–7. The viceroy had [illegible] for supposed correspondence with [illegible] It was a repetition of the old ticket, 'teni- [illegible] *Hist. Mej.*, iii. 412. For rules [illegible] xix. 385; *Mex. Col. Dec. y Ord.*, [illegible] Queretaro elected liberals despite [illegible] v. 339. *Pensador Mex.*, sup. 92–3, [illegible]

A similar result obtained in the formation of the provincial assembly. According to the constitution, each intendencia could regard itself as a province and choose its own assembly;[24] but the definition not being very clear, the intendencias united to elect one body for the whole country.[25] At the election of deputies to the córtes in Spain,[26] each intendencia acted for itself. Owing to the wide control of the insurgents, the representation of one for every seventy thousand souls was attained only in certain provinces, and here the Indians were almost wholly disregarded, and the Europeans nearly so, mestizos joining the creoles in controlling the choice which fell mainly on ecclesiastics and lawyers.[27] When the time came for sending the deputies, the viceroy declared that no funds could be spared for their expenses; they who wished to go must do so at their own cost. Only a few could afford to undertake the journey, and so the representation faded to a shadow.[28]

The change in the administration of justice began in May. Special tribunals were abolished with a few exceptions, such as army and church, and the audiencia was deprived of extra-judicial privileges. Prom-

[24] To be composed of a president, intendente, and seven members. There was a vagueness in art. 332, however, which left the impression that the president was the viceroy, now known as gefe superior, and which implied that New Spain was but one province. Consult further the text in *Dublan* and *Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 375, etc.

[25] Mexico chose two, one for itself and one for Oajaca, which being wholly in the hands of Morelos, could not take part in the election. The two were Provisor Alcocer and J. M. Fagoaga. For rules governing the body, see *Mex. Col. Dec. y Ord.*, 91–5, 103–4; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 446. The guadalupes reported the result joyously to Morelos. *Bustamante, Campañas Calleja*, 177. Election was performed by an electoral college, constituted by a secondary vote.

[26] The election for Mexico began July 4th, and ended on July 18th. Of the 41 partidos in this province, only 22 appointed electors, 29 in number, who chose 14 deputies, whereof 9 were lawyers and 5 ecclesiastics.

[27] Caste distinction was sharply discussed at the time in the córtes, partly owing to the exclusion of negro blood from equality. *Córtes, Diario*, xx. 319, etc. Comment on election influences in *Pap. Var.*, clviii. pt 56, 1–4.

[28] From Mexico only two were sent, and those partly by way of expulsion, as they were deemed dangerous to the public peace, Canon Alcalá and Licentiate Cortazar. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 423. In *Cortes, Actas*, 1813, i. 62, the representation from New Spain proper is put at 11, and from the provincias internas at 2, Yucatan being counted by itself.

least among the fallen institutions was the inquisition, which had so long cast its shadow over the land. Not content with opposing heresy, bigamy, and the like, and indorsing the existence of witchcraft by its dread cognizance, it had of late devoted special attention to repelling the invasion of modern philosophic thought and scientific investigation, by restricting publications and persecuting students. The suppression was hailed with unfeigned delight, and the inquisitors responded with admirable promptness to the popular will, surrendering the records and property without subterfuge. The estates and bonds alone, not counting allowances from churches and other sources, amounted to a million and a fifth of pesos, which went to swell the national resources.[29]

The Indians were deprived of their protective fiscales and governors, and, ignored as a representative body, rather suffered than gained by the reform movement; of the promise of land distribution and freedom from personal service there was no indication of fulfilment.[30] Another revolutionary reform was the suppression of the acordada, which had proved so efficient in checking brigandage and robbery, and of the less valuable police, established with much care and expenditure under Venegas; while the primary administration of justice in the capital, hitherto confided to thirty-two subordinates, alcaldes, and others, was now surrendered to six elected judges,[31] as aids

[29] The suppression decree, dated Feb. 22d, was issued at Mexico in June. Three months later the archbishop took the preliminary steps for enforcing it. *Gabinete, Leyes Ref.*, 33; *Mex., Prorid. Dioces.*, MS., 496–7. In *Inquisicion, Informe*, Mex., 1813, 1–60, is an argument against the proceedings presented to the cortes. Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, i. 430–3, has preserved a synopsis of its executions in New Spain.

[30] By decree of Jan. 4, 1813, the cortes ordered vacant lands to be assigned to the villages for cultivation with community funds. Lands could even be borrowed from adjoining jurisdictions for two years. *Cortes, Col. Dec.*, iii. 189–93. The decree was issued in New Spain in April, but the war prevented its enforcement; and so with the exemption from service to curas and others, proclaimed in June.

[31] The law assigned only one to aid the two alcaldes, but these being too few, the viceroy added five. See his decree in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 462. For other suppressed and reformed departments of justice, see *Id.*, 565–6, etc. The pay of these judges was $1,500 and fees. See also *Mex., Col. Dec. y Ord.*, 67–72.

to the two alcaldes, who were burdened also with the duties hitherto performed by the acordada, the police, and other bodies. The effect soon became manifest in an accumulation of delayed suits, neglect of court formalities and prison regulations, and a startling increase of crime; so much so that patrols had to be established, as well as a soldier police. Several of the measures led to open quarrels between the viceroy and the alcaldes, who were naturally jealous of interference. Beyond the capital the military took matters into their own hands with respect to insurgents, robbers, and others, to whom the summary proceedings of a civil war period might be safely applied.[32]

Matters were not improved by the jealous objection on the part of the newly invested authorities to all interference from the government or the now humbled Europeans. The latter retaliated by withdrawing as much as possible from any position where they might be exposed to further insult and defeat. They made their displeasure manifest during the epidemic which ravaged the plateau this year, by contributing sparingly for the relief of the sick and poor, who so far had depended chiefly on their charity. The infliction was malignant fevers, which began in the preceding year, and extended over the central provinces, from Vera Cruz to Michoacan, carrying off nearly forty thousand persons in Mexico and Puebla alone.[33]

[32] The audiencia seeks naturally to exaggerate the condition somewhat for its own sake. See report in *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, iv. 113–17. In their report of Feb. they showed a disposal in the sala del crimen for the preceding three years, of 9,080 cases with 14,835 criminals, of whom half were liberated. This did not include the much larger number 'quintuplicado' of cases of the junta de seguridad. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 268; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 169. Eighteen cases alone remained pending at the close of 1812; and this is strong testimony against the subsequent condition.

[33] Alaman intimates that the capital alone lost over 14,000 'quedando desde entónces desierto el barrio de Santiago.' *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 414. Concerning the board of health, see *Id., Apuntes*, 11–12. Humboldt attributes the fevers to the siege of Cuautla, but Bustamante believes they were spread by the Zamora soldiers, and originated in the humid habitations of the poor, the germ still lurking. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 286–7. The southern line of San Luis Potosí to Jalisco proved the limit northward; but Oajaca also suffered.

[illegible] the constitution of 1812, [illegible] experimental nature, were [illegible] its opponents. The audi- [illegible] representation to the [illegible] explaining the origin and [illegible] which now affected nearly all [illegible] pointing out the inapplicabil- [illegible] the colony, with its mixture [illegible] Afraid to expose the [illegible] preferred to instance the [illegible] enforcement, and the danger [illegible] in the midst of civil war. [illegible] independence, and would [illegible] is due to fear, using it to pro- [illegible] The country would in- [illegible] unless decisive [illegible] suppress the rebellion, by en- [illegible] with necessary freedom of action [illegible] Only when this had been [illegible] be introduced.[34]

The argument of the oidores that the constitution favored the independence movement, under present circumstances at least, was not entertained by all Spanish residents. The ayuntamiento of Vera Cruz, which, owing to the exceptional local influence of the merchants, was of a European stamp, but firmly devoted to the liberty party in Spain, insisted that the full enforcement of the constitution would tend to quell the revolution by removing all cause for discontent.

[34] The opening paragraphs show that the audiencia retains the duty to interfere by making the present protest, and that the opposition ascribed to Europeans against the constitution consists really in their devotion to the mother country. The clergy fostered rebellious ideas. Art. 132. Whatever the motives of the audiencia, the document contains in its 270 articles a mass of valuable statements, and presents some unanswerable arguments in support of its view. It is addressed to the king and signed by eleven members, Yañez, an American, alone refusing to sign so 'ignominious' an exposition. Oidor Bodega, appointed to another position in Spain, no longer attended the sessions. Bustamante admits the value of the paper, but declares that 'cada línea de este papel tiene mucho veneno.' *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 137. He reproduces the whole text in pp. 27–136. Alaman doubts his supposition that Oidor Pedro de la Puente, a Spaniard, prepared it, and ascribes it rather to the relator J. M. Torres Cataño, a trusted and well informed Mexican. *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 438. A valuable synopsis is given in *Ward's Mex.*, i. 490–507.

This view they supported in a representation to the córtes, wherein Calleja stood accused as the main cause for all existing trouble, partly for neglecting to let the constitution prevail.[35] Indeed, if we except the clauses relating to tribunals and elections, the organic law remained a dead letter. Not only did Calleja retain his power as viceroy, but by allowing the attributes of the audiencia to decline, and the administration of justice to became involved, and by nullifying to a great extent the effect of the elections, he obtained more unrestrained control of affairs. Nor can he be blamed for acting as he did, levying funds and troops, suppressing the liberty of the press, and otherwise encroaching on the prerogatives of the córtes; for the situation was critical, and in order to perform his duty as royal representative and agent for Spain, arbitrary measures were needed.[36]

The insurgents, as we have seen, had risen with renewed strength after the apparently crushing disaster at Cuautla, and occupied at the time of Calleja's entry into office the greater part of the region south of a line drawn from Tampico to Lagos and Colima. "The government," writes the viceroy himself, "could barely claim anything else than the capitals of the provinces, and even one of these, perhaps the richest, Oajaca, was absolutely lost."[37] Morelos controlled

[35] It was prepared by Comoto, editor of *Amigo de la Patria*, and a protégé of Venegas; and among the municipal members who signed it were Arrillaga and Ignacio Esteva, the latter a native of the town, both suspected of holding intercourse with the insurgents, and later holding ministerial posts under the republic. The document was secretly intrusted to Oidor Bodega, on his way to Spain; but on his arrival Fernando had changed the aspect of affairs, and he held back the paper, thus saving the signers; yet Calleja was informed of the facts by his friends. Bustamante reproduces the document in *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 8–22; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 286–7.

[36] It is curious to note that decrees had been issued imposing severe penalties on all who refused to take the oath to the constitution, although so little effort was made to carry out its provisions, or demand fulfilment of the oath. Another decree substituted the word 'national' for 'royal' in all public papers. In June of this year a special law was made in Spain to regulate the sustained liberty of the press. Text in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 65–73.

[37] His later proclamation, in *Bustamante, Camp. Calleja*, app. 7.

After his reception at the palace the last of February, Venegas visited him at his house,[7] and arranged for the surrender of the command. On the 4th of March, 1813, Calleja was conducted in state to the palace, there to receive the staff of office and to take the oath. The attendant ceremonies were celebrated with all the pomp so dear to his heart, manifested further in the formation of a guard in flashing uniforms;[8] but no popular applause greeted his ears.[9]

Among his first acts was a proclamation wherein, alluding to the civil war and its ravages, he pointed out that no further cause existed for discontent, as the new constitution had gone forth enabling the people to choose their own guardians of civil economy and delegates to the national congress, and so prevent abuses. They knew that he could form armies and lead them to victory, but for this he needed funds and expected the necessary aid and temporary sacrifice which would procure the restoration of peace and prosperity. As he had shown himself ready to promote their welfare, so would he prove firm in chastising obstinacy and malevolence.[10] The latter sentence was thoroughly characteristic, and the whole document appeared stamped with the energy expected from a general who had so severely criticised the policy of his predecessor. Nor was he wrong in his condemnation, to judge from the condition of affairs, with the administration in disorder, exchequer empty,

[7] He lived in the same house, hotel de Iturbide, where the liberator Agustin I. received his proclamation as emperor.

[8] Called 'dragones del virey.' Orders from Spain soon changed the term to 'del rey.' His consort, Francisca de la Gándara, moved the same night to the palace, where the usual *besamanos* receptions took place.

[9] There was no lack, however, of felicitations, addresses, and celebrations, as at the university and other institutions. Lizardi joined with a eulogistic address in his *Pensador Mexicano*, sup. pt iii. Cancelada expressed delight in his *Telégrafo*, 269, and loyal addresses were sent in. See also *Torrente, Revol.*, i. 425–6; *Mendibil, Resúm. Hist.*, 168. Portrait and autograph are given in *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iv. 77, 724.

[10] This was the characteristic closing sentence. The opening alluded to his appointment as unexpected and unsought. The clergy and other classes were urged to promote restoration of peace. For full text, see *Calleja, á los Habitantes*, fol. 1–8, dated March 26, 1813; *Pap. Var.*, xxxvi. pt vii.; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 355–62; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 6–10.

army neglected, insurgents in greater force and control than ever, and public opinion growing more hostile. The reliance in Calleja was based also on his long experience in the country, with which he had in a sense grown up, imbibing lessons from different administrations.

The intimation for funds produced most unpleasant apprehension; for Calleja was as unceremonious in levying contributions as he was prodigal in expenditure. Not long after, indeed, he came forth with a woful complaint. There was a debt of more than thirty millions and a monthly deficit of $260,000, and the sources for revenue were insufficient, the best ones being, moreover, hypothecated for advances.[11] The first necessary step for relief, he declared, was to liberate trade, and mining and other industries, from the crushing weight of oppression by the rebels, who ravaged and kept in perpetual alarm the settlements, and blocked the roads in every direction. To this end funds were above all required wherewith to organize forces; and as the interests of merchants would receive the earliest benefit, he appealed first to the tribunal del consulado for a loan of a million and a half. Although the demand was not fully complied with, the prompt response revealed a flattering confidence in Calleja, united perhaps with a wholesome fear, which proved stronger than the feelings evoked by his discouraging revelation of affairs.[12]

The loan itself drew attention to the main issue, which was means to increase the revenue, a problem intrusted to a council of representatives from different

[11] Manifesto dated April 17, 1813. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 421–2. Many condemned it as dangerous to reveal the condition so publicly, but it was well enough known, from the frequent recourse to forced loans.

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several other colonels and minor officers were executed for their bandit operations.[50]

The licentiate Francisco Solórzano was now appointed intendente, and Muñiz comandante general. It was easier to issue commands than to enforce them. Instead of obeying the order of exile, Delgado met the equally offended and recalcitrant Verdusco at Urecho; and joined by Liceaga, they issued a proclamation declaring that in them as members of the supreme council resided the sovereignty. They made a series of counter-charges against Rayon for usurpation of authority, for invasion of Michoacan, which stood subject to Verdusco and Delgado, and for unauthorized and traitorous acts, such as holding intercourse with royalists, and seeking to oust ecclesiastics from commands, and cited him to appear and give answer. They even marched against him and surprised his escort at Santa Efigenia, killing several men; whereupon they proclaimed him a traitor.[51] Returning to Tlalpujahua, Rayon issued a defence of his conduct, declared the hostile vocales suspended, and appealed to all leaders for support. Most of them took his part, but others sided with the Villagranes, Morelos avoiding a decisive answer, while expressing disapproval of the quarrel.[52] Doctor Cos took the best step in addressing both parties, pointing out the danger of discord and urging reconciliation. All declared them-

[50] Arias on Aug. 12th. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 52. The cura was banished to Las Balsas. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 633. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 244–5, presents the formulated charge against Verdusco and others, for disobedience, outrages, etc.

[51] On March 7th, three days after the surprise, *Diario de Rayon*, 634. In his circular to support charges against Rayon, Verdusco seeks to create prejudice against him by insisting that his aim is to remove all ecclesiastics from political and military command. The object of the attack at Santa Efigenia was merely to disperse a body intended for the support of Rayon. Negrete, *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 440–5, claims to be the only writer who has noticed this document. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 275–6, 315, etc., defends Rayon against the charge of traitorous intercourse.

[52] *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 5–6. He maintained relations with Liceaga and others. Rayon's decree removing Verdusco and Liceaga is dated April 7th.

selves ready to yield, but they failed to enter into negotiations with a corresponding spirit.[53]

Rayon was probably not altogether insincere; but he resolved to neglect no means for extending his own influence, and sent his brother Ramon into the old territory of Liceaga, north of Lake Cuitzeo, to assert his claims and draw recruits to his side. Liceaga also hastened to the scene with the same object. At this time Iturbide received orders at Zamora to proceed to Guanajuato, whence, among other duties, he should lead a convoy with silver to Querétaro. On the way he learned of the mustering by the two insurgent leaders, and believing it necessary for the safety of the convoy to impose a check, he turned aside to engage them. Ramon Rayon's force was by no means numerous or disciplined enough to meet so renowned an opponent with any confidence; and he would undoubtedly have hastened away but for the accusations so widely spread by his rivals that he stood in accord with the viceregal party. A retreat would lend confirmation to the charge, and he resolved rather to face defeat.

He took up a position at Salvatierra, a town situated on the right banks of the Rio de Lerma, distributing his force at the bridge and the adjoining fords. It was good Friday.[54] Iturbide proposed to attack on the following day or during the night; but while reconnoitring he was assailed and fell back on his line skirmishing. Believing that they had gained an advantage, the insurgents continued the pursuit. Iturbide perceived his advantage and turned upon them with his whole strength, throwing them into disorder and pursuing in his turn. He reached the bridge at the same time as the fugitives, and was thus

[53] The decree which dispossessed the members was issued only after a strong letter from Liceaga, with whom Ramon Rayon had been negotiating. *Diario Rayon*, 636. In *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 244, there is merely an allusion to the quarrel.

[54] Zamacois takes pains to point out that Alaman calls this April 16th, when it should be the 18th. *Hist. Méj.*, ix. 153.

able to cross it without fear from their artillery. His success promoted the advance of a detachment by the ford, and the town was taken with hardly another blow.[55]

The battle is remarkable less for the forces engaged and the direct result than for its effect on later operations, and for the decided step toward greatness which Iturbide gained thereby. He was made colonel of the Celaya regiment, his later main reliance, and comandante general of Guanajuato province, now taken back by the viceroy from the control of Cruz, of Nueva Galicia.[56] Another feature of the engagement was the neglect of Liceaga to relieve Rayon, though it was in his power, it is said, to have done so.[57] He is even said to have rejoiced over the mishaps of Rayon, who retaliated by proclaiming his conduct. Indeed, Liceaga was unfortunate in other respects. In January he had failed in an assault on Celaya,[58] and after avenging himself on the surrounding settlements, he joined Ver-

[55] In his report of the action, sent April 17th to General Cruz, under whom Guanajuato then stood, Iturbide assumes that Rayon had 4,000 men, with 14 cannon, including nearly all the forces from Tlalpujahua, and estimates loosely that some 350 'miserable excommunicated ones descended into the profound abyss,' and 25 were captured and shot, while his own men suffered a loss of one killed and 14 wounded. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 439–42; *Méj. Bosquejo*, 13, 253–6; *Mendibil*, 165–6. Bustamante, who attributes Ramon Rayon's disposition for fighting to the calumny of his rivals, indicates merely 500 infantry, including some cavalry and 3 or 4 cannon. He was assisted by his brother Francisco. Ramon collected more than 300 men, leaving 40 killed and 130 captured or missing. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 276–8. Rayon reported the total losses at merely little over 47. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 481.

[56] Iturbide naturally maintained his boast of the achievement as one of his greatest, and obtained a shield with the inscription 'Venció en el puente de Salvatierra.' He certainly behaved brilliantly, but he also stained this victory by shooting the prisoners. Liceaga adds the story of a clergyman's execution, after a convivial supper in Iturbide's company. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 245–6.

[57] 'Se mantuvo espectador...distante tres leguas,' says Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 278, adding that his men urged him at least to fall on the unprotected silver convoy; but he mistakes, the convoy had not yet left Guanajuato. This conduct led royalists to state that he had assisted them. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 407.

[58] Assisted by Rubí and others, he had attacked January 10th, and obtained at first an advantage over the garrison, which was exhausted by an expedition of the preceding day; but a reënforcement of 250 men under Gomez Pedraza came up and routed him at Peña Colorada, with a loss of 90 killed, and 400 horses, according to Gomez's report. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 193–4, reproduced in *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, ix. 775–7, and others.

dusco, as we have seen, in whose company he sustained another defeat near Puruándiro on April 24th, at the hands of Antonelli. Little resistance was offered, Verdusco escaping on an unsaddled horse, leaving his uniform, bâton, and seals of the council. The royalists slaughtered a number, and took nearly a hundred prisoners. Contrary to precedent, Antonelli not only set them free, but gave each a peso with which to reach his home. His generosity met with no great gratitude; for on finding themselves at a safe distance on a hill, they sent back a volley of annihilating epithets.[59] This was the last exploit of the venerable cura and member of the council. He determined to retire for a time.[60] A decree of Rayon removing him as well as Liceaga from the council afterward went into effect. As regards the latter, he was arrested, together with Delgado. Rayon himself made the first advances toward reconciliation; and although not reinstated in any command, Liceaga was allowed to leave for his hacienda near Leon.[61]

[59] So Bustamante relates. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 243–4. Antonelli's report with inventory is given in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 511–15.

[60] Early in March, during the height of the quarrel with Rayon, he had prepared his resignation, which was probably now allowed to take effect. Negrete, *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 445–6, reproduces the document.

[61] This was probably due to some extent to Morelos' remonstrances in his favor. See his letter to Rayon, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 147. Liceaga issued a defence of his conduct, given in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 486–90.

CHAPTER XXI.

OPERATIONS AGAINST RAYON, VILLAGRAN, AND OSORNO.

1813.

SIEGE OF CERRO DEL GALLO—THE POISONED WELL—INSURGENT FORCES AND THEIR TACTICS—MOVEMENTS IN GUANAJUATO—SWAY OF THE VILLAGRANES—THEIR SUDDEN FALL—HUASTECA CAMPAIGN—OSORNO AND HIS TERRITORY—TERREÑO'S MILITARY PROMENADE—OSORNO IRREPRESSIBLE—ADMINISTRATION OF CRUZ IN NEW GALICIA—FRONTIER OPERATIONS—CHAPALA LAKE AND ITS ROVERS—DIVISION OF PROVINCIAS INTERNAS—LARA'S EXPLOITS IN TEXAS—A FLICKER IN THE ORIENT.

THE viceroy had just completed his dispositions for the campaign in the central provinces when news came of the several disasters to the arms of Rayon's colleagues, who were likewise torn by discord, and almost ruined by their imprudence and inefficiency. The purposes of Calleja were thus already half accomplished by his enemies, and he resolved to complete the work by demolishing their centre of operations at Tlalpujahua before it could recover from the recent blows, directing at the same time a force against the Villagranes, and keeping close watch on Osorno, in order to prevent coöperation.

The movement against the Rayon brothers was intrusted to Castillo y Bustamante, who set out from Toluca toward the end of April with somewhat over a thousand men, leaving Colonel Angulo y Guardamino in charge of this section.[1] On May 3d he camped

[1] Assisted notably by Captain Concha, former subdelegado for Jacualpan, who, after serving under Trujillo at Valladolid, confined himself to campaigning in the Toluca Valley, gaining the rank of lieutenant-general. *Alaman, Hist. Mej.*, iii. 455.

in sight of the famous Cerro del Gallo, at the foot of which lay Tlalpujahua, the centre of a flourishing silver-mining district.[2] The hill itself was surrounded by a ravine, and so difficult of access as to be regarded as impregnable. The summit presented a level expanse of about 2,000 feet by 600, which commanded all adjoining heights, and was enclosed by a strong wall with seven bastions and a deep moat.

Notwithstanding the advantages of the position, Rayon thought it best to remove to a safer distance with funds, archives, printing-press, and other valuables, leaving the defence to his brother Ramon, who had hurried to the spot from Guanajuato. He had hardly gone half a league, however, on the morning of the 5th, when the royalists observed the movement and set out in pursuit. Rayon's small escort was quickly dispersed and most of his baggage captured, his own narrow escape being due to the speed of his horse.[3]

The fortress was now closely invested, receiving a sharp bombardment, especially from a battery on the adjoining hill of Los Remedios.[4] A number of bands had by this time collected in the neighborhood, but their intention of harassing and throwing in reënforcements received a check in the defeat of the main body under García and Sanchez.[5] On the following day,[6] a determined assault was made on the hill in three divisions, partly under cover of the battery. But the difficulties of the movement proved even greater than had been expected; and after a long struggle it had to be abandoned with consider-

[2] Burkart describes it at length as he saw it some years later. *Aufenthalt*, i. 141 et seq. The town itself had, at the end of the revolution, 4,000 inhabitants, and the dependent villages 8,000 more.

[3] The greatest loss was 'la petaca del dinero que llevaba 5,000 pesos en oro y plata, los sellos y algunos papeles.' *Diario Rayon*, 633.

[4] Bustamante places the besieging force at 2,000, with 8 cannon, the camps numbering 4. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 279.

[5] The royalist report places it at 400 or 500 cavalry, which were put to flight with little effort.

[6] The 8th, according to the royalists.

able loss,[7] amidst the triumphant shouts of the besieged. The bodies of the slain were hurled with suspicious zeal into a crumbling mining shaft, hitherto serving as an occasional water source. Shortly afterward Ramon Rayon was puzzled by the mysterious warning of an Indian, "Beware of gachupin blood," the meaning of which presently appeared. The repulse had so discouraged Castillo that he sent to ask for reënforcements. Just then a point was discovered for another battery, which not only permitted a closer approach to the stronghold, but covered the communication between it and the river. This unexpected manœuvre reduced the garrison for its water supply to the mining shaft now poisoned with corpses.[8] The warning was no longer doubtful, yet the water had to be drank, to some extent, quenching thirst as well as hope. So far the garrison had felt confident, cheered by their successes, and sustained by abundance of food and ammunition; but an irresistible foe had joined against them. Thirst, and perhaps prudence hitherto neglected, prevailed over vainglory. During the night of March 12th Ramon Rayon stole silently from the place, unobserved by the besiegers, whose attention was attracted by a series of prearranged explosions.[9]

The following morning the silent walls with twenty-four spiked guns smiled calmly on the enraged Castillo, who sent three parties in pursuit by different routes, toward Irimbo, Huichapan, and Maravatío, but with little result. On their return, however, the cavalry, under Aguirre, came upon a small band led by Colonel Valdespino, which was totally destroyed,

[7] 'Esta accion general que duró hasta la oracion de la noche.' *Castillo y Bustamante's Report*, *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 582.

[8] Three hundred, according to the *Diario Rayon*, 638–9. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 28, gives the Indian's warning as 'Te morirás, señor, si bebes el sangre del cachopin,' and adds that the soldiers, reduced to the shaft supply, lost courage in drinking the bloody water.

[9] 'Volado su parque de artilleria,' says the royalist account. Cárlos M. Bustamante alludes to the useful artillery inventions of Ramon Rayon, which greatly assisted the defence.

and Filisola razed the fortifications at Cerro de Nadó, with all the storehouses and the valuable factories for arms.[10] This Filisola figures prominently in after years under Iturbide and Santa Anna; and a fellow-lieutenant in this campaign, Miguel Barragan, was the one who a dozen years later received the surrender of the last Spanish stronghold on the North American continent, and who soon after, as president of the republic, raised to the supreme rank in the country a descendant of Montezuma II., in the person of his wife. Such were the men now foremost in seeking to extinguish the dawning independence.

The capture of Cerro del Gallo involved the destruction of the best machinery possessed by the revolutionists for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, and its fall spread no little dismay. The reputed impregnable capital lost, and that within a few days, to a handful of men, and the president a fugitive, were disasters more discouraging than almost any previous defeat, and preceded the advancing royalists like an ominous blight.[11]

Castillo now marched to Zitácuaro, which Ramon Rayon had entered in company with his brother, only to abandon it on the approach of the royalists. He thereupon took up a position at Maravatío, thus assuring communication between Valladolid and the capital,[12] leaving the commander of the province to continue the pursuit. Notwithstanding his forlorn condition as fugitive, President Rayon moved with all the splendor he could muster, exacting pompous

[10] The Cerro lay not far from Temascalcingo. See Filisola's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 588, with inventory of arms.

[11] In the lengthy report of Castillo Captain García Revilla is praised for his success in finding the point for cutting off the water supply. Food was within the fortress in large quantities. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 579–84. Bustamante bases his account on a special diary, which does not appear very reliable, however. The royalists, for instance, are said to have appeared before the cerro on April 20th. The dates in *Diario de Rayon* appear safer.

[12] Marshal Saucedo, Inspector Izaguirre, and others were overtaken on the way and shot. Castillo reported from Maravatío June 17th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 641–2. Ignacio Rayon had observed the operations against Cerro del Gallo from a distant summit.

receptions and profound homage, and disdaining not even such titles as prince and liberator. In August he reached Puruándiro, and news arriving of his wife's accouchement at Huétamo, where her family had sought refuge, the town celebrated the incident in truly royal style, with salvoes, illuminations, balls, and other demonstrations.[13] The era of republican simplicity had not yet arrived.

Ramon Rayon had meanwhile taken another direction in pursuance of his newly received dignity as comandante del Norte, with special control of the southern part of Guanajuato, Doctor Cos being confirmed in the charge of the northern. About the same time García Conde, the royalist commander of the province, and fully acquainted with its features and people, was replaced by Brigadier Sotarriba, a man to whom this field was comparatively unknown. The change in itself caused an interruption in the campaign, which gave respite to the insurgents and permitted them to recuperate. Ramon Rayon now retrieved himself in a skirmish at Chaparaco near Zamora, wherein he displayed strategic skill of no mean order.[14]

This skill, unfortunately, was seldom brought into practice when most needed; that is, in more important engagements. In such cases as involved a combination of forces, the rivalry between the different subordinate chiefs and their assumption of independence in control of their men, interfered with the plans and orders of the commander-in-chief, so that their ineffectiveness must not be too hastily attributed to him. Another still greater source of weakness was the want of discipline. The leaders

[13] The wife is spoken of in the *Diario*, 644, as 'la Exma Sra ministra Dª Mariana Martinez,' the title referring to Rayon's ministerial office under Hidalgo. He himself is called the prince. The secretary is lavish with such terms. Even Alaman sneers at this taste for show and parade among these early revolutionists.

[14] He captured threescore horses and some arms, and claimed the slaughter of 'much more' than a score of men, to which he added by executing six out of eight prisoners. The artillery captain Rielas distinguished himself for activity, and Echeverria and Colonel Lobato for bravery, the latter being rewarded with the rank of brigadier. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 362–4.

lacked the power, or the inclination—perhaps both—to enforce it to any considerable extent. Nor did they themselves, as a rule, possess the experience or ability to organize troops. They were little better than the raw recruits who swelled their continually broken and dispersed ranks, wherein the wide gaps were filled with the first material that came to hand. Eager for military rank, which depended largely on the number of men enlisted, the value of the force was of less immediate consideration with them; and so the insurgents remained in altogether too great proportions a mere rabble, who did further injury to their cause by reckless disregard for property, even where retaliation or other outrages were uncalled for.

Ramon Rayon's triumph was of short duration, for at Zacapo a third of his small force was taken with fever, and while thus crippled, a royalist body under Landázuri came suddenly upon him on September 19th. He had barely time to post a handful of men with which to occupy the enemy, while the dragoons carried the sick beyond reach, each horseman taking an invalid on his saddle. He thereupon hastened to place the skirmishers in safety, with the royalists close on their heels—so close, indeed, that his brother, the president, with whom he came up, had to save himself by shooting at the pressing horsemen. Fortunately for them they reached the bridge at the hacienda Zpimiéo slightly in advance of the pursuers, and by destroying it the latter were checked.[15] The Rayons now took different directions, Ignacio going to Uruapan, and Ramon leading his reunited force toward lake Cuitzeo, thence to operate along the course of the Lerma. Sotarriba being soon after called away, the energetic

[15] In *Diario de Rayon* the bridge is called la Alberca. The pursuers are placed at 1,000 men. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 647; but Landázuri reports that he led 300 cavalry and 200 infantry, with four guns, from Pátzcuaro, where Robledo remained in charge with 160 men. The insurgents are placed at 800 for the main body, while Bustamante allows a less number for the total. Their loss is given at 100 dead and wounded, the royalists acknowledging only a few wounded. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 1167–70; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 364.

[illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] A [illegible] table [illegible] the newly [illegible] under the [illegible] driven Cos [illegible] no little [illegible] quar- [illegible] while returning [illegible] with a captured herd, it was sur- [illegible] slaughter by Ortiz [illegible] with six other officers being among [illegible] The result was the abandonment of San [illegible] followed by that of several other posts.[16] [illegible] Rayon shared in these triumphs by a decided [illegible] San Juan del Rio, in Querétaro, wherein he overwhelmed one detachment at Galindo, and re- pulsed a larger reenforcement;[17] and his brother Rafael obtained a similar advantage near Celaya.[18]

These movements, however, were becoming more circumscribed as Iturbide, the new commander of the province, extended his energetic operations. Aware of Ramon Rayon's intention to seek the Cuitzeo region, he had in August called on Ordoñez of Queré-

[16] Ortiz surprised one at San Bartolo in July, and in August he defeated a party under Ignacio Juarez, near Villela. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 298.

[17] From San Juan, of 100 dragoons. The comandante at Galindo fell with 20 men, and 260 animals and some money were captured. *Diario de Rayon*, 646.

[18] At the hacienda San Antonio, which he captured in October in connection with the Indian chief Hilario Rodriguez, taking 500 animals and a quantity of supplies. *Diario de Rayon*, v. 649. Hilario is said to have tortured the comandante Gallardo before beheading him. He was overtaken and killed with four adherents soon after, his head being impaled as a warning. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 1178–9, 1190, 1196.

taro for coöperation, and made a sweep of the Salvatierra district, completing the task by razing the fortifications on the famous lake island of Liceaga. Forces from Michoacan had marched to intercept the insurgents along the south line, who, however, obtained timely information. Orrantía, second to Iturbide, remained for a time in charge at Salvatierra to maintain the advantage, and managed to capture the leader Rubí, who was promptly executed. By a further movement in the direction of Pénjamo, early in October, the proposed reunion there of different insurgent forces was frustrated, and consequently their campaign plan. Similar prompt manœuvres along the east side, from Celaya northward, tended greatly to extend the royalist influence, affirmed as it was by increased activity among the local militia for the protection of their respective districts.[19]

At the same time that Castillo marched against Rayon another expedition moved against the adjoining power represented by the Villagranes, father and son, whose forces were ever threatening the eastern side of the northern highways, and extending their raids into the lake valley. By coöperating with Rayon and other leaders they might have rendered good service to the revolutionary cause, but the latter served them mainly as a cover for their own ambitious views, to exercise sovereign sway in their district, protected by its natural strength and favored by the diversion of royalist arms elsewhere. The efforts of Rayon to stir their patriotism and recall them to duty had proved ineffectual, as we have seen,

[19] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 962–3, 1196–8, etc.; *Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist.*, 161–9. Velasco, Ramirez, Vargas, Mendizábal, and others continued to reappear round Yurira or Cuitzeo, and so in other directions, with varying success, but the operations were comparatively insignificant. The towns-people exhibited henceforth greater eagerness than ever in aiding the royalist troops, offering at Celaya, for instance, to serve as volunteers, without the pay thus far granted them. Iturbide who had suggested the offer in view of the need for funds, insisted nevertheless on aiding the poorer men and invalids. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 1275–6.

[illegible] been [illegible] a [illegible] its [illegible][24]

[illegible] in the [illegible] and [illegible] affirm [illegible] L[illegible] of [illegible] its [illegible] to the [illegible] Rio [illegible] by the aid of [illegible] Indian [illegible];[25] but General [illegible] in the Valle del Maiz, [illegible] the intruders [illegible].[26] General [illegible] Querétaro [illegible] in the adjoining [illegible] and capturing [illegible] insurgent Colonel Peralta, and [illegible] Villagran.[27]

Villagran might have succeeded better with the aid of [illegible], but for a despotic administration which by no means tended to retain their adherence.

[24] [illegible] Villagran [illegible] would [illegible], was the lofty answer [illegible] T.I., v. 421.

[25] [illegible] a Spaniard of Mexico who [illegible] and who [illegible] him to some extent while [illegible].

[26] This [illegible] was performed by Captain [illegible], who entered Jalpan on the [illegible] after having with [illegible] men inflicted a severe lesson on Gomez's troops, which were estimated at no less than 3,000. A more signal rout would have resulted but for the warning of a woman. As it was, fully 300 Indians fell. [illegible] report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 323, etc.

[27] Peralta's force, including some of Gomez's men, lost 45 in killed and 22 in prisoners. The colonel and his captain, [illegible], were executed. The victory was achieved early in April by [illegible], the aid of Carbajal, commanding at [illegible], who himself drove off Villagran. At Xichú were found 3[illegible] royalist bodies hanging. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 564-5. Further northward the leader Camacho was defeated by Montes with Rio Verde troops. *Id.*, 545.

At Zimapan his arbitrary disposal of life and property was prompted greatly by the royalist sentiment among the people, who had not only fought stoutly against annexation to his territory, but plotted more than once for liberation.[24] His strength was therefore much less imposing than it appeared on the surface.

The task of humbling him was intrusted to Colonel Cristóbal Ordoñez, in charge of the troops stationed at Tula; but a rich convoy from Guanajuato to Mexico required at the time his personal attention. The escort duty was not without effect on the primary object, however, for insurgents were attracted in large force to the upper line of his march, with an eye to booty, only to be effectually repulsed.[25]

Meanwhile Ordoñez' second in command, Pedro Monsalve, assisted by troops from San Juan del Rio, Ixmiquilpan, and other parts, presented himself before Huichapan on May 3d. The whole besieging force not having yet arrived, Chito Villagran, who held control at this place, haughtily rejected the pardon offered, confident in being able to maintain himself till reënforcements should arrive, especially as he had more than once repulsed Monsalve. Strong barricades had been thrown up at the mouth of every street, the church-towers were occupied by armed men, and a few hundred feet south-east of the town rose a well fortified bastion. The assault was made from several

[24] In several districts the religious care of the inhabitants was wholly neglected. Dorantes defends the Villagranes as both just and patriotic, and disputes the charge that the son José María inflicted the dagger-wound which killed his intended father-in-law, Chavez Nava, in 1810. He did not obtain the daughter's hand, and married instead Guadalupe Neve. See letter in *Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX.*, vi. 17–20. 'Fueron unas plagas tan funestas á la nacion como los mismos españoles,' exclaims Bustamante. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 355–6.

[25] At Baltierrilla, near Salamanca. They were said to number over 4,000, under the Rayons, Salmeron, Torres, Hermosillo, Segura, Rosales, and Najar. Iturbide assisted Ordoñez, who reached Querétaro May 4th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 472–3, 496–7. Arechederreta, in his *Apuntes*, adds that the convoy reached Mexico on May 10th, with 1,751 bars of silver, whereof 600 for royal account, much grain, tallow, and other effects.

directions, however, partly by scaling, partly through breaches, and by the close of the day fort as well as town had been captured, leaving only a remnant of the insurgents in possession of the church-towers till the following morning. Nearly 300 insurgents

CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST.

perished, and 400 were taken prisoners, out of about 2,000, the besieging force reaching nearly the same total.[26] A larger proportion would have escaped, but

[26] Fernandez of Tlahuelilpan captured the bastion, with 57 prisoners; 17 guns were obtained. Reports by subordinate leaders, Barradas, Casasola.

retreat to the hills had been cut off, and the fugitives had to take a more open road, led by Villagran. Finding the pursuers gaining, the latter struck out for himself, scattering gold pieces to detain the troopers. The Colchian trick availed not, however, for the horse of the Chito had been drugged, and he was caught.[27] This success could be regarded only as a first step in the campaign, for the power of the Villagranes centred in Julian. An arduous fight was in prospect, and rather than sacrifice blood and time the royalists proposed to use their advantage so far toward negotiations, offering pardon and privileges to both if the father would submit. But Villagran the elder was too proud and ambitious to barter his position, even for the life of a son, and with patriotic declamation he declared himself prepared to sacrifice also his other children for his country, even to the unborn ones.[28] "Die with dignity," was the characteristic message to the son, who was thereupon shot in front of his late palace, the head being impaled on the walls.[29]

After due preparation, the royalists passed on toward Zimapan, on May 30th, this time with increased forces under Ordoñez himself. The same day they reached a strongly fortified height on the Rio de los Aljibes, which formed a turn at its foot within a deep ravine. The plan for attack was made with some care, for the place could not be readily assailed;

Torres y del Campo, etc., are attached. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 470–2, 492–6. Monsalve describes the bastion which rose nearly 30 feet in height. Bustamante claims that the defence was stupidly managed, for 'nadie de buena razon' would serve under such a leader. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 354–5. Bocanegra of Toliman cut off retreat to the hills.

[27] A false servant had filled the ears of his steed with quicksilver, which caused it to act queerly. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 79–81.

[28] Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 355, followed by Alaman and others, intimates that mere pardon was offered, the son being induced to plead with the father in a letter. Negrete, *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 19–20, following a narrative friendly to the Villagranes, states that a brother was sent to persuade Julian, offering 'todos los honores que tenian en las filas de los independientes.'

[29] On May 14th, Major Clavarino remained in command at Huichapan, which failed not to pay the customary tribute of being sacked. Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, i. 436, alludes to the success as 'un bálsamo consolador,' reflecting glory on Calleja.

but after discharging a few shots the insurgents rolled the guns into the chasm and took to flight, amid the detonation of the fired ammunition. Monsalve pursued them, and entered the evacuated Zimapan amidst great rejoicing, for the inhabitants here had ever shown decided royalist sympathies. In this instance they greeted the comers as saviors, declaring that Villagran had threatened to butcher them all and burn the town. There was evidence enough of his ill-will in the desolate surroundings.[30]

Old Villagran, as he was usually known, had occupied a height a few hours' march beyond the town, and fortified it with the thirty pieces of artillery thence withdrawn. When Monsalve appeared in sight on June 1st he was met by a series of heavy volleys and stone showers; yet nothing daunted, the royalists rushed to the assault, inspired greatly by the conduct of Villagran's men so far, and the well known disaffection among them. Indeed, no vigorous resistance was offered, at closer quarters, and on approaching the summit they found the occupants already in full flight, abandoning guns, baggage, and provisions.[31]

Villagran hastened with a mere handful to the hacienda San Juan Amajaque, only to find further progress barred on all sides. In this strait, one of his colonels, named Maya, resolved to save himself by facilitating his capture, which was effected June 13th. A week later he was shot at Huichapan, and his head impaled close to that of his son, a hand being sent to Ixmiquilpan as a warning to his sympathizers.[32] Thus perished the ambitious sovereign of the Huas-

[30] 'Robados hasta lo sumo, quemadas sus casas y haciendas,' says the report, leaving the impression that all save the centre of the town had been burned. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 577.

[31] Monsalve estimated them at 3,000, against 300 royalists. *Id.*, 590–4.

[32] Alaman, following Bustamante, states that he suffered death at Gilitla hacienda, *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 466; but reports by friends in Negrete are more reliable. Twenty-two fellow-captives fell on the same day, June 21st. His body was buried without honor; but within a few days, friends came to Huichapan and carried off the heads after a skirmish, entombing them at Zitácuaro with great solemnity. *Méx. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 17–21. Thus was avenged on Villagran the blood of Sanchez, says Bustamante. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 356.

teca, less through the onslaught of a few hundred royalists than through his own waywardness, lack of skill and prudence in managing the defence, and alienating the devotion of his followers, whom he controlled greatly by fear, sustained by a passionate temperament and immense physical strength. The latter he was rather fond of displaying, both from vanity and a desire to impress people, and on the way to his place of execution he astonished the escort by knocking down a mule which had stepped on his foot.[33]

Few regretted his loss. Immediately after the death of the Chito a revulsion of feeling became manifest in the rapid flow of adherents to the royalists, even by the intimate officers of the Villagranes, such as Casimiro Gomez, who had been prominent in raiding expeditions and outrages on Spaniards. He prudently negotiated for pardon at the head of nearly two thousand Indians, many of them armed with hand grenades for want of muskets. Captain Trejo came in earlier with 400 persons and 27,000 head of animals, and was confirmed in his position, yet subject to José Andauro, an Indian of Zimapan, who had zealously supported the cura Salgado in opposing the revolution.[34] In less devoted districts the royalists are said to have acted with great severity to secure permanent submission.[35]

The advantage gained by Ordoñez was followed up from the coast side by Argüelles and Gonzalez de la Vega, successively commandants at Tuxpan, who in

[33] As related by Dorantes, in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 20.

[34] Ordoñez praises these men highly in his report. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 614–17. Casasola was about to march against Gomez, known as comandante general of the region around Ixmiquilpan, when the former marshalled his forces to expedite the pardon. Among those executed was Captain Carpio, appointed inquisidor general under Villagran.

[35] In Huichapan prisoners were decimated and the people oppressed more than formerly. 'Un nuevo despotismo tanto ó mas feroz que el de los Villagranes,' declares the bitter Bustamante. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 355. At Jilotepec over 800 persons were immolated. Negrete also gives instances of cruelty, especially at Huichapan. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 22–4. In the following year an epidemic, which he calls yellow fever, added to its affliction.

connection with Güitian, long stationed in Huasteca,[36] succeeded in establishing communication between the coast and the interior, and in asserting the supremacy of royalist arms from Tampico to Huauchinango. In the coast region, from Misantla northward, General Rincon figured as leading insurgent, assisted by Father Calderon, Arroyo, Lozano, the Indian Olarte, Bermudez, and others, who could together muster 3,000 followers or more; but with the judicious aid of gunboats and minor craft the royalists obtained several advantages both by sea and river. The capture of Tecolutla served to cut off supplies for the opponents. Papantla fell in September, Rincon's attempt to recover it proved a failure, and several other discomfitures tended greatly to disorganize insurgent movements for a time.[37] In the Jalpan districts Bocanegra, and others under orders from Arredondo of the Valle del Maiz, succeeded in enforcing royalist control in a more decided manner, assisted by a number of lately pardoned insurgents, who manifested no little zeal in the pursuit of their late comrades, and in breaking up their haunts and plans.[38]

Nevertheless, the Sierra Gorda and its southern extension presented too many natural advantages for guerrilla warfare, for sudden descents on roads, posts, and fields of supply, with ready and secure retreats, to allow anything like complete restoration of royalist control. José Antonio Villagran, Rafael Pelo, Francisco Rayon, Cañas, Atilano, García, and Epitacio Sanchez were among the leaders who here

[36] Güitian's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 597–1214, passim, as comandante en gefe de la Huasteca. The inhabitants of Tamiahua had distinguished themselves for their obstinate defence against insurgents, women and children assisting in the trenches and bringing in the lead from their nets for bullets. *Ib.*, 68[illegible].

[37] See reports of Argüelles and Vega in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 663–1293, passim. These successes of the royalists frustrated Rayon's efforts to communicate with the U. S. and other parts, as will be seen. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 347; [illegible], 181.

[38] General Rebollo of Querétaro and General Torres of San Luis Potosí cooperated, so that the force in this direction was especially large. Valdivia, Melo, and Lombardo were among captured leaders. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 597–8, [illegible], etc.

sustained the revolutionary struggle, carrying their operations to the lake shore of Mexico. Anastasio Bustamante, the future president, figured in the ranks of their pursuers.[39]

The main reliance of the insurgents in this quarter was now Osorno, the last of the three central leaders, against whom Calleja directed his opening campaign, and the strongest of them all he proved himself. He occupied the territory south of the Villagranes, and was recognized as chief by nearly all the revolutionary bands scattered from the slopes above Papantla to the plains of Apam, and in irregular sections from below Huamantla northward. Unlike the stern Julian, he possessed admirable traits to sustain his popularity, but displayed the same lack of skill as organizer, and of tactics and prudence as commander-in-chief. When Bustamante, the fugitive elector from Mexico, took up his abode with him in the latter part of 1812, he observed the neglect to utilize the important elements at hand, and was permitted to introduce some order into the administration, to cast artillery, erect a mint, and to discipline the force of some 500 cavalry and infantry kept within call, out of a total of over 3,000 which could be united under Osorno's banner. This interference roused no little jealousy, especially on the part of Vicente Beristain, an artillery officer who wielded a great influence over the leader; and when Bustamante raised his voice against the excessive vandalism so alluring to the bands, it became easy to so direct feeling against him that he took his departure.[40] With him vanished also the lingering hope of Rayon to win Osorno to his side.

[39] Sanchez surprised Quauhtitlan in Nov. and shot its comandante, Moreno, at Colhuacan. Ordoñez came down and retaliated by executing at Jilotepec and Ixtlahuaca several insurgents, including Teodoro Lopez, and a boy of twelve years. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 1136, 1238, et seq. Operations so near the capital receive frequent notice in the journals, although insignificant in themselves.

[40] *Bustamante, Not. Biog.*, 13–14. Nicolás Berazaluce had assisted in the reörganization. He estimates that Osorno could at this time raise 4,000

In January 1813, a royalist party under Rubin de Célis proposed to surprise Zacatlan, which was understood to be poorly prepared for defence; but an intercepted despatch gave warning to Osorno and he hastened to anticipate the movement in reversed order. Although astonished to find their foe before their camp one morning at the hacienda of Mimiahuapam, the royalists boldly sallied to the attack. Osorno fell back as if in flight; but as soon as the cavalry of the pursuers had been separated from the main body he turned and succeeded in routing it. The infantry also could have been annihilated if Osorno had exerted himself. As it was, he allowed it to escape.[41]

Made confident by success, he now proposed to take the offensive and advanced in April against Zacapoaxtla with about two thousand men, chiefly cavalry. The natives of this place had roused his ire by their loud royalist demonstrations, and the expedition was prompted rather by ill feeling and a desire for spoil than by motives connected with the cause.[42] At first an advantage was obtained; but the death of a favorite officer created confusion among the foot-soldiers, the most effective part of the troops for this mountain region, and the opportunity being seized by the opponents, under direction of Valle, the wavering column was routed with loss of the siege artillery. Osorno thereupon retreated, his scattering forces at-

horsemen, in good condition. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 258–9. His efforts were brought to the notice of Venegas, partly through his appeal for a warfare on international principles, not to the knife. An amnesty was offered to him, and to promote its acceptance his wife was to be arrested, but she obtained warning and joined him at Zacatlan.

[41] His maxim being to offer the foe 'la puente de plata,' or silver bridge, says Bustamante, who adds that a main object was to capture himself. Osorno had by this time over 1,000 horsemen round him, whom he dismissed on reaching Zacatlan January 9th. It had at first been proposed to send Lieut-col Cándano against Osorno, in the belief that Rayon was also to be met here. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 259-60. The royalists gave no report of the encounter, as may be imagined. Bustamante writes Cœlis.

[42] Bustamante and others were strongly opposed to it, and the movement had at first been directed early in March against Tulancingo. When halfway the expedition turned back. *Id.*, 260. Col. Bocardo instigated the present attack.

tempting in vain to retaliate for their failure on some of the minor settlements.[43]

This reverse gave no little impulse to the preparations of Conde de Castro Terreño, the new commander in Puebla, to whom had been assigned, among other tasks, the subjugation of Osorno's strongholds. The importance of the undertaking was measured not alone by the opposing forces, but by their dangerous proximity to the Vera Cruz highway; and taught by the failure of Célis, the conde resolved to lead in person the carefully fitted out expedition. On presenting himself before Zacatlan,[44] May 19th, he found the place abandoned by Osorno, who, preferring prudence to glory, had buried his artillery, and retired to a safe distance. Pursuit seemed useless, and after sending out detachments to destroy the fortifications and factories at San Miguel, Tenango, Huamantla, and other places, Terreño returned to Puebla three days later, taking away the discovered guns.

The only resistance met during this military promenade was offered by Arroyo at Huamantla and by the cura Ortega Moro, who with greater rashness than sense bore down upon the advancing expedition with

[43] Such as Tlatlanquitepec, Tenextepec, Huatepec, and Chignauta. The attack on Zacapoaxtla began on April 27th, the main assault and retreat occurring on the 28th. Royalist accounts estimate the assailants at 5,000, and claim the capture of four cannon with a sacrifice of only two killed. The officer whose death influenced the defeat was Lieut.-col Epitacio García. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 552–8. Bustamante places Osorno's force at over 1,000 men, four cannon, and two companies of infantry, but this may not include the troops added on the way under Arroyo, Espinosa, and others.

[44] He proposed to be guided in the campaign by Col J. de Dios Ramirez, lately an officer of Osorno, who had found it prudent to escape from the ill feeling roused by his excesses. At the last moment came letters from Osorno, enclosing notes by Ramirez on Terreño's projects, and charging the latter with secret adhesion to the insurgent cause. The charge, whether true or not, could not fail to incense the conde, and he had the double-faced colonel arraigned before a court-martial and executed, to stop further disclosures, according to some. Bustamante declares, however, that the only ground for suspicion was the courteous treatment of insurgents by Terreño. Correspondence on the subject is given in Bustamante's journal *Correo del Sur*, July 1, 1813. Terreño had additional trouble with the ayuntamiento of Puebla, which neglected to promptly furnish certain beasts for transport. The alcalde, Marqués de Monserrat, was actually placed under arrest for protesting against a curt summons to appear before the general. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 285, 287–9.

less than a score of followers. The party was cut to pieces, and the cura fell captive, fatally wounded.[45]

No sooner was Zacatlan free from royalists than Osorno reëntered it, and his followers resumed their usual raids southward and into the valley of Mexico. During one of these incursions, Colonel Montaño was overtaken and killed near Calpulalpan by Captain Salceda, commanding some San Luis Potosí dragoons.[46] The colonel was not only a popular leader, but a friend of Osorno, and he resolved to avenge him. A considerable force under Inclan went in quest of Salceda, who was overtaken on the plains of Apam on August 7th, and after a severe conflict, slaughtered with nearly his entire company.[47]

Calleja in his turn burned to retaliate for this and other inflictions, and sent Llorente in the midst of the rainy season with several hundred men, to reënter Zacatlan. This was effected August 23d, with little more than a skirmish, and the fortifications at San Miguel were once more destroyed, the head of Salceda being removed from its impaled position. Llorente thereupon followed Osorno and attacked on the 29th his strong position at Las Mesas, but without decisive effect; for after a fight of seven hours he retired toward Tlasco, and thence back to Apam.[48] Osorno remained master of the situation.

[45] Orders came from Calleja to shoot him; whereupon the compassionate Terreño gave him poison, says Bustamante. *Id.*, 285. Terreño reports that the expedition cost not a drop of blood, but the large expenses of the preparation he does not dwell upon. The Guanajuato battalion under Samaniego destroyed San Miguel, and Colonel Águila marched against Huamantla. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 571–5; *Mex. El Virey*, 4.

[46] His horse failed him at a critical moment. Salceda claims that he put to flight with less than threescore men the forces of Montaño and Manilla, numbering some 600 cavalry. He had previously routed the lesser Gomez and shot Ortega. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 745–6. In *Correo del Sur*, Sept. 4, 1813, a tribute is paid to Montaño. His death is placed wrongly on July 23d instead of the 21st.

[47] The fight began on the 6th, near Mal Pais, and ended at the hacienda de Jala, whither Salceda retreated with 60 men, followed by about 800, according to the *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 855–6. His death was deeply regretted.

[48] Yet his report speaks of insurgents fleeing in all directions with innumerable wounded, while his own loss is reduced to two wounded during the last encounter. *Gaz. de Mex.*, iv. 909–12, 927–30. Bustamante increases his casualties to eleven killed and many wounded. At Tlasco 'cometió la bajeza,'

The order of Calleja[49] withdrawing from the control of Nueva Galicia both Guanajuato and Michoacan was apparently based on Cruz's former somewhat pretended objections to the responsibility, but rested really on the long-growing hostility between the two leaders, and the desire of the new viceroy to assume direct control wherever possible. Cruz understood the motive, and took it so much to heart as to tender his resignation of the Nueva Galicia command.[50] But the friendship of Venegas, leagued against Calleja, induced the government to retain a man of so recognized ability, partly as a check on the viceroy.[51]

Elated by the confidence expressed in him, Cruz assumed a more independent attitude. He erected a mint at Guadalajara, obtained larger commercial privileges for San Blas, and fostered trade with China, the West Indies, and in other directions, at the expense of Acapulco;[52] developed local manufactures, and formed for himself a long-enduring monument in the public buildings with which he embellished the capital of the kingdom. All this, however, had the effect also of opening the eyes of the people to their resources and strength, and to rouse a spirit of provincialism that failed not to bear fruit in due time. The latter feeling received, moreover, direct encouragement from the continued hostility between Cruz and Calleja.[53]

The energetic measures of Cruz had assisted to con-

he adds, of deluding a party by means of a false password and firing upon it, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 366, 'quedando casi todos muertos y prisioneros.' *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 61; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 187.

[49] Dated April 21, 1813.

[50] As comandante general, governor, and gefe político, as well as president of the audiencia. The objections to Calleja are clearly indicated. The letter is dated May 10th. See *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 748–50. Calleja was notified by another letter of the 12th, which Bustamante wrongly assumes to be the resignation.

[51] The latter by letter of July 6th also remonstrates against the resignation and expresses warm regard. *Id.*, 76.

[52] Effects were brought direct by way of Panamá, for instance.

[53] Armament not being well manufactured at Guadalajara, Cruz asked for a supply from Mexico. This was refused and a strong letter followed, which led to a reprimand from Calleja. Bustamante alludes to Cruz as 'feroz y sanguinario,' yet admits his talent and insight. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 400–1. Alaman points to his wide influence in the kingdom, where he could direct elections at will. *Hist. Méj.*, iii. 427.

fine the revolution in Nueva Galicia to very narrow limits, notwithstanding the dangerous proximity of Michoacan and Guanajuato. Along these frontiers there were movements of some importance, in the south mainly under the direction of Vargas, who figured as comandante general of the province for Rayon, but the counter-campaign fell rather to the share of Iturbide and Linares or his successor, and in the north a corps of observation served to restrict the incursions toward the Rio Grande from the fastnesses of Nayarit and Acaponeta.[54] Encounters were frequent enough, and for the greater part in favor of the royalists, with their superior arms and discipline, and their possession of nearly all the towns well fortified and provided;[55] but the insurgents aimed here less at winning battles than raiding and harassing; and if less glorious, such operations served at least to keep alive the spirit of resistance and provide means for more effective demonstrations elsewhere.[56]

The most important movement which occupied the province itself was the siege of Mescala rock in Lake Chapala, situated six miles from the northern shore. Roused by certain unjust exactions on the part of Cruz,[57] a number of Indians had taken refuge there to devote themselves to sweet revenge under a revolutionary banner, after having secured arms from surprised convoys, and inflicted some damage on the royalist parties which attempted to suppress their

[54] The royalist command in Nayarit was held by Colonel M. de Iturbe who died this year of apoplexy. To the eastward moved such leaders as Hermosillo, Segura, Carranza, Cabeza de Vaca, and Saturnino, with from 2,000 to 4,000 followers, and at times in conjunction with Torres and Caballero of Guanajuato. See extracts from Cruz's report in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 402–3.

[55] And herein the inhabitants were kept busy to support the garrisons, as instanced by the order at Autlan obliging the people to build ramparts. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 47.

[56] The *Gaz. de Mex.*, Oct. 21 to 25, 1813, gives a report of operations mainly along the southern border, from Feb. till Aug. In the latter month Severiano was taken with nearly all his remnant of followers near Tepetilte. *Id.*, 1813, iv. 1106–7.

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first demonstrations.[58] Protected by their distance from shore and by the precipitous sides of the rock, they felt secure in their retreat, and could devote their whole attention to descents upon the inimical settlements along the lake shore, choosing their own time and place and keeping them in constant alarm. These well planned operations were under the direction of the presbyter Marcos Castellanos, assisted by Encarnacion Rosas and José Santa Ana.[59]



CHAPALA LAKE.

Cruz directed a considerable force to guard the shore, under Lieutenant-colonel Linares, while suitable vessels could be built at San Blas for a formal assault. During a reconnoitring tour in February,

[58] Comandante Serrato in Nov. 1812 attacked Rosas at San Pedro Ixican, near Ocotlan, but reënforced by Santa Ana, the latter took a telling revenge on his assailant, and pursued the advantage by routing Hernandez at Poncitlan and the curate Alvarez.

[59] The latter governor of the adjoining shore village of Mescala. The account is from the report furnished by Castellanos in 1824 in response to Bustamante's appeal to the congress. Castellanos had burned all documents at the time of capitulation to prevent exposures, and testified from memory. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 87 et seq., iv. 545, with plans.

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

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undertaken by Linares himself in seven large canoes, he came in conflict with the islanders, and succumbed with several officers and twenty-three men, three canoes only regaining the shore.[60] Equally unsuccessful was the main attack in June, under General Negrete with about five hundred men. For this the new large boats from San Blas were brought out, some lashed together to sustain cannon. Paralyzed by stone showers from the rock, the lumbering squadron became an easy target for the light active canoes. A large number of the assailants were killed, two boats were captured with cannon and ammunition, and Negrete had a narrow escape, with severe wounds.[61]

Royalist operations were after this reduced to little more than a defence of the shore line from the headquarters at Tlachichilco, supplemented by a blockade for cutting off supplies which was maintained by a cruising flotilla.[62] The occupants of the rock numbered at this time about a thousand, including 300 women and children.[63]

[60] According to Cruz' report. Castellanos asserts that 'apenas' one canoe escaped with five men. Santa Ana, who commanded at the island, lost three men. This occurred on Feb. 27th. The islanders are given 70 canoes by the opponents. Soon after a division against San Pedro, under Lieut-col. Alvarez was routed by the valiant Indians, who also defeated another at Vigía. Castellanos' report is full of similar and less important skirmishes, always favorable to the islanders, who kill large numbers while suffering little themselves. Royalists of course report their own victories.

[61] The expedition is said by insurgents to have consisted of 600 men with 11 guns. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 641. Castellanos claims that the greater part of Negrete's force was lost, with one gun, etc., the leader leaving the fingers of one hand behind. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 95.

[62] The leading vessel thereof was successfully assailed and captured one night by Santa Ana, who distinguished himself about the same time by almost annihilating the forces of Cuéllar and Vallano, the former numbering 'nearly' 500 men.

[63] This from the report of a captured Indian, who is rather vague in his statement, for he knows the leader only as a Franciscan, with one Morillo 'apparently' as second. He states that they were poorly provided with armament and supplies. He enumerated 10 cannon and fully 100 canoes. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 204–6. For additional details on movements in Jalisco, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 15–20, 190, 839–40, 1085, 1107, 1294, etc.; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 216–17. At this period figured a woman, Paula Atienza by name, who was recommended to the córtes by the municipality of Guadalajara for her devotion to the sick and wounded on both sides. *Córtes, Diario*, xx. 82–4. The reports from this city at the opening of the year are signed by J. L. J. Pinilla, as intendente. *Id.*, xix. 357.

In the adjoining annexed province of Zacatecas, Victor Rosales figured as the leading revolutionary spirit, maintaining himself very well with nearly three hundred men, despite the close watch kept by several cavalry divisions. Assured that the city of Zacatecas was ripe for revolt, he ventured in September to attack it, and penetrated to the very barracks, capturing two cannon; but the royalist commander, Brigadier Irizarri, had received warning in time to summon aid. Rosales' small force was soon obliged to retreat, and on reaching the open field it was intercepted and dispersed with considerable loss,[64] the remnants restricting themselves henceforth to minor raiding expeditions.

Nueva Galicia was not the only command that suffered disintegration with the elevation of Calleja. The provincias internas were divided into two comandancias generales, de Occidente and de Oriente, the former retaining the original provinces save Texas and Coahuila, which together with Nuevo Leon and Nuevo Santander, hitherto under the viceroyalty, formed the Oriente section. The command of the Occidente, with headquarters at Chihuahua, passed in course of the year from Salcedo to Alejo García Conde, whose brother Diego became intendente successively of Zacatecas and Durango.[65] That of the Oriente, for which Monterey became the seat, was bestowed on Simon de Herrera, late governor of Nuevo Leon, and a friend of Calleja.

[64] That within the city amounted to 6 deaths, now increased by 17, besides 18 prisoners taken by Captain Pascua, who led the reënforcement. The insurgent party is placed at 250, a section of which was commanded by Magdaleno. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 664; 1813, iv. 1087. Bustamante relates that Rosales' son, eleven years of age, fell wounded into the hands of the victors, who first lashed and then shot him, to which end 'lo sacaron en una camilla.' *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 405. Rosales' name was later inscribed in letters of gold among the national heroes. Matías Ortiz, Zamora, Rosalino Lopez, and Picazo made occasional entries on the south-east border. An attack by them on Ojuelos, at the close of August, with 460 men, was repulsed with a loss of 50. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 1175–8.

[65] Nemecio Salcedo returned to Spain. Some time later Bernardo Bonavía figures in *Cedulario*, MS., iv. 238, as commander.

The change arose less from the increase of population and material development than from a military standpoint, in view of the need for energetic suppression of hostile movements. The north-west section suffered rather from the usual Indian hostilities,[66] but eastward the revolutionary spirit had again sprung into alarming prominence. After the suppression of the insurrection in Nuevo Santander, Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara, an inhabitant of the town of Revilla, and attached to the revolutionary cause, had sought an asylum in the United States, there to seek aid in behalf of his cause and to await developments. The attention accorded him by the government at Washington, and its known intentions regarding the Texan frontier, created no little alarm in New Spain,[67] and the insurgents grew correspondingly elated, loudly announcing in March that a large army was already marching to their assistance.[68]

Lara failed, however, to effect anything with the government, and the jubilation of his compatriots was founded merely on the march of some four hundred and fifty men, partly filibusters from the United States, with whom he had in the latter part of 1812 begun operations in Texas. He took possession successively of Nacogdoches, Trinidad, and Espíritu Santo, and with the coöperation of the Indians drove back the advancing forces of Governor Manuel Salcedo and Colonel Herrera, the proposed commander of the provincias internas de Oriente. In April following both these officers were captured and executed in retaliation for their share in the arrest of Hidalgo. A representative government was established at Béjar,

[66] As alluded to in *Escudero, Son. y Sin.*, 58, etc., and as fully related in *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series, from original sources.

[67] Onis, the Spanish minister, sent accounts in 1812 of American designs on the whole of New Spain, or at best the northern provinces, and Venegas issued orders for the provincial commanders to be on their guard against agents from the States. Letters in *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. app. 45–9. See also *Onis, Mem.*, Madrid, 1820, 1–60, with appendix.

[68] *Correo del Sur*, March 18, April 22, 1813. Lara, in a *Manifiesto* from Monterey, 1827, claims to have indignantly rejected every design on the national territory.

which held undisputed sway over the province, and prepared even to extend it southward.

Warned of the danger Arredondo, stationed lately in the valley del Maiz, hastened of his own accord to counteract it, gathering troops and material on his way through Nuevo Santander. His independent action might not have pleased Venegas. Calleja, however, not only approved but appointed him to the comandancia general vacated by Herrera's death, and sent the newly arrived Estremadura regiment to Tampico to take the place of the departed forces. Colonel Elizondo was sent in advance to prepare the way, but allowed himself to be engaged in battle and routed. Two months later, in August, Arredondo himself approached Béjar with eighteen hundred men, whereof two thirds were mounted, and retaliated by inflicting a crushing defeat on Álvarez de Toledo, a Spanish naval officer who had managed to supplant Lara. Of the prisoners a large number were executed, especially people from the United States, who were outlawed and shot wherever encountered, for their so-called perfidy against a confiding government. The later dictator Santa Anna won his earliest distinction in this field, where a score of years later humiliation overtook him.

The province was quickly cleared of insurgents, and after appointing as governor Cristóbal Dominguez, Arredondo returned to Monterey, there to establish the seat of his comandancia.[69] And so vanished also the hope of any aid from the United States, for the people there made no movement to interfere in behalf of the persecuted adventurers in Texas. The agent accredited by Rayon to Washington and other places for interesting foreign governments in the cause failed to obtain even means for departure.[70]

[69] Full account of these and connected events will be given in *Hist. North Mex. States*, ii., this series.

[70] The agent was Colonel Francisco Antonio Peredo, empowered to negotiate treaties, obtain armament, and confer with the papal legate. He had

Morelos then proceeded to Quetzala and Cruz Grande on the coast, sending scouts to the pass of La Sabana and El Veladero, when the commandant at the latter position, Brigadier Ávila, reported the operations of the flying column under Captain Montoro, a part of his command, against Acapulco, causing the royalists much injury.[3] Early in April he reached the vicinity of Acapulco, encamping at the cerro del Veladero, and summoned the acting governor, Captain Pedro Antonio Velez, to surrender. Openly Velez refused; but Morelos received two confidential notes without signature, said to be in the handwriting of the governor, indicating a disposition to come to terms in some underhanded way. However this may have been, or whether or not Velez intended to deceive Morelos, the latter paid no attention to the communications.[4]

The town of Acapulco is situated at the north-west extremity of the harbor which extends inland northward and, turning westward, terminates in a narrow creek. Opposite to the town on the east side stands the castle. Both town and castle are commanded by the hills of Las Iguanas and La Mira. Besides the support of the castle the town is defended by advanced fortifications, and the forts of the hospital and El Padrastro. The island of La Roqueta, stretching east and west, lies at the mouth of the harbor, forming two wide and commodious entrances.

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María Manuela Molina, who having raised a company had been commissioned captain by the junta. She had journeyed 100 leagues to join him.[6]

Though measures were adopted to press the siege, which was now confined to the castle, only slow progress could be made, for the want of heavy artillery. Moreover, the defenders obtained fire-wood from La Roqueta Island, and had the communication by sea open to them. Thereupon Morelos constructed a mine from the Padrastro, and carried it to within 100 varas of the counterscarp of the intervening moat. Provisions being scarce, and disease having broken out in his camp, the general called a council of war, at which, by the suggestion of Pedro Irrigaray, it was resolved to occupy La Roqueta, which lies about six miles from shore, and was defended by one company, three small guns, two launches, fourteen canoes, and the armed schooner *Guadalupe*. Ruvido, who had proved himself so inefficient at the hospital fort, had the command. The enterprise was intrusted to Colonel Galeana, a nephew of the mariscal, and Montes de Oca, who succeeded in crossing over unnoticed four times from 11 o'clock in the night of June 9th with a canoe, conveying eighty of their regiment to the *Guadalupe*. They then attacked the royalists, who made but slight resistance, most of them being taken prisoners, the rest making their escape in the canoes. The only casualties were one little girl from the city accidentally shot, and another drowned. The schooner *Guadalupe* attempted to sail away, but was captured. The loss of La Roqueta would have been a terrible blow to the garrison of the castle but for the timely arrival of the government brig *San Cárlos*, which with proper precautions landed her cargo. Colonel Galeana attacked her with two canoes in the night of July 9th, but was repulsed, and she returned to San Blas.[7] About the middle of August the gar-

[6] She took part with her company in seven actions. *Diario Exped. Morelos*, in *Bustamante, Supl. to Cavo, Tres Sig'os*, iv. 70–1.

[7] Among the charges brought forward against Velez at his trial were that

rison was not only suffering for the necessaries of life, but sickness had greatly increased. There were not healthy men enough for the routine of military duty. Morelos becoming informed of it, saw at once how easy it would be in such a state of things to bring matters to a quick termination by setting fire to the place. But he bethought him of the women and children, of the aged and helpless, that were in the fortress, and he determined to adopt other means, though involving some risk to himself and greater peril for his men. Let such instances as this be remarked. These men were not altogether merciless, as some delight to represent them, even though they did sometimes kill prisoners of war. Were not prisoners killed on either side during modern wars in other countries—men wholly innocent of any crime and hardly knowing why they were shot; killed simply by way of reprisal and revenge? I do not remember any instance where a fortress was spared out of consideration for the non-combatants in it, either in the late wars of Europe or in any other late wars.[8]

To avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering, therefore, Morelos determined to cut off the besieged from the sea; and during the night of the 17th, Galeana was directed to surround the castle under its very guns, with a picked body of men, on the right or Hornos side. Colonel Gonzalez was ordered to do the same on the left side to meet Galeana. This perilous undertaking was successfully accomplished in spite of the active firing of the enemy, including their free use of hand grenades. Early in the morning, finding the revolutionists in posssession of the moat, and

both he and his officers had constantly neglected their duties, and had been engaged in trade and in other practices against discipline and order. But the witness Crame testified on the 24th of Feb. 1814, that the defence had been a heroic one, and the garrison had suffered greatly; many persons had died of disease; there was toward the last no lard, oil, salt, meat, or fire-wood. An egg was worth 6 pesos. The grain was worm-eaten, and could not be cooked for want of fuel. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 145–55, 160–1.

[8] See *Bustamante, Elogio Morelos*, 19; *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 262–9; *Id., Camp. Calleja*, 78–9.

ready to scale the walls, Velez saw that even if he succeeded in repelling the assault Morelos would surely set fire to the mine as soon as his own men were out of the way. Indeed, he wondered why it had not been done before. In this strait he asked for a parley, and proposed to capitulate if the honors of war were granted. Morelos acceded, vouchsafing even more liberal terms; and on the 20th the independent standard of Mexico waved over the castle of San Diego de Acapulco.[9]

Morelos tendered Velez, who was a native of Córdoba, a position in his army, which being declined, the former told him that his fidelity would be ill requited by the Spanish government; this was indeed true, as an order had been issued, before news of the surrender reached Mexico, appointing the naval lieutenant Jacobo Murphy to supersede him, under the pretext of allowing him needed rest, and instructing Velez to proceed to San Blas and Guadalajara. Velez was subsequently tried, at his own request, by court-martial, and was not honorably acquitted till after his death.[10]

We have seen that the royalists were so harassed that they were unable to send any relief to Acapulco. The present was in fact their most critical period since the beginning of the revolution. Yet this success was

[9] The result of this victory was the capture of 407 muskets, 50 sabres, 35 machetes, 145 lances, 50 boxes of powder, 80 pieces of artillery of the calibres from 4 to 36, two 12-inch mortars, 20,000 cannon-balls, flags, provisions, and dry goods, besides about 200 prisoners. The terms of the written capitulation were in eight articles, the first of which called for forgetfulness and forgiveness of the past, forbidding all abuse or insult. The prisoners who were officers or natives of Spain were allowed passports to go where they liked, not within the enemy's lines, on giving their parole not to take up arms again in the royalist service. The native-born were mustered into Morelos' army. Passports were accordingly issued to Velez, the paymaster, his wife and children, the chaplain, 2 captains, 5 subalterns, 2 merchants and their families, and about 9 others. The terms were made public by Morelos on the 25th of August. They were first printed in the *Correo Americano del Sur*, 1813, no. 30, 235; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. app. 53–5; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 113–14; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 383–505. See also *Morelos' Decl.*, in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 27–9; *Velez' Decl. and Official Despatch*, in *Id.*, 100–19, 130–8, 161–89.

[10] The day following the capitulation the officers of both parties dined together, when Morelos gave the toast 'Viva España! but España as a sister, not as a ruler over America.' *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 173.

the origin of misfortune to Morelos. The time he employed in the capture of Acapulco—from early in February to the end of August—gave Calleja the advantage of seven months, the best of the year, for his own operations, enabling him to carry out without opposition all his plans—to destroy the most dreaded revolutionary chiefs in the north, and then turn his united strength upon those in the south. The capture of a single seaport town could hardly compensate for this. The best course for Morelos to have pursued would have been to concentrate his forces in Oajaca, fortifying the passes in the Mizteca Mountains, and open the ports of that province on the Pacific to foreign commerce; then to send a division from Oajaca to take possession of the country at the bottom of the gulf, particularly Goatzacoalcos, and promote trade with the United States and the British colonies, which would have assured an abundance of supplies. Instead of this, the immense booty captured at Oajaca was to a great extent squandered by incompetent officials, and conduced little to the improvement of the army. The fact is, Morelos was at this time too sanguine of success, expecting to be able soon to capture Mexico, when the fall of Vera Cruz and other places would quickly follow. Having arranged matters at Acapulco he departed for Chilpancingo.

Shortly after Morelos set out on his march to Acapulco, an expedition of about 700 men under Lieutenant-colonel Dambrini invaded Oajaca from Guatemala, to avenge the death of Saravia; but on the 19th of April it was attacked by Matamoros, and driven back across the frontier with the loss of the military chest and armament.[11]

The royalist party, which during the winter of 1812–13 had been apparently destroyed in the Costa Chica,

[11] Among the effects captured were a crucifix and a beautiful picture of the virgin, which Matamoros with much solemnity gave to the churches there. The celebration was called 'de desagravios.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 269–74; *Carriedo, Estud. Hist.*, ii. 29.

rose anew into life during the siege of Acapulco. Páris and Reguera had retired to that port, where the former died April 15th, the latter effecting his escape from the besieged castle on the 6th of May. Having collected a force of about 400 men, he attacked Vicente Guerrero on the 1st of July, 1813, at Cuautepec, but being repulsed retired to Cruz Grande.[12] Manuel Mier y Teran, independent, was unsuccessfully attacked at the Trapiche de Santa Ana on the 16th of August, and on the 25th of September he took Tututepec. But on the 5th of November the largest place in that region, Ometepec, hoisted the royal standard and received Reguera with open arms on the 10th. His forces now amounted to 1,200 men, and he believed himself able even to assail Oajaca.

A body of royalist troops under Moreno Daoiz had its headquarters in Tepecuacuilco, and from it parties were sent to the right bank of the Mescala, where they were well received, the inhabitants being tired of the war and desirous of protection. That force was strengthened in September with the battalion of Lovera sent by the viceroy to Cuernavaca. In September Telolóapam was occupied by Captain Manuel Gomez Pedraza, who was in later years a famous statesman of Mexico. Lieutenant-colonel Armijo directed operations from Izúcar; and Matamoros, having on the 10th of August issued a proclamation,[13] stationed himself at Tehuicingo waiting for an opportunity to recover Izúcar. Some distance south of this place, at Piaxtla, on the 20th of August an action took place between a portion of Armijo's command under the captain of dragoons, Juan B. Miota, and a party of Ramon Sesma's force, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Ojeda, a man of little or no military expe-

[12] See his official report of Nov. 30, 1813, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 58-60.

[13] He had been promoted in July to lieut-gen. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 95. Bustamante claimed to have drawn up the proclamation. It was published in the *Diario del Sur.* Aug. 12, 1813, no. 25. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 522.

rience. Though Ojeda occupied a pretty strong position, he was dislodged in about an hour, losing many men and a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, after which the royalists entered and sacked Acatlan.[14] The men captured and the war material were left in Izúcar, where no little surprise was caused by the good clothes of the prisoners, and the fine quality of the arms taken.

The insurgents had used every endeavor to possess themselves of the city of Tlascala, as Morelos had been induced to believe that the inhabitants were in favor of Mexican independence; but they had been frustrated by the vigilance of the royalist garrison, and according to the commandant of the place by the opposition displayed by the citizens' heroic loyalty to the crown. On the 4th of December a force, which the commandant, Agustin Gonzalez del Campillo, estimated at more than 1,000, though he had been assured by some prisoners that it was only about 500 strong, attacked the town after a demand for its surrender had been made and declined. The garrison, if we must believe the commandant, consisted of only 75 men, who were aided by the citizens, many of whom had never seen military service. The assailants' plan was to draw attention to the main street, where the royalist artillery was stationed, while they attempted on the left by approaching along a narrow street to capture the parapet. In this they were disappointed, being repulsed with several killed, among them a captain. The assault having thus failed, the revolutionists retired.[15]

[14] Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 348, acknowledges that the loss of men on the independent side was heavy, without giving figures; two small guns and 113 muskets fell into the enemy's hands. The royalist official report speaks of 300 killed, among them Lieut-col. Ojeda, a Franciscan friar with the same military rank, and Capt. Zavala, and 80 prisoners. The rout is given as complete, only two friars, one clergyman, and 20 others escaping. The royalist loss, according to Miota, was one mule killed and 6 wounded, and 6 sabres 'rotos de matar enemigos.' The whole report seems to be much exaggerated. *Gaz. de Gob.*, 1813, iv. 984–8; *Torrente, Revol. Hisp. Am.*, i. 439; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 521–2; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 199.

[15] Campillo's report to Ortega, commander of the south, on the 7th of Dec., a long grandiloquent document, asserts that the defences suffered no injury

The precaution of Calleja in sending a regiment to Tampico proved most opportune, for the insurgent Herrera was rousing the Indians of Nuevo Leon before Arredondo had crossed into Texas; and assisted by Marcelino García and others, with hordes of Lipanes and Comanches,[71] he overran the whole region from San Cárlos northward. Monterey was entered, and the commandant Sada would have had to surrender the last intrenchment but for the approach of the Spanish regiment under Armiñan, acting as governor of Nuevo Santander. The latter, in connection with Diez de Bustamante, governor of Nuevo Leon, Felipe de la Garza, sent by Arredondo, Perea and Melgares from the Occidente provinces, now pursued the insurgents hotly. García fell; Herrera among others was captured and shot; and the rest dispersed, leaving the revolution wholly suppressed throughout the Oriente.[72]

also to open communication with the coast for his own departure as well as for bringing in arms; but Bravo failing to assist him in the northern Vera Cruz districts, he turned back. Bustamante blames him for indiscretion, whereby the royalists were put on guard against his movements, and for spending time to collect vanilla to defray the expenses of his mission. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 347. Alaman thinks he should have taken cochineal and sought exit from Tabasco. He reproduces his commission, etc., in *Hist. Méj.*, iii. app. 49–52, and so does Negrete, *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 73–8, who approves the mission; but the fullest record is in *Hernandez y Dávalos*, *Col. Doc.*, v. 18 et seq., 96; vi. 1036–43; i. 872–3, with an anonymous document expressing fears of foreign designs. Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, i. 218, declaims vaguely against privateers from the north.

[71] The latter coming this year for the first time south of Rio Bravo. *Mex., Informe Comis. Pesquis.*, 1874, 121.

[72] These statements are from the reports of Arredondo and his aids, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 954–6, 970–1, 980, 992–4, 1081–2, 1229–30, 1245–6; 1814, v. 27 et seq.; to which Gonzalez adds details from the opposite side. *Cuad. N. Leon*, 248–327, passim.

CHAPTER XXII.

CONGRESS OF CHILPANCINGO.

1813.

MORELOS' MARCH TO ACAPULCO—HE BESIEGES AND CAPTURES IT—ROYALIST REACTION—PIAXTLA—GUERRILLAS AND THEIR DOINGS—BRAVO'S OPERATIONS—HIS REPULSE AT ALVARADO—SIEGE OF COSCOMATEPEC—ORIZABA SURPRISED—SECOND ROYALIST DEFEAT AT SAN AGUSTIN DEL PALMAR—ITS CONSEQUENCES—DISCORD IN THE SUPREMA JUNTA—CONGRESS OF CHILPANCINGO—RAYON'S ACTION—MORELOS THE GENERALISSIMO AND SIERVO DE LA NACION—DECLARATION OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE—CONSTITUTION—JESUITS.

MORELOS, having decided to lay seige to Acapulco, started from Oajaca on the 9th of February, 1813, with 3,000 men,[1] leaving there a force of 1,000 under Colonel Rocha; 1,000 having previously been despatched against the royalist chiefs Montaño, Sanchez, and others. Marching to Yanhuitlan, he stationed there Matamoros with 1,500 men to secure possession of that country. In the Mizteca road he detached Galeana in aid of the brothers Bravo, who had been assigned the duty of guarding the line of the Mescala River on Chilapa and might need assistance in their encounters with Páris, now subordinate to the royalist brigadier Moreno Daoiz. Galeana was to rejoin the main army at Ometepec, of which place Vicente Guerrero was made comandante. On the 2d of March the independents opened their way at the Jacalones del Campamento, a strongly fortified place defended by royalists, whom they routed.[2]

[1] Most of the new troops organized in Oajaca deserted soon after.

[2] *Diario de la Expedicion de Morelos*, in *Bustamante, Supl. to Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 57–73. Bustamante claimed to have in his possession the original

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fine the revolution in Nueva Galicia to very narrow limits, notwithstanding the dangerous proximity of Michoacan and Guanajuato. Along these frontiers there were movements of some importance, in the south mainly under the direction of Vargas, who figured as comandante general of the province for Rayon, but the counter-campaign fell rather to the share of Iturbide and Linares or his successor, and in the north a corps of observation served to restrict the incursions toward the Rio Grande from the fastnesses of Nayarit and Acaponeta.[54] Encounters were frequent enough, and for the greater part in favor of the royalists, with their superior arms and discipline, and their possession of nearly all the towns well fortified and provided;[55] but the insurgents aimed here less at winning battles than raiding and harassing; and if less glorious, such operations served at least to keep alive the spirit of resistance and provide means for more effective demonstrations elsewhere.[56]

The most important movement which occupied the province itself was the siege of Mescala rock in Lake Chapala, situated six miles from the northern shore. Roused by certain unjust exactions on the part of Cruz,[57] a number of Indians had taken refuge there to devote themselves to sweet revenge under a revolutionary banner, after having secured arms from surprised convoys, and inflicted some damage on the royalist parties which attempted to suppress their

[54] The royalist command in Nayarit was held by Colonel M. de Iturbe who died this year of apoplexy. To the eastward moved such leaders as Hermosillo, Segura, Carranza, Cabeza de Vaca, and Saturnino, with from 2,000 to 4,000 followers, and at times in conjunction with Torres and Caballero of Guanajuato. See extracts from Cruz's report in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 402–3.

[55] And herein the inhabitants were kept busy to support the garrisons, as instanced by the order at Autlan obliging the people to build ramparts. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 47.

[56] The *Gaz. de Mex.*, Oct. 21 to 25, 1813, gives a report of operations mainly along the southern border, from Feb. till Aug. In the latter month Severiano was taken with nearly all his remnant of followers near Tepetilte. *Id.*, 1813, iv. 1106–7.

[57] Bustamante is doubtful whether the reëstablishment of the Indian tribute or interference with fishing on the lake claims prominence.

first demonstrations.[58] Protected by their distance from shore and by the precipitous sides of the rock, they felt secure in their retreat, and could devote their whole attention to descents upon the inimical settlements along the lake shore, choosing their own time and place and keeping them in constant alarm. These well planned operations were under the direction of the presbyter Marcos Castellanos, assisted by Encarnacion Rosas and José Santa Ana.[59]



CHAPALA LAKE.

Cruz directed a considerable force to guard the shore, under Lieutenant-colonel Linares, while suitable vessels could be built at San Blas for a formal assault. During a reconnoitring tour in February,

[58] Comandante Serrato in Nov. 1812 attacked Rosas at San Pedro Ixican, near Ocotlan, but reënforced by Santa Ana, the latter took a telling revenge on his assailant, and pursued the advantage by routing Hernandez at Poncitlan and the curate Alvarez.

[59] The latter governor of the adjoining shore village of Mescala. The account is from the report furnished by Castellanos in 1824 in response to Bustamante's appeal to the congress. Castellanos had burned all documents at the time of capitulation to prevent exposures, and testified from memory. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 87 et seq., iv. 545, with plans.

for September, the small town of Chilpancingo, which was now raised to the rank of city under the name of Nuestra Señora de la Asuncion.[34]

A main object of the congress was to frame the long-mooted constitution; and to this Morelos also gave a certain direction by drawing up rules for the proceedings of the assembly, and determining a number of vital questions, one conferring on army officers the power to nominate from among the four captain-generals a generalissimo, in whom was to be vested the executive authority, with full powers. Under the circumstances, this was equivalent to appointing himself.

In these steps he had been guided greatly by the draft for a constitution prepared by Rayon early in 1812, and which aimed above all to perpetuate the actual council. According to Rayon's plan sovereignty, emanating from the people, stood vested in Fernando VII., but was to be exercised by a national American council of five members, elected by the provinces and gradually renewed by the change of one member yearly. For the present, vacancies were to be filled by elections made by the existing members.[35] A congress chosen every three years by the municipalities should exercise legislative power, though subject to the decision of the council, which

ios, Col. Doc., v. 133-4. On following pages are the affirmative replies from different towns. The convocation was based on formal representations from Oajaca, headed by Bustamante, showing the need for such an assembly. Text of document and votes upon it in *Id.*, vi. 467-74. In reply to Rayon's remonstrances Morelos pointed out that a congress could no longer be deferred, and that no other section of the country offered a secure meeting place. 'Seria, no menos que grande absurdo aguardar otro año, cuando ya no tengamos un pueblo libre del enemigo, en que celebraria.' He had no personal ambition, such as the presidency, and would abstain from further acts as soon as the council was established. See also letter reproduced in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 512-14, and dated Aug. 5th. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 212, 99, etc.

[34] Afterward called de los Bravos from being the birthplace of these insurgent heroes, but the original native name reasserted itself. It was a quiet agricultural town, embracing 8,000 inhabitants within the distended municipality, which stretched along the eastern slopes of the Sierra Madre coast range and covered also some mining ground.

[35] In accordance with the agreement made Aug. 21, 1811, whereby the renovation by election should begin only after the fall of Mexico.

again had to be guided in all important acts of government by a council of state composed of brigadiers and higher officers.[36] Caste distinctions, slavery, and torture must be abolished, and the habeas corpus system introduced. Four military orders should be created, applicable also to civilians. Of the four captain-generals, embracing the three who were members of the council, one should in time of war be chosen temporary generalissimo, equivalent to dictator.[37]

This draft had been submitted to Morelos,[38] who, while recognizing therein the ideas of Hidalgo, objected to several points. Fernando should no longer be held up as a mask for independence. The council of state should be reduced to a fixed number of generals, and a generalissimo elected for life. The safety of religion demanded that foreigners be admitted at the furthest only to a few ports.[39] This smacked strongly of the cura. Some of his objections acquired weight, for shortly after appeared the Spanish liberal constitution, which effectually eclipsed the other document in the eyes of its very projector, and caused him to withhold it.[40] As Morelos revealed his own designs,[41] Rayon became anxious to secure himself; and to this end he hastened to frame another constitution, which was submitted to the guadalupes at Mexico and others, and intended for publication before the congress should meet.[42] Nothing came of this; for Morelos

[36] A 'protector' appointed by the deputies should submit bills to reform laws, etc. The dogmas of the exclusive catholic religion were to be guarded by a tribunal de la fé, not exactly an inquisition, as declared by Arechederreta and the audiencia. Foreigners were to be protected, but not admitted to office, nor favored to the prejudice of religion. Liberty of press to prevail in science and politics.

[37] Among national holidays were to be September 16th, the saints' days of Hidalgo and Allende, and December 12th, the Guadalupe day.

[38] Although he had not yet been appointed member of the council.

[39] Protectors should be appointed for each bishopric. The generalissimo to hold office till incapacity, sickness, or the age of 60 made it undesirable.

[40] Yet leaving it to the option of the others. 'Se rien de nosotros,' he says, as mere automatons. Bustamante sent in a project to Morelos after this, but it received no attention. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 349.

[41] The convocation of a congress by him was stamped as lacking 'autoridad, prudencia, y legalidad.' *Diario de Rayon*, 641.

[42] This was elaborated by P. Santa María, who afterward joined Morelos, and excused himself as having merely followed Rayon's orders. *Id.*, 642.

assumed a firm attitude, charged the president with obstinately seeking to injure the cause by creating dissension, and peremptorily commanded him to join the meeting at Chilpancingo and assist Liceaga, then under restraint, to do likewise. With the members against him, with his prestige shattered, and hardly an escort to sustain him, Rayon had to yield, although not without quibbling.[43]

Meanwhile, Morelos had been actively carrying out his plan, which required, foremost, that he should strengthen his position by completing the council with a fifth member[44] elected by the friendly citizens of Oajaca, as a compliment to them and the province. The choice fell on the able and patriotic intendente, José María Murguía,[45] esteemed no less by the royalists, and figuring prominently throughout this period. On September 13th took place the election of a deputy for Tecpan, the new province corresponding to the present Guerrero, and the same day a representative meeting of electors and officers was opened before whom Morelos read his views on the proposed congress and its labors, and stated that it should be composed in the first place of the council members, Rayon, Verdusco, Liceaga, and Murguía, representing respectively Nueva Galicia, Michoacan, Guanajuato, and Oajaca;

[43] He omitted for instance to sign the assent sent in, so as to defer the opening of the assembly. Morelos wrote another severe batch of letters, as late as Oct. 25th, insisting on his conformance, and threatening, though otherwise polite enough, to issue direct orders to subordinate leaders in Michoacan and elsewhere. The correspondence may be consulted in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 99, 161, et seq.; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, v. 367, etc.; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. ap. 16. Rayon set out from Tancítaro on October 7, 1813, arriving at Chilpancingo on November 2d, accompanied by his family and brothers Ramon and José María, as described in his *Diario*, 648–9.

[44] On this point his views had changed considerably. At one time he had been willing to let Rayon and his then friendly colleagues elect that member, who should be intrusted with administrative and judicial functions, leaving the others free for campaigns. Later he thought it well to court Oajaca by letting the members select a colleague from there. Rayon naturally objected to a Morelos man, and to gain time suggested Villaurrutia, the liberal elected at Mexico under the constitution of 1812.

[45] On Aug. 5th, Crespo and Bustamante receiving second and third place. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 347. The order for the election is dated as early as April 29th. In a previous letter Morelos recommended that later conquered provinces should be accorded a similar representation in the council. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 5, 42; vi. 477–81.

of José Manuel Herrera, vicario general of the army, who had just been chosen for Tecpan; and of three substitutes, selected by Morelos to represent Mexico, Puebla, and Vera Cruz, namely, Cárlos María Bustamante, Andrés Quintana Roo, and Doctor Cos. Murguía prudently retired almost at the opening, leaving his place to Manuel Sabino Crespo, the second choice for Oajaca.[46] The retention of the councilmen in the assembly gave good reason for considering it a mere extension of the former body, and as such it was afterward designated by Rayon and others for motives of their own.[47]

The congress was installed with the members then present, on September 14th, under the presidency of Murguía,[48] Morelos delivering the opening speech.[49] It was accorded the title of majesty or highness, and the deputies that of excellency, supported by a salary of six thousand pesos annually for their term of four years.[50] A majority of votes with a quorum

[46] List in *Id.*, v. 159. Yucatan and the northern provinces received no direct voice. For lack of documents no doubt Alaman expresses himself both vaguely and erroneously on some points, while taking Bustamante to task for defects which belong to the latter's paragraph headings. Negrete covers himself by a disjointed introduction of documents not always to the point, and Zamacois evades the difficulty as usual by quoting the vague allusions of a previous writer.

[47] Bustamante quibbled till the end of Oct. for a large escort corresponding to his pretensions before he would join. Rayon delayed, and Cos stayed away. See letters in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 97, 103–5, 132.

[48] It had been fixed for the 8th. Bustamante intimates the 13th, and Morelos' letter to Rayon, *Id.*, 161–2, shows that the general meeting sat on the 13th, 14th, and 15th; in the same collection, p. 163, the opening speech is dated the 18th. So many errors appear in the set, however, as to seriously impair its authority on minute points. The very speech indicates that the 14th should be regarded as the opening day, and so it is confirmed in *Id.*, vi. 208.

[49] Not the exalted declamation against tyrants, with invocation of aboriginal heroes, as prepared by Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 387–91, and published in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 163–6, from the copy retouched by Morelos; a royalist distortion is given in *Id.*, vi. 212–15.

[50] Sessions were to be daily and public, the summons being chimed by the parish bells for 8 A. M. during summer and 9 A. M. during winter. Any citizen could present written suggestions for consideration. After discussing a question, a majority of ballot votes decided it, the decree being sent in to the executive, signed by the president and two secretaries, who, together with a vice-president, attended to ministerial affairs. The executive could submit whatever projects for laws he deemed well. Charges against deputies were to be decided by a commission of five persons elected from the five provinces adjoining the seat of the congress. They could not leave their seat for military

of five sufficed to pass laws. The first act was to give sanction to the tumultuous acclamation by the army officers in favor of Morelos as generalissimo, a position created by himself with full knowledge that the nomination, almost wholly from among his own men, must fall upon himself, and that the deputies then present would confirm it.[51] The office embraced the executive power, and was to be held so long as the occupant showed fitness for it, with perfect freedom for granting honors and promotion, and with the title of highness, although Morelos preferred to call himself the servant of the nation.[52] The judicial power remained for the present vested in existing tribunals, headed by the congress itself, but a meeting of advocates and learned men was to be called at an early opportunity to elect judges for a supreme court of the same number as the deputies, and with the same term and pay.[53]

The rules issued by Morelos for the guidance of

or other outside duties, and in accordance with this rule the captain-generals, except Morelos, were retired, although retaining their title. The secretaries of the body received the title of señoría, with which retired deputies had also to be contented. See additional articles in the regulation issued by Morelos. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 207–11. The secretaries of the body were C. Zárate and C. E. del Castillo. To its title of Supremo Congreso Nacional Americano was at times added Gubernativo. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 1105. Coat of arms used by congress given in *Soc. Mex.*, 2d ép. iii. 49; crude descrip. in *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, ix. 793.

[51] Yet he pretended to refuse. For list of voters, see *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 177–8. Glowing encomium on Morelos in *Bustamante, Elogio Morelos*, 20, etc. This took place on September 15th, Verdusco presiding to insure the result. Bustamante, *Cuadro*, ii. 385–6, 391–5, deplores the military intimidation of the congress, and points to the now clouding star of the leader. 'Desde este instante se fijó la época de las desgracias y desaciertos del Sr Morelos.' Vicario-general Velasco, who started the nomination, was made mariscal de campo, although expecting a deputyship, and sent to Oajaca, as a riddance. Thence he drove into exile two canons, who thereupon carried disastrous revelations to the royalists.

[52] The military had to elect his successor, the command devolving meanwhile upon the next in rank. The congress should assist with arms and money. Warned perhaps by the Texan occurrences, he insisted that no foreign troops should approach the seat of the congress. The execution issued the decrees of the congress, assisted by two secretaries, who in this case were Rosains and J. S. Castañeda. Further details in the regulations already cited, arts. 14, 25, 45, etc.

[53] The judiciary list includes Morelos' secretaries. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 159. An ecclesiastic tribunal would decide in clerical affairs, at present pertaining to the jurisdiction of bishops, and also promote the welfare of the church.

the congress were practically a constitution,[54] wherein he had framed everything according to his own fancy, making himself actual ruler wherever his arms might obtain sway, and sustaining that control by appointments at will. The congress, essentially his own creature, and easy to so maintain when kept under his eyes, was designated rather as an adjunct to himself, and its power could in any case be readily curtailed.[55] Although crude and incomplete, the constitution sufficed to achieve the aim of its projector, which after all was not out of keeping with a personage of this period who so completely overshadowed all the other leaders of the party in military success and power. He cannot be said to have abused the trusts he outlined, and he sustained an assembly which might have been dissolved on the plausible ground that advancement of the cause required concentration of authority into one hand.[56]

The men, however, who had hitherto figured as captain-generals with so little credit were retired, on the plea that their new sphere as deputies required undivided attention. The two provinces of Michoacan and Guanajuato lately controlled by them, together with Guadalajara, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí, were placed under the command of Manuel Muñiz, as lieutenant-general. The only other officer of this rank was Matamoros, who received charge of the more important region of Oajaca, Vera Cruz, Puebla, Tlascala, Mexico, and Tecpan. Additional control was exercised through the judges appointed in different provinces.[57]

[54] An outline for the real constitution he presented on Sept. 14th to the congress, under the title of *Sentimientos de la Nacion*, in 23 articles. See *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 215–16.

[55] The power to appoint deputies was vaguely admitted as belonging to Morelos. Act of Oct. 8th.

[56] As he himself declared in an earlier letter to Rayon.

[57] Whereof a list of 15 in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 159, 177, 649. His own appointment as generalissimo Morelos tendered to Rayon, in the usual Spanish form of mere courteous phrase. His brother Ramon was made comandante general of the Tlalpujahua region.

Rayon made his appearance at Chilpancingo on November 2d, and in order to soften his fall the men of Morelos joined his adherents in tendering him a pompous reception, with triumphal arches and allocutions.[58] Bustamante and others having also arrived, the congress opened for regular business, the first act being the famous declaration of independence of November 6th, wherein New Spain, or Anáhuac, is declared forever freed from Spanish control, with liberty to administer its own destinies,[59] and with the Roman catholic religion for the exclusive spiritual guide.

SEAL OF THE CONGRESS.

Rayon sought in vain to oppose this radical step as dangerous and needless. He admitted that to retain the name of Fernando was a mere disguise, but one which served to gain a vast and valuable support, especially among the Indians who were accustomed to venerate and bend to royalty.[60] This view received favor, that of Bustamante among others, as indicated by his proposal through the ayuntamiento of Mexico for a base of conciliation, or at least for a more humane warfare;[61] but Morelos

[58] As described in his *Diario*, 649. Morelos kept away till the morrow.

[59] And make treaties with foreign powers. All who oppose this act or refuse aid toward the war of independence are declared guilty of high treason. In *Hernandez y Dávalos*, i. 877, among others, is given the text of this brief document, signed by Vice-president Quintana, Rayon, Herrera, Bustamante, Verdusco, Liceaga, and secretary Zárate. See also *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, pt iii. 469; *Mex. Refut. Art. de Fondo*, 27–8; *Pap. Var.*, xxxvi. pt 68, no. 2, pp. 2–4; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 64, 303–12; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif.*, 246–7; *Mendibil, Res.*, 184–6; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 202–3.

[60] As instanced in the representation of 1812 from Tlascala. Rayon's paper argues the point with detail. See text in *Rev. Verdadero Origen*, no. ii. 2–3, prepared after the 6th, but the independence act had not been published as yet.

[61] Dated Oct. 1st. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 181–3, extract in *Cuev. Hist.*, ii. 378–82. Yet Bustamante framed the act of independence. Little in accord with this is the declamation of Morelos on Nov. 2d against Spanish tyranny and foreign interference, as reproduced in *Castillo Negrete, Mex.*, v. 529–30. Cancelada instances that a Mexican deputy at this time suggested the concession of independence as inevitable. *Tel. Mex.*, 426.

carried the point, as indeed he did all, by outlining the work and attitude of the assembly.[62]

In consonance with the act of independence were confirmed the decrees already issued by Morelos, merging all race and caste distinctions under the one equalizing term of Americans, removing the ignominious tribute tax, affirming the liberation of slaves,[63] and opening offices in church and state to all classes. Past indebtedness to Europeans was cancelled, in virtue of the authority of the nation to confiscate the property of its opponents.[64] Taxes were reduced practically to excise, including tobacco, and to tithes and parochial fees, to all of which Indians were subjected in common with others, to their no small prejudice if we consider the previous burdens. Bustamante takes credit for a decree to restore the Jesuits, with a view to educate the youth and spread the faith.[65] For the maintenance of the revolutionary cause, it was proposed to enlist half the serviceable population in each town and provide them with the best arms possible, drawing from this source for the army.[66]

[62] The act was supplemented by a proclamation to the people in support thereof. *Hernandez y Dávalos*, v. 215–17. Compare Cos' manifest against royalist rule. *Gaz. Mex.*, 1815, vi. 1103–14.

[63] A fac-simile of the decree against slavery, dated October 5th, may be found in *Soc. Mex. Geog., Boletin*, ép. 2, iii. 49, with elaborate rúbricas by Morelos and his secretary. The lash had been abolished by decree of September 8th. *Mex. Col. Dec. y Órd.*, 105. All classes, from laborers to clergy and women, were enjoined to work, partly as a means to counteract the vices flowing from idleness.

[64] A document to this effect, of extremely communistic tendencies, is given in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 879–80; v. 271–2.

[65] *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 407; *Jesuitas en Mex.*, 3.

[66] Training should be given on Sundays and feast days. For lack of other weapons, each man should be provided with slings and four dozen arrows. Gambling was prohibited, including the manufacture of cards, as cause for quarrel, and consequently duelling. *Hernandez y Dávalos*, v. 207, etc. In order to increase the means for campaigns, a reduction was projected by Rosains in the number and pay of treasury employés, to three chiefs, eleven aids, with a pay of $18,440 instead of $25,063 paid before July 1813. *Id.*, 84–5.

The following authors have been studied for preparing the foregoing chapter: *Alaman, Méj.*, i. 266–7; *Id.*, iii. 165–6, 245, 304–575, passim, app. 42–3, 49–52, 53–5, 58–67; *Id.*, iv. 724; *Id., Apuntes Biog.*, 11–12; *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, 78–9, 174, 176–7; *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, i. 335–55; *Id.*, ii. 40, 128–32, 180, 239–98, 301–7, 315–407; *Id.*, iii. 8–9, 11, 87–97, 213–15, 291–303; *Id.*, iv. 7–143, 310; *Id.*, v. 42–3; *Id., Elogio Morelos*, 9–10, 17–20; *Id., Noticias Biog.*, 16; *Córtes, Act. Ord.*, 1813, i. 62, 89, 232, 384; *Id., Col. Dec.*, iii. 189–

93, 209–10; *Id.*, *Diar.*, 1813, xvii. 228; *Id.*, xix. 236–41, 247–8, 317–18, 357, 385, 416; *Id.*, xx. 82–4, 257–9, 313–14, 319–20; *Id.*, xxi. 152, 168; *Id.*, xxii. 207, 390; *Carriedo, Estud. Hist.*, ii. 25–9; *Cancelada, Tel. Mex.*, 269–84, 373–84, 426; *Cavo, Tres Sig.*, iv. 50–105, 111; *Cedulario*, MS., iv. fol. 238; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, viii. 574–5, 645–8, 700–2, 743; *Id.*, ix. 386, 741–2; *Id.*, x. 311–12, 575, app. i. 55, 166; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1812, iii. 491–4, 898–904, 1070; *Id.*, 1813, iv. passim; *Id.*, 1815, vi. 1103–14; *Guerra, Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 278, 280–1; *Gutierrez, Leyes de Ref.*, 33, 449–56; *Gonzalez, Col. N. Leon*, 248–349, passim; *Hernandez y Dávalos*, i. 872–3, 875–7, 879–80, 899–926; *Id.*, iv. 760; *Id.*, v. passim; *Id.*, vi. 27–8, 40–2, 101–4, 107–18, 126–7, 130–3, 145–55, 161–83, 195–202, 206–16, 222–4, 248, 356–8, 467–9, 472–81, 1038–43; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rect.*, 243–50; *Lahaipe*, x. 82–4; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 73–8, 161–97, 216–17, 285–94, app. vi. 386–91; *Mex. Col. Dec. y Ord.*, 66–72, 86–106, 111–13; *Mosaico Mex.*, ii. 232; *Mora, Rev. Mex.*, iv. 419–20, 443–4; *Mex. Soc. Geog. Bol.*, 2d ep. iii. 49, 56; *Mex. Refut. Art. Fondo*, 28–32; *Mex. Legis. Mej.*, 1849, 341–68; *Mayer, Mex. Aztec*, i. 288–91; *Orizava, Ocurr.*, 15–41; *Perez, Dicc. Geog.*, i. 102; *Id.*, iv. 265–8; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 403, 409, 429–33; *Robinson, Mex. Rev.*, i. 39, 48, 320–1; *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, vii. 415–21, 424; *Id.*, 2d ep. ii. 631; *Torrente, Rev. Hispan.-Amer.*, i. 425–6, 429–47. *Viagero Univ.*, xxvi. 332–4; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 202–7, 211–14, app. 489–509; *Young, Hist. Mex.*, 99, 101–8; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, vii. 482, 494, 785; *Id.*, viii. 562–8, 579–80, 585–6, 607, 675, app. 790; *Id.*, ix. passim; *Id.*, x. 168–9, app. 23, 75–81; *Zavala, Revol. Mex.*, 57, 64, 303–12; *Arizpe, Idea Gen.*, 1–4, 21–50; *Apuntes para Hist.*, 1–4; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, i. 198–237; *Azanza, Instrucc.*, MS., 92–3; *Abbot's Mex. and U. S.*, 54–6; *Adalid, Causa Form. Contra*, MS., i. 1–3, 130–3; *Apuntes Hist.*, in *Pan. Bol. Ofic.*, June 12, 1868, *Pinart Col.*; *Bringas y Encinas, Sermon*, passim; *Berenger, Colton Voy.*, vi. 46–9; *Calle, Mem. y Not.*, 60; *Dampier, Voy.*, i. 244–7; *De Page, Travels*, 161–5; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, pt iii. 469; *Disposic. Var.*, ii. fol. 23; *Gomez, Diar.*, 442, 447; *Robles, Diar.*, 399; *Escudero, Son. y Sin.*, 59–60; *Fossey, Mex.*, 311–13; *Gregory's Hist. Mex.*, 42; *Gleeson's Hist. Cath. Church*, ii. 104; *Mier, Manifest.*, 3–31, in *Miscel.*, iii. 8; *Müller, Reisen in Mex.*, iii. 270–8; *Inquisicion, Informe*, passim; *Mex., Bosq. Lig.*, 13, 253–6; *Id., Revol.*, 13–14; *Mex., Virey N. Espan.*, 1–2, 4, 6, 9, *Pinart Col.*; *Mex., Informe Comis. Pesq.*, 1874, 121; *Nacional*, May 12, 1883; *Niles' Register*, iv. 392, 408; *Id.*, v. 336; *Ogilby's Amer.*, 260; *Olavarria y Ferrara, Castillo Acapulco*, xiii. passim; *Id., La Constitucion*, passim; *Queipo, Col. Escrit.*, 160–70; *Calleja, Virey á los Habit.*, passim; *Pensador Mex.*, ii. sup. btwn. 92–3; *Id.*, iii. passim; *Print. i.*, nos. 10 and 15, *Pinart Col.*; *Pap. Var.*, xxxvi. 68, no. ii. 1–4; *Sammlung, Reisebesch.*, xiii. 479–81; *Miguel, Mex.*, 1846, i. 17; *Span. Emp. in Amer.*, 117–18; *Acapulco, Provision*, 1–6, in *Virey de Mex., Instrucc.*, MS., 2d ser. no. 2; *Mex., Contestª á las Observ.*, 71–2; *N. Am. Rev.*, xxxi. 113–16; *Tornel, Fastos Mil.*, pp. vi. 77.

CHAPTER XXIII.

FALL OF MORELOS.

1813-1814.

MORELOS MARCHES AGAINST VALLADOLID — CALLEJA'S COUNTER-MOVEMENT—REPULSE AT THE GATE OF ZAPOTE—BRILLIANT CHARGE BY ITURBIDE—DEFEAT AND DEATH OF MATAMOROS—THE CONGRESS ASSERTS ITSELF—ARMIJO OVERRUNS TECPAN PROVINCE — GALEANA FALLS—MALEADMINISTRATION IN OAJACA—ALVAREZ'S TRIUMPHANT ENTRY—THE ENCHANTED MOUNTAIN—SPECULATIONS WITH CONVOYS—QUARREL AND MISCONDUCT OF RAYON AND ROSAINS—EXPEDITION AGAINST ZACATLAN AND FLIGHT OF RAYON—MAN-HUNTING IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

VALLADOLID, the capital of Michoacan, had ever proved an attractive spot to the insurgents, by reason of its wealth, its central position, and the revolutionary spirit of the surrounding population. Similar motives stimulated the royalists to strive for its possession, when every other point in the province was lost, and after defeating the Rayons, they made the city again their headquarters for energetic operations against the remaining leaders, wresting from them nearly all the northern districts, as far as Zitácuaro.[1] Southward, however, the ranges offered a comparatively safe retreat for the insurgents, who could thence make their raids into the rich lowlands, and in case of need fall back into the Zacatula region, beyond which Morelos held absolute sway, as undisputed successor of Hidalgo.

So he undoubtedly regarded himself. Flushed with

[1] It was recovered in Sept. 1813, from Ramos and other leaders, who had there reëstablished powder factories. *Gaz. Mex.*, 1813, iv. 1082-4. See for other minor operations, *Id.*, 865-1350, passim; *Hernandez y Daválos, Col. Doc.*, v. 167 et seq.

his successes in field and council-hall, he proposed to remedy the mistakes and avenge the humiliation of his predecessors and colleagues. Deliverance was to come from the south. A first and necessary step was to recover the much disputed Valladolid, there to install the new-born congress, and thus affirm its dignity, and further to make this city the starting point for future operations, which henceforth must be directed into the central provinces. While the place at this time was not strongly fortified, aid could easily reach it; and he proposed to insure his project by mustering all the forces possible. To this end he summoned Nicolás Bravo and Matamoros from Vera Cruz and Puebla, counting upon their well trained troops as the nucleus for his army, to which were to be added the guerrillas of Michoacan, including those of Ramon Rayon.

Morelos kept his object secret from all except a few intimate friends, and sought to delude the royalists by a movement which obliged Daoiz to fall back on Cuernavaca. He thereupon set out from Chilpancingo November 7, 1813,[2] incorporating the forces of Matamoros and Bravo at Cutzamala, and further on those of Muñiz, Ortiz, Arias, and Navarrete, so that he was able to present himself before Valladolid on the 22d of December with an army variously estimated at from 6,000 to 20,000 men, with thirty cannon and large supplies.[3] The city was in despair, for the garrison under Landázuri,[4] numbered only some 800

[2] Leaving Miguel and Victor Bravo with over 1,000 men to protect the congress, ordering Rocha to Tehuacan, and intrusting Acapulco to Irrigaray. A proclamation was issued menacing all royalist sympathizers among Americans. Bustamante's outline of the march, *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 459 et seq., is contradictory.

[3] According to the statement of Father Solana the total was 19,050, of whom Galeana commanded 1,200, Sesma 1,100, Bravo 1,300, and Muñiz 1,800, while Matamoros brought over 7,000. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 250; vi. 251–2. But his sources for the statement need explanation. Bustamante gives to Matamoros only 2,000, and to Bravo 800. Morelos admits 5,700 men just before reaching Valladolid. *Id.*, vi. 30. Landázuri claims that the force after this must have doubled. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 79–81.

[4] A native of Lima, not from Spain as supposed. The inhabitants professed great loyalty, to judge by their document in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 86–91, signed by the chapter.

men; and Morelos sternly presented the dread alternative of surrender within three hours or bloody infliction.[5]

But Calleja had not been deceived by the movements of the insurgents, and his plans had been so laid as to permit ready counter-movements in any direction. He ordered the concentration at Acámbaro of more than 2,000 men from Tula, Mexico, and Guanajuato, who, under the designation of the army of the north, were placed under command of Llano, the successor of Castillo at Toluca, Iturbide joining as second.[6] Ramon Rayon sought to impede their advance, but was defeated;[7] and after a forced march, the royalists came up on the 23d, guided by the cannonade which had already begun. The fighting was directed mainly against the Zapote gate, as most threatened by the expected reënforcements from Mexico. It had been taken by the select forces under Galeana and Bravo, retaken by Landázuri, and again captured by the former. At this moment Llano and Iturbide appeared from different directions, and fearing to be cut off, the insurgents fell back toward their camp, only to be driven into disorder and routed with great loss.[8] The royal troops thereupon entered the city, amidst loud demonstration from the inhabitants.

It was a severe blow to Morelos, this check to his cherished plans, and the whole of the following fore-

[5] He also addressed a threatening letter to Bishop Abad, with regard to his strong upholding of the royalist cause. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 84–8, 101–4.

[6] The forces are minutely enumerated in the *Diario de Ixtlahuaca*. Ordoñez was ordered back to Jilotepec. *Mex. Virey*, 7–8.

[7] Near Ucareo by Aguirre, Dec. 19th. He had then nearly 1,000 men, and might have rendered better service if Morelos had permitted him to occupy the pass of Medina, as he proposed, rather than to follow a parallel route with Llano for the sake of joining the generalissimo. Aguirre claims to have killed 200. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 1351. Ramon had received at Chilpancingo the appointment of mariscal de campo, with the command of Tlalpujahua district, Nov. 8th, and left at once to raise troops. *Diario de Rayon*, 649–50. His brother Rafael was defeated by Iturbide about the same time at Santiaguito.

[8] Morelos making no movement to aid them, says Alaman; but royalists state that he sent 1,000 horse. *Torrente, Rev.*, i. 446. Most of the prisoners now taken, over 200, were promptly shot as deserters from royalist armies, as Llano admits in his report.

noon was spent in determining what next should be done. He then placed the active management of his forces in the hands of Matamoros, who thereupon extended the infantry in a long line before the city, and the cavalry along the hill of Santa María, which held the encampment. Not knowing what the display was intended for, Llano sent out Iturbide with 360 horsemen to reconnoitre. This officer had not failed to observe the defective position of the insurgents, and could not resist the temptation[9] to avail himself of it, and display before his old home the prowess for which he was becoming famous. With a rousing cheer he led his little band to the attack, broke through the line, threw into disorder a cavalry reënforcement, and warmed with success, charged up the hill to the camp of Morelos in the very face of its formidable battery. It was already dusk. The gathering gloom seemed to have entangled the skill and courage of the revolutionists. They were bewildered by the unexpected charge, and their broken columns scattered and spread panic on all sides. The alarm was given throughout the army, creating the impression that the enemy had fallen also on their flank and rear. Shot and shouts began to resound in every direction. Soon it became difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and a fight sprang up among the insurgents themselves, lasting far into the night, with deplorable effect.[10]

Meanwhile, Iturbide had availed himself of the confusion to penetrate into the camp, regardless of the murderous volleys from battery and file. His men came upon Morelos himself, but did not recog-

[9] This was greatly due to the rivalry roused not alone by the near presence of Llano, but by the companionship of Aguirre, a Navarrean from Catorce, who commanded the Fieles de Potosí, famed for their bravery.

[10] Bustamante attributes the confusion greatly to the trick of the royalists in blackening their faces, in imitation of the insurgents, whom Morelos had ordered so to do, as a means to distinguish them from opponents; but it is believed the order was not carried out, for no authority alludes to what would have been a very striking feature. Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectif.*, 248, has a less good suggestion for the cause. It has also been supposed that Navarrete's reenforcements were taken for foes and attacked by Morelos' men.

nize him at the moment. As it was, his fate might have been sealed if Rosains and others had not come to the rescue.[11] This led to a rally which served to break the charge; the advantage was not followed up, and Iturbide retired in good order with two banners and four cannon, entering the city amid tumultuous ovation.[12]

The achievement might have been put down only as a display of bravery but for its effect. Added to the havoc suffered by the select forces of Galeana and Bravo, this charge and its attendant panic so demoralized the insurgents that they fled in all directions. The officers did their utmost to reassure the men; but finding this impossible, they spiked the guns and followed, seeking to collect the stragglers. A few still remained on the ill-omened hills of Santa María at daybreak, leading the royalists to suppose that their task was yet before them. They accordingly mustered in full strength for the assault, but soon divided into pursuing columns.

Learning that the main body of the revolutionists had gathered at Puruaran, forming with the remnant of Ramon Rayon's force a body of about 3,000 men, with twenty-three cannon, Llano marched against them, to cull the final laurels by a victory over dispirited troops. The latter awaited the assault, on the 5th of January, 1814, behind parapets of loose stones. In these, breaches were made by a few well directed shots, and within half an hour the assailed were in full flight, this time intercepted by a detachment under Iturbide. The slaughter was very great.

[11] There is much contradiction on this point. Rosains claims in his *Rel. Hist.*, 3–4, to have killed two assistants. The half-drunken troops took Morelos at first for Llano, because he had a dress like his, and happened most unusually to be mounted on a horse with Spanish trappings. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 418.

[12] A reënforcement sent by Llano came only to support the retreat. Alaman thinks that Valladolid should have received the name of Iturbide, not that of Morelos, who had no claim to such honor. *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 7–8. Morelos' birthplace was a rancho near Apatzingan, not this city, as some believe, though he passed some of his younger days here. See *Bustamante, Cuadro*, ii. 407–8. Negrete upholds Morelos. *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 181.

Along a line of two leagues lay stretched 600 dead, and 700 were captured, including a score of superior officers,[13] among them Matamoros, who was directing the flight, while Morelos was striving to save from disaster what he could.[14]

Two hundred prisoners were offered in exchange for him, but this and other efforts in his behalf proved useless. He was shot February 3d at Valladolid, dying with the firmness to be expected of so valiant and brilliant a leader.[15] Unimposing in appearance, but of strong character and magnetism, he had exerted a marked influence on the campaigns of More-

[13] Llano in his report places the killed at over 600, with the capture of 18 high officers, admitting for himself only a loss of 5 killed and 36 wounded. The capture included 23 guns, 150 loads of ammunition, and 1,200 muskets. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 74-80. He gives the first loss of the insurgents before Valladolid at 1,000, including 217 prisoners, and assumes that the total loss at this place amounted to 1,500 men, 27 or 30 guns, and large supplies. Landázuri, who estimated the besieging force at over 11,000, places their first loss at 650 killed and 233 captured. The royalists lost 25 killed and 57 wounded. *Id.*, 9–11, 79–84, 181–8; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 276–81; vi. 30–1, 256–60. Bustamante allows for the first encounter under Galeana 1,800 men, with a loss of 700. The value of the abandoned artillery material he places at $800,000. He goes into paroxysms over the cold-blooded execution of prisoners, many of them half dead with wounds. *Cuadro*, ii. 419–28; *Caro, Tres Siglos*, iv. 105–11. The losses at the first battle are attributed partly to Galeana's neglect from pique at the promotion of Matamoros. *Mendibil, Res.*, 192–5. Negrete doubts any such feeling; but his speculations on causes and effects are feeble. Zamacois assigns 3,000 men on this occasion to the revolutionists. *Hist. Méj.*, ix. 333 et seq. Royalist accounts like Torrente's *Rev. Hisp. Am.*, i. 445–6, ii. 89–90, naturally gloat over the victory. *Escalera y Llana, Mex. Hist.*, 10–12. Morelos' *Declaracion*, 29–31, is brief and unsatisfactory. Rosains, *Rel. Hist.*, 3 et seq., adds some interesting details, most of them used by Bustamante, Alaman, and others.

[14] Matamoros was captured in seeking to cross the river on a poor borrowed horse. A dragoon named J. E. Rodriguez overtook and surrendered him to a comrade without stopping for the usual plunder. He was rewarded with $200, and recommended for decoration. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 707–8.

[15] Yet the royalists published a reputed confession and proclamation by him, wherein he denounces the insurrection as wrong, and urges his compatriots to submit with him to the king. Full text in *Id.*, 169–80. None but royalists have received them as genuine. Alaman believes, nevertheless, that he signed the proclamation as well. *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 15. His handkerchief bathed in blood was preserved as a relic, and masses were secretly offered in Valladolid for his repose as he died. He was a small, thin man, with pock-marked face inclined to the left, and modest blue eyes, but with a stentorian voice that had assisted not a little to cheer his soldiers on to the victories for which he stood famed. He was a born soldier, writes Bustamante, and displayed both strategy and prudence, combined with great piety. 'Fué el brazo izquierdo de Morelos.' *Cuadro*, ii. 423. For detailed biography, see *Gallo, Hombres Ilustres*, iv. 227–49; *Arroniz, Biog. Mex.*, 226–31; *Dicc. Univ.*, art. 'Matamoros,' etc.

los, although leaving a record for brilliant feats rather than great achievements. The wide-spread grief for his loss was manifested by comrades in a terrible reprisal on royalist prisoners, of whom over 200 were executed, and by an admiring posterity in honors to his name, which is preserved notably in that of the gulf port.[16] Morelos retired to the fastnesses in Tecpan with the remnant of his once imposing army, there to consider his crushing misfortunes.[17]

Calleja's plans had been succeeding, and this last stroke practically opened to him the gates to the hitherto impenetrable south. It merited his substantial approval,[18] and he hastened to take advantage of it by ordering a relentless pursuit of the dispersed bands, and the shooting of all who had heretofore failed to submit.[19] Reënforcements were summoned to Mexico from the comparatively quiet Puebla, ready for any movement, and Lieutenant-colonel Armijo replaced Daoiz in the command of the Cuernavaca troops, with instructions to march on Chilpancingo. This energetic officer crossed the Mescala January 21st, despite the opposition of Guerrero, outflanked and defeated Victor Bravo,[20] and thereupon proceeded unhindered toward the seat of the congress, assisted not a little by the consternation created by his sudden advance.

[16] Izúcar, not far from his early pastoral field, also adopted the name, and the congress inscribed his name among national heroes. Morelos, *Declaracion*, vii. 30, 61, admits ordering the shooting of 203 prisoners in reprisal. See also *Rosa*, in *Pap. Var.*, xlii. pt viii. 31; *Diario de Rayon*, 651.

[17] Bustamante declares that he warned him against going further for conquests, instead of assuring his southern acquisitions. *Cuadro*, ii. 409, 417, 420–1; *Id.*, *Elogio*, 20–1. See also *Negrete*, *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 95 et seq.; *Liceaga*, *Adic.*, 247–52.

[18] Brigadier Llano's services were proclaimed, and his soldiers and the garrison at Valladolid received a badge for the left arm, with the inscription 'Valor y fidelidad,' etc. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 188. Iturbide having just been promoted could not expect further reward at the time, but his fame spread far and wide. Bishop Abad failed not, however, in praising him, to hint with prophetic spirit that so ambitious a person might become dangerous to the royalists!

[19] The mere fact of their having formed part of Morelos' army sufficed to condemn them. *Id.*, 112.

[20] Who lost 95 prisoners out of a force of 500. *Id.*, 148–50.

The absence of Morelos had served to revive the contentious spirit of the members, and when the news came of his disaster, deferential praise of the generalissimo changed to condemnation of the cura, initiated by the lately humbled Rayon. They assumed of their own accord the executive power and took steps for directing affairs. Liceaga was sent to assure the occupation of Acapulco, and Rayon, whose ambition they feared, was consigned to a safer distance, with the commission to superintend the defence of the Oajaca province.[21] In the midst of their dispositions came the news of Armijo's approach, and now was resumed the alternate wandering and flight that characterized the former body. Under the protection of Guerrero's force of 400 men, they hastened to Tlacotepec, where they reopened their sessions on January 29th, with only five members,[22] and with hardly any means.[23]

Here Morelos arrived not long after with over a thousand men, whereof Licentiate Rosains had been given the second command, with the title of lieutenant-general, amidst the undisguised and not unjust murmur of a host of older and well deserving officers of military training. Somewhat humbled by reverses, he readily surrendered the executive power, now vested in five members, whose places were filled by new appointees, the total number of deputies being fixed at sixteen,[24] including Morelos. The latter was

[21] Regarded as an extension of the junta de Zitácuaro, the congress had a right to assume the executive power which it was supposed to have conferred on Morelos. There are always charges enough which can be brought against a fallen ruler as a reason for still further humiliating him. The quorum rule was reduced to less than five members. Act Feb. 14th.

[22] Verdusco, Cos, Herrera, Quintana, and Liceaga, the first three priests. During the flight Crespo left for his home at Oajaca, while Bustamante followed Rayon. Orders were issued for their return. They pleaded that the congress was expected to move to Oajaca. *Cvad. Hist.*, iii. 6. Verdusco also longed for a quiet retreat in his province, where he promised to use his influence for the cause, and Cos wished to go and reform the misrule of Salmeron in Guanajuato; but more members could not be spared from the sessions. Acts of Jan. 30th and Feb. 14th.

[23] The 10,000 and more pesos in copper held by the treasurer, Berazaluce, had to be abandoned on the road for lack of mules.

[24] President Liceaga, Vice-president Bustamante, Rayon, Verdusco, Morelos, Cos, Crespo, Herrera, Quintana, Alderete y Soria, Ortiz de Zárate, Sotero de Castañeda, José Ponce, José Argándara, Antonio de Sesma, and José San

confirmed in his title of generalissimo, but he allowed the congress to distribute all his forces, save a mere handful, among men of their own choice; and henceforth a coldness sprang up between them. Three comandantes generales, Rayon, Cos, and Rosains, were assigned respectively to Tecpan and Oajaca, Michoacan and Guanajuato, and Puebla and Vera Cruz,[25] to assist in reducing the importance of their late chief, but also in weakening the cause by a division of power and harmony.

The most urgent measure now demanded was to check the advance of Armijo, who had already passed

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through Tixtla. To this end Galeana, Guerrero, and the Bravos took up a position at Chichihualco, on the 19th of February, contrary to the views of Rosains,

Martin. Ortiz and Castillo were secretaries. Act of March 1st. The above 16 deputies represented the following provinces, in the order named: Guanajuato, Mexico, Guadalajara, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Zacatecas, Oajaca, Tecpan, Yucatan, Querétaro, Tlascala, Durango, Sonora, San Luis Potosí, Puebla. San Martin had evidently no province assigned. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 296–7.

[25] The list of intendentes reads now: for Oajaca, Murguía; Tecpan, Ig. Ayala; Mexico, José María Rayon, Ant. Perez; Vera Cruz, José Flores; Valladolid, Pablo Delgado; Guanajuato, José Pagola. San Martin became vicario general. The presidency and vice-presidency changed by lot every three months. Rosains pretends not to have aspired to other than diplomatic positions. *Rel. Hist.*, 2, 7, etc.

the general in command. A few shots from the royalists sufficed to scatter the 1,500 insurgent recruits.[26] Armijo followed by forced marches to Tlacotepec in the hope of surprising the congress; and indeed, so narrow was the escape of this body that the archives, seal, and baggage were captured; and Morelos himself would have been taken but for the heroic self-sacrifice of Colonel Ramirez,[27] who made a stand till he got safely away. The deputies passed onward into Michoacan, and Morelos with a small escort took refuge in Acapulco.

Armijo, now promoted to the rank of colonel, resolved to complete his task by sweeping the whole province. He set out from Chilpancingo in the beginning of April, with over a thousand men, and appeared before Acapulco on the 12th, only to find it in flames and abandoned, with immense loss to the inhabitants as well the merchants in Mexico.[28] Thus was surrendered without a blow, and to smoke, the richest port on the northern Pacific, the capture of which had shortly before required a costly campaign of seven months. Without loss of time, Armijo hastened up the coast in pursuit of Morelos, who had left a track of bloody retaliation, notably at Tecpan and Zacatula, on his way to the fastnesses of Michoacan. But if the pursuit proved vain, royalist control was

[26] Galeana's obstinacy, caused by jealousy of Rosains, was the main reason for making the stand. *Rosains, Rel. Hist.*, 6. Bustamante, on the contrary, allows Galeana to blame the other. Armijo estimates the insurgents at 1,500 or 2,000. *Gaz de Mex.*, 1814, v. 237, 349–56. Another account in Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, iv. app. 3, allows Rosain to be outwitted by flank movements which caused him to divide his forces.

[27] This occurred Jan. 24th, at the rancho de las Ánimas, near Tlacotepec. The booty included Morelos' portrait in oil, his uniforms, and some trinkets. Out of the force of 60 soldiers and 300 unarmed men, 38 were captured and shot, including Secretary Castillo. Armijo had followed with 300 infantry and 150 dragoons. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 269, 356–60; *Morelos, Declaracion*, vi. 31. Armijo is supposed to have secured a large prize for himself, the foundation for his later wealth. *Bustamante, Cuadro*, iii. 13–16; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 252 et seq.

[28] Who lost especially on the cacao there stored. See report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 595–9; *Mex. Virey*, 9; *Torrente, Rev.*, ii. 96–8. Reports reproduced in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 286–305.

reëstablished in a great measure throughout this region, sustained by the local guards now formed.[29]

The great achievement during this march was the capture of El Veladero, a series of forts on the mountain summits close to Acapulco, and occupied by Galeana with several hundred men. The strength of the position demanded a fortnight of extensive preparations, with close investment, after which, on the morning of May 6th, the main fort was captured by a daring assault, whereupon the revolutionists took advantage of the still prevailing darkness to escape.[30] They united in Cacahuatepec to the number of nearly 200, and in combination with Guerrero, Galeana began to rouse anew the upper country, known as Costa Grande;[31] but he was defeated on the 27th of June in an attack upon Aviles, the royalist commander of this region, stationed at Coyuca. In seeking to escape, Galeana was thrown stunned from his saddle by the branch of a tree and was then shot. The whole movement subsided.[32]

Among the series of disasters involving the revolutionary cause, the loss of Galeana created less attention than that of Matamoros, whose fall was signalled by a crushing defeat. Nevertheless the death of so great a leader added decidedly to the depression; and

[29] Morelos had left Juan Álvarez, in later times the undisputed lord of this province, to make a stand at the pass of Pié de la Cuesta, with 200 men and a few guns; but the approach of Armijo dispersed them. Miota continued the pursuit of Morelos, who was attended only by an escort, and reached Tecpan in time to prevent further retaliation. Advancing to Petatlan, he captured the intendente Ayala with a considerable booty, acquired by peculation and robbery, for which Morelos had suspended him. Details of above in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 598–600, 615–21, etc.

[30] San Cristóbal, the key to the position, was carried by Captain Ocampo. 'Este ha sido el no pensado y nunca esperado fin del decantado Veladero,' writes Armijo in his report. *Id.*, 603, 621–6. Hunger assisted to intimidate the besieged. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 73–7. Also reports in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 288 et seq.; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif.*, 252–3.

[31] Avila surprised Petatlan, and Galeana the town of Asayac.

[32] The attack was boldly made with 500 not well armed men, partly contributed by Morelos, and commanded by Avila, Mayo, and Montesdeoca. Struck by the branch, Galeana fell almost senseless, and was shot and decapitated by a soldier named Joaquin de Leon. The head was deferentially placed on the church door at Coyuca by the admiring Aviles, and then interred within the edifice.

Morelos on receiving the news exclaimed in a tone of despair, "Both my arms are gone; I am now nothing!" Galeana was a warrior by instinct, with a vast fund of resources, although illiterate, and withal of greater gentleness than the other commanders, a trait that commended him also to the royalists.[33]

Another prominent leader had been taken shortly before, in the person of Miguel Bravo, mariscal de campo,[34] surprised at Chila by La Madrid. This officer, commanding at Izúcar, and Villasana in charge of the Mescala district, assisted greatly to suppress revolutionary operations,[35] so that with the fall of Galeana the province of Tecpan, the cradle of revolutionary movements since the time of Hidalgo, might be regarded as practically subjugated, an achievement on which Armijo failed not to pride himself.[36]

Equally great had been the royalist success in the adjoining province of Oajaca. Morelos had not fully appreciated the value of this acquisition, with its large wealth and natural strength, and had allowed unfit administrators to misdirect or neglect its resources, thereby fostering a reaction against the cause among an

[33] He was repeatedly approached with offers of pardon, but remained true to the cause. He was born at Tecpan about 1762, and passed most of his time on the hacienda of his cousin till called to fight for his beloved Morelos. If the latter slighted him of late, it was perhaps mainly due to his illiteracy. Bustamante calls him the right arm of Morelos, Matamoros being the left. *Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 423; iii. 80–5; *Mendibil, Resúmen*, 214.

[34] He was the second of his family to be executed for the cause. He was shot on April 15th, at Puebla, where a monument now records his services. Col Robles claims that Bravo surrendered only on condition of being granted his life, but Ortega ignored the promise. *Bustamante, Cuadro*, iii. 97–9. But this Alaman doubts. No allusion is made in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 313–14, to any condition, yet the fact that Bravo was remitted to Puebla lends color to Robles' version.

[35] The former destroyed the fortifications at San Juan del Rio, organized defence movements in the villages, and executed a number of petty leaders. Villasana took Zimatepec, and occupied a strong central position at Teloloápan. Details in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 227–8, 302 et seq., 364–8.

[36] In his report of May 25th, already he wrote: 'Ya está cumplida enteramente la conquista del sur,' and this in 52 days, with 1,000 men. *Ll.*, 604. Armijo now established his headquarters in the more temperate region of Tixtla, leaving sufficient forces at Acapulco and other points, and keeping open communication with Mexico.

otherwise tractable people.[37] His own act in taking away nearly all the mules and horses required for agriculture, the interruption of communications, the circulation of copper money which had been introduced, and the effects of the change on his occupation of the capital, had all assisted toward ruin.[38] The appointment of Rayon to the command had been made partly in view to remedy the evil; but he was unknown in the province, and without influence or interest.[39] He did not advance farther than Huajuapan, sending thence San Martin and other agents to organize forces, collect means at Oajaca, and correct abuses;[40] measures which were nullified partly by partisans of Morelos, hostile to Rayon, but mainly by the sudden advance of the royalists.

The conquest of Oajaca, as a complement of Armijo's operations, was intrusted to Colonel Melchor Álvarez,[41] who set out from Tepeaca after the 10th of March, with over 1,000 men. Colonel Hevia accompanied him as far as Huajuapan, there to remain in observation, and to pursue the feeble force collected by Rayon and Rocha. Álvarez marched unmolested to Oajaca, which opened its gates with ovations

[37] The canons Moreno and Bazo having shown strong royalist proclivities, Morelos sent Velasco to exile them. They went to enlighten the viceroy on the true condition of affairs. Velasco remained with the Mariscal Anaya, to create disorder by their shameless and pompous conduct. Brigadier Montezuma, left in charge by Commander Rocha, showed himself a dissipated gambler. Bustamante had vainly urged the congress to make Oajaca its seat and capital, as more secure, open to foreign intercourse, etc. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 50. He even proceeded to it in January, thinking that the deputies would follow. *Not. Bioy.*, 16–19.

[38] Murguía in framing this report, sent in by Álvarez in April 1814, admits that the insurgents had not otherwise been exacting with levies and contributions. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 555–60; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 16–19.

[39] Morelos disliked the appointment, and Rosains proclaimed against it in his *Justa Repulsa*. See also *Diario de Rayon*, 650; *Teran, Manif.*, 5. Rocha recognized Rayon.

[40] Velasco was arrested after some trouble, but escaped to join the royalists and publish a rabid denunciation of his late comrades. Text in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 472–6. Vicario-general San Martin was sent to represent him, and Teran to organize troops. See the different instructions in *Diario de Rayon*, 651–3; and *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 299–301.

[41] Subordinate to Brigadier Diaz de Ortega of Puebla. See proclamation in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 289–90, 408.

March 29th.[42] Assuming the government of the province, he began at once a series of reforms, by reinstalling former officials and appointing new incumbents, withdrawing the copper coinage, introducing the constitution of 1812, restoring alienated estates, and correcting other abuses. The revolutionists were, on the other hand, sharply pursued, and fines and other inflictions were imposed on the chapter and those who had countenanced their presence. The vicarios generales and agents San Martin and Velasco stooped low for pardon, only to return to the revolutionists at the first opportunity.[43] Alvarez's efforts were nevertheless too spasmodic and circumscribed to produce any decided improvement. He was vain and pompous, and allowed personal interests to outweigh his duty and the public good.

The subjugation of the remaining part of the province did not occupy much time. Encouraged by the extensive withdrawal of troops by Morelos for the campaign in Michoacan, royalists from Vera Cruz had already in December occupied the eastern line, and penetrated as far as Villa Alta;[44] while Dambrini avenged himself for the defeat inflicted by Matamoros by a fresh invasion from Guatemala into Tehuantepec, and by prompting Reguera to fresh activity on

[42] Yet the colonel halted before it to issue a pompous and threatening proclamation. The last revolutionary adherents had departed shortly before, attended by insults from the populace, who now turned to raise arches for Alvarez. *Carriedo, Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 29; *Torrente, Rev.*, ii. 95–6.

[43] Both were afterward caught and tried. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 313, 316–440. Velasco sought to merit his pardon by bitter denunciation of the cause. Bustamante writes that Murguia was confirmed as intendente by Alvarez, but had soon to leave for Madrid to seek absolution. *Cuad.*, iii. 37–8. Carriedo states that he was at once removed and sent to Mexico, *Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 29, which is more likely. *Pap. Var.*, clxxi. pt xviii. 5–14. Rosains assailed Rayon in his *Justa Repulsa* for so readily losing the rich province intrusted to him, and Rayon came forth to explain that Morelos' adherents had prevented the execution of his orders, and withheld arms and money, and had furthermore created a reaction against the revolutionary cause by their outrages. It was moreover too late to save the province when he took the task. Both documents are given in *Revolucion, Verd. Origen*, pt ii. 62–6.

[44] By order of Topete, stationed at Tlacotalpan. Tuxtepec was captured with a loss of over 80 insurgents. The entry into Villa Alta was a mere raid. Reports in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 277–84, 415–19.

the adjoining Costa Chica, where he occupied Jamiltepec, Amusgos, and other places.[45] The Mizteca region alone remained true to the revolutionists, who found succor in its valleys and shelter in its labyrinth of fastnesses. Against them Álvarez now exerted himself. His lieutenant, Obeso, penetrated to Tlajiaco toward the end of April, and defeated the leader Herrera; but reënforced by Sesma, the latter gathered his men again on an adjoining hill, and inflicted, mainly with the aid of stones and bowlders, so severe a check upon the royalists that the spot became celebrated as the Cerro Encantado.[46] Eager to avenge the disaster, Álvarez marched against them in person with a large force, and laid siege to Silacayoapan at the close of July; but was effectually repulsed, notably through a brilliant charge by Teran,[47] whereupon he retired to Teposcolula, to remain in observation and guard the route for convoys from Mexico.

The centre of revolutionary operations had now shifted to Puebla and Vera Cruz, attracted partly by the resources of the tierras templada and caliente, and the rich prizes held out by the traffic between the gulf port and the capital, and partly by the strategic positions offered by the east range of the Sierra Madre, which stretches along the border between the two provinces and sends its branches into the central pla-

[45] Carriedo assumes that Reguera had 500 men before the occupation of Amusgos. *Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 30. Dambrini's force included 100 Omoa negroes. Bustamante dwells on his cruelty springing from a revengeful spirit. His negroes were taken by Álvarez for a guard. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 38–9. Reguera figures as commander of the fifth division of south coast militia, assisted by Captain Arrázola and Cura Herrera of Jamiltepec.

[46] Enchanted hill. This action took place April 29th, with a loss to the assailants of 19 dead and over 200 wounded. Bustamante states that Sesma came up to aid the Americans. *Cuad.*, iii. 287–9. Royalist accounts allude only to the previous victory, at Cerro del Coyote close to Tlajiaco, over 500 men, of whom they killed 93 and captured 13. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 538–9. Carriedo, *Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 30–1, reduces Herrera's force to 100.

[47] Who captured part of his artillery. *Bustamante, Cuad.*, iii. 289–91. After the fight at Cerro Encantado, Sesma, who had been appointed by Rosains, arrested Herrera, who claimed authority under Rayon. Teran now came up and reconciled and joined them. *Mier y Teran, Manif.*, 8–9. He was made a colonel for his achievement. Álvarez abandoned the siege August 19th. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 433–7.

teau. The advantages of the region had been demonstrated by the failure to overcome Osorno. His presence sufficed to render the highway to Vera Cruz insecure and to necessitate strong escorts for the rare convoys, causing an immense increase in the prices of merchandise.[48]

The train leaving Mexico in January 1814 consisted of eighty-seven coaches, with passengers, and 7,000 pack-mules, carrying five millions in precious metals, besides other effects. Among those departing were the oidores Bodega and Villaurrutia, Salcedo, later comandante general of the provincias internas, and several distinguished persons suspected of revolutionary tendencies, such as Doctor Alcalá and promotor Cortazar.[49] Later in the year went Conde de Castro Terreño and Olazábal, both with lessened glory. The convoy was harassed, especially after leaving Puebla, and at San Juan where a valuable part of it was cut off.[50] The transit occupied more than a month, and the return cargo did not reach Mexico till the middle of April, owing to stoppages at different points.

The delays and excessive charges were due less to danger from attack than to the reprehensible greed of officials, from the lowest upward, who aside from the money to be gained in the escort service, made large sums by speculating in merchandise or accepting bribes and partnerships from traders interested in certain goods and districts, and so retarding or advancing convoys at their will, under plausible pretences. Iturbide was known to have engaged in such transactions with the silver consignments from Guanajuato,

[48] Coaches were taxed $600 each, and other things in proportion.

[49] Both sent by force as deputies for Guanajuato. Alaman, who joined the party, adds many details. *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 36–9. Finding the road toward Puebla unmolested, several went on in advance of the slow convoy, only to be cut down by lurking bands.

[50] Martinez effected the capture. Oidor Bodega alone lost 1,000 ounces in gold, and the jewels of his wife, worth $40,000, which fell into the hands of Intendente Aguilar. For details, see *Rivera, Hist. Jal.*, i. 472–3; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 292 etc.; *Orizava, Ocurrencias*, 42–3, 85–6. Also Rosains' account in *Revol. Verd. Origen*, 63–4; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, i. 240–1, 261; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 361–3.

and the return cargoes of quicksilver and other effects; and Calleja, who bore no spotless reputation, was widely accused of having favored convoys from Tampico to the exclusion of Vera Cruz trains.[51]

The most dangerous part of the route lay in Vera Cruz, which fairly swarmed with lusty bands, living partly by direct plunder, partly by the exemption tax obtained from traders, and unwilling to recognize any superior authority under which their profits might have to be shared or restricted. After the departure of Nicolás Bravo to join Morelos, their independence of spirit ripened into actual discord, and there was need for a guiding spirit to uphold the tottering cause. During the flight of the congress to Michoacan, Rosains ingratiated himself so far with the members as to be confirmed as comandante general of Puebla, Vera Cruz, and northern Mexico;[52] but on reaching his new field he found that Rayon had already claimed the command, on the strength of his superior rank as captain-general and minister of Hidalgo, and of the appeal to him of several chiefs who objected to Rosains, notably Perez, intendente of Puebla.[53]

Rayon would listen to no proposals from Rosains, who thereupon resolved to try his influence in the adjoining province of Vera Cruz, where Joaquin Aguilar, the congressional intendente, disputed for control with Rincon, the comandante general left in Morelos' name.[54] Rincon had been humbled in a severe encounter with the royalists under Álvarez,[55] while

[51] Arechederreta gives some interesting revelations to this effect in his *Apuntes Hist.* Also *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 325, 335–44, 731, etc.

[52] Bustamante adds Oajaca, but Rosains does not claim it in his *Justa Repulsa*, 63–4.

[53] See Rayon's reply to Rosains in *Revol. Verdad. Orígen*, 65–6. Alaman assumes that he had also obtained a commission similar to that of Rosains. To bind Perez, Rayon made him also brigadier and comandante of Puebla. *Diario Rayon*, 654.

[54] Aguilar was a late tobacco official, who had promised to capture Vera Cruz, and bring to the treasury half a million within six months. Rosains sought to cut the difficulty by appointing a new comandante in Colonel Aldana, a protégé of Rayon, but Aldana ignored him.

[55] The conqueror of Oajaca, Jan. 20th, at Jamapa. As a result, his fortifications and factories at Huatusco were destroyed. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 152, 167–8. Bustamante claims that Álvarez was disfigured and nearly

Aguilar had been rather successful in association with Martinez, generally known by his baptismal names of José Antonio, now the most famous among the several leaders[56] and occupying the road between Jalapa and Vera Cruz. The latter had not only gained the advantage over two Spanish expeditions,[57] but had amassed a large treasure by means of his fortunate raids, as, for example, on the February convoy from Mexico. These funds enabled him to command more men than other chiefs, and exert great influence. Such a personage had to be courted. Rosains began by proposing to arrange the difficulty between Aguilar and Rincon, offering the latter the command of northern Vera Cruz, and the other the districts to the south. This appeared satisfactory, but just as the outlook became promising a cloud rose to obscure it.

When the subjugation of Oajaca was undertaken Hevia had been instructed to pursue Rayon. The latter eluded him for a time, and reached Teotitlan with a valuable store of cochineal and other effects; but Hevia came again upon his tracks, defeated his lieutenants Roca and Anaya with considerable loss in men and supplies, and compelled Rayon to take refuge in the Orizaba region with a bare remnant, including Deputy Bustamante, the brothers Teran, and Crespo. Hevia also established here his headquarters as commander of the second division of the southern army, routed Rosains at Huatusco, and inflicted so severe a blow on Rayon at Omealca on May 15th that he sought refuge with Osorno at Zacatlan.[58] These successes did not, however, avail against the

killed in a previous encounter with Calzada, the lieutenant of Arroyo. *Cuadro*, iii. 22.

[56] Lately employed on the hacienda of a Biscayan trader named Arrillaga, who headed the liberal party at Vera Cruz.

[57] One of 300 men in Dec. 1813, under Ulloa, sent in his pursuit, and another of nearly 300 men under Major Fajardo. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 272-6, 287-9.

[58] Details in *Orizava, Ocurrencias*, 53-71, 41, etc. Bustamante, who followed Rayon, gives many interesting points, *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 43-9, as does Mier y Teran in his *Manifest.*, 6, etc. Hevia's reports appear in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 470, 540, 553-5, etc. The Teran brothers now crossed to the more promising Mizteca region, to which Rosains also sent Sesma.

numerous bands investing the highways mainly for plunder, for they prudently yielded before regular forces, to reappear at a safer distance. Martinez did not exactly belong to this cautious class, but the late reverses affected him less than Rosains, and he did not care to submit to this intruder. Rosains cut the matter short by enlisting the services of jealous leaders, with whose aid he took by surprise and killed the redoubtable chief.[59] Anaya was rewarded for his coöperation with the position of the rebellious Aguilar, and Guadalupe Victoria, now rising into prominence as a colonel, received the second rank. Although several leaders had been awed into submission, others still held out for independent raids on the highway; and seeing little prospect of restoring harmony, Rosains resolved again to try his fortune in Puebla, where Rayon's influence had greatly declined.[60]

While raising troops near San Andrés, and awaiting there a proposal from Rayon, he was surprised by the watchful Hevia, on July 2d, and narrowly escaped with a bare remnant to Tehuacan.[61] Close to this town rose a hill known as Cerro Colorado, accessible only by one narrow approach, and used in aboriginal times as a fortress.[62] Here Rosains intrenched himself, and bid defiance to the pursuing Hevia, who was not prepared for a prolonged siege. His flight, however, revived the spirit of the startled Rayon faction, and the captain-general, as well as his intendente Perez, came forth with circulars against him,

[59] 'Asesinado,' is Teran's view. *Manifest.*, 8. Rosains began by a raid on Martinez' treasure cache. He then sought to intimidate him during an interview, attacking him afterward with Rincon in ambush. Thus much he confesses in his *Rel. Hist.*, 7, etc.

[60] He proposed an exemption tax to the traders at Vera Cruz, which they gladly accepted, notwithstanding the injunctions of the authorities; but other leaders insisting also in levying tribute on the convoys, the plan failed. The effort to rout the latter resulted in a repulse for the Spaniards. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 978–80.

[61] The royalists took about 100 muskets and 49 prisoners. Although the latter had just been enrolled by force, and were kept under lock, Hevia had them all shot. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 53–4; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 735; *Orizava Ocurrencias*, 81–2.

[62] See *Mier y Teran, Segunda Manif.*, 86, etc.

to which he replied with similar denunciations.[63] Such scandal could not pass unnoticed by the congress, and Brigadier Arroyave was sent to take command of the disputed territory, while two deputies should investigate and arrange the difficulty. Neither party chose to obey a distant and powerless assembly, and Rosains went so far as to shoot the troublesome Arroyave on finding that he sided with his opponent.[64]

To such a state had fallen the sacred cause of independence, unfolded by Hidalgo and exalted by the victories of Morelos. Two of the leaders arrayed one against the other, the other two wandering or ignored, and the petty chiefs intent mainly on plunder, ready to draw their sword equally on foe and comrade; campaigns reduced to mere raids and pursuits, with victory steeped in bloody executions, often of guiltless participants.[65]

While the congress vainly endeavored to settle the differences between the two claimants in Puebla, the royalists brought more radical means to bear. Osorno having become more daring in his raids and attacks, even threatening Tulancingo,[66] another expedition appeared necessary, to intimidate him at least, for he generally managed to avoid dangerous encounters. A main object was to nip in the bud the projects which Rayon was supposed to be framing at Zacatlan. These were overestimated, however, for the resources were

[63] Both sides reproduced by Martiñena in *Verdad. Origen*, no. ii. 62, et seq. Rosains also quarrelled with Arroyo and sent a force against him, which was defeated.

[64] Partly on the assumption that he was a Spaniard, which was wrong. *Aguila Mex.*, pt 315. Bustamante, *Not. Biog.*, 22, as a friend of Arroyave, had to flee. The proceedings against Arroyave are given in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 757–70.

[65] It is interesting to read the introductory declamation of Rosains in his *Rel. Hist.*, protesting against such iniquity! See Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 18, and passim, and the more honorable Teran, *Manifest.*, 7 et seq.; also the documents in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 318–19, 588–94, 674–5; *Pap. Var.*, xxxvi., pt lxviii. 62–6, etc., and observations in *Torrente, Rev.*, ii. 90–1.

[66] On Feb. 26th, with 2,500 men, of which only 500 were soldiers. The commandant, Col Piedras, repulsed him with a loss of 20. His lieut. had rashly attacked Osorno on the 25th and lost 41. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 261–7.

diminishing with which he hoped to utilize his present force of four hundred men, and Osorno was by no means disposed to exert himself in the interest of another.[67] Indeed, the latter seems to have purposely kept Rayon in the dark concerning the royalist preparations, under the direction of Colonel Águila.

This officer succeeded in presenting himself wholly unawares before Zacatlan on September 25th, with a force far outnumbering the garrison. He intended to surprise the place by night, but the roads delayed the march, and at the last moment the heavy mist broke and revealed the danger in time to sound the alarm for defence. The first assault carried everything before it, however, and over 200 insurgents succumbed, leaving a large quantity of newly manufactured war material to the victors. Deputy Crespo was caught and shot,[68] and Rayon had a narrow escape from the same fate, but succeeded after great hardship in reaching his brother Ramon in Michoacan. Nothing loath at being rid of his unwelcome guest, Osorno took possession of Zacatlan after the royalist departure, and resumed his operations with such success that Brigadier Jalon, successor of Águila in the command of Apam region, had to be replaced by the more energetic Major Barradas.[69] The command of the army of the south, with headquarters at Puebla, passed about the same time to Brigadier Daoiz, Ortega returning to Spain.

[67] An agent at Puebla had embezzled the small stock of cochineal left him, and his efforts to create sympathy in Oajaca had failed.

[68] Together with 50 others; Colonel Peredo, the envoy to the U. S., had a narrow escape. Twelve guns and 200 muskets were taken. Although claiming over 200 dead foes, Águila admits only one fallen royalist. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1089–96. Bustamante escaped with his wife. He gives Águila 1,200 men. The later president Anastasio Bustamante distinguished himself in leading a detachment to the assault. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 58–60. Crespo was offered pardon on the condition of turning against the insurgents, but refused. He had been college professor, and later parish priest of Riohondo, Oajaca. *Carriedo, Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 115–16.

[69] Who distinguished himself in November by a valiant defence of Apam. Jalon came to his relief and routed the insurgents, killing among others Brigadier Ramirez, commander of Huamantla district. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1241–4. Jalon was removed in March 1815, with a narrow escape from being subjected to court-martial.

The trouble experienced by Rayon and Rosains in obtaining recognition as comandantes generales was also encountered by Doctor Cos in Michoacan and Guanajuato, although in less degree. Muñiz, who had lately held the command over all this region under Morelos, objected to any interference in the former province, and refused obedience, as did also several minor leaders. Most of them acted indeed as they pleased, while according a certain deference to the wandering congress which had sought refuge among them, and to Morelos, who had retired with a chosen hundred to the isolated hill of Atijo, there to manufacture war material and gather adherents till opportunity should offer for retrieving himself.[70] Ramon Rayon was similarly occupied in the position, of equal strength, known as Mount Cóporo,[71] after having made a brilliant and advantageous sweep into Querétaro and northern Mexico, which added both to his fame and resources.[72] A number of lesser chiefs now joined his standard, such as Benedicto Lopez of Zitácuaro, Polo, Cañas, Sanchez, and Enseña, who had been closely pursued by the detachments sent out by Llano under Aguirre and the cruel Andrade.[73]

Iturbide coöperated on his side, and surprised later in the year the town of Puruándiro, killing forty-five of the garrison, including the dashing commander, Mariscal Villalongin.[74] So zealously did he employ

[70] Stories are told of ancient subterranean passages in the hill, where he confined those who incurred his anger, starving them on scant rations. Morelos' testimony in *Morelos, Declaracion.*

[71] Bearing the additional name of San Pedro, from the day he began to fortify it. Previous to this he had been manufacturing arms in a beautiful cavern near Zitácuaro, whence he was driven forth by Llano's lieutenant Aguirre in March. Report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 319–20, 378–81. Muñiz had previously taken away most of his men.

[72] Assisted by Sanchez and Atilano, he took vengeance at the hacienda de la Barranca for the death of a friend, and then surprised Huehuetoca, after luring Ordoñez to Jilotepec. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 113–17.

[73] Notably under Colonel Andrade, who swept the whole northern section and managed to end the career of Arias at Pátzcuaro July 8th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 485–8, 797–800, 993, et seq.

[74] Famed for the daring rescue of his condemned wife at Valladolid in Dec. 1811. The surprise was effected on the morning of Nov. 2d by Castañon, the

Orrantia and other lieutenants within his own province of Guanajuato and on the adjoining borders in the pursuit of revolutionists, that he claims to have despatched within less than two months nearly 900 men, including nineteen chiefs, among them the brigadier presbyter Saenz and one of the celebrated Pachones.[75] The effect was undoubtedly to render the highways more secure and to restore comparative peace in the long-desolated settlements. To this contributed greatly the active enrolment of local guards in the different towns and villages which coöperated in the pursuit of such leaders as Torres, Rafael Rayon, and Tovar, who still hovered in the mountains of Guanajuato, and two scions of Villagran, who flitted as avengers in the Tula region.[76] But this was no longer a campaign. It was a hunting-down of human beings, as blood-hounds hunt wild beasts; and it is to be noticed that the foremost hunter and persecutor was the personage who finally gave the decisive blow for independence, and rose to the summit of power in liberated Anáhuac. His able though merciless performance as a royalist, however, served rather to excite admiration than hatred among many of his opponents; and it is a tribute to their gallantry as well as fairness to note that the greatest outcry against Iturbide at this time was raised by his execution of a woman who lent her beauty to sustain the cause of independence.[77]

insurgents being less watchful, owing to the festivities of the preceding todos santos day. *Id.*, 1401–8.

[75] And this with a loss of only three of his own men. He mentions the execution of Captain Omelas, Rodriguez, commander of Cerro Gordo, Colonel Borja, commandant of the Curadero. There is a boastful tone throughout these reports of Iturbide when speaking of the butcheries. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 37–40.

[76] Ordoñez' campaign here is reported in *Id.*, 1814, v. 650–1, etc.; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 196–204.

[77] Her name was María Tomasa Estevez, 'comisionada para seducir la tropa.' Iturbide's report in *Id.*, 1084. Negrete, *Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 455–6, and Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectif.*, 254–5, join in condemning the act. See also allusions to cruelties in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 328, et seq., 282, etc. It has been observed that Rayon and other leaders had frequently to take severe measures against unprincipled chiefs who injured the cause by their outrages and afforded royalists just motives for severity.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES.

1814.

CHANGED ASPECT OF THE REVOLUTION—DEPRESSION ON BOTH SIDES—PROPOSED RESTRICTION OF PASSPORTS AND EXPORT OF TREASURE—CAUSES OF THE EXODUS OF THE SPANIARDS—FRESH TAXES—RESTORATION OF FERNANDO VII.—CONSTITUTION OF 1812 IS ANNULLED AND AUTOCRACY RE-ESTABLISHED—FEELING IN NEW SPAIN—INSURGENT CONSTITUTION—ITS PROVISIONS AND ANALYSIS—HOW IT WAS RECEIVED—ELECTION OF OFFICERS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION—LICEAGA PRESIDENT—COMMEMORATIVE MEDAL—CONSTITUTION ORDERED READ BY THE CURAS—RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

THE revolution had by this time assumed an aspect widely different from its condition when Calleja took command. His plans had been not only well laid, but in the main well carried out. Rayon was humbled; the Villagranes were no more; and the power of Morelos had faded to a flitting shadow. Rich Oajaca and rock-bound Tecpan were at his feet; the north enjoyed repose, and in the central provinces little more appeared to be required than a watch on the isolated bands in their mountain retreats.[1] Much more remained to be done, however. The power of the insurgents as a whole was broken, but small bodies hovered about in nearly undiminished number, independent in action and casting off more and more the

[1] Calleja does not fail to extol himself in a review of affairs issued on June 22d, wherein he naturally exaggerates the results achieved. Disclosing as it does also the plans followed, it has been widely quoted. The text may be consulted in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 554–62; *Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja*, sup. 1–18; *Ward's Mex.*, i. app. 509–25. See also *Mex., Virey*, 2–14, 18.

wholesome restraint which Rayon and others had formerly imposed. They were becoming raiders rather than revolutionists, intent mainly on harassing the royalists, but inflicting at the same time great injury on the country at large, by circumscribing agriculture, mining, manufactures, and trade, as well as by obliging the government to increase rather than diminish its costly operations for guarding the exposed districts and pursuing and besieging the raiders. Calleja, in fact, appealed in August 1814, to Spain, for reënforcements of 8,000 men, and obtained a portion of the force.[2] Under the new condition of affairs disunion seemed indeed favorable to the cause. The explanation of this anomaly lay partly in the greater precautions taken by the leaders to keep the way open for retreat, and to maintain a larger number of strongholds for refuge.

No wonder then that a general feeling of uneasiness continued, notwithstanding the exultant demonstration of successes by Calleja. This feeling was strikingly manifested in the increasing exodus of Spaniards, which assumed such magnitude that it was proposed to limit the issue of passports, and decided to restrict the export of treasure.[3] One cause must be sought in the depression left on all industries by the long struggle to which were added the continual levies by insurgents, especially on farms, and the reckless imposition of loans and taxes by Calleja, who cared above all for the success of his campaign. In the latter part of the year when everybody expected a partial release from burdens, he added six per cent to the excise duty, and a special board was created to apply a large direct contribution on prop-

[2] As late as Dec. 1815, Calleja was complaining of his inability to check these bands. See the translated despatch in *Revol. Span. Amer.*, 331–9.

[3] The convoy from Mexico of Oct. 31st took about four millions in precious metal and 66 coaches with passengers. The tributary train from Guanajuato had brought 2,300 bars of silver and 80,000 animals. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 218–22. Over seven millions in money would thus have been sent out of the country at the time had Calleja permitted it to follow the large departure of passengers and treasure effected by the previous opportunity.

erty and on incomes exceeding three hundred pesos a year.[4] This measure had soon to be abandoned however, but the levy of ten per cent on urban property, established for one year, was continued, with application to convents and communities, save charitable institutions, and the reluctant merchants had to respond with more than half the sum of a fresh half-million loan. In the following year a compulsory lottery was introduced to extort annually a million and a half from the people at large. Further, a new copper coinage was issued to replace the immense variety of copper tokens, circulated from almost every large store under the name of *tlacos* and *pilones*,[5] and to remedy the growing scarcity of small silver money, such as half and quarter reals. At first the coin fell into discredit through the objections raised by merchants, but the issue being restricted to prudent limits and its proportion in payments being regulated a decided benefit was experienced.[6]

Another cause for the exodus of Spaniards was the

[4] This had been proposed in 1813 and abandoned; nevertheless a board was created soon after to apply it, only to abandon the project for the six per cent excise. Calleja applied it however, by decree of October 14th, on the birthday of the king! under the name of 'subvencion general de guerra.' The board consisted of three members, one a churchman, with sub-boards composed of citizens, before whom statements of property and income were presented. The deduction had to begin Jan. 1, 1815, also on official salaries. Decree with rules in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 697–701.

[5] The former being the term for an eighth of a real, the other, meaning piles, being evidently an ironic expression. Each store had its own stamp, which was also placed on pieces of wood and soap.

[6] Official salaries after Sept. were paid one third in this coin, by decree of Aug. 23d. Another of Dec. 20th introduced the improved rules. See *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1394–8; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 1048–9; *Diario Debates*, cong. 10, ii. 530–3. The insurgents at first availed themselves of this by filling Oajaca and other districts with copper coin, but soon the circulation was strictly forbidden. For further observations on the condition and the measures, see *Cortes, Diario*, i. pt xii. 105, etc.; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 724, 744–7, etc.; the representation of Abad y Queipo, *Informe*, and of Bodega, *Repres.*, 1–12; *Cortes, Act. Ord.*, 1814, ii. 260. The urban tax was at first equally divided between tenant and owner, later the owner had to pay 8 per cent. The prosperous and peaceful northern provinces now came more prominently forward with voluntary contributions, such as horses. Instances in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 43–4, 395 et seq., 1360. The lottery scheme announced in *Id.*, 1815, December numbers, embraced two drawings annually, one for Mexico, the other for the provinces which took two thirds of the tickets. A whole ticket cost $100. Half of the million and a half was returned in prizes.

improved condition of affairs in the peninsula, marked by the return of Fernando VII., under whom promised to blossom anew the prosperity so hopefully connected with a brilliant court. The victory of Vitoria in June 1813 signalized the end of French sway in Spain, and in the following September the new regular córtes elected under the constitution of 1812 met untrammelled by foreign intimidation.[7] But its reign was not to last. Under the pressure of accumulating reverses Napoleon sought in Fernando VII. a means for relief, and readily prevailed upon the imprisoned king to sign a treaty which restored him to the throne on condition that the English should leave Spain.[8] Once beyond the French frontier, which he crossed March 22d, the unreliable monarch cast to the wind his promises, made for that matter without consent from the popular representatives and against his own former declaration.

By this time the servile party, or absolutists, had acquired sufficient strength to adopt a decided attitude against the constitution; and joined by interested nobles and ecclesiastics three score deputies petitioned the king to set aside the córtes, and summon another on the plan prescribed by the ancient monarchical regulations.[9] Nothing could please Fernando better; and

[7] The extraordinary sessions of the preceding body closed on the 14th of Sept., the speech on the occasion being delivered by Gordoa, president and deputy from Zacatecas. Text in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 205–12. The yellow fever appearing at Cádiz, the regent hastened on the following day to Santa María. This step caused the córtes to be summoned anew to determine the residence for the government and the meeting place for the new assembly. Fever ravages hastened the end of the session before the question was settled. A number of the extraordinary deputies served as suplentes in the new body till those elected in America should arrive. The formal opening took place Oct. 1st, at Cádiz, but the fear of fever assisted those who longed for the capital, and on Jan. 15, 1814, the sessions were resumed at Madrid.

[8] The French leaving simultaneously. An annual allowance of a million and a half was assigned to Fernando's parents. The regency pointed out that his own act of Jan. 1811 declared null any convention signed by him as captive, and the córtes issued a rather humiliating order defining the route and manner of entry so as to oblige him to take the oath to the constitution before assuming sovereign power. Text of treaty in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 595–604.

[9] This representation, known as the Persian from the opening phrase, was dated April 12th and headed by Bernardo Mozo Rosales, some of the following 69 signatures being added later with a view to court favor. Text with

encouraged by the reinstallation of the Bourbon dynasty in France, and the warm reception accorded him throughout his journey from the northern border to Valencia, he marched boldly to the capital, dissolved the córtes, arrested the regents, hostile deputies, and other dangerous persons,[10] and issued a decree dated May 4th[11] restoring affairs to the footing held in March 1808, and declaring all intermediate acts annulled. On the 13th he made his formal entry into Madrid, there to affirm his position by a sweeping series of reforms and appointments, with a distribution of offices and honors to his supporters, among whom Americans were prominently remembered, and even courted.[12] The country submitted to the new order, yet not without deep indignation in certain quarters, from which developed a number of plots that served only to bring forth severe measures, involving a number of prominent and patriotic men.

Fernando's liberation and entry into Spain were welcomed in Mexico on June 10th and following days with solemn and imposing celebrations, especially at the feast-loving capital,[13] but even there the news itself

signers and refutation in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 377–532. Record of proceedings in the córtes are given in *Córtes, Act. Ord.*, 1814, i.–ii.

[10] The córtes had in Oct. 1813 reconstructed the regency, so that it now consisted of Cardinal Luis de Borbon, Pedro Agar, an American, and Gabriel Ciscar, both of the navy. The cardinal was sent away, but his colleagues fared worse. Among imprisoned Mexican deputies were Arizpe, Manian, Larrazábal, Teran, and Felín. These proceedings took place on May 10th and 11th, with no little commotion. Arizpe's wail is uttered in his *Idea Gen. sobre Conducta*, 4–10.

[11] Issued on the 11th.

[12] Perez, deputy for Puebla, and last president of the córtes, received the mitre of that see. Gordoa and Ramirez were appointed canons of Guadalajara, and Rus and Mendiola, oidores of the same place. Rosales was made a count, Lardizábal, minister of the Indies, and so forth, one lowly person, who had merely brought a pen for drafting the decree of May 4th, being raised to councillor.

[13] Orders for celebration in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 541–2. Cos' counter proclamation in *Id.*, vi. 227–8, designating the return as a French intrigue and disastrous. See also *Pap. Var.*, clviii. pts lv. lix. Arechederreta in his *Diario* gives details of this minor celebration. Ladies dressed in white and escorted carried round the portrait of the king, and Indians had their semi-grotesque processions. Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, ix. 499, attributes greater enthusiasm than really appeared.

roused far less enthusiasm than it would have done half a dozen years before. Royalty had lost prestige under the assiduous inroads of republican ideas, and the character and mishaps of the king had not presented themselves in a light to call for great sympathy and admiration. Succeeding news did not tend to improve the feeling.

The tone in the despatches from Spain, which remained suspiciously silent with regard to córtes or constitution, totally escaped the otherwise observant Calleja. In a manifesto of June he held out the prospect of fully establishing the constitution, and hastened to summon the provincial deputation which was installed July 13th, with a very incomplete representation,[14] owing to interrupted elections and other obstacles. Early in the following month arrived the famed decree of May 4th. The officials and corporations were summoned to a praise service at the cathedral August 10th, and there Dean Beristain announced from the pulpit the change to be introduced, now attacking severely the same constitution which he had more than once impressively upheld.[15] The usual demonstrations were ordered to follow, but this time the people held aloof, sullen and ominously silent.

A large number of Europeans observed the same attitude, especially the merchants, and above all those of Vera Cruz; so much so that the viceroy and commandants took precautions against a possible outbreak. Then, in order to distract attention, prepara-

[14] Embracing the viceroy as gefe político, Intendente Gutierrez del Mazo of Mexico; the canon Angel Gazano and J. B. Lobo, trader of Vera Cruz, deputies for Mexico; García Illueca, suplente for Mexico; Col Acebedo for Querétaro; Licentiate Daza, for Tlascala. Report with reasons in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 793–4. Canon Vazquez joined a fortnight later, for Puebla. Rules, etc., in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 575–8; *Mex., Col. Dec. y Ord.*, 116.

[15] Bustamante attacks the dean as 'el órgano de la mas vil adulacion,' and reproduces one of the pasquinades against him. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 104-5. The decree is given in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 606; *Rockwell's Span. Mex. Law*, 398; and an account of the celebration on August 10th in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 959–60.

tions were made to formally celebrate the accession of the king, as soon as the rainy season had passed, with a prolonged series of solemn processions and masses by different public bodies, followed by bull fights, banquets, fireworks, illuminations, balls, and other performances, and this in every town and settlement throughout the country, in a manner that did much to cast a veil over the less acceptable features of the occasion.[16] The army was flattered by Calleja in a special appeal, and reminded that the constitution, which he now termed illusive, would have deprived it of cherished privileges. Efforts were besides made to keep the soldiers in good humor by the enforcement of different measures for their comfort and weal.[17] Nor was Calleja himself overlooked. He received the approval of the king, with promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general.

In order to soften the blow the king had issued a decree of May 24th, manifesting his interest in the people, promising to remedy grievances, and holding out the prospect of convoking new córtes wherein America should receive due representation.[18] Although this remained a dead letter, the creoles were somewhat consoled to find five among them given places in the restored council of the Indies,[19] and Indians received

[16] A programme of celebrations at Mexico, extending from Dec. 8th till Jan. 7th, is given in *Id.*, 1344, and descriptions of special ceremonies appear in following numbers. Medals were struck to commemorate the incident. Iturbide gave at Irapuato a sham battle to represent Calleja's victory at Calderon. *Id.*, 1815, vi. 102–6, 388–90, etc.; *Negrete, Mex. Sig'o XIX.*, vi. 471–8; *Córtes, Acta Ord.*, 1814, ii. 187. During the festivities a rare phenomenon took place in a fall of snow on Dec. 26th, four inches in thickness. The pendon celebration of the conquest was renewed, and Cárlos IV. and his reviled consort received again honors on their saints' days.

[17] Proclamation in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1009–11. Decrees for army in *Fernando VII., Decretos*, 4–5, 9–22, 66–7, and how applied. *Pap. Var.*, clviii. pt xxxiii. 994–8; *Rivero, Mex.*, 1842, 151.

[18] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1025–7. The constitution of 1812 and the córtes are here termed illegal and unauthorized, and aiming to undermine monarchy, religion, and welfare. 'De la proxima convocacion de las Córtes.. se ocupa una comision.' Five days later appeared a decree countermanding the departure of any deputies.

[19] Including Oidor Morquera y Figueroa, late regent of New Spain, Oidor Bodega of Mexico, a Peruvian by birth, and the Guatemalan Aicinena. The Mexican Lardizábal y Uribe, brother of the minister, was replaced in the restored council of Castile. *Id.*, 1217–20, etc.

exemption from the humiliating tribute. The people were further lulled for a moment by a decree to renew municipal authorities in larger towns as indicated by the late constitution; but just as elections began, with the usual overwhelming defeat of Spaniards, a new decree ordered the instalment of the old perpetual ayuntamientos.[20]

Then came a larger dose of radical measures, encouraged by the calmer beat of the public pulse. The audiencias of Mexico and Guadalajara were reinstated in all their former privileges, and incited by long abstinence from their fat commissions the oidores did not wait for formal orders to pounce upon the spoils.[21] So also with the long-deposed special tribunals, corregidores, and sub-delegates, together with the gallows and whipping-post.[22] Further, the dread inquisition was restored, and the inhabitants soon obtained a reminder thereof in a circular commanding them under penalty to appear and denounce themselves and others for utterances against religion and the holy office.[23]

The effect of Fernando's reforms was evidently to increase the strength and bitterness of the party which had so far been appeased with the prospect of a liberal constitution, conferring local self-government and a voice in national affairs. The taste of these privileges had whetted the appetite, and the only means for satisfying it were now held forth by the insurgents. The latter naturally felt jubilant at the tone

[20] Decrees with regulations in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1141–4, 1380, etc. Arechederreta speaks in his *Diario* of the usual election tumults. *Pap. Var.*, clviii. pt lvi. 4–8.

[21] Two prominent members had just died, the regent, Doctor Calderon, a native of Mexico, and Auditor Foncerrada; the rich and generous Conde de Basoco followed them.

[22] 'Se empeña en degradar y envilecer á la especie humana,' inveighs Bustamante bitterly. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 103. The decree reëstablishing the old judicial system was issued at Mexico on Dec. 15th. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1378–81.

[23] Edict of Inquisitor Flores dated Jan. 21, 1815. *Id.*, 1815, vi. 83–6. This official was the only one who had remained in Mexico. The effects of the tribunal had by this time been nearly all sold. Confessors were permitted to absolve light offences. Even the pious Bustamante ventures to declaim against this restoration 'y con ella sus furores.' *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 109.

thus imparted to their tottering cause, and hastened to support it by a series of appeals to European settlers, public bodies, and the people at large, wherein they contrasted the renewal of colonial despotism with the benefits to be enjoyed under independent republican rule.[24]

But what availed the arguments of a party broken in power and prestige, existing only in scattered guerrilla bands and hunted fugitives, and this against an able and determined man like Calleja, with devoted and victorious armies at his disposal? He was, besides, pushing the advantage already gained by intimidating the wavering with decrees to shoot all who appeared in arms, and to confiscate property, even of those who merely passed into districts occupied by insurgents.[25] On the other hand he kept open the liberal offer of pardon, issued in commemoration of the king's return, to all who tendered submission. Even Morelos and other leaders were included, on condition however of their leaving the country.[26] This combined strictness and leniency had great effect, and the insurgents saw with apprehension one group of adherents after another dropping off, with a corresponding decline in their resources.[27]

[24] One by Rayon, drafted by the flighty Bustamante, was sent to the consulado of Mexico, which naturally feared to receive it. Sent to the viceroy, he caused it to be publicly burned. Cos, Torres, and others also figured with the pen; the former pointing out that the insurgents must under the new aspect be regarded as less rebellious than their opponents, who had supported illegal córtes against the king. Bustamante addressed two private letters to the viceroy, advising him to enter into negotiations with Rayon and save his person, for the United States were about to join and give victory to the insurgents. These different documents may be consulted in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 610–13, 702, vi. 215–16, 233–7, etc.; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 62 et seq.; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 397–401; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 312–17.

[25] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1345–8, 681–4, 737–9.

[26] Text in *Id.*, 681–4. It was at first limited to 30 days. All intercourse with rebels was strictly prohibited. *Dispos. Varias*, ii. 19. See also *Fernando VII., Decretos*, 5–8, 15–16. Appeals were also made direct to insurgents, *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 548–50, 566–9, and rejected by Rayon, etc. *Id.*, 674; *Negrete, Mex., Siglo XIX.*, vi. 319, 478, et seq.; *Córtes, Act. Ord.*, 1814, ii. 95.

[27] Among the pardoned were Doctor Maldonado, who in Hidalgo's time published at Guadalajara the *Despertador*, and now issued the *Telégrafo ó Semanario Patriótico*. Comments on the growing conciliation in *Pizarro, Re-*

Their most impressive effort to stem the tide was the issue of a republican constitution, which came as it were to replace the one just withdrawn by the royalists. It was the great work for which the congress had been formed by Morelos, wrought amidst persecution and wandering. Since its flight into Michoacan the assembly had flitted from one place to another,[28] attended by a ragged and almost unarmed escort of four score men, and suffering privations of every kind, of which hunger was not the least.[29] Yet misfortune taught no lesson of humility and prudence. The bent for pomp was not restrained, nor the clashing of jealousy and obstinacy which threatened what little influence still remained to the body.[30]

Apatzingan, a small town in the western part of Michoacan, was selected on account of its seclusion for the important task of issuing the constitution, and here it was signed October 22d by eleven of the deputies, and proclaimed with all the demonstration that could be evoked from a small population, fringed by the ragged army of five hundred men brought in by Morelos and Cos. The document opens characteristically with the declaration that the Roman catholic shall be the sole religion. Sovereignty is vested in a congress elected by the people by indirect ballot, and consisting of one deputy from each of seventeen provinces now formed. This body elects the members of the other two powers, the supreme government and supreme court of justice, together with a residencia tribunal for trying charges against all the supreme officials. The executive shall consist of three members, equal in authority, alternating in the presidency

flex., 1–11; *Pap. Var.*, ccxv. pt vi., and *Torrente, Rev.*, ii. 109–10. Yet a number of persons were left to languish in prison. Instance Lorenzo de Zavala, later author of *Revoluciones de México.*

[28] From Uruapan to the haciendas Santa Efigenia, Púturo, and Tiripitio, and finally to Apatzingan.

[29] There was rarely any money in the treasury. The deputies had to share the rations of the soldiers.

[30] A manifesto was issued at Tiripitio on June 15th to refute the charge of discord. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 543–4.

every four months, and holding office for three years. They are to be assisted by three secretaries, for war, finance, and government, and in the provinces by intendentes, appointed for three years, and presiding over the financial boards which form branches of an intendencia general at the capital. Administration of justice is to centre in a supreme court of five judges, chosen like the executive, and retiring gradually within five years. So long as any province is occupied by the enemy, existing deputies select a suplente to represent it. Peace once established, a formally elected congress shall assume the sovereignty and adopt the present or a new constitution, and establish the laws, local governments, and other features so far left unchanged. The present imperfect document was intended therefore only as provisional. Following the French ideas enunciated in the opening, we find the regulations proper to be chiefly modifications of the Spanish constitution, with a sprinkling of features from colonial laws.[31]

[31] As intimated in a manifest of the congress to the nation, of Oct. 23d. *Hernandez y Davalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 720–3. For greater satisfaction I add a more complete synopsis of the document. It consists of two parts: principles and form of government, comprising 6 and 22 chapters respectively, the whole divided into 242 articles. The first article declares the Roman catholic the sole religion. The following chapters of the first part dwell on sovereignty and equality. Mexican America is divided into 17 inseparable provinces: Mexico, Puebla, Tlascala, Vera Cruz, Yucatan, Oajaca, Tecpan, Michoacan, Querétaro, Guadalajara, Guanajuato, Potosí, Zacatecas, Durango, Sonora, Coahuila, and Nuevo Reyno de Leon. The sovereignty of the people is vested in the representative supreme Mexican congress, besides which are created two bodies, the supreme government and the supreme tribunal of justice, all to reside in one place, but in separate palaces and with special guards.

The congress shall consist of one deputy from each province, elected for two years. Deputies must be 30 years of age; no two close relatives can sit at the same time. Their election is indirect. Every person above the age of 18 born in the country, and naturalized foreigners, vote for electors, one for each parish. These unite to choose partido electors, who again meet to elect the deputy, each voter in both cases depositing a ticket with three nominees, the majority of votes deciding. While the provinces are occupied by the enemy, existing deputies choose suplentes for them. The congress is to have a president and vice-president, selected every three months by lot. The body is entitled majesty, and each deputy excellency. The congress elects the members of the supreme government, supreme court of justice, residencia tribunal, etc., appoints envoys, chooses generals of division from a trio nominated by the government, decrees laws, subject to criticisms from government and supreme court, fixes taxation, etc.

The constitution was at once given effect by the election of the executive in the persons of Liceaga, Morelos, and Cos, the first-named winning the presi-

The supreme government shall consist of three persons, equal in authority, and alternating every four months in the presidency as decided by lot on first assuming office. The congress elects in secret session nine nominees, from whom the deputies choose by ballot the three rulers. One of them retires every year, by lot drawn in congress. There shall be three secretaries of war, treasury, and government, holding office for four years. Reëlection cannot take place before the lapse of an intermediate term. The supreme government is entitled highness, the ruler excellency, and the secretary señoría. The government has the power to organize and move armies and appoint to a number of military and civil offices, etc. National funds to be administered by an intendencia general, consisting of an intendente general, a fiscal, an asesor, two ministros, and a secretary. Similar boards are to be formed in each province, headed by the intendente of the province, who holds office for three years, like the intendente general.

The supreme tribunal of justice shall consist for the present of five judges elected like the executive, who alternate in the presidency every three months, and retire by lot, two with the first year, two with the second, and the fifth with the third year. There shall be a fiscal for civil and criminal cases respectively, with the title of señoría, the judges being called excellencies and the court highness. The government shall appoint judges for partidos for three years, till popular elections can be held. These judges wield the same judicial power as the former subdelegates. In towns and villages existing governments shall remain till the congress finds opportunity to change the system. The government has to appoint ecclesiastic judges to try ecclesiastics in the first instance. A residencia tribunal of seven judges shall be chosen by lot, by the congress, from the candidates selected by provincial electors, one for each province; and its duty shall be to decide charges against members of congress, government, and supreme court.

The congress shall form within a year after the next installation of government, a plan for a representation based on population and suited to the latest change of circumstances. As soon as all the provinces save Yucatan, Sonora, Coahuila, and Nuevo Leon are free from foes, the government must convoke the national representation in accordance with that plan, and into its hands the congress shall surrender the sovereign power. The present constitution remains in force till this new body frames another.

To this document, dated October 22, 1814, are attached the signatures of Liceaga, deputy for Guanajuato and president, Verdusco, deputy for Michoacan, Morelos for Nuevo Leon, Herrera for Tecpan, Cos for Zacatecas, Sotero de Castañeda for Durango, Ortiz de Zárate for Tlascala, Alderete y Soria for Querétaro, Antonio José Montezuma for Coahuila, Ponce de Leon for Sonora, Argándar for San Luis Potosí, and secretaries Yarza and Bermeo. It is added that Rayon, Crespo, Quintana, Bustamante, and Sesma were absent, but had contributed their views. The supreme government countersigns on Oct. 24th, in the persons of Liceaga, as president, Morelos and Cos, and Yarza, as secretary. Text in *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 703–20; *Mex., Lec. Constit. Apatzingan.* Imprenta Nacional, año 1815, 12mo, 1–88, one of the rare early special issues of the constitution. *Dublan y Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 427–51; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, pt iii. 479–93. Bustamante also reproduces it in his *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 157–89; *Dic. Univ.*, ap. i. 220–32; *Perez, Dic. Geog.*, i. 524–40; *Araujo y San Roman, Impug., Pap. Var.*, lxvi. pt v.; *Mex. Dec. Constit.*, 1–68, in *Constit.*, ii.; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 343–85, with synopsis in *Alaman, Mendibil, etc.* Morelos states that the framers of the document were Quintana, Bustamante, and Herrera, *Declaracion*, 29; but Bustamante certainly could not claim the share. With regard to the prov-

dency, with Yarza as secretary of government, and the formation of the supreme court, which was installed at Ario a few days later, under the presidency of Arriola, with additional festivities.[32] The number of deputies was completed, and a medal struck to commemorate the installation.[33] Curas were instructed wherever practicable to read the constitution and have it solemnly adopted by their flocks, under penalty of chastisement. The royalists made counter-threats to prevent compliance, and ordered the collection and burning of all copies of the constitution and other documents circulated by insur-

MEDAL OF APATZINGAN CONGRESS.

inces it is to be noted that Vera Cruz comprised Tabasco, San Luis Potosí included Tamaulipas or Nuevo Santander, and Sonora covered Sinaloa. The rules governing congress, elections, and several other features are adopted from the Spanish constitution, while the financial and residencia systems are mainly derived from the colonial laws.

[32] At an expense of $8,000. 'Cantidad excesiva, y que debió economizarse,' observes Bustamante. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 204–8. Morelos, he adds, danced for joy that day, displaying a glittering uniform and embracing everybody. The other judges were Ponce, Martinez, and Castro. A letter from Antequera complains of the cost of type for printing, two to three pesos a pound, and the difficulty of obtaining it. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 2:8–9.

[33] The emblems on the balance beam surmounting the temple, a pen, staff, and sword, symbolize the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, respectively.

gents, a term now formally changed to rebels, while royalist supporters were to be called *realistas fieles.*[34] Further, local authorities were required to send in a disavowal of the insurgent deputies who claimed to represent them, which resulted in a stream of professed adhesions from all parts of the country; and churchmen were strictly bidden to combat the constitution. The main argument was based on the false charge that it fostered tolerance and heresy, and on this ground the inquisition also joined in the tirade, declaring excommunicated even those who merely held the document in possession or failed to denounce other holders. Orders so extreme could only serve to lower the influence of the framers from their necessarily wide-spread failure to receive effect.[35]

Whatever the effect of the constitution at home, it certainly lent a dignity and legality to the insurgent cause which could not fail to leave a favorable impression abroad. Nor was this impression devoid of value; for as the cause grew weaker, the greater became the necessity for foreign aid in loans and perhaps in troops, while intercourse must in any case be opened for the purchase of fire-arms and ammunition. Projects to this end were confined almost exclusively to the United States, and although hopes had so far proved vain they were never abandoned. In June 1814 they received a marked impulse from the arrival at Nautla of a 'General' Humbert, claiming to be an agent of the northern republic.[36] Anaya went with him to New Orleans, only to find him a mere corsair. Nev-

[34] Faithful royalists, instead of patriots, which designation had been widely adopted by the other side.

[35] Text of denunciation in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 727–34; see also 537–42, containing Calleja's decree, 553–6, that of the cathedral chapter at Mexico, 703–10, giving Doctor Torres' formal argument against the constitution. *Modelo de los Cristianos*, Mex. 1814, 1–128, is another argument. *Miscelanea*, i. pt iv.–v.; *Salvador, Suscrip.*, 1–22; *Bergosa y Jordan, Carta Pastoral*, 1–20; *Guerra, Oracion; Pap. Var.*, lxv. pt xiv., clxi. pt xxv.

[36] Rosains entered into negotiations with him, and the congress ordered joyous demonstrations. See *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 547, 570, vi. 233, 243; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 501–2; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 55–6.

ertheless he availed himself of the opportunity to obtain letters of marque from the pirate headquarters at Barataria Island, none of which were used however.[37] He also joined Toledo in planning an expedition against Tampico, but the government at Washington was advised and forbade its formation.[38] About the same time Rayon appointed Bustamante minister to the United States.[39] He failed to depart on his mission, and in the following summer of 1815 Doctor Herrera was charged therewith by the congress, on the strength of Toledo's representations that aid could be obtained in the northern United States.[40]

He was also to arrange with the papal nuncio for confirmation of ecclesiastic appointments by the congress and permission to dispose of church revenue till the close of the war.[41] Herrera did little or noth-

[37] Two hundred were sent to Rosains. *Rel. Hist.*, 11. The Spanish government took alarm and ordered a fleet against the pirates. *Cortes, Act. Ord.*, i. 453, ii. 19. Anaya's companion Father Pedroza revealed his plans to the Spanish consul at New Orleans. Declaration in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 2-3.

[38] *Amer. State Papers*, iv. 1, 422-626, passim; *Niles' Register*, ix. 33, 315, 392-7, 405, etc.; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 419-24. Rosains on his side checked the project to appoint Anaya a minister and empower him to seek a loan of six millions. *Rel. Hist.*, 12, et seq. He remained a mere agent awhile and came back bringing John Robinson.

[39] He separated from Rayon after the fall of Zacatlan, but failed to obtain either means or opportunity for departure. He had several narrow escapes in his effort to reach the coast between Oct. 1814 and Feb. 1815. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 60-1, 210-11, 216, etc.; *Id.*, *Hay Tiempo de Hablar*.

[40] Alvarez de Toledo stated by letter of May 1815, that he had 2,000 men, and needed only funds to raise 10,000. John Robinson, who claimed to be a brigadier in the U. S. army, came about the same time with Anaya and promised to bring 10,000 men. He obtained $1,000 and was authorized to capture Pensacola in Florida, but remained at Tehuacan. Herrera was accompanied by deputy Zárate as secretary, Father Ponz, late provincial of Santo Domingo de Puebla, as chaplain, and a son of Morelos, young Almonte. He received $15,000 and authority to collect all he could en route. Later remittances followed. With him went Peredo and an American named Elias, with commission to fit out a privateer...Captured vessels and arms to be delivered to the congress together with half the cargo and other booty. Nothing came of it, nor of the $8,000 given them. *Morelos, Declaracion*, 43-4; *Mendibil, Resumen Hist.*, 491-2. The appeal to Hayti failed and England held aloof. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 609; *Quart. Rev.*, xvii. 548-53; *Mayer MSS.*, pt xxvii. 7-14.

[41] Always on condition of repaying the sum taken. Further, the concession of cruzada bulls, exemption from fast, restoration of Jesuits, and formation of sees, colleges, and benevolent institutions. Cruzada bulls had at one time been suppressed by Rayon as a royalist resource. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vi. 482-8. For details concerning attitude between church and insur-

ing save to arrange with pirates for delivery of arms, and even this brought hardly any results, owing to royalist precautions and neglect to provide funds.[42]

gents, see *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 63–5, 264–74, 480–1, 539–639, passim; *Araujo y San Roman, Impug.*, 59–66; *Rivero, Mex. 1842*, 151; *Pap. Var.*, lxvi. pt v.

[42] Herrera came back at the close of 1816, accepted pardon from the royalists, and furnished in return compromising revelations. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 391–3.

CHAPTER XXV.

DEATH OF MORELOS.

1815.

THE REVOLUTIONISTS ON CÓPORO HILL—POSITIONS OF THE INSURGENT FORCES—DETERMINATION OF CALLEJA—SIEGE OF CÓPORO—REPULSE OF ITURBIDE—ATTEMPTED SURPRISE OF JILOTEPEC—RAMON RAYON IS SHORN OF HIS TRIUMPH—CLAVERINO'S MOVEMENT SOUTHWARD—ITURBIDE CHASES THE CONGRESS—INSUBORDINATION OF DOCTOR COS—HE IS ARRESTED AND CONDEMNED TO DEATH, BUT IS DISCHARGED—DEATH OF DOCTOR COS—HIS CHARACTER—THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT MIGRATES—IT IS OVERTAKEN AT TEZMALACA—CAPTURE OF MORELOS—HIS TRIAL—DEGRADATION AND PENANCE—THE LAST AUTO-DE-FÉ—EXECUTION OF THE GREAT LEADER—REFLECTIONS ON HIS CHARACTER—TWO MEXICAN WRITERS ON THIS PERIOD.

AMID the series of reverses inflicted by Llano and Iturbide on the revolutionists of Michoacan, Ramon Rayon alone preserved a really spirited and successful attitude, adding fresh lustre to the well known name that reflects also upon his compatriots. He had selected a retreat of great natural strength on Cóporo hill, near Yanzapeo,[1] accessible on only one side, and this was protected by an imposing line of three batteries with four bastions and thirty-four guns. A wide moat, with a stockade in front of it, formed additional impediments, while within was an abundance of stores, with water from the brook at the foot of the hill.

With the confidence inspired by this position, and the late brilliant achievements of Ramon, a number of leaders had gathered round his standard, under

[1] North of Zitácuaro.

which he led them from one success to another. So conspicuous and dangerous an enemy, on the line between Valladolid and the capital, could not be quietly tolerated by the royalists, and Llano resolved to reduce the stronghold. An effort in this direction, in November 1814, had been frustrated by Ramon in so ingenious and able a manner as to gain him great applause.[2] This served only to rouse the determination of Calleja. He ordered a fresh attack with forces swelled to three thousand by troops from Valladolid and Guanajuato, the latter under command of Iturbide as second to Llano. The insurgents numbered about six hundred



MOUNT CÓPORO.

and fifty men, only partly armed, fully a third relying for weapons on stones and boulders. In the vicinity roamed also several insurgent leaders, prepared to harass the supply trains, while Torres and others had come from the adjoining provinces to fall upon the weakened royalist garrisons around.[3] Their move-

[2] This success referred to by Bustamante as the battle of Los Mogotes, *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 119–21, took place on November 10th, near Tuxpan. Ramon first disabled Llano's cavalry by scattering poisoned forage, and then lured his men into ambush, killing over 200 during the main action, with a loss to himself of 28 out of 800 men, Llano bringing 2,000. More leaders now offered to join Ramon. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 773. Llano admits only 8 deaths, and places the insurgent forces at 1,500, and their losses at over 150. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814, v. 1277–80.

[3] Acámbaro was attacked Feb. 4th by 800 men under Torres, Obregon,

ments were directed to some extent by Ignacio Rayon, who had arrived here after his flight from Zacatlan, and assumed the command.

The siege began on January 28th, and continued for more than a month without the least progress being made. A battery had been advanced to within short range of the fort, but effected little; and even the stockade before the moat resisted all efforts to destroy it. A stronger foe began however to work within the intrenchments in the form of sickness and prospective famine; yet the defenders held out manfully, cheered by more than one fortunate sally. Even the sanguine Iturbide now regarded the task as hopeless, and believed it more advantageous to maintain a close investment with a thousand men, while the rest scoured the surrounding districts for much needed supplies, and cleared them of troublesome guerrillas; yet for the sake of royalist reputation he was ready to head an assault on the fort, by the only accessible approach. The immense sacrifice of lives which the attempt would involve held Llano back, but finally he yielded, insisting however that the attack should be directed mainly along a steep path on the left, leading to the brook, against which Iturbide protested, although he accepted the hazardous leadership.

Iturbide selected 500 infantry and 200 horsemen, the latter intended mainly to cut off retreat or remedy any unfortunate break, and moved against the fort before day-break on March 4th, ordering a feint and cannonade to be directed at the proper moment against the front to distract attention. Shielded by the darkness a column under Filisola approached in single file by the brook path, and arrived within a few paces of the gate without being observed. All was still on this side. The besieged were evidently un-

Saucedo, and others, but was repulsed by Commandant Barrachina with a loss to one section alone of 45, the royalists having 22 killed. His report is in *Id.*, 1815, vi. 219–22.

suspicious, and the fort could now be carried by surprise. "Malediction on it," exclaimed Filisola, just as he was about to direct the rush against the parapet. A favorite hound of his had broken loose to follow him, and came now bounding forward with a joyous bark of recognition. The insurgents were warned just in time to meet the assault. A hot fire was then opened by the revolutionists, from which the exposed Spaniards suffered severely while vainly trying to scale the walls.[4] Iturbide saw that they would be slaughtered, and honor being satisfied he sounded the recall, "with the fortunate result of saving four fifths of the men," as he writes.

A council of war agreed only too readily with Llano that the siege would be a mere sacrifice of life, and two days later the royalists withdrew from what Iturbide calls the scene of his first repulse, amidst the undisguised joy of the garrison and the settlers of the district. Calleja did not conceal his displeasure, condemning the operations as badly planned, and the retreat as premature; yet he consented to Llano's suggestion of leaving Aguirre with about 600 to ravage the neighborhood and cut off supplies while watching the garrison. Llano made Maravatío his headquarters, and Concha was stationed at Ixtlahuaca to assist in operations, and in keeping open communications with Valladolid.[5]

[4] It would seem that the troops had brought no scaling ladders, to judge by the quoted observations of Calleja, in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 139.

[5] Llano had pleaded lack of supplies as an excuse, and insisted that of infantry alone 3,000 were needed for the siege. Calleja maintained that the batteries should have been better employed for opening a breach or covering attacks, and that the garrison could have been starved out. Bustamante reproduces the text of these letters, together with Llano's boastful order for retreat, etc. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 137–42, 122 et seq. 'Hombre estúpido y calmado,' is what he calls Llano. He places the loss of Iturbide alone at over 400, which is of course exaggerated. Llano admits only 27 killed, and 60 wounded. Reports in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 211–14, 335–42, 353–71. Céspedes, later republican president, distinguished himself here. The dog story was told by Filisola to Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 270. Bustamante speaks of a 'mute dog' among the insurgents as giving warning. Torrente alludes to brilliant deeds to compensate for a failure which cost over 100 royalist lives. *Hist. Rev.*, ii. 188–9. See also *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 169–92.

Encouraged by the success of his former raid into Querétaro, the exultant Ramon Rayon proposed to surprise Jilotepec, the headquarters of Ordoñez' military section controlling the northern highway. Although inferior in strength, the latter was better protected than had been expected, and managed by a well calculated flank movement to overwhelm the left wing of the advancing forces. The disorder spread to the centre and right, and seemingly sure victory was turned into a disastrous rout, with the capture of over 100 fugitives, who were as usual executed, at the brink of one immense grave.[6] And so were lost at one blow the fruits of Ramon's brave defence. The fame of Cóporo diminished, and the convoy routes to Querétaro and Valladolid were quickly cleared of several imposing bands, including that of Mariscal Cañas, who was overtaken and killed.[7]

In Michoacan Aguirre's operations round Cóporo were supplemented by several others in the interior, notably under Claverino, who with nearly 500 men swept resistlessly southward into the Tiripitio region.[8] More important were the movements of Iturbide, who, ever intent on great deeds, undertook to surprise the insurgent congress, and this without imparting his plans to Llano, to whose field it pertained.[9] The preparations were made with all secrecy, and by forced marches Iturbide covered in four days the distance from Irapuato to Cínciro, not far from Ario, where the deputies then held forth in comparative confidence. He had proposed to fall upon the town before dawn

[6] This occurred on May 12th. Ramon narrowly escaped. Ordoñez places the insurgent force at 1,200 and the loss at 160 killed and 121 prisoners. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 522–4, copied in *Torrente*, while Bustamante reduces the force to 300 and the loss to 72 killed and 123 prisoners. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 422–4. Ordoñez' total force did not exceed 300.

[7] The leader Gutierrez fell in June, near Nopala, and Concha in September destroyed the stronghold on Huatepec near Chapa de Mota, dispersing Vargas' followers. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 582–3, 655, 1007–9, 1168–9. The insurgent Enseña stands forward to retrieve some of the disasters in this region and to commend himself for exceptional leniency.

[8] The tour occupied six weeks in May and June, and included Uruapan and Pátzcuaro on the return. Hardly any resistance was met. *Id.*, 761–71.

[9] Llano was furious, but Calleja had given his consent.

on May 5th, but certain mishaps delayed him for one day. This saved the assembly; for warning came just as the session began, whereupon the startled members rose in tumultuous flight. Deeply mortified at the failure of his project, Iturbide allowed his resentment free play, leaving a bloody track to mark the return route by way of Pátzcuaro,[10] and destroying the valuable though neglected stronghold of Chimilpa.[11]

The three fugitive insurgent powers reunited at Uruapan, save Morelos, who had gone to the borders of Tecpan to assist the struggling guerillas,[12] and Cos, who flattered by the appeal of several old followers cast aside his legislative duties to place himself at their head in the field, selecting for his headquarters the fortress of Zacapo, south of Puruandiro. This change was due to more than a military whim; for when the congress remonstrated against this infringement of the constitution, his choleric nature took fire, and he circulated a manifesto declaring that body arbitrary and illegal. The members had not been elected by popular vote and were exceeding their usurped faculty in controlling executive and judicial powers, and in authorizing abuses against the church, revealing besides a traitorous disposition.[13] Such charges could not be left unchallenged, and Morelos was instructed to arrest the rebellious member. Doctor Cos prepared to resist, but his own men delivered him up at the command of the generalissimo, and the congress

[10] Among those who succumbed before his anger was Commandant Abarca, of Pátzcuaro, a worthy citizen who had accepted the position from Cos under compulsion, as related from original sources by Alaman. *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 281. Cos and others took terrible vengeance for this act. Diary of Iturbide's march in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 612–16. Bustamante reproduces a part in *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 151–5.

[11] Seven leagues from Uruapan. It covered a fertile spot three leagues in length surrounded by steep ravines and approachable only on one side. Doctor San Martin discovered the place and added stockades and other fortifications, but it had not been appreciated.

[12] With him went as prisoner a priest named Muñoz, who soon escaped to reveal the misery of this march, during which several men died of hunger. His report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 815–20.

[13] The document is reproduced in *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, ix. 899–906, from the *Gazeta* of Oct. 19, 1815.

passed the death sentence. This raised a wide remonstrance, and the penalty was at the last moment changed to imprisonment in the dreaded hill dungeons of Atijo. Cos remained obstinate throughout, the effort to intimidate him provoking merely the observation, "A flea-bite would pain me more than the transition from life to death." A counter-revolution soon gave him liberty; but the decline of his influence, of which he had been so sadly convinced, induced him to accept the viceregal pardon, though with manifest bad grace. He retired to Pátzcuaro to resume the ministry, and died there in 1819, deeply regretted by his parishioners.[14]

He was undoubtedly a worthy patriot, who had served the cause with credit in the field and in the council hall. His talents by right should rather have been devoted to the administration of affairs; and had he possessed the command of his temper he could have rendered far greater benefits to the cause. As it was, he destroyed with one hand much good performed with the other.

Since the disaster before Valladolid, which opened to the royalists the gate southward, the centre of the campaign had shifted to Puebla and Vera Cruz. This in itself was a sufficient incentive for the national assembly to transfer its sessions to that region. Another was the need of a strong effort to restore harmony there among the quarrelling leaders; and this could not be effected from a distance, as already proved. Hill-girded Tehuacan appeared a place where the congress might find a more stable abode, and recover the dignity and influence now rapidly deserting it as

[14] He had made it a condition that no questions should be put regarding his past conduct, and that he should not be sent back to his former parish. He feared the persecution of Bishop Cabañas of Guadalajara, but this prelate joined with others to befriend him. Throat disease was his malady. Bustamanto adds that impatience with a servant caused the doctor to expose himself while on the sick-bed, with fatal result. This writer claims that he often remonstrated with Cos, whom he really loved, and predicted a tragic fate. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 214–15.

a fugitive body, flitting about in a remote part of the country, among petty haciendas, with scanty means and a ragged escort. It was decided therefore to leave a neighborhood which was becoming so unprofitable, and which was overrun by pursuers; yet a council was formed of the leading chiefs, including Muñiz and Ayala, to represent the migrating authority and keep the scattered bands in accord.[15]

It was not so easy however to depart with a large body, while the royalists were scouring the provinces in all directions, ready to perform such marches as did Iturbide when within four days he came down in large force upon the devoted Ario from his distant headquarters in Guanajuato. To penetrate through the province of Mexico or northward seemed hopeless. The only way was to pass through Tecpan and the Mizteca, with the aid of the bands there scattered. As Morelos possessed the most influence in this region, and had the best knowledge of it, the members were only two glad to entrust the undertaking to him, and to this end he was specially empowered to assume direct command. Requests were sent to Nicolás Bravo, and other leaders along the Zacatula, who brought reënforcements to Huetamo, swelling the escort to about a thousand men,[16] half of whom had fire-arms. The orders to Teran, Guerrero, and Sesma to assist were disregarded.

Morelos sought to confuse the royalists by a series of feints and false rumors; and on November 2d, he brought to Tenango his party, including less than half a dozen members of the congress—the rest having either leave of absence, or instructions to join later—three judges, the secretaries, two members of the executive, and Antonio Cumplido, the successor of

[15] Rojas, Pagola, and Carbajal were the other members. *Morelos, Declaracion*, 31.

[16] *Morelos, Declaracion*, 32. Bustamante intimates a similar number, yet concludes by saying '500 soldiers,' assuming the rest to be rabble probably. *Cuadro*, iii. 217.

Cos.[17] At this point they forded the river and arrived on the following day at Tezmalaca, six leagues from Tenango. Elated with their success so far in avoiding the enemy, and relying on the river barrier behind them, they resolved to rest here for a day,[18] dreaming of safety beyond the mountains. A rude awakening was to follow.

Calleja had been duly notified of the migration, and to some extent of the direction taken,[19] although the measures adopted by Morelos had baffled him with regard to the exact route. This uncertainty induced him to make greater efforts. Commanders were sent out to hunt the trail from all the garrison posts west and south of the capital, Claverino having besides orders to pursue with 500 men as far as the banks of the Zacatula, and Aguirre to advance within easy reach of Concha, who also hastened toward the Zacatula with 600 men, while Villasana of Teloloapan scoured his section, and Armijo moved onward to Tixtla. It so happened that after a month of tiresome marches, following now one rumor, now another, Concha stumbled, with the aid of Villasana, upon Tuliman, and there obtained positive news which sent him in hot haste toward Tezmalaca, guided also by the still smoking ruins of

[17] Liceaga had gone for three months to the Bajío; deputies Argandar, Isasaga, and Villaseñor remained awhile in Michoacan; Sanchez and Arias were to take another route. Verdusco's term having expired he had withdrawn to his curacy at Tusantla; and several members were absent on commissions. Among those present were Alas, Sesma y Gonzalez, Sotero, Castañeda, and Ruiz de Castañeda, judges Ponce, Martinez, and Castro, and secretaries Bermejo, Calvo, Arriaga, and Benitez, the last two for the government. They had left Uruapan Sept. 29th, carrying goodly supplies, archives, some $20,000 intended for the U. S. to buy arms; and a quantity of personal effects. Each supreme member received $600, Morelos alone declining. The sources for these and following details are based mainly on the declarations at Morelos' trial, under *Declaracion*, and other titles; *Morelos Causa*, with documents bearing on his trial; reports of royalist commanders, especially Concha, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, for Nov. and Dec. of this year; the diaries and statements of Cumplido, Arechederreta, Concha's chaplain Salazar, Morales, and others, reproduced or used in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 215 et seq.; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 249 et seq.; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 304 et seq.; and especially in the voluminous collection of *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v.-vi., with briefer allusions in *Liceaga, Torrente, Ward*, etc.

[18] This was due also to a rain shower during the night, which made progress less convenient.

[19] Rosains and certain priests appear to have contributed information.

Tenango, which had proved disobedient to Morelos. He arrived there on the morning of the 5th of November, just in time to perceive the rear of the revolutionary party disappearing beyond the near ridge.

The consternation of the latter may be imagined, and but for Morelos' firm attitude a disorderly flight would have ensued. He promptly sent in advance the deputies and the non-fighting men with part of the baggage and a small escort, and remained with the rest to protect their march by detaining the pursuers. As Concha approached he gradually fell back, but found it necessary after a while to take a stand; which he did in three divisions, the right and left under Lobato and Bravo respectively, he himself occupying the centre with his two solitary field pieces. Concha then gave orders to charge. Bravo received the first shock, but held his ground well.[20] Not so the right wing. At the first onset of the royalists, Paez and his command took to their heels, demoralizing the whole of Lobato's section. After a few blows it broke in flight, carrying disorder into the centre and left, and with a fresh effort from Concha's column the entire line followed; the royalists after them slashing and cleaving.[21]

Seeing that all was lost, Morelos called out to Bravo, "Go, protect the congress; it matters not if I perish." After vainly seeking to keep his men together, he bade the remnant near him escape as best they could, he himself with a single attendant striking out for a steep hill. He dismounted at the base of it to remove his spurs for climbing afoot. At this moment a squad of pursuers came up, headed by Lieutenant Carranco, who had once served under his standard. "Surrender!" came from behind the levelled carbines. Resistance was useless. Turning to

[20] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 1219–21.

[21] Lobato excused himself on this ground, and Bustamante confirms it by stating that Paez reached Tehuacan with his own baggage in good condition. He was a royalist deserter with a certain reputation for fleetness. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 219.

the lieutenant, Morelos removed the cigar he had all the while been smoking, and said in a tone of indifference, "Señor Carranco, it seems we know one another."[22]

He was conducted back to camp, and as the intelligence spread before them that the great leader had been captured, vivas and salvos rose in every direction, accompanied by yet more tumultuous demonstrations of joy. Concha was so delighted that he omitted further pursuit, to the saving of not a few distinguished lives, and gave his soldiers free access to the captured baggage train.[23] Mexico also went into ecstasies, and the viceroy distributed rewards and promotions with liberal hands.[24] The decline of Morelos' influence was little understood or considered among the royalists. To them his name towered in all the magnitude of the once ruler of the south and creator of the congress, whose victories stood unecliped by those of any rival chief.

On the way to Mexico the prisoner passed through Tenango, now in ashes, to become there as elsewhere the object of the curious who lined the thoroughfares and crowded the approaches. The attentions accorded him, and the varied demonstrations of the curious, seemed at first to flatter his vanity, but soon they became annoying. Among others Colonel Villasana pressed him with needless questions, asking after an impatient reply what he would have done with him and Concha if the capture had been reversed. "I

[22] Bustamante adds that he gave him one of his watches in return for spar[illegible].

[23] [illegible] bars of silver which were reserved for the government. The insurgents lost [illegible] less than [illegible] men, says Concha, including [illegible] Ga[illegible] [illegible] Nov. [illegible] with [illegible] 300 men. [illegible] gave the first [illegible] cruel [illegible]

[24] [illegible] and all the officers of [illegible] and Villasana's [illegible] one grade, the men receiving a month's pay. Carranco [illegible] Villasana managed to [illegible] in the [illegible] as to be regarded as the hero [illegible] as it was he [illegible] promotion. Morelos, Causa, 37.

would have given you two hours for confession and then have shot you!" was the curt answer of the cura as he turned his back upon them. To a woman, however, who grossly insulted him, he said mildly, "Have you naught to do in your house?"[25]

He was confined in the inquisition building until the viceroy arranged with the ecclesiastical authorities for his surrender to the military courts. Meanwhile two judges from both jurisdictions proceeded to try him as a rebel and a traitor, mainly on the charges that he had ignored the king, promoted revolution, disregarded episcopal decrees, cruelly ravaged the country, and executed loyal subjects. Morelos replied that no king existed in Spain during the earlier period of the war; his subsequent restoration was either doubted or ascribed to a Napoleonic compact prejudicial to Spain. Episcopal decrees were inapplicable against an independent people, unless sanctioned by the Vatican. Ravages were the inevitable consequences of war, and executions of royalists were reprisals authorized by circumstances and by insurgent powers. The defence of the counsel covered the same ground, except in assuming the reasons to have been based on erroneous judgment. Morelos had warred rather against the córtes; and the king having dissolved this body as illegal, and annulled all acts passed during his absence, the accused stood absolved, if not justified.

The church now took the prisoner in hand. Intent above all upon branding the revolution, the inquisition condemned him, its reputed leader, as a heretic for having profaned the sacraments, neglected religious duties, ignored the ecclesiastical authority, and led an immoral life, the latter fault being intensified by his sending an ill-begotten son to a protestant country to be educated. In partial expiation he was arrayed

[25] His 27 fellow prisoners were shot at Tenango, all but the priest Morales, who like himself was shackled during the journey. On approaching Mexico it was found prudent to avoid the throng by taking him in by coach, before dawn, on November 22d.

in penitential robe in which to adjure his errors and perform certain religious exercises, before a vast assembly. During the attendant ceremony of reconciliation the culprit knelt to the recitation of the miserere, and was purified by the infliction of blows gently applied. The torture chamber and the stake had passed out of date, and the inquisition itself, now only a semblance of the former dread reality, soon disappeared. The auto-de-fé of Morelos was its last imposing spectacle. Of greater significance was the act of degradation from clerical office already decided upon by the church authorities. This was solemnly performed by the bishop of Oajaca, who burst into tears during the ceremony, and roused the first and only visible emotion in the otherwise passive prisoner.

Stripped of the sacerdotal character and privileges, Morelos was surrendered to the military authorities and removed to the citadel under increased guard and with shackles, from which he had been free while in charge of the ecclesiastical officers. Greater strictness was also enjoined to prevent the use of poison, although later rumor attributed it to fears that he might escape. The inquisition jailer is said to have been so moved by his fame and elevation of character, as well as by sympathy with his priestly office, that he offered to let him escape, but Morelos declined, saying: "God forbid that I should imperil you and your innocent family to prolong my own life."[26]

Sentence had been passed, involving confiscation of property and capital punishment, with the impalement of the head and right hand at Mexico and Oajaca respectively; but it was deferred in the hope of inducing timid insurgents to submit,[27] and of drawing from

[26] Bustamante adds that this jailer, by name Martinez, alias Pampillon, frequently neglected his charge through drunkenness. He could hardly have effected release, with the extra guard all around, and he probably never offered to do so.

[27] Calleja might no doubt have stopped the execution, but he feared the Spaniards, says Bustamante. 'Quieres que mañana amanezca preso como mi antecesor Iturrigaray?' was his observation to the petition of his wife. *Cuad.*

Morelos valuable information, on the strength of the offer by his counsel to make revelations in exchange for his life. If such an offer was ever made or authorized by him it is the only weakness that reflects upon his character, for unlike many other leaders he did not seek to relieve himself of blame at the expense of others, nor did he implicate his adherents, although he might be considered somewhat indiscreet in making the declaration on insurgent forces and operations which was drawn from him.[23]

Hist., iii. 231. The insurgent congress sent in a remonstrance addressed to 'General' Calleja, offering to stop useless bloodshed if he would be lenient; otherwise let him and all Spaniards tremble. *Id.*, 221–3. Bustamante drafted it, but had to copy the text from *Beautés de l'Hist. Mex.* It may be consulted in the English. *Revol. Span. Amer.*, 339–42.

[23] By Concha, Nov. 28th to Dec. 1st. It forms one of the most valuable contributions to the history of this period. There is still a doubt as to what part of the suggestions for crushing the insurgents is really his, for the royalists did not scruple to invent declarations in order to tarnish the fame of their opponents. Hence the statement is also doubtful that Morelos had proposed to abandon the revolution as hopeless, and after leaving the congress at Tehuacan to depart for abroad, preferably to Spain, and there ask pardon of the king. He is also said to have offered to persuade insurgent leaders to stay the war; but the very fact that an offer so promising was not accepted indicates that it was not seriously made; yet Alaman is inclined to credit the story. A retraction issued over his name is not in his style.

The following additional details of the trial may prove interesting: Oidor Bataller and the ecclesiastic, Doctor Alatorre, provisor of the archbishopric, were the joint judges, who took up the case on Nov. 22d. The latter being requested by Morelos to choose an advocate for him, selected José María Quiles, a youth still studying at the seminary. The defence is brief, and while admitting the errors of the accused attributes them to wrong information and false judgment, and offers to condone for them by revelations. Jealous of the privileges and sacredness of their profession, rather than in sympathy with Morelos, the archbishop, two other bishops, and several other dignitaries implored the viceroy on the 24th to spare the life of the prisoner, 'ni le aflixa con efusion de sangre.' *Causa*, 47. This sentence reveals their real motive. The lower clergy appeared no less eager, to judge from the placards nailed to the cathedral door, threatening with divine vengeance those who should profane the church by taking priestly blood. The result was the arrangement between the viceroy and archbishop for expelling Morelos from the priesthood. The sentence in accordance was passed by a council including the very members who had signed the petition. The inquisition took four days to deal with the prisoner, and on the 27th was performed his penance, before the two inquisitors, Flores and Monteagudo, and a distinguished assembly of several hundred persons. The charges by this tribunal, 23 in number, included disregard for the decrees of bishops and of the holy office, manifested by his continuing to confess and receive the communion after being excommunicated; contempt for papal bulls and indulgences; desecration of cemeteries and temples; unauthorized appointments to ecclesiastical offices; endorsement of heretical dogmas by Voltaire and others; immorality, etc. Morelos answered that the excommunication had been based on false charges and was consequently invalid; the war had interfered with the due observance of bulls and religious observances; the people needed spiritual

On December 20th the viceroy decreed his execution, which out of respect for the church should take place beyond the capital, and without dismemberment.[29] Early in the morning of the 22d he was taken in a coach to San Cristóbal Ecatepec, a village north of the lake, with a palace then converted into a fortress, and famed as the spot where outgoing viceroys used to tender welcome to their successors. The last prayer over, Morelos himself bandaged his eyes and was led forth with arms tied, slowly dragging the heavy shackles. "Kneel!" said the officer in charge. He complied, calm as ever, murmuring: "Lord, thou knowest if I have done well; if ill, I implore thy infinite mercy!" The next moment he fell, shot in the back;[30] passing through a traitor's death into the sphere of patriot-martyr and hero immortal.

His countrymen have placed him next to Hidalgo in the rank of patriot liberators, and justly so, for if the latter started the revolution, Morelos nobly carried on the great work, and more ably, it must be admitted. While possessing little book learning, he

care and he had been obliged to provide priests. He admitted irregularity of life, but not a scandalous one. His children were not regarded as his own. His son would not have been safe in New Spain, and he therefore sent him to the United States, but to a catholic college. In three additional charges his humble origin was adduced to support the charge of heresy; whereat Bustamante waxes indignant. Was not Christ the son of a carpenter? *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 229. In speaking of insurgent leaders Morelos gives the first rank for ability to Teran and Ramon Rayon; Bravo had been successful, and Osorno deserved prominence for his influence. See also *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 161–4.

[29] For fear of public commotion, says Bustamante.

[30] At 3 P. M. on Dec. 22d. A second volley was required to produce death. He was buried by the curate of the village an hour later. Reports of Concha and curate, and orders for execution, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 1394–8; and *Noticioso Gen.*, Jan. 5, 1816, followed by the retraction attributed to him. Bustamante speaks of his coolness; how he enjoyed a meal with his usual marked appetite, followed by a cigar and small talk with Concha, his captor and jailer, whom he finally embraces. He objected to be confessed by a friar, whereat Father Salazar, who attended him, took umbrage and came forth in denial of several of these points, in *Eco de la Justicia*, Oct. 24, 1843. Bustamante angrily retorts, referring as authority to his brother-in-law, Colonel Camacho, who received the information from his lieutenant. As he fell he gave a terrible shout, 'con que invocó la justicia del cielo.' *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 234. See more fully among my collection of Bustamante's autograph MSS. *Muerte de Morelos*, in *Diario, Exact.*, MS., pt v.; *Supl., Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 120–6.

had what far outweighed it—genius; which, when the summons came, transformed the benign cura into the greatest and most successful military leader among the insurgents, at least till Iturbide joined them. He revived an almost extinct cause, found for it a new cradle in the mountains of Mizteca, laying at its feet the whole rich south; he raised it to the greatest height attained ere came the end, crowning his work with the declaration of absolute independence from Spain, and the formation of a true republican government. His task was done. From that moment his star declined, to set within a year.

Even during this gloomy period, that restless energy reverberating in his thunder voice did not fail him; that determined valor and serenity sustained him to the last. Modest as he was astute and reserved, he yielded once only in any marked degree to ambition, in creating himself generalissimo, with a congress to do his bidding; yet it was a justifiable effort, for the cause needed then one firm controlling hand. He yielded also to a prevalent vice around him, in breaking his vows of continence; but in all beside he was most exemplary. During his period of decline he remained true to the self-assumed appellation, 'servant of the nation,' zealously serving a wilful and exacting congress which doomed to comparative inaction its most brilliant soldier.[31] He shines

[31] His praise has been spoken and sung time and again on the national feast day, and in articles and books. Among the earliest to offer his tribute is Bustamante, who devotes a special *Elogio Historico*, Mex. 1822, 1–32, ending with an ode. Pedraza, *Oracion*, 8, attests his calmness and intrepidity: *Pap. Var.*, clv. pt xi., xlii. pt iii. Lancaster Jones, *Oracion*, 5, sees a prodigy of genius. Arroniz, *Biog. Mex.*, 244–9, and Gallo, *Hombres Ilustres*, iv. 7–171, join in according him the second place among revolutionary heroes. See also, besides the main authorities already referred to, *Arrangoiz, Mej.*, i. 284–90; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 237–8; *Peña, Areng. Civic.*, 21–3; *Pap. Var.*, cxlix. pt vi.; *Carriedo, Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 25–6. The only property left by Morelos, a house at Valladolid, was confiscated. In later years the site was bought by his sister, to whom he and his brother, Nicolás, had assigned the maternal patrimony in 1808. He nevertheless managed to set aside something for his unrecognized family of marked Indian blood, of whom Juan Nepomuceno Almonte had already been sent to the United States to be educated, whence he returns to take a prominent place in the republic, rising in 1863–4 to be regent for the chosen emperor Maximilian, thus overthrowing in great measure the plans of his father. Bustamante alludes to him

the cause. Finally, at Tezmalaca, he lays down for it his life in willing sacrifice.

scruples about correctness of dates or facts, or completeness of narrative, and thus he can soon point triumphantly at seven bulky volumes for a period covered by prolix Bustamante in only half as many. At the close of the seventh, however, he suddenly awakes to find so large a surplus of neglected material by his side that he resolves with conscientious integrity to write a second work on the same period under the slightly changed title of *Historia Militar de Mexico en el S. jlo XIX*, which shall cover a portion at least of his many omissions. And so he starts anew, consoling his subscribers with the assurance that no nation possesses so complete a military history as he offers, for he has seen the *Commentaries* of Cæsar, and similar later books, and found them circumscribed and of little use to him. The present work is to comprise six great episodes, the first to cover the war of independence, the rest foreign invasions and civil war. As the first volume does not exhaust even the opening campaign of Hidalgo, there is a prospect of a whole series for the revolution alone. Meanwhile the former work is still pending, with its pretension to more connected narrative of political, social, as well as military matter. Castillo divides his pages into numbered paragraphs, a method which affords a certain relief to wearied and perplexed readers. It would have been still better had he consigned most of his text to foot-notes.

CHAPTER XXVI.

LAST CAMPAIGNS UNDER CALLEJA.

1815–1816.

EFFECT OF MORELOS' FALL—RESPECTIVE STRENGTH OF INSURGENTS AND ROYALISTS—INTRIGUES AND OVERTHROW OF ROSAINS—HE JOINS THE ENEMY—TERAN RISES IN FAME AND INFLUENCE—ARRIVAL OF THE CONGRESS AT TEHUACAN—IT IS FORCIBLY DISSOLVED—THE GOAZACOALCO EXPEDITION—FIRST NAVAL VICTORY FOR THE MEXICAN FLAG—THE MOUNTED RAIDERS OF APAM PLAINS—OSORNO'S LAST CAMPAIGN—THE CONVOY SERVICE IN VERA CRUZ—MIYARES' MEASURES FOR ITS PROTECTION—OPERATIONS UNDER VICTORIA AND HIS ASSOCIATES—BRAVO AND GUERRERO ON THE SOUTH COAST.

THE termination of Morelos' career, which to the royalists appeared so great a blow, was after all the fall of only one among the leaders. The late generalissimo might have accomplished much good had he been allowed to raise his voice in the south, where none stood so high as he, or had he been sent to promote harmony along the gulf coast; but in Michoacan, under the thumb of the congress, his influence counted little. The disaster at Tezmalaca was hardly felt beyond the Zacatula. Teran controlled, in the region of Tehuacan, about 2,000 well armed and disciplined men, and had a certain influence in Mizteca, where Sesma and Guerrero also commanded perhaps 1,000 mountaineers. He was, moreover, recognized by some chiefs in Vera Cruz province, although here Victoria claimed to be the leading spirit, with nearly 2,000 men, most of them mounted rancheros, intent mainly on spoils and adventure. Osorno had a similar and more united force of about 1,000, with a few scattered bands

northward in the Querétaro region, and in the lake ranges of Mexico. Torres led 800 in the Bajío of Guanajuato, with as many more to the north-eastward under Correa and others. Rosales still held out in Zacatecas with 300, and Vargas claimed to control 700 men along the southern border of Nueva Galicia, including Chapala Lake. In Michoacan were the Rayon brothers, Carbajal, and Yarza, with from 500 to 800 each, besides unenrolled adherents, extending from Cóporo along the range westward to Zacapo Lake, and connected southward in Tecpan with Ávila, Pablo Galeana, and Montesdeoca, who controlled from 500 to 700 men in all.[1] To these forces Morelos assigns from 7,000 to 8,000 muskets, 1,000 pairs of pistols, and 200 pieces of artillery, the greater part of the former either worn out or not generally used. The resources from farms under their control might be placed at a million pesos a year, to which has to be added tribute levied on convoys and traders, a little excise, and the yield from raiding expeditions. All this was insufficient to support more than a limited body; but the number could, when occasion demanded it, especially with the hope of booty, be raised to triple the figure representing the fire-arms.

The royalists, on the other hand, could boast of 30,000 men, half of them regular troops, and the remainder local militia. Of this force over 6,000 were distributed in Vera Cruz, over 8,000 in Puebla, 4,500 in and round the lake valley, 2,600 under Armijo in the south, nearly 4,000 in the army of the north under Iturbide, 1,600 in Querétaro and San Luis Potosí, besides 4,000 in the Provincias Internas de Oriente,

[1] Morelos, *Declaracion*, 42, adds that Carbajal, who commanded Muñiz' former force, could generally obtain more than 1,000 men for any expedition, and Yarza, stationed at Zacapo, fully 1,600; while Rayon could, with the aid of Vargas and Atilano García, muster 600 musketeers, which implied a similar number of men with inferior arms. Nicolás Bravo commanded along the South Sea, Galeana and the others being his lieutenants. Slightly varying details are given on page 31. A report from Valladolid with earlier data indicates that arms were readily manufactured by more than one leader, *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 241–5; but this is doubtful.

3,400 in Nueva Galicia, and a somewhat larger force in the Occidente,[2] to which must be added the armed citizens in towns, villages, and farms; so that the royalists could really command about 80,000 men, on the whole better armed and disciplined than the insurgent forces, and with increasing resources, as the latter were driven back, but also with proportionately heavier expenses than the more frugal and enduring patriots.[3] Calleja's plan henceforth was to isolate the insurgent leaders as much as possible from each other, and press steadily upon them, reducing one stronghold after another.[4]

The central point of war operations had changed to Puebla and Vera Cruz, as we have seen. The flight of Rayon gave a fresh impulse to Rosains' plans for asserting his authority over this region; and to this end he proposed first that Osorno should join him in surprising the forces of Marquez Donallo, who occupied the line between them. But Osorno was justly

[2] This distribution applied rather to a few months later, and rests on the official table given in *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 288, which shows 39,436 men, including nearly 2,000 who arrived in June 1815 under Miyares, and 8,000 stationed in the Provincias Internas and California, the latter province having 3,665 assigned to it. This figure belongs to the Occidente, yet the mistake casts a doubt also on other parts of the list, as Tabasco; the summing up is also wrong. Of the 40,000, 12,000 were in regiments from Spain. For regulations governing them and official lists, see *Fernando VII., Decretos*, 25-73, passim, 109-55, 337-49; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1836, 59-64; *Noticioso Gen.*, Aug.-Sept. 1815, passim; *Estado May. Gen. Ejer.*, 1-2; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 20; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 288-9; *Bonnycastle's Span.-Amer.*, 56.

[3] Great as was the pressure on the country, with increased excise and other taxes, while mining and many other industries had declined, yet the pay of civil and military employés was seldom delayed, the old high rates being generally maintained. It had not been thought prudent to impose taxes on Indians in lieu of the abolished tribute. The sale of tobacco, which yielded so large a revenue, was in the remote provinces granted to contractors. Forced contributions by commandants were forbidden, and surplus funds in one province were ordered sent direct to the troops and officials in an adjoining needy one. Decree in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 162-6; *Bonnycastle's Span.-Amer.*, 55-6; *Torrente, Rev.*, ii. 193-4.

[4] Of these were in Mizteca: Silacayoapan, Jonacatlan, Ostocingo, and Cerro del Alumbre; in Michoacan: Zacapo, Artijo, and Cóporo; in Nueva Galicia: Mescala Island; in Guanajuato: Cerro San Gregorio and Cerro del Sombrero; in Tehuacan District: Cerro Colorado, Tepeji, and Teotitlan; and in Vera Cruz: Monteblanco and Palmillas, besides a number of temporary strongholds. Robinson expresses some views respecting the value of the troops on both sides. *Mem. Rev.*, 182-3.

suspicious of the intrigues, and kept aloof. Meanwhile Donallo got wind of the project, and turned the tables by falling unexpectedly upon Rosains at Soltepec, near Huamantla, on January 22, 1815, and inflicting a crushing defeat.[5] The disaster carried rejoicing to the others, and Osorno, Arroyo, and Calzada not only declared their independence, but joined in picking up stragglers from the defeated army, and in tak-



OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

ing possession of several of Rosains' towns. Sesma abandoned him and retired to Mizteca, and a number of chiefs in Vera Cruz withdrew their allegiance,

[5] The royalists numbered about 1,000, and claimed that the insurgents lost 200 in killed on the battle-field alone, out of a force of 1,300. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 123-9, 99-100. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 300-2, and Rosains, *Rel. Hist.*, 13-14, belittle the affair; but Teran speaks more plainly. For Lobera's share in the victory, see *Barrera, Elogio Lobera*, 1-12.

choosing the successful Victoria for lieutenant-general, under the pretence of adhering to the congress.[6]

Rosains gave vent to his rage by sending an agent to ravage and reduce to ashes the town of San Andrés, simply because the otherwise well disposed population had been reduced by his rivals.[7] Undaunted as ever, he thereupon collected all the force he could muster against the leaders in Vera Cruz. His men by no means relished a campaign against brethren in arms, and their chief having been repulsed on the Jamapa, they nearly all abandoned him.[8] Teran, who had so far remained true, was now persuaded to arrest and remove him from command. This was effected August 20th, and after being tossed from one leader to another, it was resolved to send him in chains to the congress. On the way he escaped, accepted pardon from the viceroy, and repaid it with most injurious exposures of insurgent plans.[9] And so disappeared a man who owed his rise to the partiality of Morelos rather than to ability[10] as a leader, and who chose to sacrifice the cause of his country and the blood of his adherents to satisfy a selfish ambition and indulge a choleric temperament.

Calleja considered this a good opportunity to seize upon Tehuacan, the centre of Rosains' district. The

[6] Rosains' agents, Velasco and Joaquin Perez, were arrested. Foremost among the rebellious leaders were Corral, who had so warmly upheld Rosains, and Montiel, the cobbler of Orizaba, leader of one of the finest cavalry bands there.

[7] Details of the outrage in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 21–7. He also attempted to shoot the intendente Perez, and he escaping the guards suffered in his place.

[8] He rashly insisted on charging the intrenched camp of Corral and Montiel, at the close of July. By this time his disaffected force had dwindled from 700 to 200. Details in *Teran, Manifest.*, 13–22; *Orizava, Ocurrenc.*, 103–4.

[9] The text is reproduced among others by Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, ix. 843–53. For pardon and character, see *Noticioso Gen.*, Oct. 23, 1815; *Bustamante, Notic.*, 22–4. He claims in his *Rel. Hist.* to have aided the insurgents with information, although taking no active part in the war, and Victoria certainly rewarded him with a pension after 1823. He became in 1824 senator for Puebla, where he had been residing with his family all this time. In 1830 he conspired with Victoria's brother against General Bustamante and was shot at Puebla Sept. 27th. *Bustamante, Voz Patria*, v. no. 31, p. 3.

[10] For 'no sabe mandar ni obedecer,' says Teran, *Manifesto*, 31, who also intimates that he came on the battle-field merely to turn his back.

task was intrusted to Governor Álvarez of Oajaca, who on the way laid siege to Teotitlan. Teran came to the rescue and managed to surprise the royalists, inflicting so severe a chastisement that they retired whence they came.[11] So notable a success could not fail to give fame and influence to this rising officer, then little over twenty; and it certainly came opportunely to assure his position as successor of Rosains in Tehuacan and the adjoining district in Mizteca. His youthfulness was overbalanced by strong will and energy, and by a certain reserve, which, if repelling intimacy, served to increase his self-reliance and attract a wholesome confidence and respect.[12] Morelos pointed to him as the most promising of the leaders, partly from his knowledge of military science; and he justified the praise by placing the administration of his district on an excellent footing, and forming the best organized force among the insurgents, 800 strong, with which he began to plan movements destined to bring credit to himself as well as to the cause.

Such was his position when, on November 16th, the fugitive congress marched into Tehuacan with a dilapidated remnant of followers, escorted by Guerrero. Teran was by no means pleased, for he saw that this body expected not only a refuge, but obedience to its whims and sustenance for its respectable train of adherents. The latter feature appeared especially serious, owing to the limited extent of the district, and the neglect of other leaders to contribute for the maintenance of the assembly. Several arbitrary measures, and the injudicious election of deputies to fill

[11] This occurred on Oct. 12th. The place was defended by Teran's brother Joaquin, with 130 men. Teran brought 200 men, according to Bustamante, who places the royalists at 700. *Cuadro*, iii. 305–6. General Daoiz reduces the latter to 405, with one cannon. At the same time Sesma gained an advantage at Yolomecatl on the Mizteca border. Álvarez was a drunkard and a despot, says *Carriedo, Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 36. He was threatened with removal.

[12] Manuel de Mier y Teran had joined Rayon's forces in 1811, bringing the reputation from Mexico of a talented student. Later he fought under Matamoros, and after remaining in the south till 1814, vainly urging Rayon to defend Oajaca, he came to Puebla province, gaining here the rank of colonel.

vacancies,[13] served to increase his annoyance, which developed into alarm as the financial administration was taken from his control and intrusted to a hostile and improper person, and as he found Corral, Sesma, and other opponents seeking to undermine his influence with the troops, and creating discontent generally.[14]

Under the circumstances, he can hardly be blamed for taking steps to rid himself of a body which had long since sacrificed its influence by internal discord, impolitic conduct, and inefficient management, and was generally looked upon as a useless intruder. What rôle he really played is not clear, but he certainly countenanced the act of his leading officers, who placed him under arrest during the night of December 14th, while they secured the persons of the deputies, executive, and judges, together with Sesma and other supporters of the old régime.[15] On the following morning it was decided to dissolve the congress as not sanctioned by popular election, and create a provisional executive commission, composed of Teran, together with the existing executive members, Alas and Cumplido, till a similar formal body could be chosen by the departments of Vera Cruz, Puebla,

[13] Ignacio Alas had on the way been chosen associate of Cumplido, to fill the place of Morelos in the executive, and Ponce de Leon figured as chief justice, leaving only four deputies, President Potero Castañeda, Ruiz de Castañeda, Sesma the elder, and Gonzalez. Three suplentes were now chosen, the presbyter Gutierrez de Teran, Benito Rocha, former commandant at Oajaca, and Juan José de Corral, the late opponent of Teran on the Jamapa battle-field. Cárlos Bustamante and Nicolás Bravo were chosen supreme judges—truly a wise act, to withdraw in the latter an able and much needed officer from the field. In the beginning of Dec. the assembly withdrew for more undisturbed session to San Francisco hacienda, four leagues distant, after having decreed, against Teran's opinion, the expulsion of Carmelite friars from Tehuacan.

[14] Sesma uttered mysterious threats, Corral threatened to arraign Teran for his treatment of Rosains, and the troops escorting the congress began to quarrel with Teran's men. Sesma challenged Teran, and the latter was placed under arrest by the deputies, but the clamor of his soldiers obtained his release.

[15] Including Intendente Martinez and Lobato. Sesma might have been shot but for Teran's interference. So far the members of congress had been accorded all the pomp which they so dearly loved. Bustamante proposed a restoration of affairs, with the concession of the war office under Teran to direct campaigns; but this was considered impracticable.

and North Mexico, to act till a regularly elected congress might be installed.[16] Victoria and Osorno took no notice of the project, and so it was abandoned, nor did the dissolved assembly attempt to form anew. With it vanished the representative government started by Hidalgo's followers and reorganized by Morelos, leaving the insurgents adrift, at least for a while, and giving the royalists greater reason for treating them as rebels and bandits;[17] yet this applied rather to the east, for in the home of the original junta rose another to influence the destinies of the cause.

Rid of the burdensome assembly, and with forces swelled to nearly fifteen hundred men from its late escort and other sources, Teran felt himself strong enough to take the offensive against the royalists, and so break in upon the plans forming against him. He succeeded, in fact, in giving so effectual a check to a column under Barradas, which was advancing against Tepeji, that it had to abandon the expedition.[18] As a further measure, he sought to strengthen his posi-

[16] The new triumvirate was to be called convencion departamental, and its three members comisarios. They were to reside alternately in the three districts electing them. The plan was dated at Tehuacan Jan. 16, 1816. The district of Tehuacan elected in Feb. the cura Montezuma Cortés, but Victoria paid no attention to the project, nor did Osorno, although he had sent in his usual meaningless consent. The argument against the existing congress was its illegality, as self-elected, and its unwise elections and other acts. The deputies and other prisoners were released and departed, chiefly for Vera Cruz, where Victoria figured as passive sympathizer. Alas and Cumplido soon returned to Michoacan. About this time Liceaga set out to join the congress. Informed of what had happened, he turned back, but he was overtaken by royalists in Mexico Valley, and lost all his baggage, having a narrow escape with his life. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 191.

[17] For details concerning the affair, see the account of Bustamante, who participated. *Cuadro*, iii. 308–34. He is naturally somewhat offended with Teran, and prefers to let the report of a royalist spy and the documents issued on the occasion speak for themselves in quoted form. Mendíbil reproduces also the proclamations, *Res.*, 259–61, 404–11, one of them the effusion of a royalist intriguer. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 400-36. Royalist versions, in *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 198–200, 202–3, implicate Teran as main actor, 'á amenazar con la muerte á varios de sus compañeros.' Ward, *Mex.*, i. 212–14, and Robinson, *Mex. Rev.*, i. 72–3, 213–15, while not blaming Teran for his conduct, ascribe to the dissolution of the common bond the downfall of the revolution. Teran naturally maintains a garb of innocence. *Segunda Manifest.*, 26; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, ii. 74–116, 194–5.

[18] This triumph was gained at Rosario Dec. 27, 1815, with 500 men. Barradas admitted the loss of two officers and nine men; but not a defeat.

tion in Mixtoca by constructing another stronghold on Mount Santa Gertrudis, and sending reënforcements under command of his brother Juan, who from his retreat at Topojiodid good service in obstructing the highway to Oajaca and harassing the detachments coming round Izucar.[29]

Teran's forces were not only the best organized among the insurgents, but with the aid of brothers and loyal officers he wielded a more absolute control within his district than other leaders in theirs, and could therefore claim at this time to be the most prominent among them. His position, however, was becoming more exposed, for the royalists had lately gained several successes to the north and west, and were ready to combine against him from different quarters. Teran saw the gathering storm, and in preparing to face it he found that more arms and ammunition were above all necessary,[30] for his prestige would bring all the recruits he wanted. At this juncture appeared an American, named William Davis Robinson, lately dealing with Caracas, who offered to provide necessary funds. It was agreed that the delivery, including four thousand muskets, should take place at Goazacoalco River, which was unoccupied by royalists, and presented the only point accessible to Teran.[31] The route was long and difficult, obstructed by forests and marshes, and threatened by the rainy season just beginning; but necessity overruled all.

[29] Under him was placed Lieut-col Fiallo, a royalist deserter, who began to intrigue among the troops with a view to seduce them for Victoria, or even for royalists, it is said. The intrigue was attended by lack of discipline, which called the attention of the strict Teran. He arrested both his brother and Fiallo, and the guilt of the latter appearing, he was shot. Bustamante assisted in the case. [illegible] 347-7. [illegible] 49 et seq. Rosains, [illegible] 17, makes a severe charge of this act. La Madrid speaks highly of the bravery and discipline of Teran's troops. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 209.

[30] His supply from Puebla had been cut off, and the lead mines at Zapotitlan yielded him little.

[31] Robinson had landed at Boquilla de Piedras, but Victoria demanded an exorbitant price for transmitting the arms from there. The price of the muskets was $20 each. Guerrero was invited to join, but objected to entering a territory claimed by Victoria, whose district was supposed to extend to Yucatan.

He set out with 400 men[22] in the middle of July, by way of Tuxtepec, and after a toilsome march, reached, six weeks later, the southern tributary of the Papaloapan, which rises near Villa Alta. The delay had enabled the royalist troops to approach from Tlacotalpan and Oajaca, and the rivers being swollen by rain, it was thought imprudent to venture farther, to struggle with a threatening famine, and perhaps to be cut off by pursuers.[23] During the retreat the royalist column from Tlacotalpan was bravely repulsed, and Juan Teran came in time to check two Oajaca expeditions which had been organized with the intent of attacking his brother in the rear. The latter reached Tehuacan September 22d.[24]

Meanwhile the schooner *Patriot* had appeared off the Goazacoalco with the armament, as agreed, and managed to profit by the interval of hopeless waiting to capture an aggressive Spanish vessel,[25] thus achieving for the Mexican flag, which it boldly hoisted,

[22] Attended voluntarily by Wm Robinson, and also the doctor, John Robinson, who came with Arrayá from the United States. Juan Rodriguez commanded half the force, as Teran's second.

[23] Teran did cross the river in a small boat with a few men to Playa Vicente, a new entrepôt for trade between Oajaca and Vera Cruz, but was surprised and narrowly escaped capture. Most of his companions were either drowned or captured; among the latter, Wm Robinson. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 997–8. After 2 years' imprisonment at Ulúa, Robinson was sent to Cádiz, whence he escaped, although under parole, and wrote the history which will be noticed in a later chapter. The other Robinson returned from Tehuacan to the United States soon after the expedition arrived home.

[24] The march from Tuxtepec back having been accomplished in 9 days. The Tlacotalpan column under Topete is placed by Teran at 800 men, and its loss at 80 killed, 17 prisoners, 90 muskets, etc. Four days later, on Sept. 15th, Juan Teran dislodged Castro from Coscatlan with 300 men, and the latter in retreating took with him the corps under Lopez, intended to harass Teran's expedition. Castro, who appears to have had 160 horsemen, claims that he routed Teran! *Id.*, 1002–4. Topete retrieved himself by taking Ojitlan, with its garrison of 100 men under Miranda, left to cover Teran's retreat. Miranda was well treated, contrary to custom. Details concerning the expedition in *Teran, Segunda Manifest.*, 6 et seq.; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 365–79; *Robinson's Mex. Rev.*, i. pp. xxx–li. 216–31. He claims that Topete lost 120 killed during the first repulse. *Carriedo, Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 34–5.

[25] The cargo was in charge of Juan Galvan. Bustamante gives the vessel 3 guns, and calls the captured Numantina a corvette, taken after 'accion reñida.' It afterward put to flight another bergantine of 18 guns and 150 men. After waiting for 3 months the *Patriot* proceeded to Galveston, and gave part of the cargo to Mina. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 378–9. A statement of Victoria identifies this vessel with the *General Jackson*, despatched, like a preceding one, by A. L. Duncan from New Orleans. See Duncan's claims in *Miller, Reflexiones,*

the glory of the first naval victory during the revolution.

A surprise awaited Teran in the bid for alliance from the hitherto unapproachable Osorno, who had at last succumbed under the combined onslaught of royalists, and now sought aid to recover a part at least of his lost ground. His overthrow was greatly due to a persistent and almost exclusive use of cavalry with little or no discipline. This availed little even against light intrenchments, behind which royalist infantry could generally manage to retire; nor had his men shown any ability to resist a well sustained charge, or maintain one in turn. These horsemen of the plain were too independent to submit to discipline or follow irksome tactics. The latter were reduced to feints for drawing the enemy to open ground, where a quick though not determined charge might have full effect. Their chief ambition appears to have been a display of their fiery steeds; saddles inlaid with silver, and striking dresses with embroidery and a profusion of glittering ornaments;[26] and to satisfy this vanity they did not hesitate at exactions, and even robberies, which naturally produced great irritation against their party. Osorno was powerless, and had to humor them in order to retain a semblance of authority.

At Tortolitas, not far from the famous battle-field of Otumba, his forces in August 1814 and April 1815 gained two triumphs over royalists,[27] on the latter occasion by driving a number of loose horses upon the infantry and taking advantage of the disorder by a

1-8; *Pap. Var.*, lxxiii. pt xv. Rivera assumes that the Mexican flag hoisted occasionally by interested pirates and others was red, white, and yellow, the latter afterward replaced by green. *Hist. Jalapa*, i. 509.

[26] A royalist commander reports that in one of Osorno's columns defeated by him was a regiment of richly dressed men, with fine hats and broad white ribbons, all mounted on thrush-colored horses. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 1357. They were the poorest fighters. Bustamante incurred wide-spread indignation by his remonstrances against such laxity. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 255.

[27] On the former occasion over Herrera; in April 1815 over Barradas, the new commandant for Apam. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 375, 423-8; *Arrecederreta, Apuntes*, Aug. 28, 1814.

murderous charge. They thereupon spread over the lake valley to the neighborhood of the capital, plundering the towns, farms, and villas, and creating such alarm at Mexico that adjoining garrisons were called in to protect it and assist in constructing additional fortifications. Satisfied with this paltry result, they turned homeward to celebrate it, proclaiming Osorno lieutenant-general and allowing him to distribute honors and promotions, regardless of the congress, which they had, for that matter, formally ignored.[28] Barradas, commandant of Apam, retaliated soon after by a temporary occupation of Zacatlan;[29] but this had no effect in restraining insurgent raids on highways and border towns.

Encouraged by the withdrawal of Spanish troops for the pursuit of Morelos, Osorno and his lieutenants ventured to attack the neighborhood of Puebla, and to make a futile attempt to capture Apam. The result was to bring back the royalists in so strong force that his columns were severely repulsed in two different engagements.[30] Concha, who had gained renown as the captor of Morelos, was now given the command on the Apam plains, and began to press closely round Osorno, assisted by Donallo on the line between Puebla and Perote, and by the garrisons at Zacapoaxtla, Tulancingo, and the district westward. One town after another was taken and held; one party or detachment after another was surprised and slaughtered, with relentless execution of all captives, and distilleries and other industries were closed in order to stay the flow of resources. Osorno retaliated with

[28] By a council at Chinahuapan. Among other appointments was an intendente for Tlascala. *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 152–6.

[29] Barradas was soon after removed for arbitrary conduct and replaced by Ayala, and he falling ill Monduy took charge till Concha came. A fray on Sept. 9th, near Teotihuacan, remained undecided. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 257–60.

[30] At Ocotepec and Tortolitas, Dec. 5th and 6th. Royalists place the insurgent forces as high as 2,000, with a loss of 150 for each action. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 1355–67. The attack which startled Puebla was made by Vicente Gomez and Colin, who destroyed the garrison of Cholula, over 100 strong.

sword and torch on all who fell off, only to irritate the terrified people against himself. Finally, from April 21 to 23, 1816, his combined forces under Inclan, Espinosa, Serrano, and others, 1,600 strong, were so effectually routed in a series of actions, beginning at Venta de Cruz, that they lost heart and crowds presented themselves to accept the pardon held out; sometimes to the number of 500 in a day, headed by Serrano and other leaders. Only too many turned at once to assist the royalists in the pursuit of their late comrades,[31] whom they stigmatized as rebels, while receiving for themselves the appellation 'Don' from the now obsequious royalists, and from the church blessings in lieu of late anathemas.

The districts of Tulancingo, Huauchinango, and Huasteca had followed the example of the others, after suffering severely at the hands of energetic royalist leaders like Piedras, Friar Villaverde, Güitian, and losing several prominent chiefs, notably Vicente Gomez and the last patriotic relatives of Villagran, Aguilar, the rival of Rincon in the Vera Cruz region, and the formidable Arroya.[32] Farther south, the districts round San Martin Tezmelucan, now in charge of Hevia, were by June almost wholly cleared of insurgents, Colin and Brigadier Angulo being among their most prominent leaders who perished. Deserted by most of his followers, and now even pursued by them, Osorno found it impossible to maintain himself any longer in his old stamping-ground, and attended by

[31] For details, campaign, and acceptance of pardon, see *Id.*, vii. 1816. Feb. to Aug. numbers, passim, especially April and May. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 248–64, 350–1; *Mendibil, Res.*, 238–41, 269–81, passim; *Noticioso Gen.*, 1816, March–July, passim; *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 200–4, 277–80, etc.; *Dicc. Univ.*, x. 529, 631.

[32] The last three were killed in quarrels among themselves, Arroya being assassinated by his lieutenant, Calzada, who wanted his command and his wife. Mariano Guerrero, the last noted chief in Huauchinango, caused the surrender, Aug. 12th, of the last effective stronghold there, the Cerro Verde, with 8 guns and 143 men. Capt. Luvian of Tututepec remained in control and granted pardon to 4,800 persons within a few weeks. The friar Villaverde was aided by troops from Rio Verde and Huichapan to recover Sierra Gorda and the regions along the Tula and Montezuma. Güitian had in Jan. taken Tlascalantongo, where Aguilar and his confederates held forth. For details, see the authorities in preceding note.

Inclan, Manilla, and some other adherents, in August he sought the mountain regions south-eastward, in order to place himself in communication with Tehuacan. Apam and the districts beyond thereupon rapidly recovered from the depression created by the long campaign.[33]

Osorno had still nearly 600 followers, and Teran believed that combined operations would serve to distract the royalists, permitting advantageous descents on the Vera Cruz highway and the pursuit of many other projects. Not choosing to burden his own district with a host of strangers, he persuaded the new ally to maintain himself near San Juan de los Llanos and wait for opportunities. One of these was to surprise in detail Concha and Moran, stationed in November at Huamantla and San Andrés, respectively, with 400 men each. On November 7, 1816, accordingly, Teran and Osorno approached San Andrés with a force of nearly 1,000, mainly cavalry; but Moran by a quick movement managed to secure the advantage of position, and repulsed the first column of horsemen so effectually that their disorderly flight created a panic among the rest and led to a general scamper.[34] This was followed by another discouraging repulse of Teran's forces by Samaniego, in the region of Acatlan;[35] and now the clouds grew darker still.

In Vera Cruz the operations of the insurgents centred more than ever on the roads to Mexico, by

[33] Concha was promoted to colonel of the San Luis Potosí dragoons, and Anastacio Bustamante to lieut-col. His pursuit of the fleeing Osorno is reported in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 885–7.

[34] The royalists claimed to have with 300 men defeated 1,040, killing from 80 to 100, and capturing over threescore. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 1093–4, 1133–40, 1169–70. Teran admits a total force of 800. *Segunda Manifest.*, 59. Vicente Gomez, known as the *capador*, for his unseemly mutilation of prisoners, and one of Osorno's best lieutenants, soon after accepted pardon and continued his campaigning as a royalist. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 389. One reason for Teran's confidence in his plan was a successful outmanœuvring of Donallo's forces two weeks previously. *Id.*, 385–6.

[35] On November 25th, Samaniego was on his way to Huajuapan with 260 men. Teran had 500, but he incautiously divided them. *Id.*, 389–91.

way of Jalapa and Orizaba, along which several convoys of great value had to pass every year, as Vera Cruz harbor was practically the only outlet for the wealth of New Spain. The nature of the roads, with rivers, marshes, and undulations, rendered it exceedingly difficult to guard the trains, so much so that an official report declared 15,000 men insufficient to protect, in transit, against 1,000, the convoy of 6,000 mules which in the spring of 1815 lay besieged at Jalapa, unable to cover the short distance to the port.[36] The hovering bands could always manage to cut off some part, enough to repay the risk. Tired of the delay, and of the attendant expenses for animals, servants, and guard, the traders continued to break the stringent rules against purchasing passes from insurgents, and thus provided the latter with a considerable revenue wherewith to sustain the war. The main convoy was finally brought to its destination in sections, the return cargoes reaching Mexico in June, eight months after its departure thence.[37]

The merchants of Cádiz joined loudly in the clamor at this inefficiency of the convoy service; and finding that the king entertained seriously the appeal of Calleja for reënforcements, they advanced sufficient money to hasten the departure of 2,000 out of the proposed 8,000 men.[38] This body arrived at Vera Cruz June 18, 1815, under command of Brigadier Miyares, a young, active, and really able man.[39] He submitted a new plan for the convoy traffic, which consisted in opening a military road from Vera Cruz to Perote, the latter as central entrepôt, with strong forts at intervals, especially at the difficult points. The viceroy approved, and conferred on him to this end the

[36] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 343.

[37] For details concerning the operations for bringing the convoy from Jalapa to Vera Cruz, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, vi., January to May, 1816.

[38] Part of the 10,500 men for Caracas were promised, and also a regiment from Habana, but none of these came.

[39] Son of the late captain-general of Caracas. The troops numbered somewhat over 1,700.

command of the district. The task was not easy, for it required a constant campaign of six months to keep the insurgents at bay while the forts were constructed. One of the most imposing of these was formed at Puente del Rey, half-way between Jalapa and the port, to protect the fine bridge across the Antigua.[40] December saw the plan carried out, so that trains could henceforth pass with comparative security.[41]

A futile attempt was made during the same period to occupy Misantla and Boquilla de Piedras, through which the insurgents introduced war material.[42]

The occupation of Spanish troops in the pursuit of Morelos, and in campaigns on the plateau, gave a respite which Victoria used to good advantage. Toward the end of 1816, however, the war was resumed with vigor. Donallo captured, November 7th, the fort of Monteblanco, from which the insurgents had been long dominating the Orizaba route,[43] and shortly after

[40] This is one of the finest public works in New Spain, 260 varas in length, 12 in breadth, and 18 in height, with 7 arches, besides one to serve for floods. The central one is 25 varas in diameter. It had occupied the builders from Feb. 1803 till Dec. 1811. Since the beginning of the war it had been one of the most bitterly contested points. Miyares occupied it finally on Dec. 8, 1815, Victoria's lieutenant having abandoned it during the night after a brave defence, and the royalists henceforth kept possession, with a fort and a battery on the respective banks, the former named Fernando and the other Concepcion. Eleven other bridges exist on the road to Perote. For operations from June till Dec. 1815, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, vi., during this period; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 197 et seq.; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 444–70. A history of the bridge is given in *Dicc. Univ.*, vi. 493–6.

[41] After improving the fortifications at Vera Cruz, Miyares retired in April 1816 to Spain, partly from disgust with the jealousy shown by the viceroy and other officials, and partly to recuperate from an injury to his chest inflicted during the campaign. This carried him off soon after. He had shown a marked leniency toward the captured insurgents. A train with 8 millions in treasure reached Vera Cruz in Feb., followed a few weeks later by one for passengers alone, in 75 coaches and on horseback.

[42] The task was intrusted to Llorente, and he captured Misantla on July 5th; but reënforcement being held back by the bad roads, he had to retire to Nautla with considerable loss. This success enabled Victoria in Oct. to receive a large supply of arms from Toledo, who had lately figured in Texas.

[43] The garrison numbered about 300, under Muzquiz and Mauri. After a brief siege with over 1,200 men, Donallo effected a breach in the walls which resulted in a capitulation with guaranties of life only. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 1101–4, 1141–50; *Orizabi, Ocurrencias*, 124–5. The later famous Santa Anna gained his captaincy by coöperating in the district northward. *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 27–8.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

This was merely a just and politic concession to an officer who had suddenly risen into fame by several unexpected advantages over the royalists,[47] which also brought followers to his banner. He was a man much like Galeana, under whom he had earned his first distinctions; not proficient in book-learning, but of quick apprehension, and possessed of a gentleness and magnetism that inspired love as well as confidence among his adherents; while his swarthy face, resonant voice, and flashing eye made him an object of profound respect among his enemies.[48] It was not long before he gained the supremacy in forces and influence, partly through the temporary departure for Tehuacan of Sesma, who there suffered in prestige and command. This influence he extended by fortunate expeditions as far down as Costa Chica,[49] and appeared in June 1815 at the head of nearly a thousand men, half of them well armed.

Two attempts to capture Acatlan and Tlapa failed through the arrival of strong reënforcements to those places,[50] but he held his ground well during the fol-

[47] He surprised the forces from Chilapa and Tlapa on two different occasions, besides obtaining other advantages. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 264 et seq. This author places the Chilapa force as high as 700 men. Rosains was preparing to attack Guerrero and force compliance, when he yielded.

[48] He was among the first to enlist under Morelos, rose to the rank of captain in 1811, and signalized himself as commandant at Izúcar by assisting materially in defeating Llano in Feb. 1812. His biography will be given when he rises to the presidency in the next volume.

[49] Where his lieutenant, Cármen, a negro, gathered both recruits and booty round Ometepec and beyond. Meanwhile, Guerrero had manufactured artillery and ammunition at his fort of Tlamajalcingo.

[50] Commandant Flon of Acatlan was relieved in July by Samaniego, stationed at Huajuapan, and this same officer brought succor to Tlapa. Guerrero was already gone, although he had on October 28th inflicted so severe a chastisement on Armijo as to compel him to fall back. This is partly admitted in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 872–80, 1347–50; also 402–6, 643–4, 840–2, 1251–2; 1816, vii. 51–9. Bustamante assumes that Armijo lost fully 100 men. His account of Guerrero's operations are indistinct and partial. It is one series of successes from the time he enters Mizteca. He repulses La Madrid at Chiquihuite and Xonacatlan; routs Combé; captures an Oajaca convoy from Samaniego, near Acatlan, and repulses the latter, when in conjunction with La Madrid he seeks to retaliate for his loss; his lieutenant Ochoa repulses Armijo near Culuac, and he inflicts further lessons on La Madrid. His relations with Teran are meanwhile not cordial, for he refuses to recognize the government substituted by him for the dissolved congress, and declines to join in the expedition to Goazacoalco, as infringing on Victoria's ground. See details in *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 264–77; *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 274, etc.; *No-*

CHAPTER XXVII.

VICEROY APODACA AND HIS VIGOROUS MEASURES.

1816–1817.

CAUSES WHICH SUSTAINED THE REVOLUTION—REVIEW OF CALLEJA'S RULE—CHARACTER OF THE NEW VICEROY APODACA—MEASURES TO GAIN ADHESION—COMBINED MOVEMENT AGAINST TEHUACAN—ITS SIEGE AND SURRENDER—DEPLORABLE WEAKNESS OF TERAN—VERA CRUZ IS SWEPT BY THE ROYALISTS—THEIR SUCCESSES IN MIZTECA—THE COUNCIL OF JAUJILLA—STRIFE IN MICHOACAN—TARNISHED REPUTATION OF RAMON RAYON—THE FIVE YEARS' SIEGE OF MESCALA IS ENDED—TREACHERY OF VARGAS—MOVEMENTS IN THE NORTH—THE DECLINING INSURRECTION CENTRES IN GUANAJUATO—APODACA'S SUCCESS.

IT may have struck the reader as peculiar that the excellent campaign plans of Calleja, of concentrated and energetic action against the revolutionary leaders in detail, which had succeeded so well during the first year of his rule, should not have met with more general success since then. This certainly failed not to be pointed out by the enemies of the viceroy, with hints more or less sinister about personal interest in maintaining the war. There appears little doubt that he could, with prompt and efficient avail of advantages gained by his well disciplined troops, have long before this overthrown leader after leader, as he had lately Osorno, and reduced the insurrection to a far smaller compass. One reason for the failure, or neglect, lay in the lack of subordination among his officers, whom we repeatedly find committing blunders without being brought to account, and indulging in exactions, speculations, and outrages, at which Calleja and authorities under him winked complacently, mainly, it was

soldiers were employed in the cities or fared relatively well. It is in part because the military governors had administration of the drunkard Alvarez in Oaxaca, the several cases of disobedience of orders during the early days, with their lamentable results, and lastly the arraignment of Iturbide for extortions and other abuses in Guanajuato.[1] Calleja could hardly exercise himself on the ground that loyal officers were too scarce to permit strict investigation of conduct.

His neglect caused him to be wilfully burdened with all the evil growth out of a prolonged war, such as excessive taxes and forced loans, partly levied also by district commanders and distributed for a long time with pressing inequality, to the ruin of many families and localities. Add to this a severity which converted campaigns into bloody retaliations and barbarous man-hunting, and sent a number of prominent persons to languish in exile.[2] One acceptable reason presented by Calleja for the long continuance of the war was the liberal sentiment fostered by the constitution of 1812, and the discontent roused in so many quarters by its withdrawal, with a consequent readiness to serve and shelter insurgents.[3] He also pointed to the independent action observed by Cruz in Nueva

[1] Still [illegible] an outcry rose against him that he had to leave his command and appear at Mexico in April 1816 to answer. The affair was so managed, however, that none within his provinces dared appear against him, fearing his very arrest, and so he was readily absolved. *Gac. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 892. The cura of Guanajuato, Doctor Larrieta, alone made a vain protest exposing his speculations with convoys, grain, etc., through agents, and his neglect and cruelty, and this was unanimously confirmed by persons at Mexico. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 445–51. Iturbide declined to return to his command. Armijo made a fortune by speculating with the convoys, and so did others. See chapter xvi., this volume.

[2] Among these were Fagoaga, honorary alcalde de corte to the audiencia, and a Spaniard by birth, but with a Mexican family and Mexican sympathies; Marqués de Rayas, who managed to stay, however; Relator Matoso Adalid, a rich land owner of Apam. The foremost to bear testimony against him, however, was Abad y Queipo, bishop elect of Michoacan, called to Spain early in 1815 under pretence of giving his views on the revolution. His able and scathing report on Calleja may be consulted in *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 119–50; also *Ticknor*, [illegible] *Exposé à las Cortes*, 8; *Vindicacion Escritores*, 2–4; *Pap. Var.*, clx. pt xiv., lxviii. ccxv. pt x.

[3] Letter of Aug. 1814, in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, MS., i. sup.

Galicia, and Arredondo in the Oriente provinces—the other two viceroys, he calls them—which frustrated many of his plans for fostering trade, swelling the revenue, and so forth.[4]

It must be admitted that these plans did succeed to a great extent, as shown by the increasing returns from custom-houses and treasury, and the crowning achievement must ever be accorded to him by Spain that he did break the revolution, even if he failed to extinguish it, thus practically saving the colony for his king, and leaving the way and means for a successor to complete the task.[5] The king recognized the service by bestowing on him the title Conde de Calderon, in commemoration of his great victory over Hidalgo;[6] in New Spain his name stands connected with everything that is cruel and relentless.[7]

The fact that Calleja had been appointed by the regency assisted no doubt to magnify the insinuations against him for having failed to suppress the revolution, and to dispose the monarch for a change. This

[4] The former maintained direct trade with Panamá, through San Blas, the other through Tampico with the open ports of Yucatan, thus flooding the country with goods on which the proper duty had not been paid. Calleja's measures succeeded, however, in swelling the custom-house revenue, and the coinage at Mexico was again rising from its low figure in 1812 of $4,490,000 to $9,276,000 for 1816. In 1811 it had been $10,000,000. *Lerdo, Comercio Exter.*, ap. 120, etc.; *Arrillaga, Informe*, in *Cedulario*, iv. pt i. 38.

[5] Alaman is too unqualified in his praise. He does not look sufficiently at his neglect. Had the colony not been ultimately lost, he concludes, 'Calleja debia ser reconocido como el reconquistador de la Nueva España, y el segundo Hernan Cortés.' *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 477. Zamacois, with his Spanish proclivities, merely copies him. *Hist. Méj.*, x. 161; and so does Arrangoiz. *Méj.*, i. 321–30. Bustamante breaks out, as may be expected, in uncontrolled abuse of his cruelty, hostility to Mexicans, etc., and concludes his special edition on this reign, *Campañas del General D. Félix María Calleja*, Mex., 1828, 200 pp. and sup., by calling Calleja 'malvado extrangero:' 'execrado sea su nombre por las edades venideras como los de los Corteses, Almagros, y Pizarros.' *Id., Cuad. Hist.*, ii. 252–5, etc. Guerra, *Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 337, 352, ii. 491, etc.; Zerecero, *Rev. Mex.*, 116 et seq.; Ward, *Mex.*, i. 199, etc., join in condemning his cruelty, direct and indirect. Much of Calleja's neglect may be ascribed to his confidants, Secretary Villamil, Canon Beristain, and the poet Roca.

[6] And the great crosses of Isabel and San Hermenegildo. See previous titles in *Disposic. Varias*, ii. 19.

[7] 'Esta fiera,' wild beast, is a term applied even in *Diario del Congreso*, 1824, ii. 497.

was effected by appointing a new viceroy in the person of Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, a naval officer whose ability had gained for him the rank of lieutenant-general in the armada, and the important mission of ambassador to England, where he left a good impression also for amiability and elegance of manner;[8] but the chief recommendation to his royal patron was a zealous devotion to the monarchy and a benign and felicitous rule as captain-general of Cuba. It was expected that a few energetic movements combined with a more temperate attitude would conclude the war and reconcile the people. This hope was sound, as proved by the immediate results; and if ultimately dissipated, the cause must be sought elsewhere.

Apodaca arrived at Vera Cruz toward the close of August 1816. On the journey to Mexico he received a disagreeable insight into affairs by a sharp onslaught on his party at the hand of Osorno, who with a little more energy might have captured the new viceroy.[9] The latter retaliated by setting free the captives made, and permitting his wife[10] and daughters personally to tend the wounded insurgents. This unusual and humane proceeding somewhat softened the easily impressed Mexicans, no less than his piety, his kindness toward sufferers in prisons and elsewhere, and

[8] He was born at Cádiz and entered the naval academy there in 1767. As an officer he distinguished himself for energy and bravery, but above all, for scientific investigations connected with his department, and was therefore largely employed on commissions as inspector of arsenals, etc. In 1807 he was given the command of a squadron, and achieved a brilliant success over the French fleet. In the following year, as ambassador to England, he promoted the alliance which proved of so vital import to Spain, and four years later he assumed control of Cuba, displaying there of late so great loyalty and judicious tact in preserving the peace that he was decorated with the great crosses of San Fernando and San Hermenegildo, and promoted to New Spain. For additional observations, see *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 353 et seq., v. 61 et seq.; *Escalera y Llava, Mex.*, 12; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 953–69, with portrait and autograph; *Pap. Var.*, clx. pt xlii.; *Disposic. Varias*, ii. 18, 35; *Cedulario*, MS., iv. 34; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 272.

[9] Which would have caused the war to assume fresh fury, under Calleja's direction, observes Bustamante. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 353–4. Apodaca's troops brought by him from Habana were unused to war, and he to action in the field. Fortunately Donallo came to the rescue.

[10] María Rosa Gaston, daughter of a lieut-gen. in the navy, and maid of honor of María Luisa, who had borne to him seven children.

his strict orders against the arbitrary execution of captives, combined with the most liberal offers of pardon to those who submitted. Such efforts by so pious a man were eagerly assisted by the clergy, headed by Archbishop Fonte, the obsequious Bishop Perez of Puebla, and other prelates,[11] and by the restored Jesuits.[12] Others were encouraged in loyalty and coöperation by bestowal of the Isabel order,[13] and an increased liberality was shown toward the army in promotions and badges of honor, the latter granted also to widows. On the other hand, Apodaca issued certain ridiculous decrees, one against kite-flying, which drew upon him ineffaceable ridicule from the banter-loving population.[14]

The new ruler gave impulse to the campaign plans of his predecessor,[15] and as the officers could not ven-

[11] Pedro Fonte, an able man of less than forty years of age, late canon of the cathedral, came in June, 1815, to replace Bergosa y Jordan, whom the regency had promoted from the see of Oajaca. Bergosa, unconfirmed also by the pope, had to return to his southern diocese. In the following June he consecrated his rival. Perez, late president of the córtes, was rewarded with the mitre of Puebla for assisting to dissolve this body. He arrived early in 1816, and made himself conspicuous by his panegyrics of his royal patron. In July 1816 the Marqués de Castañiza was consecrated as bishop of Durango. See *Sosa, Episcop. Mex.*, 214–15, 239–40, etc.; *Fernando VII., Decretos*, 136–7; *Puebla, Pastoral*, 1–47; *Pap. Var.*, lxvi. pt i.

[12] Restored by act of Sept. 16, 1815. They were escorted into Mexico with great ceremony on May 19, 1816, as described in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 514–16, and installed in the old college of San Ildefonso. Buildings and novitiates fell rapidly into their hands as formerly. Castañiza, brother of the marquis bishop of Durango, took possession as rector, assisted at first only by P. Canton. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 45–7; *Alegre, Hist. Comp. Jesus*, iii. 306–8; *Mendizabal, Carta; Pap. Var.*, clxv. pt xvii.; *Jesuitas en Mex.*, 4.

[13] Real Orden Americana de Isabel la Católica, instituted March 24, 1815. Cruz, Yermo's son, and four Spanish traders were among the loyal ones who received it, but also Adalid exiled for disloyalty, while Iturbide and others were passed by. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815, vi. 719–23.

[14] The decree came out because a careless child fell off the roof in flying a kite. *Noticioso Gen.*, Aug. 26, Nov. 11, 1816. For references to pardons, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 1092; 1817, viii. 28–30, 40; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 810, urging leniency; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1836, 290–2; *Pap. Var.*, clx. pt lxviii. 5–6, on benevolence to the poor.

[15] Calleja departed for Spain with the convoy, leaving Mexico in October, after having retired from the palace Sept. 16th—a day on which his appointment as viceroy had been dated, four years before, and on which Hidalgo raised the war-cry for freedom—and surrendered the staff of office on the 19th at Guadalupe. Apodaca's entry took place on the following day, as described in *Noticioso Gen.*, Sept. 23, 27, 1866; *Orizava, Ocurrenc.*, 113–25.

ture to trifle at the very outset with a stranger, as they had with Calleja, his orders received an energetic obedience that soon produced a radical change. In the autumn he ordered a formidable concentration of troops under Hevia, Bracho, and Obeso, against Teran, the most conspicuous among the insurgent leaders. Operations were to begin with the reduction of outlying towns; and on December 30, 1816, Hevia invested Tepeji with about a thousand men. The commandant, Juan Teran, had one fourth of that force. His brother hastened to the relief, and succeeded in repulsing La Madrid, who sought to check his advance;[16] but the attack on the besieging lines proved a failure. Don Juan thereupon made his escape with nearly all his followers on the night of January 5th,[17] and joined Teran, who most unaccountably had ordered the garrison of Teotitlan to evacuate this place. The loud remonstrance evoked opened the eyes of Teran to his mistake, and he resolved to repair it by marching against Obeso, who with nearly 600 men had advanced from Oajaca to occupy it. He met him at Ayotla, not far from the town, on January 12th, and gave proof of his superior tactics by utterly routing his opponent.[18] This left the road open to Oajaca; and by merely threatening this point Teran might have frustrated the royalist campaign plan, but he did not deem it proper to abandon his district.[19]

He proposed now to retake Teotitlan; but hearing that Colonel Bracho was marching toward Tehuacan with over a thousand men, he hastened instead to the relief of this place, which constituted his centre. He came too late to enter the adjoining fortress of Cerro Colorado, the stronghold of the region, and had to

[16] At Ixcaquixtla on Jan. 1, 1817; both sides having 500 men, according to Bustamante.

[17] He claims to have beaten his way through the lines. A royalist force of 100 men was left as garrison.

[18] Who had a narrow escape and was severely wounded. He received a colonelcy to console him. Teran must have had about 800 men.

[19] Bustamante covers this oversight, which might have kept the war open till Mina came, and so changed its aspect. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 402–3.

content himself with occupying the Franciscan convent of the town, with little ammunition and hardly any food. His position was rendered still more precarious by the dispersion and desertion of a great part of his force during preliminary skirmishes, so that only half remained to oppose the closely pressing royalists. Bracho was fully informed of his condition, and eager to obtain for himself the honor of reducing so important a place and leader before his superior, Hevia, should arrive and secure the prize, he warmly urged the surrender, with free pardon for all insurgents in the district, or a terrible alternative. In a moment of weakness Teran consented not only to yield, but to order the surrender of the impregnable Cerro Colorado, and induce Osorno and other chiefs to submit. And so on the 21st of January, after a siege of barely two days, fell famed Tehuacan, the centre of insurgent hopes, and with it the reputation of Teran. All his past successes were overclouded by that one hasty step, and a nation which forgave such men as Rosains refused to inscribe his name among its heroes.[20]

[20] Bustamante, who had admired him till he overthrew the congress, bewails bitterly the results of his act, especially in ordering the surrender of Cerro Colorado, to which he should have fought his way. *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 393–422. Yet it must be stated, in partial vindication of Teran, that mutiny had broken out at the fortress with desertion, which might have made its capture easy. Teran stipulated for himself a pass with means to go abroad, but the viceroy found a pretence for refusing to comply. Bustamante admits that Teran declined to accept proffered service under royalists, and most honorably contented himself with a humble clerkship in Puebla. After Iturbide's revolution he served successively and ably as member of congress, minister of war, and comandante general of the northern provinces. In 1832 he took part against the government, and being defeated at Matamoros, he committed suicide in July of that year. He was buried by the side of Iturbide. Payno, in *Gallo, Hombres Ilustres*, iv. 251–81, paints him only as a hero. See also *Museo Mex.*, ii. 121–31, with portrait that somewhat resembles Iturbide's. Alaman also upholds his noble traits at Tehuacan rather exclusively. *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 518–23; *Blasco, Discurso*, 6–9. He believed Teran feared that Hevia might come up and prove less lenient. Teran had shown perhaps the least cruelty of all the insurgent leaders. He himself pleads lack of ammunition, desertion of men, and deceptive offers from Bracho, and intrigues with the fortress. He could have broken away with the cavalry, but would not sacrifice the rest. See his *Segunda Manifest.*, 60–95, and appendix; also *Mora, Obras*, i. p. lxi. The blame cast upon him is for not breaking through to the adjoining fortress, with its greater resources, there covering his honor by a longer resistance; also for ordering its surrender, and promoting the submission of Osorno and others. This chief submitted on February 11th at San Andrés, with 175 followers, and retired to one of his farms. His example was

Teran's persuasion and example, and the renewed pardon issued from Mexico, enabled Llano, commanding the Puebla region, to report by the middle of February that peace was restored throughout the section. This left the royalists free to enter with greater force into Vera Cruz. Armiñan retook Nautla on February 24th, and with it the roadsteads of Palmar and Barra Nueva, after which he overran the adjoining districts northward, and succeeded within a short time in restoring order throughout nearly all of Huasteca, whereof he had been made comandante general. Donallo continued his work southward by driving Victoria from Misantla, and clearing the whole district as far as the Vera Cruz road. Below this Colonel Ruiz expelled Couto from the fortress Maltrata, whence he had been raiding the neighborhood of Orizaba.[21] Hevia followed up the success in February by taking Huatusco and the bridges Atoyac and Chiquihuite, while his subordinates cut short the career of Calzada, and crowned the campaign with the capture of the strong barranca fortress of Palmillas, the last refuge of Couto, who became a prisoner.[22] Applications for pardon had meanwhile been flowing in from every quarter, and before the close of the spring a few fugitive bands, one of them headed by Victoria, were all that remained of the lately imposing insurgent forces along the gulf coast.[23]

followed by Brigadier Aldana, who had been a lieutenant-colonel in royal service, by Manilla, Osorno's second, Espinosa, and the cura Correa. Bracho reported his own force at 1,043 men, and the capitulated at 570, the latter having lost 75 killed and 22 wounded. At the fort were found nearly 400 muskets. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 1-4-15, and adjoining numbers for other parts of the campaign. The royalist participants in the campaign received promotion from the rejoicing viceroy.

[21] At the close of 1816, Couto was the successor of Montiel, who had lately died of sickness. He was again defeated at Tomatlan on February 9th in connection with Luna, who soon after submitted.

[22] The fortress was about to be assaulted, when on June 28th Couto sought escape with his followers. They were captured, however, and shot, Couto escaping at the last moment and gaining pardon. Calzada's fort, La Fortuna, was taken about three months earlier, he being overtaken and executed in April.

[23] Among those who applied for pardon were Deputy Castañeda, and Cárlos Bustamante, the historian, who was confined in Ulúa fortress, and at first treated harshly. For details of this campaign, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, viii., January

Equally sweeping were the royalist successes in Mizteca and Tecpan under Samaniego and La Madrid, with the coöperation of Álvarez from Oajaca and Armijo along the south coast. The stronghold of Santa Gertrudis and Piaxtla fell without resistance. Ramon Sesma surrendered San Estévan, and tendered his assistance to the foe in seeking, among other acts, to persuade Martinez and Sanchez to capitulate at Silacayoapan. They nobly held out, however, till hunger and desertion obliged them to accept the bare offer of life.[24] Armijo had cleared the region between Acapuleo and the Mescala, and now he reduced Ostocingo, Tecolutla, and Alumbre, on Tecoyo hill, laying siege also to Jaliaca; but here the commandant Catalan escaped with his 200 men to join the repulsed Bravo. Even more brilliantly did Galvan force his way through the lines round Jonacatlan, after a siege of a month and the loss of over 100 men.[25] The result was that both Guerrero and Bravo had to abandon this region and take refuge in the hot lowlands of the Zacatula, there to watch for a better opportunity to retrieve the cause.

Their hopes centred now on the ranges of Michoacan, where the revolution had ever managed to maintain itself, although declining of late to isolated and less important operations. Here ruled yet a branch of the dissolved congress; not the junta installed by this body on its departure for Tehuacan, for that had also been extirpated[26] in the spring of

to June 1817, passim; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 1 et seq.; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 28 et seq.; *Orizava, Ocurrenc.*, 125, etc.; *Noticioso Gen.*, January to June 1817, passim; *Robinson's Mex. Rev.*, i. 232; *Mendibil, Res.*, 306–13.

[24] For their 200 men, early in March.

[25] Among them the commandant Cármen. For details of the campaign, see official reports in *Gaz. de Mex.*, viii., January to May 1817, passim, especially 331–6, 423–38, 481–5. Guerrero intimates that he it was who cut the way through from Jonacatlan. Letter in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 3–4; *Noticioso Gen.*, January to May 1817, passim.

[26] Under the rebellious leadership of Anaya, lately envoy in the United States, who captured and dissolved it, yet not with consent of the junta now formed to replace it.

1816, but another formed by Vargas, Yarza, Rosales, Torres, and other leading spirits[27] of Michoacan and adjoining northern provinces, and known by the name of Jaujilla, from the fortress island in Zacapo Lake, where it took refuge. Ignacio Rayon took advantage of the change to present his old claims as Hidalgo's minister and late president, and even sent his brother Ramon to enforce them. His efforts failed, however, and he himself narrowly escaped capture at the hands of the treacherous Vargas.[28] This strife among the insurgents added to the misfortunes of the province, so long the scene of bloody wars. Iturbide, who included it under his command during the early part of the year, was too occupied with his own speculations to accord energetic protection, and so low fell its condition that the intendente and his staff had to be replaced by a mere collector, while the insurgents grew so daring as to attempt in April to make a raid on Valladolid. Under Linares the royalists gave fresh impulse to the campaign; and among other successes was the capture in September of the island fortress Janicho, in Pátzcuaro Lake.[29] A number of chieftains accepted pardon after suffering a series of reverses, and Ramon Rayon found his adherents melting away, Enseña being killed and Epitacio Sanchez joining the royalists to clear the region north-west of Mexico. He had long been closely besieged at the famed stronghold of Cóporo by Aguirre, and famine and desertion were beginning to invade his ranks with no prospect of relief. Under such circumstances, he seemed more justified than Teran in accepting about the same time as he an

[27] Amador, Isasaga, and Doctor San Martin, the canon of Oajaca. Vargas figures as comandante general of Nueva Galicia, Rosales of Zacatecas, whence he now has fled to Michoacan, soon to claim here the same rank, and Torres was the most prominent Guanajuato leader. See *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 336–7; *Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX.*, vii. 436–42.

[28] This occurred in Nov. Vargas thereupon joined the royalists in pursuing him, and routed his forces under Rafael Rayon on Dec. 7th. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 338–44; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 2033–4, 2086–7.

[29] By Castanon. He distracted the attention of the garrison and surprised the island on the night of September 13th, but the besieged escaped. *Id.*, 981-3.

honorable capitulation; but like him, he was never forgiven by the nation, partly because the taunts of late comrades drove him to join the royalist ranks.[30]

These successes were greatly promoted by the efficient coöperation of Brigadier Negrete, commander of the Spanish forces in Nueva Galicia, under the supervision of Cruz, who otherwise maintained himself as independent of the new viceroy, as he had of Calleja.[31] He not only made the southern frontier uncomfortable for the revolutionists from Michoacan, but he concluded the five years' struggle[32] with the islanders of Chapala Lake by such radical measures as ravaging the lake shores in every direction in order to cut off supplies. Epidemics came to his aid; and on November 25, 1816, the heroic band yielded to the inevitable by surrendering the Mescala Islands on fair terms.[33] They were now set aside for a convict presidio. After this the submission of chieftains grew general, and included Vargas, who claimed to

[30] The fortress fell Jan. 7, 1817, with 345 men, besides 1,000 other inmates, 60 guns, including 25 of wood covered with hides, and 300 muskets. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 33–4, 194–201. Bustamante, *Cuadro*, iii. 425–38, gives the terms of capitulation and other documents, and seeks to justify the surrender. The viceroy at first disapproved the lenient clauses, but Aguirre insisted. This officer received a colonelcy and later the command of the province. Ignacio Rayon would not forgive his brother. Ramon soon retired to private and comparatively secluded life, dying in 1839 in circumstances so poor, says Bustamante, that even his daughters had to work for a maintenance. *Id., Gabinete Mex.*, i. 204. See also, on this and preceding events, *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 365–6; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 1052–3; *Mendibil, Res.*, 232 et seq., 283–4; *Noticioso Gen.*, 1815–1816, passim, Jan. 1817.

[31] The king sought to smooth matters by urging Cruz to visit Mexico. He did so in Feb. and March in almost regal state; but Apodaca sought to snub him, and nothing came of the attempt.

[32] With its alternative successes and reverses. Instance the insurgent victory in May 1814 by Salgado with about 500 men over the 300 of Arango, who was taken and shot with a great number of his force. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 86–9, exaggerates the numbers in favor of Salgado. Then, again, the defeat in 1816 of Chavez by the royalist Correa, with a loss of 300 and 100 respectively. For other operations in the province, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1814–17, passim; *Noticioso Gen., Id.; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, v. 292–376, passim, 532–9, 696, 729–34, 736–79; *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 293; *Cortes, Act. Ord.*, ii. 345, 349, 353; *Rivas, Carta Past.*, pt v.; *Jal., Not. Geog.*, 72.

[33] They contained 17 guns. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1816, vii. 1193. The permanent force not long before this was placed at 1,000, excluding women and children. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 541–7; *Dicc. Univ.*, ix., 26–9; *Jal. Not.*, 2; *Negrete, Observ.*, 10. Santa Anna and Father Castellanos were still the leaders.

be comandante general of this region, and who ignominiously stopped to lead the royalists in pursuit of his late comrades, and to influence the surrender of Cuiristaran fortress. A similar misstep was taken by Muñiz. Incensed with Rosales, who after being driven from Zacatecas claimed the post of comandante general in Michoacan, he joined the pursuers against him, and the brave Rosales, overtaken near Tacámbaro, fell fighting for the cause.[34]

In Zacatecas revolutionary movements had hardly ever passed beyond Colotlan and the south-east border, and even these dwindled to a shadow under the energetic brigadier Diego García Conde, who infused also greater discipline among his troops.[35] San Luis Potosí was also undisturbed save by frontier movements along its southern lines, and beyond, in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, slight local disturbances alone broke the quiet.[36] In Chihuahua a revolutionary plot had been promptly suppressed in November 1814.[37]

The most northern province in which the war continued to prevail was Guanajuato, the cradle of the revolution; and but for the mining resources, its condition might under the attendant ravages have been reduced to the same deplorable level as in Michoacan. Favored by the mountainous nature of the country, the insurgents managed to find encouragement in occasional successes, and ample supplies to maintain a considerable force under several leaders, as Rosas,

[34] In June 1817. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 653–4. For previous submissions, see *Id.*, 1816, vii. 2033, 2085, etc.

[35] Those who showed cowardice in battle were shot. After Rosales' departure, Hermosillo of Colotlan stood the foremost leader in the northern region; and as late as 1816 he and his adherents are said to have mustered as many as 700 men. A formidable opponent of his was the cura Álvarez. See *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815-16 passim; *Noticioso Gen.*, *Id.*; *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 276–7; *Gonzales, Hist. Apuntes*, 83–5; *Mora, Mej.*, iv. 439, 443–4. Conde was in 1816 succeeded by Gayangos.

[36] For scattered details, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815–16; *Noticioso Gen.*, *Id.*; *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 279.

[37] Through the treachery of a conspirator. Hidalgo's former colonel, Arrieta, which caused the arrest of Trespalacios and Caballero on November 4th. The former escaped while on the way to Spain, the other was finally pardoned, as will be related in *Hist. North Mex.*, ii., this series.

who claimed to be intendente of San Luis Potosí, Moreno, Lúcas Flores, the famous Pachon Ortiz, and above all, Father Torres,[38] who had now assumed the foremost place in the revolution. They were even bold enough to propose an attack on Guanajuato itself, cheered by a profitable raid made upon it in August 1815, for which Iturbide was severely blamed.[39] After his arraignment at Mexico in April 1816, and renunciation of the command, his second, Orrantia,[40] took charge till Apodaca appointed Colonel Ordoñez, who had so ably guarded the high road to Mexico. He gave fresh chase to the insurgent bands, and captured, on March 10, 1817, the stronghold known as Mesa de los Caballos, near San Felipe, after a vigorous resistance, slaughtering every occupant.[41] Another sweep was made along the eastern line of Querétaro by the three divisions of Villaseñor, Torre, and Casanova, of which the former took Cerro de la Faja, held by Tobar, who was soon after caught and shot.[42]

[38] Several of them combined in Feb. 1816, with a force of fully 1,500 men, but were dispersed by Iturbide before the intended movement could be effected.

[39] Among the preceding operations may be noticed a victory in October 1814 over the Zacatecas border troops, in Pinos district, by Rosas and Ortiz, and a defeat on July 24, 1815, at Rincon de Ortega, by Orrantia and Castañon of the same leaders, assisted by Rosales and Moreno. The insurgents lost a great number, including Rosas, who was executed. He had been a sergeant at Guanajuato, and connected from the first with the revolution. Francisco Rayon met a similar fate soon after. Orrantia received a colonelcy for his success. Ortiz was again routed on Sept. 12th, at Dolores, and his 300 men dispersed. His comrades gained an advantage near Celaya in the following month, whereupon Iturbide shot several of his men for yielding.

[40] Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 199, refers to him as looked upon with mingled hatred and disgust by Americans, and this caused him to leave for Spain in 1821. A cruel man, without education and principle, says Robinson. *Mem.*, i. 202.

[41] The place, known also as San Miguel, was an elevation of about two leagues in circumference, well provided with water and timber. Ortiz, Nuñez, and Carmona held out here, and are said to have lost 250 men. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 456; while Bustamante, *Cuadro*, iv. 298–302, assumes that the royalists lost 300 out of nearly 1,700 engaged. For further details on this and preceding operations in Guanajuato, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1815–16, passim; *Noticioso Gen., Id.; Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 262–70; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 311–12; *Mégico, Bosquejo*, 22–39. Colonel Alvarez, who kept the southeast corner in disorder, was caught and shot in April 1817.

[42] Faja fell Dec. 17, 1816. Several leaders now surrendered, among them colonels Gonzalez and Vargas, the latter aiding in a campaign through Sierra

The success of Apodaca's campaign measures justify the insinuations cast on Calleja as being either neglectful or calculating. Within a few months the revolution had been crushed throughout the vast extent of Vera Cruz, Puebla, Mexico, Mizteca, and Tecpan, while in the semicircle north of Mexico province it had been reduced to insignificant proportions, leaving only a few organized bands in the central ranges of Michoacan, in the bajío of Guanajuato, round San Felipe, and in Sierra Gorda, which coöperated to some extent under the direction of the junta of Jaujilla in Lake Zacapo. Remnants of dispersed forces could also be found elsewhere, but reduced to fugitives and bandits, and manifesting their presence mainly by descents for plunder from their secret haunts. This result had been accomplished by an energetic execution of Calleja's plans, in conjunction with a more humane attitude, as manifested especially in liberal offers of pardon. The continuance of this policy promised a speedy restoration of complete order, for the enormous odds against the few insurgents were steadily growing, and the tenders of submission came literally pouring in.[43] It must not be supposed, however, that revolutionary ideas were fading. Men were merely drawing back before imposing might, awaiting an opportunity for a combined and harmonious rally round some influential leader with a stronger war-cry.

Gorda, which did not prove so successful, owing to the coöperation among the leaders, Borja, El Giro, and Doctor Magos. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 9-36, 355 et seq.; also *Id.*, 1815-16, passim; *Noticioso Gen.*, *Id.*; *Bustamante*, *Cuad. Hist.*, v. 47, etc.

[43] As shown in the *Gaz. de Mex.* during the opening months of 1817.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

MINA'S EXPEDITION.

1817.

A Famous Navarrese Guerrilla—Preparing for the Enterprise—The Landing at Soto la Marina—Alarm of the Royalists—The Victory at Peotillos—Penetrating the Interior—Traits of Mina—Overthrow of Ordoñez and Castañon—Liberation of Prisoners—Jealousy of Torres—Character of Mexican Guerrillas—Fall of Soto la Marina—Siege of Fort Sombrero—Ravages of Thirst and Sword—The Bulwark of Independence—Mina's Field Operations—Repulse at Guanajuato—Capture and Execution of Mina—Reflections on his Undertaking—Siege and Fall of Los Remedios—Bibliography.

Among those who in Spain resented the arbitrary measures of Fernando VII., when in 1814 he returned from ignominious captivity to overthrow the constitution and the córtes, were the Navarrese, a brave and sturdy race, of Basque Gothic blending, whose keen and passionate temperament clung to the chase and yielded to smuggling, without reproach to their otherwise upright and good-natured traits. With the prestige of former independence, and with liberal instincts nurtured midst the ranges of the lofty Pyrenees, they objected to the king's infringement of popular rights. But the movement failed, and lay crushed for a time by the exile of the leaders, the famous General Espoz y Mina and his nephew, Francisco Javier Mina. The latter had been the first to shed lustre on the family name by daring and successful military operations. He was a student at the university of Zaragoza in 1808, when the French invasion roused his sympathies for the imperilled fatherland, and led to an exchange

of books for the sword. Although a beardless youth of barely nineteen, he inaugurated the guerrilla war in his native province, at first at the head of a mere handful of followers. A born leader of men, and with great military talents, he achieved one success after another,[1] and within two years he had become celebrated throughout Spain as its foremost guerrilla chief, with the official rank of comandante general of Navarre. Captivity placed a sudden check on his career, and later the failure in 1814 of his uprising against Fernando drove him a refugee to England.[2] In company with other exiles, he soon evolved a plan for avenging outraged liberty, by lifting anew the standard of revolt in the colonies. Some Englishmen interested themselves in the scheme, partly from pecuniary motives, and provided a vessel, with arms and money, on which Mina embarked at Liverpool in May 1816, attended by over a dozen officers.[3]

[1] As Marshal Suchet testifies in his *Mem.*, i. cap. iii.

[2] He was born Dec. 3, 1789, at Otan, near Monreal, the eldest son of a well-to-do land owner. After studying at Pampalona and Zaragoza, he became a volunteer, carried despatches across the French frontier, and then began the guerrilla war in Navarre, with the object of harassing convoys for French armies, and cutting off their communications. The biography in *Robinson, Mem. Mex. Rev.*, i. 81–2, credits him with having inaugurated the guerrilla war in the peninsula. The regency rewarded his successes by making him a colonel, and finally comandante general also of Upper Arragon. In 1811 he was captured and sent to France, leaving his uncle, Espoz, who added to his own the now famous name of Mina, and was recognized as his successor, to add fresh glory to the family, which he did finally as one of the foremost generals of Spain. *Mina, Breve Extracto de la Vida*, 1–107, published at London in 1825, where this man was then an exile. Javier profited by his imprisonment at Vincennes to study military science, and on returning home, after an absence of three years, he was offered a prominent command in New Spain, but preferred to join his uncle in the vain revolt for the constitution. England recognized the services of the refugee by granting a pension. Portraits in *Bustamante, Cuadro Hist.*, iv. 306; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 547, 728; *Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 160, etc.

[3] Six Spaniards, a few Italians, two Englishmen, and one American, to whom commissions were given, two of them above the rank of captain. The party included Doctor S. T. de Mier, a Mexican priest of distinguished descent, who had suffered persecution for his liberal ideas, and lived a poor exile in London. He joined as confessor. In his *Declaracion*, 806, he gives the names of some of the officers, and says that they embarked May 5th, on board the 'fragata *Caledonia*.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. no. 952. He adds that the English government provided him and other Spanish patriots with assistance, as it had Mina, by pension. England certainly favored Spanish liberals to a certain extent. The biographers also point out that Gen. Scott of the U. S. met Mina in London. Alaman adopts a misprint in the Spanish translation of Robinson concerning the number of followers.

New Spain appeared the most attractive country for the movement, and thither Mina proposed to sail direct, believing that able officers and arms were alone needed to give it impulse. At the last moment, however, came news of reverses in Vera Cruz, which induced him to change his course to the United States. There he bought or chartered three smaller vessels, prepared supplies, and enrolled, mainly at Baltimore, a number of recruits, including a large proportion of officers, with whom he sailed in September[4] for Galveston, in Texas, by way of Port au Prince. Commodore Aury, a French freebooter who had received an insurgent commission as governor of Texas, and was preparing to invade it, gave him assistance; and after spending some time in refitting, he continued his course, in seven vessels, to Soto la Marina, in Tamaulipas, the only available landing place on the gulf coast.[5] He disembarked in the middle of April, and took possession of the town, issuing proclamations in favor of independence under the title of General of the Relief Army of the Mexican Republic.[6]

[4] The Spanish minister was informed by deserters of the project and sought to stay the departure, but clearance papers were taken for the Antilles, and 200 men embarked quietly near Ft McHenry under Colonel Count de Ruuth, at the close of August. Mina followed Sept. 27th. Storms and desertion played some havoc among his men, and subsequently yellow fever; but the president of Hayti gave him aid, and French sailors filled the gaps. Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 67, and Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, x., point at the indifference of the U. S. to Spanish remonstrances.

[5] A despatch boat sent with letters to Victoria had found all the ports in Vera Cruz occupied by royalists. Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, i. 348, even declares that Mina secretly visited Vera Cruz, but this is doubtful. Although Aury aided the expedition with vessels and supplies, he at one time threatened to attack it because his subordinate, Col Perry, chose to transfer himself and 100 Americans to Mina's party. Aury had received his commission, including the rank of general, from the congress envoy Herrera. Toledo, who had formerly invaded Texas, sought also to assert his claims to the command, and a Spaniard named Correa is said, in *Robinson*, i. 121–5, to have tried to seduce the men; but this is doubtful. Meanwhile Mina had gone to New Orleans for additional aid, and was there tempted with a project to seize Pensacola; but it savored too much of a freebooter scheme for his taste. He left Galveston March 27th, and after watering at the Rio Bravo, landed on April 15th at the mouth of the Rio Santander, or Marina, the former site of the town of Soto la Marina, now situated 18 leagues above on the left bank of the river. This landing was suggested by Hinojosa, who knew this region. *Mier, Vida*, 34.

[6] A proclamation to the Spaniards had been issued already at Galveston and sent to New Spain for distribution; and now were issued others to royalist

Within a short time nearly two hundred of the active rancheros of the district joined his party,[7] and with their aid was constructed an adobe fort on the eastern outskirts of the town, for the security of the stores with which a small force could not well burden itself on a flying trip.

The dismay created at Mexico by the news of his invasion, the precursor perhaps of others, was all the greater as it came upon the royalists at a time when they had succeeded in beating back the revolution within very narrow limits.[8] Warned by information already from the United States, Apodaca had taken prompt steps to guard the Vera Cruz coast as the most likely to be approached; and now reënforcements were hurried forward to Arredondo, of the Oriente provinces, Colonel Armiñan following with troops collected from the Tampico region, while a frigate and two armed tenders sailed in the middle of May from Vera Cruz, under Brigadier Berenger, to attack Mina's squadron. Aury had departed, leaving at the mouth of the river, manned by a small force, only three transport vessels, one of which had been beached and condemned. The lightest sailed away on beholding the Spanish squadron, and the other, being unable to follow, was abandoned. After a series of lively broad-

soldiers, and to his own men, together with six octaves of patriotic doggerel with the following refrain:

'Acabad Mexicanos
De romper las cadenas,
Con que infames tiranos
Redoblan vuestras penas.'

It was composed by Doctor Infante, who managed the printing-press of the expedition. The text of the different proclamations may be consulted in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 317–23, 328–33, etc.; *Alaman, Hist. Méj*, iv. ap. 52 et seq.; *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, x. ap. 9–21. In *Ilust. Mex.*, ii. 388–91, iv. 251–8; *Abispa de Chilpancingo*, 77–8, 223–35, is also reproduced a letter to Arredondo of May 21st, urging him to join the cause, and arguing that Spain like England would gain more from liberated colonies by fresh impulse to trade and friendship. In conversation with the Spaniards he thought it prudent to leave the impression that he would, as in Spain, aim at the restoration of the constitution of 1812 rather than at independence. He counted also on the Masonic spirit among Spanish officers.

[7] Including Lieut-col Valentin Rubio and his brother, Lieut Antonio.

[8] 'Un peligro, tanto mas terrible cuanto menos esperado,' says Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, ii. 368. But the royalists had had ample warning. 'Apodaca tembló,' observes Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 338.

sides without response, the Spaniards ventured to approach and captured the sole occupant—a cat—whereupon they fired the vessel and hurriedly retreated.[9] One effect of the blow was to increase the discouragement or discontent among several of the invaders, and to induce Colonel Perry, one of the leading officers, to depart with over fifty Americans. This unworthy conduct brought its own punishment, for he was overtaken by royalists in Texas and cut to pieces with all his men.[10]

It was thought advisable not to weaken the expedition by unprofitable encounters with the enemy, but to join the insurgent centre, now understood to be in Guanajuato, and there revive the sinking cause, organize troops, and start a glorious campaign. Hence, when the report came that Arredondo was approaching with a large force, Mina left Major Sardá in charge of the fort at Soto la Marina with about a hundred men, and hastened away on May 24th, with the remaining three hundred, promising speedily to bring reënforcements.[11]

[9] Frightened by the sight of a few tents from approaching the shore, says the diary in *Robinson*, i. 155. There appears to have been a small battery close to them, however. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 340, grows eloquent over the cat prisoner. Berenger's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 615–18, is headed, 'Destruction of the squadron of the traitor Mina.' Extra pay, badges of honor, and other rewards were granted to the men engaged.

[10] In the middle of June, near Matagorda. By this time they had become reduced to 40. They bravely refused the fair terms offered. Fourteen fell captive, 12 mortally wounded. Perry shot himself rather than yield. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 787-9. According to Mier, *Declaracion*, 811, Perry had become dissatisfied with the lack of confidence bestowed upon him. Before leaving he received extra arms, and agreed to skirmish in Texas and distract royalist attention. He had served with credit at New Orleans in 1815, and in Texas under Toledo. Major Stirling took his place as commander of Mina's union regiment. Colonel Ruuth had left with Aury, and was replaced by a Swiss captain, named Maylefer. During the foraging a successful encounter took place with the overwhelming forces of Garza.

[11] The force as definitely formed soon after consisted of general and staff, 11; guard of honor, composed of officers under Col Young, second in command, 31; regiment of the union, under Major Stirling, 56; 1st regiment of the line, Capt. Travino, 64; cavalry, under Maj. Maylefer, 124; artillerists, 5; servants, etc., 17; total, 308. *Robinson*, i. 161. Mier, who roughly estimates the force at 400, states that 30 of the garrison were local recruits, and as many more were soon enrolled. *Declaracion*, 811. The men were well uniformed from the abundant and varied stock on hand. See *Robinson*, i. 145.

It was a daring attempt, in truth, for this handful to penetrate through an unknown and dangerous border-land into the midst of a hostile kingdom, braving victorious armies and hardships innumerable. But it was after all a sort of forlorn-hope party, for retreat was practically cut off by the loss of the vessels; and this added one more resemblance to Cortés' famed expedition, with similar aims and hopes; if it counted more confidently on the internal discord sustained by white insurgents, while the Andalusian captain with his children of the sun had to conquer allies for himself, the chieftain of Navarre had more powerful opponents, and a smaller band, although from boreal climes. Whether right or not in dividing his forces, he undoubtedly suffered by delaying so long on the gulf coast. A prompt advance might have prevented the secession of Perry, and have gained for him decided advantages before the royalists could combine.

Avoiding the corps of observation under Garza, Mina hastened by a southern curve through Horcasitas to Valle del Maiz, where he rested for two days, after having driven back a royalist force under Villaseñor.[12] This delay enabled Armiñan to approach, whereupon the party pushed onward, and reached on June 14th the Carmelite hacienda of Peotillos, fifteen leagues north-east of San Luis Potosí. Early on the following morning they were startled to find close upon them their pursuers, now swollen by reënforcements to about 1,700 men.[13] Retreat before so large

Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 68, who follows royalist sources, adds 200 recruits to Mina's party.

[12] Who came too late to occupy a pass in advance of Mina. His force is placed in [illegible], *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 343, at 150, in *Robinson*, i. 167–8, 206, at nearly 400, and his loss at 6 prisoners, several killed, and 4 cannon. The prisoners were nobly set free, yet the royalists afterward shot a wounded hussar who fell into their hands. No pillage or disorder was permitted at the Valle, but a small contribution was levied, which, added to the horses and booty obtained on the way in fair capture, helped to cheer the party.

[13] Whereof 680 infantry of European regiments, and 1,100 of Rio Verde and Sierra Gorda cavalry, with a rear guard of 300. *Robinson*, i. 180. This is adopted in [illegible] and [illegible], and fairly confirmed in the less definite royalist reports, *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 735–6, wherein the invaders are

a body, composed mainly of cavalry, was out of the question, and a siege within the convent buildings equally forbidding; so Mina proposed an attack upon the foe before it should form. Encouraged by previous successful skirmishes with superior forces, the men responded eagerly. A part remained at the hacienda with the baggage, and the rest marched forth under their general and his second, Colonel Young, to the number of 172, to meet a body ten times stronger, a large proportion of which ranked as veterans used to victory. The royalist guerrillas opened the engagement, and then came the cavalry with a rush that threatened to overwhelm the little band. Fortunately a few well directed volleys arrested the movement, but the rear had come up and the odds appearing so enormous Mina prepared to fall back toward the hacienda.[14]

This stirred the Spaniards to fresh efforts, for which a galling fire prepared the way by creating havoc in the narrow ranks, while the cavalry wheeled round them, and the infantry moved forward en masse to closer quarters. At this critical moment, when the struggle seemed reduced to selling their lives as dearly as possible, Mina gave his men the order to charge. One blinding volley was delivered, and then with ringing hurrahs they leaped from out the smoke with gleaming bayonets. The startled infantry broke and fled, and the cavalry, partaking of the confusion, fell back to increase the confusion. On came the doughty band, a narrow-bounded cyclone, resistless in its sweep, with cheers that rolled before them, and bringing quick answers in shrieks of fear and pain. The disorder had swollen into a panic, lending wings to feet that halted not for leagues, the men meanwhile regardless of the sharp lances with which Arruiñan at

placed at 500–600, although Arredondo admits that their entire force, including the detachment at Soto la Marina, 'no excede de 400 á 500.' *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 892; Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, ii. 376–7, seeks to equalize the forces.

[14] A mere feint, he afterward declared.

last turned on them to rally. Mina's horses were too tired to pursue very far, and consequently the royalists escaped with a loss of little over 100, while the three hours' battle cost their opponents the proportionately heavier casualty of fully 50.[15]

Mina dared not at present face such another ordeal of dear-bought victory, but relieved himself of all cumbrous luggage and hastened away, reaching the flourishing mining town of Pinos late on the 18th. A few daring fellows scaled its walls during the night, and surprised the garrison; whereupon the place was sacked in retaliation for its neglect to surrender.[16] Now followed a march of three days southward across the bare, silent plain, whose borders were desolate by the ravages of war, and during which hunger and hardships pressed sorely upon them, while in the distance a formidable corps of observation under the cruel Orrantia threatened at any moment to fall upon them. On the 24th, however, they arrived without further mishap at Fort Sombrero, or Comanja, five leagues east of Lagos, and one of the two strongholds remaining to the insurgents in Guanajuato. It was commanded by the mariscal Pedro Moreno, who with his small garrison gave them a greeting worthy of their heroic achievements. Their fame had preceded

[15] Whereof 30 killed and 26 wounded. List in *Robinson*, i. 180, 11 of the wounded and 11 of the slain being officers. Royalist account places the dead opponents alone at 95 and allow for themselves only 116 killed and wounded. *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 378. For details, see Armiñan's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 733–44, wherein he casts the blame for the 'retirada,' as he calls it, on the Rio Verde cavalry. Mina's departure in the afternoon he attributes to an acknowledgment of fear, and his own subsequent advance to occupy the deserted hacienda he claims as a triumph, for which the viceroy indeed gave thanks, with rewards for the wounded. Mina cared for the royalist wounded, and sent a message to Armiñan to do the same for his, which was complied with. The writer in *Robinson*, i. 178, blames Col Noboa for not joining the fighters to swell the victory, and for prohibiting Maylefer to do so. Bustamante testifies, *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 355–6, to the dismay created by the defeat at Mexico, Vera Cruz, etc., and thinks that he could have achieved a great advantage by marching on terrified San Luis Potosí, and there recruiting men for marching on Mexico. See also *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 328, etc. The use of buckshot is said to have promoted the panic.

[16] A valuable booty of money and rich clothing was obtained, besides 4 guns and other effects. Two guns were taken along. The garrison numbered 300.

them, borne in every direction by defeated royalists, who to shield their own failure declared the followers of the lauded Navarrese leader to be demons, not men.[17]

The personal qualities of Mina were well calculated to sustain the fame that had preceded him. There was a combined dash and dignity about him that commanded admiration as well as respect; the stamp of a born leader, exacting an involuntary deference, yet permeated with a generosity and frankness that inspired confidence and love. In manners and accomplishments a gentleman, he possessed also every sterling trait of the soldier. While foremost in a spirited charge, he remained calm throughout the danger, ready to seize the opportunity and direct his officers. Frugal and enduring as was required of the mountain guerrilla, he shared hardship and discomfort with the meanest, cheering the sufferer, and winning the hearts of opponents with his kind sympathy. His broad Spanish face, with its heavy lower chin, the dark bushy hair, and favorite whiskers of his race, gave the impression, primarily, of a man of firmness and action, and one somewhat beyond the twenty-seven years which he had just passed. In figure he was well formed and strongly built, though rather slight, and of scant medium height.[18]

An opportunity soon presented itself to give his new comrades in arms an inspiring proof of his ability. While Armiñan held back under the lesson he had received, Comandante general Ordoñez of Guanajuato, in conjunction with Castañon, renowned both for his successes and cruelties, advanced with 700 men against Sombrero. Mina set out to meet them with about half that number,[19] and brought them to a stand June

[17] Their number had now diminished to 269, whereof 25 wounded, 39 having been killed and lost. *Robinson*, i. 205. For other rosters made about this time, see *Soc. Mex. Geog., Bol.*, ép. 2, iii. 145–54.

[18] About 5 feet 7 inches.

[19] He took about 200 of his own, Moreno joined with 130, and some ragged

29th at the hacienda of San Juan de los Llanos, near San Felipe. He at once charged, regardless of the sharp firing, and threw them into disorder. Within eight minutes the royalists were in full flight. The rest was but pursuit and slaughter. Over 300 are said to have been stretched along the route, including both commanders, while more than 200 were captured.[20]

MINA'S OPERATIONS.

And here is told the story of a most politic act, which added lustre to the cause of the revolutionists.

infantry fell in on the way, forming nearly 400 in all. *Robinson*, i. 254. Alaman misinterprets the translation by adding 400 rabble on the way.

[20] In *Robinson*, i. 257–8, the prisoners are placed at 220, the slain at 339, and those who escaped at 150. Two guns and 500 muskets were taken. It is related that the royalists fired silver dollars; and Bustamante confirms the story by saying that one of the gunners could not find the necessary shot at the proper moment, and so threw in a handful of dollars. *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 377. It is agreed that Col Young and Maj. Maylefer led the victorious charge, yet a commentator in *Soc. Mex. Geog., Bol.*, ép. 2, iii. 165–7, seeks patriotically to replace Young with Moreno. The insurgents crowned the victory everywhere with loud demonstrations.

The foe had shortly before taken a favorite officer of Mina, who offered in exchange the numerous prisoners held by him. He was refused. Then he called his prisoners before him and said: "Behold the heartless indifference of your government. Your lives are doubly mine—mine by victory and retaliation; yet you are free! You may join my standard or peaceably depart, as you will." A policy so rare and generous won an almost unanimous adhesion to the insurgents, and the report of it spread abroad evoked an admiration that added not a little to the popularity of the general, even in the opposing ranks.

Greater achievements could not have been desired to inspire the confidence necessary for energetic coöperation among the insurgents. To promote this end, Mina now held a conference with Father Torres and two members from the junta of Jaujilla,[21] besides other chiefs. Torres was an ignorant man of ferocious instincts, a gambler and profligate, who after figuring with little credit as a priest, joined the guerrilla Albino García. His sacerdotal character assisted him to rise, and at this time he was the most prominent leader, with the rank of lieutenant-general, whose will indeed was law, both to the council and to the bands sustaining the cause. While devoted enough to the cause, he loved above all the display of a power sustained greatly by fear of his cruelty, and was only too ready to look upon the Navarrese as an interloper, whose transoceanic fame and brilliant feats would surely eclipse his own.[22] Hence also he felt predisposed to suspect, and spread the insinuation,

[21] Doctor San Martin and Cumplido.

[22] The writer, in *Robinson*, i. 237–42, 277, etc., paints him in black colors as cruel, avaricious, vindictive, ready for wine, women, and gambling; a man who sustained himself by distributing subordinate commands among uneducated men, and who held tyrannic sway over the country people. His loyalty is admitted, however, and it is related that when two of his younger brothers wrote to him, under compulsion, from a royalist prison that their lives depended on his abandoning the cause, he replied that if they escaped he would shoot them for daring to propose terms so dishonorable. *Id.*, 239. Even Bustamante condemns him. 'Torres no era capaz de hacer una accion buena, era un indecente.' *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 387, 538–9.

that the new-comer was at heart as by birth a Spaniard, in sympathy with his countrymen, and aiming not at liberating New Spain, but merely to restore the constitution of 1812, with its meagre concessions. This belief unfortunately received support from the arguments which Mina employed somewhat too openly for winning Spanish soldiers and partisans.[23] Torres nevertheless pretended great interest in Mina's projects, yielding to him the chief command, while intimating that he really was the superior, and boasting that he could place 6,000 men under his orders. "In that case," exclaimed the general eagerly, "I shall march direct on Mexico."

A rich treasure having at this time been somewhat unfairly captured at the hacienda of the marqués del Jaral,[24] active steps were taken to obtain clothing and armament and to organize troops, Mina being invested with the rank of mariscal de campo by the junta.[25] Soon, however, came disenchantment. He found that only an insignificant proportion of the promised men was sent, and these formed what he would call rabble rather than soldiers. Brave and loyal, but utterly devoid of discipline and sustained determination, and objecting to regulations and tactics as irksome restraint, the cavalry alone was valuable, and only for flying raids. One demoralizing source was the tribute

[23] And from the insignia on his despatches of four fasces enclosing a square with a lion in the centre. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 386, 402, and Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 602, point out this indiscreet talk and its sad effect on the insurgents. Col Noboa assisted to spread this feeling by siding with and instigating Torres, for Mina had offended his haughty spirit by a reprimand. Moreno, Ortiz, Borja, and others remained faithful, however.

[24] On July 7th, the marquis fled with his 300 men, and servants pointed out a cache from which $140,000 was secured, besides other valuables. The owner subsequently claimed a loss of $183,000 in money and over $100,000 in other effects. Although this was no doubt exaggerated, Mina's men may have secured privately sums beyond the $140,000 from which they also filched. *Robinson*, i. 269–74. Bustamante regrets that Mina should have stooped to such robbery; he should at least have left a promise for later repayment. *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 385. The arbitrary seizure alarmed many creoles and created distrust.

[25] Young was made inspector of the Bajío troops; Noboa went with Torres to Fort Remedios to organize; the administration was remodelled, and a certain amount of pay was distributed. For Mina's appointment, see facsimile letter in *Soc. Mex. Geog., Boletin*, ép. 2, iii. 136.

system submitted to by the towns and favored by speculating commanders, which induced the insurgent bands to sacrifice their cause for personal gain and convenience.[26] Another was the liberty accorded them, partly from necessity, of living at their homes, dressing as they pleased, and obeying the call to arms as they listed, or even the longing to turn back, which often manifested itself on the eve of threatening danger, when they were most needed. This laxity was sustained by the practice among the men to elect their officers, with rare exception, who consequently were as a rule untrained as well as numerous and subservient.[27] The leaders kept only a small body-guard with which to share the large revenue drawn from raids and tributes. Little of this reached the public coffer, as may be imagined, but it passed into individual pockets, and thence upon showy costumes glittering with gold and silver buttons, lace and embroidery, and upon superb horses richly caparisoned—incongruous enough as a whole, and in striking contrast to the general poverty, and particularly to the absence of arms. Yet even with such men Mina might have achieved something if Torres had proved sincere and the royalists had granted a little time.

The defeat of Armiñan had created a wholesome dread at the viceregal court. The leanings of the masses were well understood; but an additional danger sprung up in the popularity of the invader among the troops, especially the Europeans with their masonic bent, who spoke loudly and proudly of Mina as their countryman, or even comrade. Mexico itself was regarded as in danger, and fresh troops were hurried forward to ward it off. The mariscal Liñan,

[26] The towns paid tribute, under a passport sytem, which procured supplies and furnished in return clothing, ammunition, and other effects, and so the parties maintained one another.

[27] It was not uncommon for a colonel to command merely 50 men. *Robinson*, ii. 55. Mina's attempt to enforce order had little effect, and created ill-will.

sub-inspector of troops, and the highest military officer in the country,[28] took command, with supreme control of the provinces embracing the field of action. A few months earlier such concentration of soldiers would have been impossible, and in that case Mina might have gained a speedy triumph by combining with Victoria, Teran, and Guerrero.

The royalists received about this time crumbs of comfort in the fall of Soto la Marina. Arredondo had presented himself before the adobe fort on June 10th, with about 1,600 men. Water was cut off, and soon the tottering walls began to crumble under the heavy firing. Death and desertion had made sad inroads on the garrison, yet Colonel Sardá remained resolute as ever, cheering the famished defenders, and supplying the deficiency of hands by distributing a large number of extra fire-arms with which he effectively repelled the approaches of the startled besiegers. Occasionally a brave woman would rush through the shower of bullets to the stream and bring a momentary relief to the parched lips which swore to die rather than surrender. Finally Sardá was persuaded to accept honorable terms; but imagine the mingled rage and wonder of Arredondo when he saw marching forth before his imposing army thirty-seven cadaverous, hunger-pinched men. He dared not, in view of his heavy losses, sustain the favorable offers made to this handful, and the viceroy, ignoring the capitulation, had them sent to the dungeons of San Juan de Ulúa, and subsequently to interior fortresses in Spain, to endure the most atrocious sufferings incident to a lingering death.[29]

[28] It was said of Pascual Liñan that he had suddenly been raised from a private soldier to mariscal, by the king, in return for his fidelity as servant; and he was declared illiterate, untrained, and coarse. *Robinson*, ii. 34–5. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, 378–9, confirms the statement that he rose purely by favor, and adds, 'No tenia este gefe nombradia de valiente;' but others admit his bravery. Daoiz, now mariscal, replaced him as sub-inspector for the time.

[29] The verbal capitulation, before numerous witnesses, admitted them on June 15th as prisoners of war, with the promise of free dismissal to their homes, Americans to be sent to the U. S. *Robinson*, i. 304. A decree of the

Liñan advanced through Querétaro into Guanajuato, incorporating all the troops possible, and encouraging them by placing a price on the heads of Mina and his followers.[30] This leader had just met with a repulse—his first—in an attack on Leon,[31] and had retired into Fort Sombrero with 650 men, to whom were added some 300 women, children, and laborers. Shortly after, on July 30th, Liñan appeared before it at the head of about 4,000 men,[32] and a train of artillery, with which he at once invested the place, maintaining a constant and wasteful fire upon it—wasteful because the natural features of the fort afforded protection. It stood on a cudgel-headed

córtes of April 10, 1813, had set a bad precedent by declaring it derogatory to confirm a capitulation with insurgents. Bustamante, who was at the time a prisoner at Ulúa, testifies to the maltreatment of these men, and to Spanish breach of honor. *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 362–7; also in his *Abispa de Chilpancingo*, i. See feeling in U. S. thereat, *Niles' Reg.*, xiv. 135, xvi. 237, xix. 396–7. Mier, who figured as apostolic prothonotary, was whisked off to the inquisition cells at Mexico, but suffered no great injury. He escaped three years later, became a deputy, and died in 1827, age 64. Payno has given his biography. *Mier, Vida*, Mex. 1865, 1–112, etc., full of adventures. His writings I have referred to under page 451, this volume. Arredondo was reproved by the viceroy for not shooting the prisoners, but leaving the responsibility to him. *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 894–5, 856–7; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 325–7; *Atleta*, Feb. 4, 1830, 185–6. Mier, *Declaracion*, 811–13, etc., describes the miserable fort at Soto la Marina. A few of the men, withdrawn to a battery at the mouth of the river, were included as prisoners, but a foraging party was shot down. The party numbered at one time 135 fighters. Mier assumes that the capitulation was subject to viceregal approval. Arredondo claims, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 715–16, 695–6, that 300 persons were taken. This included the villagers and their families. Bustamante maintains that Arredondo must have lost 300 in killed alone. *Pap. Var.*, clix. pt xxxvi. Sardá escaped from Ceuta and became a general under Bolívar. *Revista Cien.*, ii. 166.

[30] On his $500; on theirs $100. Not a very munificent offer.

[31] He attacked it with 500 men during the night of July 27th, but the garrison, just reënforced, obtained warning, and he was obliged to retire with a loss of 100 men, including 21 prisoners, who were shot. Mina nevertheless liberated those taken by his force. *Robinson*, ii. 6, etc.

[32] The official statement reproduced in *Robinson*, ii. 7–8, indicates 3,541 and 12 guns, but Solórzano claims that there were 5,000 with 20 guns, which may include later reënforcements. Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, ii. 381, admits 3,500, but Liñan's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 967–8, lessens the number. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 396. The nature and distribution of the forces are given on adjoining pages. There were four main divisions; one under Brigadier Loaces, who occupied a position on the range commanding the entrance, and with him the headquarters of Liñan; another under Negrete, with troops reluctantly supported by Cruz of Nueva Galicia, was extended along the south; a third, under Ruiz, guarded the east and the approaches to the brook; while the fourth body, under Rafols, maintained communications with Guanajuato. Querétaro had been strengthened with new fortifications.

projection, with steep sides 1,000 feet high and connected by a narrow ridge, the only real approach, with the mother range, from which it could be commanded to some extent. A few rude walls added shelter; seventeen shaky guns blustered defiance, and all to cover a scanty commissariat and a decreasing water store.[33]

With many and useless mouths it was not long before thirst began also its siege. Torres had been given money with which to bring supplies from his richer districts, but he criminally delayed doing so, and on approaching the place, when already besieged, he was routed. Mina attempted a sally to open communication with him, but not being well supported, he had to retire with a loss of eleven taken prisoners, who were promptly despatched in full view of the garrison.[34] Stores must be had, however, and so the following night Mina and three others climbed down the steepest and least guarded declivity, and managed to slip through the lines, favored by the wind and darkness; but he sought in vain to improve on Torres' effort.

The situation was now becoming critical. Rations had dwindled to a mere nothing; and worse, the water was wholly gone. The rainy season was about to begin, and clouds sailed by, only to tantalize the besieged by bursting at a distance. Unable to restrain themselves, many staggered forth, regardless of booming cannon and whistling bullets, to pluck the succulent roots around, while women and children stole by night down the cañon to the brook, there to be captured by the sentinels.[35] The suffering was so aggravated by the stench of dead animals and other causes,

[33] The place took its name from a conic hill resembling a hat, which rose on the 1,500-foot-long plateau of the promontory.

[34] 'Satanized,' says Robinson, ii. 18; others say shot. During parleys held, Mina told the royalists that he came merely to restore the constitution of 1812. This was heard by his followers and left a bad impression. The sally took place early on August 8th.

[35] The misery was attributed partly to Mina's haste in ordering a dirty reservoir to be emptied and cleaned, for the rains were expected. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 388–91.

that Colonel Young, now in command, opened negotiations. But the terms offered being unconditional surrender, he proposed that they should cut their way through. This was opposed by one or two officers in a manner so insulting to his American pride that he swore to stay till the last.[36] He inspired fresh determination among the besieged, so much so that when the royalists made their second assault on the fort, on August 15th, the women heartily joined in the fray with stones and rolling bowlders, and assisted to repulse the assailants with heavy loss.[37] As Young stepped forward to watch the retreating foe, his head was taken clean off by a cannon-ball. He had kept his oath.[38]

Lieutenant Bradburn now took command, and resolved to break through the lines. The attempt was made on the night of the 19th. A distressing farewell was said to the ill and wounded, who with anguished looks and piteous appeals saw themselves abandoned to relentless butchery. Stealthily all who could walk pressed down the slope and were already gaining the level ground, when some timid females, who had unaccountably been allowed to precede the others, roused the attention of the enemy. A hellish scene ensued. The royalists rushed like blood-hounds on their victims, caring nothing whether their bullets struck women or their lances impaled children. The shrieks of the despairing mother, and the cries of the little ones whom she sought to shield, were drowned in the fierce shouts of the combatants. In their

[36] Among those who objected were Moreno, and an Italian named Mauro; yet the former had favored negotiations. See also documents in *Dicc. Univ.*, ii. 460. Robinson, i. 286, ii. 23–4, charges him with secreting supplies for himself and holding out in order to make money by low speculation. Bustamante, 373–4, praises him as one of the greatest patriots, who sacrificed his patrimony for the cause, who possessed natural ability, valor, and generosity. His name was inscribed among patriot heroes by the nation. Liñan's report shows that Moreno had plenty of water stored for himself in his house. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 975.

[37] They admitted about 200 in killed and wounded. A shower fell during the battle.

[38] He had been a lieut-col of the 29th regiment of U. S. infantry, and was greatly admired for his noble qualities.

frenzy numbers climbed back upon the rock only to fall a living prey; others leaped into the gulch to hide in the underbrush, while many ran blindly through the lines to the plain, soon to be hunted down by horsemen. Only fifty escaped from all that number, including Bradburn and Moreno. At dawn the fortress was entered, after a slight resistance from crouching fugitives. Then followed another carnage; and this time in cold blood, for Liñan must have his turn at the slaughter. The male prisoners, over two hundred in number, were brought forth in batches and shot, the sick being supported and the maimed propped up to suit the marksmen.[39]

Sixty miles south of Sombrero, in the midst of the fertile plains of Pénjamo, rises a straggling range known as San Gregorio, and near its centre a broken circle of peaks covered with bastions and breastworks, and enclosing an area 5,000 feet in circumference, to which had been applied the name of Los Remedios. This was the retreat of Torres, forming one of the strongest fortresses in the country; for it was protected on nearly every side by abrupt ravines, leaving only one easy approach, which had been covered by heavy works. Within, were inexhaustible springs.[40] It was called the bulwark of Mexican independence. The defences had of late been improved with the aid of Mina's officers, and an immense supply of provisions introduced, sufficient to sustain

[39] The women and children were spared. Impressed somewhat by Mina's example, the viceroy issued on the 24th an order to shoot only the leaders and [illegible], consigning the rest to the presidio at Mescala; but it came too late. Liñan, obeying previous instructions, wrote: 'Los prisioneros fusilados [illegible] V. E. [illegible] 1817, viii. [illegible]. Details in *Id.*, [illegible]. Bustamante asserts that the royalists lost during the assault on the [illegible] 400 men. [illegible] iv. 411; [illegible] Torrente reduces this [illegible] killed, while placing the killed revolutionists at 619 natives and [illegible] 384.

[40] [illegible] reservoirs and an accessible brook. On its highest point rose [illegible] the other lower extremity the Panzacola, from which [illegible] passage. The easy approach, covered by the works of Santa [illegible], was to the right of the ridge connecting with Tepeyac.

for months not only the garrison, now swelled to 1,500 men, but an equal number of laborers, refugees, women, and children.[41] Torres looked, therefore, with comparative indifference on the approach of Liñan, who appeared before the place on August 27th, and distributed his force, now numbering over 4,000, along the opposite sides of the ravines, and erected batteries, one upon a peak, the Bellaco, hitherto regarded as inaccessible, from which he could inflict no little damage on the surprised garrison. A large body,



FORT DE LOS REMEDIOS.

mainly of cavalry, was also in the field to keep open communications and drive back insurgents.

It had been arranged that Mina should, with all the available horsemen, harass the besiegers, and cut off supplies by ravaging the country around and attacking the convoys. In accepting this task, he allowed Torres, singularly enough, to retain most of the surviving members of his own band, who would have

[41] The supply embraced 30,000 fanegas of corn and wheat, and 3,000 head of food animals; with much material for making ammunition. *Robinson*, ii. 44.

proved of immense value to drill and lead the undisciplined and capricious field force. Less than threescore now remained of that doughty handful. As the leader reflected on their sad fate, tears sprung to his eyes, and for once he yielded to the clamor for revenge by shooting a number of prisoners, although not over forty in all.[42] He soon regretted the act, however, and the more so as day after day revealed how little he could count upon the firmness of his present followers, fine dashing fellows who attacked splendidly, but generally turned before the first resolute resistance with volleys or bayonets, when one minute more of sustained bravery might have overcome it and won the day. Thus the capture of San Luis de la Paz, in the beginning of September, took him four days, when it could easily have been carried in one assault if the men had followed the officers. The delay contributed to defeat the attacks next made upon San Miguel el Grande, and the hacienda de la Zanja,[43] by allowing reënforcements to come up.

Mina retired somewhat disheartened to Valle de Santiago, the centre of a strongly revolutionary population, there to seek the coöperation of Comandante Flores for a descent on Guanajuato, which promised, besides rich gains, to cripple the enemy severely, and even to compel the abandonment of the siege of Remedios. Torres for some reason failed to take this view, and insisted that the only way to relieve the fortress, as his main duty, was to attack the besiegers. Mina remonstrated that the relative strength, character, and position of the contending forces forbade such a movement; whereupon the other went so far as to forbid his subordinates from joining with their best troops in any enterprise beyond the one indicated. One result of this injudicious deterioration

[42] Thirty-one men captured with the hacienda Bizcocho, soon after the fall of Sombrero, and two officers, taken at S. Luis de la Paz.

[43] The former was attacked Sept. 10th, with from 1,200 to 1,500 men, it is claimed by royalists. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 1035–7; the latter on the 16th, with a loss of 20 killed. *Id.*, 1073–4.

of Mina's forces was to enable Orrantia, who had been sent to operate against him with about 900 men, to gain a comparatively easy victory in the open field at La Caja over his somewhat larger army, and to greatly dissipate the awe inspired by his former achievements.[44]

Leaving orders for his men to reunite at the same place, Mina proceeded to confer with the council of Jaujilla. They also objected to an attack on Guanajuato, and recommended that he should summon the remnant of his original band, and seek the south-western districts of Michoacan, where he would have both means and leisure to organize troops for an effective campaign. Mina insisted, however, that he was bound to relieve Los Remedios. He went back to La Caja, and thence at the head of 1,400 men marched on Guanajuato. So sudden and quiet had been his advance, that he penetrated far into the town toward midnight on October 24th, before the garrison was apprised. The latter, commanded by the determined Linares, then opened a galling fire on the intruders, with the usual effect of causing the foremost to fall back and throw the rest into disorder. Mina flew from street to street to rally them; but example, exhortation, and threats were alike in vain. He found himself surrounded by military mobs paying no attention to his orders. One or two flank movements, supported by a determined sally, enabled the garrison to drive them from the town.[45] "Had you

[44] This battle took place at the hacienda de la Caja, three leagues from Irapuato, on Oct. 11th. The main cause for the defeat is ascribed to an attack by a royalist detachment on the hacienda, where the women who usually encumber Mexican armies were abiding. Their shrieks and disorder created a panic which led to a general flight. Mina cut his way through Orrantia's lines with only 250 men, the latter not daring to pursue. He places his force at 1,000 horsemen and his loss at 35, allowing the enemy 900 men. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 430–3. In *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 386, the numbers are given at 1,500 and 836 respectively, following Orrantia's report in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 1171–4.

[45] Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectific.*, 297 et seq., adds some interesting details from his own experiences on that occasion, to supplement the accounts in *Robinson* and others. Liceaga, who was shot in the arm, received a colonelcy for his energy.

done your duty," exclaimed the exasperated general to his officers, "the men would have done theirs, and Guanajuato would have been ours." He thereupon dismissed them with a censure to their respective districts, on guerrilla duty, and rode away with about a hundred followers.

He required rest and consultation before deciding on future movements, and withdrew to the rancho del Venadito, belonging to a devoted revolutionist and friend named Mariano Herrera.[46] Pursuers were believed to be far away, and so Mina for once, after a long interval, abandoned himself to repose within the house, instead of staying as usual with his men. It so happened that this very day the watchful Orrantia came by accident to Silao, twenty miles off, seeking for traces of the general, and there received the desired information.[47] Tired as he was, Orrantia pushed onward during the night, and with the first streaks of light on the morning of October 27th he rushed upon the farm. The startled sentries gave one shout of alarm and turned in flight, and the rest hurried after them as best they could, many being overtaken and killed, including Moreno, lately commandant of Sombrero.[48] The noise roused Mina, who rushed out half

[46] A man who had suffered greatly at royalist hands for his cause, in ravaged lands, burned buildings, extorted ransoms, etc. He now lived in assumed poverty on his rancho.

[47] From the cura, says Robinson, but ever zealous in behalf of the cloth. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 533–4, explains that a ranchero named Chagoya gave the information.

[48] Orrantia estimates the party at a round 200, of which nearly half were killed, 25 being captured and shot. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 1241–4. Herrera was also taken, but escaped execution by feigning madness, a deception maintained till 1821, when he joined the victorious republicans. According to Robinson, Mina brought only about 70 men, yet they might have made a stand had they chosen. The captor did not recognize his prize till he announced himself. It is related that Orrantia spoke insolently, calling him a traitor, etc., and Mina replying in no complimentary terms about the king, he struck him with the flat of his sword. 'It is sad to be a prisoner, but sadder still to be in the hands of one who fails to respect himself as a soldier and a Spaniard,' said Mina. Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, v. ap. 102–3, afterward corrects this story at the request of Orrantia, who declares that he struck him simply because he continued to abuse the king after being warned. He said nothing on being struck. *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, x. 370–2. Orrantia also denies that Moreno's head was carried in triumph on a pike.

dressed and unarmed, only to find himself deserted. The next moment a dragoon had seized him.

The news spread rapidly, and from Mexico orders were sent throughout the country to celebrate the occurrence with ringing of bells, volleys, masses, and other demonstrations, in manifestation of delight. Orrantia was rewarded with a colonelcy in the regular army; the captor received money as well as promotion,[49] and the king testified his delight by dubbing Apodaca conde del Venadito, after the place where Mina was captured, a title which soon became to him an annoying nickname among the Mexicans.[50]

Mina was conducted in triumph to the camp of Liñan, where the officers endeavored by their attentions to compensate for the indignities he had so far suffered among them. For there had been the imposition of shackles, in allusion to which Mina said: "I shudder more to observe so barbarous a custom than to submit to it." With praiseworthy spirit he declined to make any revelations.[51] The viceroy re-

[49] The dragoon, José Miguel Cervantes of Nuevo Santander, received the prize money of $500, a special badge, and a corporalcy. The other soldiers obtained a general badge. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1818, ix. 134.

[50] And gave additional impulse to his request for a change, which was not granted. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 443. For first news of the capture, with odes, etc., see *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 1191, 1210–12.

[51] 'Sin haber querido hacer clase alguna de revelacion,' says *Torrente, Hist. Rev.*, ii. 394, although Bustamante intimates that he answered certain questions. He made it a habit to destroy letters, keeping the information in cipher. Yet he is said to have written a letter to Liñan, declaring that if sometimes he seemed a less true Spaniard, it was an error, that the existence of the republican party meant ruin to the country, and offering, if his life were prolonged, to give advice for the speedy pacification of the provinces. Copy in *Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist.*, 423, differs. Robinson, ii. 119–20, refuses to believe it authentic, and declares that he wrote about this time a letter to his comrade Erdozain, at Los Remedios, exhorting him to pursue a course marked by honor and consistency. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 445–6, insists, however, that he has seen the autograph letter, and adds, that acting upon it Liñan wrote to the viceroy for instructions whether to spare Mina or not. Apodaca declared the offer of advice valueless, and ordered his execution. Mina certainly was somewhat disgusted with the revolutionists as he had found them, and Spanish pride was strong; so argues Ward, *Mex.*, i. 255, among others. Yet we know that the authorities made it a rule to issue declarations over the name of almost every prominent captive, many of which are admitted to be doubtful or spurious; and we have royalist testimony to the fact that Mina refused to make any revelations. A number of men at Los Remedios offered to attempt a rescue, but Torres objected to it as a waste of life. *Robinson*, ii. 133; *Revista Cien.*, ii. 164.

peated the order for his execution, and with a view to make an impression on the garrison of Los Remedios, the commanding hill of Bellaco was selected for the scene. As he was led forth on the afternoon of November 11th, a hush fell upon the battle, and the combatants turned to gaze in mute sympathy, one side upon a champion and martyr, the other upon an heroic countryman. "Do not let me suffer," said Mina, with resigned tranquillity, as he turned his back to receive the whizzing bullets.[52]

And so closed a brief though brilliant career. Mina's genius is reflected in the daring nature of his undertaking, with its victories over the armies led by Armiñan, Ordoñez, and Castañon, and in nobility of mind he shines conspicuously by the side of men like Nicolás Bravo, to relieve with bright humanity a blood-stained period.[53] With a few more followers such as he brought, the invasion might have achieved success, by a prompt advance against the yet scattered royalists, and by threatening Mexico itself; thus giving time for a more effective coöperation, perhaps for a wide uprising.[54] He certainly came at an unfortunate moment, when the overthrow of Teran, Victoria, and other leaders had dampened the ardor of revolutionists, confined their struggle to narrow limits, closing the gates against foreign communication, and left royalist armies at liberty to combine in large force. Unacquainted with the country and the people, and

[52] After examination by numerous witnesses to place the deed beyond dispute, the body was buried in the field near by. For testimony, see *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 1364–6. Later it was placed by the side of Hidalgo and other heroes, in the pantheon at Mexico. Bustamante describes the ceremonies. *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 457–60. By decree of July 19, 1823, Mina and Moreno were declared beneméritos with Hidalgo, etc. *Mex., Col. Dec. y Ord.*, ii. 150.

[53] True, he yielded for a moment at Bizcocho to clamoring followers and deep sorrow; and the seizure of property at Jaral was regrettable, in the manner rather than the act.

[54] Robinson, ii. 128, 143, thinks that with 1,000 foreigners he might have done as he pleased; or had Torres proved loyal, all might have gone well. Alaman admits that 2,000 invaders could have achieved their aim. American merchants gave far less aid than the English. The delay at Soto la Marina was unwise, and some think Mina should have taken all his forces along.

without plans, Mina had moreover to struggle with the diffidence growing out of a comparison between his small party and the imposing armies of a rich government.

He also suffered from lack of discipline among the Mexicans, and from being subjected to a jealousy and distrust, due greatly to his character as a Spaniard. The revolutionists were divided with regard to his true intention; but there is no doubt that, while he may secretly have desired to maintain the connection between the mother country and the colonies, he worked faithfully for the independence.[55] Whether the time was ripe or not, Mina evidently failed to strike the key-note; yet his efforts were by no means in vain, for they served to expose the weakness of the government, and demonstrate what a band of determined men might accomplish. They served also to sustain the revolutionary spirit, and pave the way for emancipation.[56]

All this time the siege of Fort Los Remedios continued without interruption, varied alone by two brilliant

[55] His utterances to Spanish soldiers in favor of the constitution of 1812 can be counted only as efforts to promote the cause. When offered the military command in New Spain, before his flight from Spain, he is said to have refused it partly on the ground that it was impossible and inadvisable to subjugate the country, as Mendibil, *Resúmen Hist.*, 316–17, also points out. His different proclamations are clearly enough for independence, and he lands under the title of a general of the Mexican republic. Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectific.*, 300–2, is ready to accept him, with Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 628, as a champion of independence; Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, ii. 368, 394–5, stamps him as a republican who seeks to 'arrebatar de las manos de su Soberano i Señor los dominios,' etc., and Baz so receives him, *Gallo Hombres Ilustres.*, iv. 283–295; and Robinson never questions his motives. Yet Bustamante assumes him to be a Spaniard at heart, intent only on reëstablishing the constitution of 1812, and is therefore glad that he failed. 'Yo tengo para mí que fué una extraordinaria providencia del cielo que no lograra su empresa.' *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 455. Ward, *Mex.*, i. 236–7, sides rather with Bustamante. Americans would no doubt accept the enrolment of troops, mainly in the United States, as an argument that Mina aimed at a separate republic. He firmly rejected the tempting offer to begin with freebooter schemes at Pensacola.

[56] Despite his prejudices, Bustamante accords glowing tribute to Mina, as rivalling Napoleon in glory. *Abispa*, i. 77. Alaman, *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 628, refers to this episode as the 'mas brillante' of the revolution; 'as full of lustre as any of the same duration,' adds Robinson, *Mem. Mex. Rev.*, ii. 126–7. If some condemn the undertaking as rash, they must consider that Mina started it while Teran, Victoria, and others still flourished. When he heard of their downfall, it was too late to recede. Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, ii. 395, estimates the cost of the expedition at over $2,000,000, expended on 14,000 uniforms, 12,000 fire-arms, 30 cannon, etc., but the figures are very doubtful.

sallies and disastrous assaults.[57] Mina had so effectually harassed the royalists as to reduce them to great stress both for food and ammunition, but after his capture reënforcements as well as supplies came flowing in, and the batteries soon made sad havoc with the exterior works of the fortress,[58] raking also a vast extent of ground. All this, however, would not have availed much against a place so well manned and provisioned, at least for some time longer, had not the ammunition begun to fail. The object of the last sally had been to supply the deficiency, and this failing, it was resolved to evacuate the stronghold on the night of January 1, 1818, by the difficult pathway from the Panzacola, but the least guarded and therefore the only available exit. As at Sombrero, the men chivalrously encumbered themselves with the women and children, who would probably meet with no worse fate than lenient imprisonment if they remained behind, but the sick and wounded were abandoned to the well known mercies of a ruthless foe.

Unfortunately, the mistake had been made to stop the usual call of the sentinels, and this intended precaution served only to apprise the royalists that flight was intended. Hence, before half the garrison had passed the gate the movement was discovered, and in a twinkling, the signal being given, beacons blazed up along the passes and hilltops, illuminating the whole route. And now were repeated the terrible scenes presented at Sombrero, of scattering fugitives seeking the dark recesses of the woods and gulches; of a panic-stricken throng at the ravine pass, struggling in different directions, some to escape the onslaught of the

[57] The former early in Oct. and at close of Dec., against the Tigre battery, which had opened a breach in the breastworks of Santa Rosalía. On the first occasion captains Crocker and Ramsay carried the battery with 250 men, and destroyed it, the defenders believing that Mina was upon them. The second sally was only partially successful, for the battery had been strongly reconstructed. The assaults in the middle of Sept. and Nov. were repulsed with heavy loss, especially on the latter occasion, when nearly 400 royalists were killed or wounded.

[58] Attempts had also been made to undermine the chief bastion, but so unskilfully as to be of no avail.

soldiers, gathering with sword and pike and musket; others to avoid being pushed headlong over the precipice, already red with gore, and resounding with the groans of the bruised and dying. Large numbers grasped at temporary relief within the fortress, only to find it entered from the rear, while flames burst forth in every direction, enfolding also the hospital, and roasting alive the inmates, a few crawling forth to meet a speedier death on royalist bayonets. And so the slaughter and the hunt continued throughout the night, till morning came to add fresh zest. Torres escaped with only a handful, his track marked by bodies of the slain, which by this time had swollen to about 500. Over 400 prisoners had been taken, besides as many women and a host of children; but in this instance the example set by Mina succeeded in exempting at least the rank and file from the death awarded to the chiefs. They were consigned to Mescala presidio; the women were sent home, with heads ignominiously shaven, to nurse with the growing locks a deep thirst for vengeance. . The bulwark of the independence was razed.[59]

[59] Among the executed captives were Col Noboa and Lieut-gen. Muñiz, known as the gunner, from his predilection for unwieldy artillery. He had lately accepted pardon, but was lured by Mina's fame to join the cause again. Arroyo was bayoneted. Liñan gives a list of 15 guns taken, and some material for ammunition, and makes no allusion to the sentinel call. The garrison proper had dwindled to about 1,000 men. Details in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1818, ix. 162-86. See also preceding parts for reports on the progress of the siege. Torrente, *Hist. Rev.*, ii. 393-4, places the total royalist loss at 171 killed and about 350 wounded, and Liñan seeks to cover it by praising the valor of the garrison, and dwelling on the strength of Los Remedios. The besieging force appears to have swelled to fully 6,000 men. Bustamante, *Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 502, states that 273 men were sent to Mescala. Robinson, ii. 166, who denies that any ammunition was left, intimates that the women were outraged. A large number of decorations and promotions were given to the victors, with badges to all the men. See also *Noticioso Gen.*, Oct. 1817 to Jan. 1818, passim.

The earliest and most complete account of Mina's expedition was issued in 1820 by an American merchant, William Davis Robinson. He rushed into print mainly to ventilate his ill-feeling against the Spanish government for financial wrongs and imprisonment inflicted upon him. The former came from mercantile operations with South America since 1799, the latter from joining in the expedition to Goazacoalco in 1816, under Teran, to whom he sold a lot of arms. For this transaction he was carried to Spain a prisoner, but escaped in the spring of 1819, while under parole, on hearing that he was about to be transported to the dungeons of Ceuta. He modestly consigns his own adventures and affairs to an introduction and an appendix, devoting the text mainly to Mina's expedition, for its interest and the apt illustration it affords to expose Spanish misrule and weakness. The story is preceded by

a review of the colonial régime and an outline of operations prior to 1817, and followed by a special chapter on Spanish cruelty, and another on the problem of interoceanic communication, with observations on trade prospects, the whole pleasingly interspersed with sketches and reflections on customs and institutions in New Spain, as a rule favorable to the creoles, although abusive against peninsular connections. The account is woven from different material, the story of Mina being drawn from the journal of J. A. Brush, who accompanied the hero from England, and served a while as commissary-general. Robinson's knowledge of the field adds value to his work. The fresh interest roused by Iturbide's revolution extended also to this work, issued at Philadelphia in 1820, 396 pp., and in the following year it was reprinted at London in two volumes, with a portrait of Mina. Three years later appeared a Spanish translation, somewhat faulty, and with suppression of many facts as disagreeable and needless. Bustamante makes it a task to combat and correct many of Robinson's statements, while praising his ability and claiming to have furnished most of his information—see *Cuad. Hist.*, iii. 377, iv. 306-7—and he certainly adds many new points from different sources, toning his narrative somewhat to suit his conception of Mina as a Spaniard intent mainly on restoring the constitution of 1812. Briefer forms of his versions are given in *Caro, Tres Siglos*, iv. 138–66, and *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 314–53. I have been able to throw additional light with aid of such recent collections as *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, vi. 647–948 passim, containing among other papers the testimony of Doctor Mier before the inquisition, *Declaracion*, somewhat vague and distorted by fear, yet valuable; and I have found interesting details in *Mier, Vida; Mina, Breve Extracto de la Vida*, Lóndres 1825; in scattered documents in *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, ép. 2, iii. 136, 145–69; *Pap. Var.*, xlii. pt viii., cxlix. pt vi., etc., and I have made a close examination of royalist reports in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817–18, and other sources. Alaman's very acceptable version, *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 547 et seq., rests on *Robinson*, *Bustamante*, and the *Gazetas*, and he is closely followed by Zamacois, *Hist. Méj.*, x. 243 et seq., with a few corrections, and still closer by Arrangoiz, *Méj.*, i. 343–69, who nevertheless adds a point or two. The article in *Dicc. Univ.*, v. 381–433, is by Alaman. Liceaga, *Adic. y Rectific.*, 275–307, contributes a personal story of the raid on Guanajuato. On Robinson rest mainly the accounts in *Ward's Mex.*, i. 236–59; *Young's Hist. Mex.*, 129–69; *Kennedy's Texas*, 291–300, relating mainly to the stay at Galveston; *Gregory's Hist. Mex*, 42, etc.; *Mayer's Mex. Aztec.*, i. 295–7. In *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 68–73; *Revista Cien.*, ii. 159–70; *Beltrami, Mex.*, i. 82–161, 351–73, are some observations, the latter showing little regard for facts, however. Rivera, *Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 65 et seq., bases his account mainly on royalist reports, while favoring the republic. Vigneaux, *Souv. Mex.*, 430, compares Mina to Raousset Boulbon, of later Sonora fame. In *Gallo, Hombres Ilustres*, iv. 283–95, is a eulogy on Mina; *Olavarria y Ferrari, Conde del Venadito*, 1–160, is mainly devoted to him, and his story has been specially elaborated for youths in *Mina, Biog.*, Paris, 1872, 1–175. For additional authorities on this and four preceding chapters, see *Córtes, Diario*, 1813, xviii. 433; 1813, xxi. 151; 1820, ix. 15; 1821, ii. 2; 1821, xiii. 16; *Córtes, Diario Congreso*, i. 105; *Córtes, Act. Ord.*, 1814, i. 453, 457, 463–4, 489–90; ii. 14, 19, 24, 95, 160, 187, 260, 262, 331, 345, 349, 353; *Cedulario*, MS., iv. 34, 38; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1813, iv. 865–9, 961–3, 1082–4, 1088, 1090–1, 1099–1102, 1350–1; 1814, v. passim; 1815, vi. passim; 1816, vii. passim; 1817, viii. passim; 1818, ix. 59–64, 134, 257–61; *Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc.*, i. 777–814, v. 45–91, 126–30, 167–75, 238–50, 273–83, 292–335, 375–613, 650, 662–775, 810, 918, vi. 29–100, 215–74, 313–444, 460–514, 529–862, 925–48, 1042–49; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iii. 425–7, 580, 583, iv. 1–309, 328–509, 539–638, 724–8, ap. 11–17, 27–40, 45–7, 52–8, 106–7, v. 958, 960; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, i. 49–51, 103, 119, 325–7, ii. 119, 249–58, 274, 288–95, 407–28, iii. 3–87, 97–399, 422–4, iv. 23–4, 160–7, 171–502, 533–4, 541–7, v. 4, 21–31, 47–53; *Id., Elogio Morelos*, 8, 20–8; *Id., Campañas de Calleja*. 9–13, 18, 21, 96, 166, 178, supl. 1–18; *Id., Notic. Biog.*, 18–19, 22–4; *Id., Martirologio*, 19–20; *Id., Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., iii. 41–3; *Alegre, Hist. Comp. Jesus*, iii. 306-

8; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 251–307; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, i. 406–73, 501–31, 541–2, 548–51, 5–136; *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 111–66; *Torrente, Revol. Hisp. Am.*, i. 431–2, 445–6, ii. 87–110, 186–204, 273–94, 368, 372–93; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 191–360, 397–423; *Carriedo, Estud. Oaj.*, 14–15, 25–6, 29–36, 115–16; *Robinson's Mex. Rev.*, i. 69, 110–17, 140–320, ii. 5–72, 77–92, 96–124, 131–6, 155–62; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 173–4, 188, 191–2, 199, 205–7, 212–14, 217, 220, 222–5, 234–61, app. 509–25; *Negrete, Observ. Carta*, 10; *Niles' S. Am. and Mex.*, 144–53; *Niles' Reg.*, v. 436, viiii. 436, ix. passim, x. 286, 386, 415–16, xi. passim, xii. passim, xiii. passim, xiv. passim, xvi. 237, 366, xix. 396–7; *Noticioso Gen.*, 1815–18, passim; *Obispa de Chil.*, 77–8, 223–35; *Ahrens, Mex. Zustände*, 8–10; *Alerta á los Mej.; Perez, Past. del Obispo*, 1–47; *Bodega y Mollinedo, Man. de la Repres.*, 1–12; *Calend. Man. ó Guia*, 1814, 49–78, 100–71, 172–207; *Am. State Pap.*, iv. 1, 422–626; *Const. Apatz.*, 1–88; *Aranjo y San Roman, Impugn.*, i.–vi. 59–66; *Arizpe, Idea Gen.*, 4–10; *Arrillaya, Recop.*, Jan.–June, 1836, 59–64, 290–2; *Atleta*, Feb. 4, 1830, 185–6; *Barrera, Elogio Lobera*, passim; *Bib. Amer.*, 409–10; *Beltrami, Mex.*, i. 82–8, 116–18, 159–61, 341–78; *Blasco, Discurso Civ.*, 6–9; *Bonnycastle's Span. Am.*, 47–9, 55–6, 62–3, 88–158; *Chynoweth's Max.*, 12–14; *Conder's Mex. and Guat.*, 115, 117, 124–6; *Domenech, Hist. Mex.*, ii. 21–30; *Bustamante, Muerte Morelos*, MS., 1–4; *Diario Deb.*, 10 Cong., ii. 530–3; *Dergeho, Inter. Mex.*, 3d pt, 470–93; *Dublan y Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 427–8, 433–51; *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 18–19, 35; *Est. May. Gral. Ejec.*, 1–2; *Escalera y Llana, Méj. hist.-descrip.*, 10–12; *Ferry, Révol. Mex.*, 47–93, 97–125; *Fernando VII., Decretos*, passim; *Fernando VII., Doc.*, 312–14, 337–49; *Fossey, Le Mexique*, 502–3; *Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 160; *Gachupines, Eterna Mem.*, 1–4; *Gallo, Homb. Ilust.*, iii. 597–8, iv. 221–95; *Gregory's Hist. Mex.*, 42–3; *Gonzalez, Hist. Aguascal.*, 83–5; *Hassel, Mex. und Guat.*, 135; *Jesuitas en Mex.*, 4; *Ilustrac. Mex.*, ii. 388–91, iv. 213–18; *Iturbide, Breve Diseño*, 1–10; *Jalisco, Notic.*, 2, 59, 72; *Kennedy's Tex.*, i. 272–5, 291–300; *Ker's Travels*, 209–98; *Kollenkamp, Unabhaengigkeitskampf*, 177, 320–9; *Lancaster Jones, Or. Civ.*, 5; *Ledo, Alocucion*, 1–8; *Lempriere, Notes Mex.*, 424–5; *Loreto, Mission Rec.*, MS., 59; *Méjico, Bosquejo Liger.*, 22–39; *Mex., Decreto Constit.*, 1814, 1–68; *Mex., Bosquejo Revol.*, 38; *Mex. Col. Dec. y Ord.*, 116; *Soc. Mex. Geog. Bolet.*, 2ª ép., iii. 144½–69; *Mex., El Virey de N. Esp.*, 2–14, 18; *Mier y Teran, Segunda Manifest.*, 1–127; *Mier, Vida*, 3–112; *Modelo de los Crist.*, 1–128; *Mex. and Guat.*, 116–26; *Mora, Rev. Mex.*, iv. 323–4, 439, 443–4; *Museo Mex.*, ii. 121–31; *Olavarria y Ferrari, El Conde de Venadito*, 1–160; *Orizava, Ocurrencias*, 41–127; *Quixano, Discurso sobre la Insurrecion*, 1–35; *Peña, Arenga Civ.*, 21–3; *Pedraza, Oracion*, 8; *Mendizábal, Carta Edific.; Torres, Desengaño á los Reb.*, 705–18; *Pap. Var.*, lxvi. pt ii.; *Columbini, Canto Endecas*, 1–40; *Vindicac. Escritores*, 2–6; *Exposic. á las Córtes*, 8; *Bergosa y Jordan, Carta Pastoral*, 1–20; *Pizarro, Reflexiones*, 1–11; *Apuntes para Hist.*, 4–8; *Pap. Var.*, clviii. pt lvi.; *Gutierrez, Doc.*, 5–14; *Pedraza, Biog. Caudillos*, 20–32; *Perez, Dicc. Geog.*, i. 524–40, iii. 665–74, iv. 179–88; *Perez y Comoto, Represent.*, 12–15, 18–20, 29–31; *Polynesian*, v. 45; *Quart. Review*, xvii. 548–53; *Id.*, xxx. 177–9; *Rivero, Mex.*, 1842, 151; *Rivas, Carta Past.; Rev. Sp. Am.*, 331–42; *Revista Cient. Lit. Méj.*, ii. 159–70; *Rockwell's Span. and Mex. Law*, 398–404; *San Salvador, Suscrip.*, 1–22; *Soc. Mex. Geog.*, 2ª ép., iii. 136–7, 145–9, 151, 157–8, 163–5, vi. 306; *Sosa, Episc. Mex.*, 214–15, 239–40; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méj.*, 6; *Thompson's Recoll. Mex.*, app. 277–9; *Vidaurre, Votos; Vigneaux, Souv. Mex.*, 436; *Young's Hist. Mex.*, 108–10, 114–17, 129–67; *Rosa (L. de la), Discurso*, 15–16, 31; *El Liberal á los Bajos Escritores*, 67–8; *Miller, Reflexiones*, 1–8; *Yuc., Compend. Hist.; Manifiesto á Todas las Naciones*, pt i. 1–66, pt ii. 62–6; *Zerecero, Rev. Mex.*, 116–23, 161–4, 212, 223, 244–57, 269–71, 295–6, 398; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, 57, 68–73, 74–116, 194–5, 312–17; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i. 744–5, ii. 129–30, 456–62, v. 381–403, viii. 685, ix. 26–9, 318, 741, 759–80, 847, x. passim, ap. i. 220–32, 274, 426–7; *Zamacois, Hist. Mex.*, ii. 723, vii.–x. passim, xi. 311, 360–1; *Guerra, Rev. N. Esp.*, i. 281–5, 337–8, 352–4, 491–2; *Mayer's Mex. as It Was*, 335; *Mayer's Mex. Azt.*, i. 291–300; *Interf. Brit. Govt.*, 7–14; *Mayer's MSS.; Arroniz, Bioj. Mex.*, 226–31, 244–9; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, i. 237–334, 343–68.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PLAN OF IGUALA.

1817–1821.

CAPTURE OF INSURGENT CHIEFS—FORT OF JACUILLA—DISPERSION OF THE JUNTA—PARDON ACCEPTED BY NUMEROUS LEADERS—A FLICKERING LIGHT—AFFAIRS IN SPAIN—THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION PROCLAIMED IN MEXICO—ELECTION OF DEPUTIES—THE RIGHTS OF INDEPENDENCE—ITURBIDE REAPPEARS—DIVERSITY OF POLITICAL OPINIONS—PLOTS TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTION—ITURBIDE IN COMMAND—WELL-DISGUISED DESIGNS—OVERTURES TO GUERRERO—INDEPENDENCE PROCLAIMED—THE PLAN OF IGUALA—MEASURES OF THE VICEROY.

SOON after the unfortunate Mina had met his death in front of Los Remedios, another disaster was sustained by the revolutionists at the famous hill of Cóporo. Bravo had reoccupied that stronghold, and repairing the defences, had hoped to maintain his position. At first his efforts were successful, and two assaults, conducted respectively by colonels Ignacio Mora and José Barradas, were repulsed with severe loss to the royalists. Colonel Marquez y Donallo was then sent from Mexico with an overwhelming force, accompanied by Ramon Rayon, whose thorough knowledge of the ground would be of great service to the besiegers. The place was now closely invested. In vain Guerrero tried to throw in supplies. Benedicto Lopez, while engaged in such an attempt, was captured with all his train; and this true patriot, who in one of the darkest hours of the cause had given it renewed life by his victory over Torre at Zitácuaro, was shot by order of the viceroy. On the 1st of December, 1817, the place was carried by assault, many of the

besieged being slain, or perishing in their attempt to escape down the precipice. Bravo, though dreadfully bruised in the descent, managed to conceal himself, and eventually made his way to Huétamo.[1]

Further calamities now rapidly followed, and a tide of adversity overwhelmed the remnant left of the first great leaders of the cause. Ignacio Rayon, persecuted by the present junta, had fallen into its hands, and been sent a prisoner to Patambo, there to await his trial. Verdusco, after narrowly escaping capture in November 1816, had been appointed in 1817, by the junta at Jaujilla, comandante general first of the province of Mexico, and then of the south. In neither region did he accomplish anything, and he retired to Purechucho, about half a league from Huétamo. The capture of these two chiefs was determined upon, and the execution of it intrusted to Captain de la Cueva and Padre Salazar. Their undertaking was not an easy one, but by falsely representing that they were going to join Bravo, they arrived with a small force near Huétamo without encountering any obstacle, and arrested Verdusco at Purechucho. Bravo, who had reached Huétamo two days before, on his flight from Cóporo, unbroken in spirit by suffering or disaster, gathered what force he could and attempted a rescue. His effort was unavailing, however, and Cueva and Salazar, having beaten him off, pushed forward with all speed to Patambo, where they surprised and captured Rayon and his family on the night of the 11th of December. Bravo was, however, still intent on rescuing the prisoners, and having collected about 300 men, would probably have succeeded had not Colonel Armijo, the royalist commander in the south, being instructed to aid Cueva and Salazar, arrived with a

[1] Report of Marquez, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1817, viii. 1326–7, 1384–99; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 7. Rayon was rewarded for his services by being made lieut-col. Bravo's account, as recorded in *Id.*, iv. 229–30, confirms this statement, though Bustamante makes the assertion that he had ascertained that Ramon Rayon, at great risk to himself, did not keep faith with the royalists, and was of no great service to them.

[illegible]

[illegible] He arrived at [illegible] just in time to stop the [illegible]. In the proceedings which followed every effort was made to spare the lives of the prisoners; and though Rayon was condemned to death on July [illegible], Apodaca suspended the execution of the sentence [illegible] of September [illegible], in the hope that some [illegible] of escape might be found. When a general pardon was proclaimed on the occasion of the king's marriage with a princess of Saxony, the viceroy was not slow to avail himself of it. Accordingly, in

[illegible] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.* [illegible]

[illegible] is preserved in the proceedings of Rayon's trial. *Hernandez y Dávalos*, [illegible]

April, 1820, further proceedings against the prisoners were stayed; and when during the same year the Spanish constitution was restored and the king decreed the release of all political prisoners, Apodaca, in spite of doubts raised as to the application of the edict to persons on trial in Mexico, liberated on his own responsibility all such captives by order of October 13th.[4] Bravo on his release was treated with much consideration by the viceroy, who restored his estate to him. He retired to Izúcar, where he lived in seclusion, while Rayon and Verdusco went respectively to Tacubaya and Zamora.

After the fall of Cóporo the viceregal government directed its attention to the destruction of the junta de Jaujilla, with the object of blotting out the official existence of the revolution. This junta now consisted of Ignacio Ayala, Doctor San Martin, a canon of Oajaca, and Antonio Cumplido.[5] The fort to which they had withdrawn was situated on an isolated rock in the lake of Zacapo, the only access to it being by means of a narrow neck connecting it with the main land. They had also rendered their position still more unassailable by diverting the current of a neighboring river, and thereby flooding the country adjacent to the lake. Aguirre was accordingly ordered to proceed from Valladolid and reduce this stronghold. On the 20th of December, 1817, he appeared before it; and though his offer of pardon to the authorities and

[4] No sentence was recorded against any other prisoner than Rayon. They had been removed from Cuernavaca to Mexico. Bravo was confined for nearly three years heavily ironed, and bore his captivity with dignified resignation. He was frequently visited by the viceroy, who expressed his admiration at his noble demeanor, by saying that he seemed like a dethroned monarch. Bravo employed a portion of his time in making cigar-cases, by the sale of which he procured the luxuries of a little tobacco and chocolate. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 667–8. Fuller particulars of the trials will be found in *Id.*, iv. 664–7; *Noticioso Gen.*, 1819, March to July, passim, Dec. 15, 1820, Jan. 21st, and April 5th; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1820, xi. 883; *Disposic. Var.*, ii. 45; *Córtes Act. Pub.*, i. 1820, July 11th, 16th, Aug. 24th; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 207.

[5] The two last-named had succeeded Mariano Tercero and Pedro Villaseñor. *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist. Rev.*, 307.

garrison if they surrendered without resistance was received with contempt, the members of the junta deemed it prudent to consider their own safety, and effected their escape a few days afterward, taking with them the printing-press and archives. Siege was now regularly laid to the place, Aguirre being strongly reënforced by Barradas, and by troops and artillery sent by Cruz. For two months operations were vigorously carried on,[6] the position of the besieged becoming daily more desperate. An attempt made by Father Torres to relieve the garrison failed; sallies made from the beleaguered fort were equally

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unsuccessful, and on March 6th the defenders capitulated on the condition that their lives should be spared.[7]

[6] A detailed account of the siege is given in Aguirre's report of March 7, 1818, in [illegible], 1818, ix. 573 et seq.

[7] The command of the fort, owing to the absence of Nicholson, had devolved on Antonio Lopez de Lara, assisted by captains Christie and James [illegible], who with Nicholson had accompanied Mina from the United States. Christie and Devers were opposed to the surrender, and being treacherously seized were delivered bound to Aguirre, who, detesting such perfidy, not only declined to bring them before a court-martial, according to viceregal orders, [illegible] saving their lives. Aguirre attributed the whole merit of [illegible] their [illegible] and gallantry. *Ib.*, 577. He also used his endeavors to obtain their return to the U. S., but they were sent to Spain. Aguirre was [illegible] Navarre, a relative of Mina, and a man of liberal ideas, [illegible] as well as [illegible], iv. 505–6; *Id.*, *Supl.* [illegible] iv. 1[illegible]; his generosity and gallantry are also corrob-

Meantime ill luck dogged the footsteps of the fugitive junta. Ayala and Doctor San Martin were captured;[8] and though another junta was formed in the neighborhood of Huétamo, it was similarly dispersed in June, and its president, José María Pagola, and secretary, Pedro Bermeo, shot in the cemetery of that town.[9] The year 1818 was otherwise fatal to the cause of independence and its chief supporters. Padre Torres, after his unsuccessful attempt to relieve Jaujilla, made his name execrated by his tyranny and violence. Seizing private property, and burning villages and haciendas, under the pretext of cutting off supplies from the enemy, he soon became a scourge in the land. His own officers began to hate him, and revolting against his tyranny, appointed Colonel Juan Arago as their commander-in-chief in his stead.[10] Re-

orated by Robinson, *Mem. Mex. Revol.*, ii. 170–1, 180. In 1820 he was still comandante general of Michoacan, and being aware of the royal amnesty decreed March 8th of that year, on the reëstablishment of the constitution, though directed by the viceroy to await a decision of the auditor de guerra on the subject, he at once set free all the political prisoners held in Valladolid, and reported having done so. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 700–1.

[8] They finally received the benefit of the king's pardon in 1820. For an account of the capture of San Martin and the dispersal of the junta, consult Quintanar's report to Cruz in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1818, ix. 419–23; *Torrente, Rev. Hisp. Am.*, ii. 471–2; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. 507–8; and *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 313–16. *Mariano Torrente, Historia de la Revolucion Hispano Americana*, Mad. 1830; 2 vol. 8vo, 1st, 116 and 447 pp.; 2d, 572 pp. This author had written before a work entitled *Geografía Universal*. In the introductory part of his history he gives important mining, agricultural, commercial, and other statistical data, together with a long essay on the state of society in New Spain. The main portion of the work gives in chronological order the leading events of the Spanish colonies in America from 1807 to 1819. The historical facts are mostly taken from Spanish official reports, though for the most part denuded of the scandalous exaggerations appearing in those reports; they appear in concise form, in good order, and in somewhat elegant language. But the bitter expressions and marked partiality of the author for Spanish domination render his statements suspicious. He is a strenuous defender of the Spanish king's divine right to rule both in Europe and America, the interests and rights of communities being ignored. According to his doctrine, the people who were fighting in America for their independence were rebels, ingrates, and infamous; indeed, his vocabulary hardly furnished epithets sufficiently strong to apply to them. However, in the midst of all this, he throws light upon many dark points that might have remained so forever.

[9] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1818, ix. 635–6; *Mendibil, Resúmen Hist.*, 364–70. Pagola was a resident of Salvatierra in Guanajuato, of which town he had been a regidor. Bermeo was formerly a notary of Sultepec, and secretary of the congress before its dissolution at Tehuacan. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 315.

[10] Arago was a Frenchman who had accompanied Mina, and was said to be a brother of the celebrated astronomer of that name. *Id.*, 309.

fidelity de Llano to the junta established at Huetamo. He was at last deserted by most of his followers and sought refuge alone from the pursuits and perished in the sierra of Guatusco, where the Zamora put an end to his brutal life by thrusting his lance through him.[1] José María de Liceaga, former member of the junta de Zitacuaro, was also murdered at the latter end of this year.[2]

Zamora, whither the royalist arms had never yet penetrated, was taken by Armijo in May, and Michoacan and P. Galeana were driven in flight from the district. Cuyuquilany, the last rebel stronghold in the Huasteca, was captured by Colonel Luvian in September, and the plains of Apam were pacified. During this and the two following years, in the encounters which were numerous and many of minor importance, the royalist arms almost everywhere prevailed. Bradburn was defeated at Chichihualco;[3] Nicholson and Yurtis were captured by Barragan at Puruaran, and shot;[4] the Pachecos were ceaselessly pursued, and finally accepted the pardon; Barradas' fort, which had been fortified by Guerrero, was taken, and that chief driven across the Mescala into Michoacan, where he sustained a serious defeat at the Aguamarca, at the hands of Ruiz;[5] and the harassed insurgents, driven

[1] He had with at the hacienda of Tulimán 1,500 pesos from Zamora at cards, and having received from the latter a favorite horse as pledge for the payment, refused to surrender it next day when Zamora produced the money. Zamora was instantly slain by a brother of Torres and others who were on the road with him. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 688–9.

[2] After narrowly escaping capture with Mina at Venadito, he retired to the hacienda de la Loja near Charapato and belonging to his family. Depredations on the land committed by Miguel Borja on a neighboring estate also belonging to the family, Liceaga proceeded thither to call him to account. Borja in alarm caused him to be intercepted by one Juan Esse, a known robber, who in his attempting to escape, ordered his men to fire upon him. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif.*, 18–19. The author states that there are discrepancies in the accounts he received of the affair.

[3] Agreda's report in *Gac. de Méx.*, 1818, ix. 634–5. Bradburn joined Guerrero some time afterward. He resumed his pardon on the arrival of Iturbide on the scene, who made him his aide-de-camp. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectif.*, 207.

[4] June 19, 1818. Nicholson was converted to catholicism two days before his death. *Gac. de Méx.*, 1818, ix. 1184–5.

[5] With the fall of Nov. 1819, Caldelas and Urtiza were taken and executed. See Iturbide's report in *Gac. de Méx.*, 1819, x. 1211–12, 1269–73, in which he

from place to place, sought the benefit of the pardon in great numbers, among whom were Ramsey, the brave defender of Fort Los Remedios, Tercero, ex-member of the junta, Pablo Anaya, fathers Navarrete and Carbajal, Huerta, Borja, Arago, Erdozain,[16] and other leaders.

Among the few insurgents who scorned to ask for royal clemency was Guadalupe Victoria, whom the government vainly endeavored to capture. A reward having been offered for his arrest, he fled to the recesses of the woods and mountains, and though chased for six months like a wild beast, he always succeeded in baffling his pursuers. For more than thirty months, without a companion, he lived in the fastnesses of the mountains, undergoing incredible sufferings from hunger and exposure. During this period he never saw a human being; his clothes were torn to shreds and reduced to a single cotton wrapper, and frequently for four and five days at a time no food passed his mouth. But with indomitable will he endured to the end.[17] By 1820 the pacification of nearly the whole of New Spain had been consummated, and the revolution was confined to the narrow limits of the cerro de la Goleta, where Pedro Ascensio still held out, and a portion of the district on the banks of the Mescala, to which Guerrero had retired after his defeat at the Aguazarca.

says that of Guerrero's 600 men, 400 were killed, and the other 200 fled day and night without rest or food till they were beyond the Brasilar, where the pursuit could no longer be continued. *Torrente, Revol. Hisp. Am.*, ii. 555; *Perez, Dicc. Geog. Estad.*, i. 178.

[16] Arago and Erdozain had come with Mina. In their letters to the viceroy they spoke of the other party in most offensive terms. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1819, x. 797–9. Zamacois takes them to task for their conduct, justly laying more blame on Arago. *Hist. Méj.*, x. 449–50. Arago later took part in all revolutionary plans in Mexico, from that of Iturbide till 1837, when he died a general. Erdozain at the end of the war of independence was a colonel, and retired to private life, never taking part in revolutions.

[17] *Ward, Mex. in 1827*, i. 229–31. Alaman would persuade us to believe that these were mere tales, and that Victoria had his hiding-place in the hacienda Paso de Ovejas of Francisco de Arrillaga. *Hist. Méj.*, iv. 640–1. Ward assures us, however, that he heard the story of Victoria's sufferings from himself, and it was confirmed by the unanimous evidence of his countrymen.

[illegible] desolating war, the coun-
[illegible] to taste the pleas-
[illegible] its first period had
[illegible] Morelos, Bravo,
[illegible] in vain: the sacrifices
[illegible] sufferings, the great
[illegible] character and high
[illegible] men like Victoria, Mata-
[illegible] and hundreds of others
[illegible] spirit shown in the
[illegible] Huajuapan, Cóporo, Som-
[illegible] other places had been bar-
[illegible] And this result was
[illegible] union among a number
[illegible] valries and jealousies on
[illegible] generally speaking, to the
[illegible] many leaders, who, in-
[illegible] under a central
[illegible] been made very useful,
[illegible] the country by their dep-
[illegible] The Indian masses had become
[illegible] to the respectable por-
[illegible] to seek the viceregal
[illegible] a time the general desire
[illegible] pervaded even the royal-
[illegible] evident by coming

[illegible] one faint light burning
[illegible] of the mountains in the
[illegible] indomitable patriot, Vicente
[illegible] flame, apparently, that
[illegible] fear nor inspired hope
[illegible] yet Guerrero would not let it
[illegible] and prayed and labored that the day
[illegible] when new men and new leaders would
[illegible] banner of liberty. But after the old
[illegible] was to be no such happy consummation.
[illegible] it was to be, however, but as the work
[illegible] men and unexpected combinations, as the

effect of unlooked-for causes. Independence was to be brought about by a change of front of the army, directed by a hierarchy,[18] and under the leadership of a late enemy to the cause.

Before continuing the narrative of affairs in New Spain, let us glance once more at doings in the mother country, inasmuch as they had a direct connection with the events leading to the final separation of Mexico.

A triumphant military revolt restored, early in March 1820, the constitution of 1812, and compelled the king on the night of the 7th to accept it, and to pledge himself to its support. The oath was wrung from the reluctant Fernando on the 9th by the ayuntamiento of Madrid, backed by the people;[19] after which he appointed, as was also required of him, a "junta provisional consultiva," presided over by Cardinal Luis de Borbon, archbishop of Toledo, and generally composed of men who used moderately the absolute powers placed in their hands.[20]

Early in April, 1820, the first news of the revolutionary movements in Spain reached Mexico, and, when confirmed, caused much excitement among the Spaniards, some hailing the change enthusiastically, while others deprecated it. Among the latter were the upper clergy, who feared that the liberals would push on the reforms to their prejudice, and therefore awaited with anxiety the installation of the córtes. The friends of independence, on the contrary, were hopeful that the new order of things would afford them means to attain some of their desires, such as a

[18] The incentive of the upper clergy was their hatred of the Spanish constitution. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, iv. 725.

[19] The royal order for the promulgation of the constitution in all the Spanish dominions is given in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1820, xi. 671–2.

[20] The men that figured in 1812, and suffered in 1814 for their liberal principles, now claimed their reward in the form of high office. The Mexican deputies, says Alaman, did not neglect themselves; hence Joaquin Maniau secured for himself the position of chief of the tobacco bureau in Mexico; Llave, Couto, Gastañeta, and Ramos Arizpe obtained canonries in New Spain. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 11–13.

free press, popular elections, and constitutional ayuntamientos. At first the viceroy resolved to make no alteration till he received orders from the court, withholding the news received from time to time as much as possible from the public. But a vessel which sailed from Cadiz on the 5th of April brought the information that a brig of war had sailed on the 24th of March, bringing orders to establish in New Spain the constitutional system; whereupon the merchants of Vera Cruz compelled Governor Davila, who could not count on the support of the garrison, to proclaim the constitution in that city on the 26th of May.[illegible] The same was done at Jalapa on the 28th. Fearing now that the European portion of the garrison at the capital would follow the example of their comrades in Spain, the viceroy, in accord with the real acuerdo, promulgated the constitution on the 31st, after its adoption by the sovereign had been made known in an edict. That resolve was hastened by Apodaca's knowledge of the influence freemasonry was already exercising in Mexico. There were but few masons in the country before the coming of the expeditionary forces, and these had preserved strict secrecy from dread of the inquisition.[illegible] The field and nearly all the company officers of those troops, as well as of the navy, were members of the order, and it was whispered that Apodaca was one of them, though this was not divulged. He was, however, sure that the masons had effected the revolution in Spain, and feared that those in the army of Mexico had been directed to promote one in the colony. The instructions received from the court were therefore rigidly carried out. The viceroy, audiencia, and other authorities took the

[illegible] proclamation would be that of independence, [illegible] as the [illegible] when he uttered them, [illegible]

[illegible] was the order of Mexico, Felipe Martinez [illegible] were Fausto de Elhuyar, the mineralogist, [illegible] of them Spaniards, who belonged to the order [illegible]

oath in form[23] on the 17th of June, the reëstablishment of freedom of the press was published, and the junta de censura was constituted, the same persons who were appointed in 1813 being elected;[24] the acordada, inquisition, and other privileged jurisdictions were suppressed, the administration of justice being established in accordance with the decree of the córtes of that year; and the corporations and authorities prescribed by the constitution were organized as soon as possible. The election of members to form the constitutional ayuntamiento of the capital took effect on the 18th of June, a few Spaniards being chosen.[25]

On the 18th of September the election of deputies to the ordinary session for 1820–21, of the national congress, and to the diputacion provincial[26] took place with no little disorder, but with less enthusiasm than that shown in the former constitutional epoch. The choice fell almost exclusively on ecclesiastics and lawyers, with a sprinkling of soldiers, merchants, and men of no particular calling, among whom were three natives of Spain, namely, Colonel Matías Martin y Aguirre, comandante of Michoacan, chosen for San Luis Potosí, Tomás Murphy, and Andrés del Rio for Mexico.[27] These deputies arrived at Madrid after the second session of the córtes had begun.

[23] The archbishop and his chapter on June 1st, and later, from day to day, the courts, officials, corporations, religious communities of both sexes, etc. The 9th of that month was appointed for the solemn promulgation. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1820, xi. 547, 553–5, 677–8; *Noticioso Gen.*, 1821, Feb. 16; *La Cruz*, vii. 548.

[24] The junta consultiva of Madrid on the 10th of March, and Apodaca in his edict of June 19th, urgently recommend writers to use the liberty granted with moderation, in enlightening the government and in promoting national welfare. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1820, xi. 591–4, 697–711.

[25] The election took place pursuant to the viceroy's decree of June 14th. *Dispos. Var.*, ii. 42–3.

[26] The territory within the jurisdiction of the junta preparatoria did not include Yucatan or Nuevo Leon, which were to have juntas of their own. The district of that junta comprised the following provinces: Mexico, Puebla, Oajaca, Guanajuato, Valladolid, Vera Cruz, and San Luis Potosí; Tlascala was constituted together with Huejocingo as a province detached from Puebla, and Querétaro another, separate from Mexico. The total population to be represented was set down at 2,886,238 souls; at the rate of one deputy for every 70,000, there were awarded to said district 41 deputies. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1820, xi. 683–8.

[27] At the installation of the córtes on the 9th of July, New Spain was rep-

Spain since the reëstablishment of the constitutional regime had been subject to continual disturbances. The reforms and innovations introduced during the first session of the congress were vigorously maintained and extended in the second, the American deputies coöperating with the radicals in the hope that the independence of Spanish America might be achieved. The upsetting of the government policy in the metropolis was not without effect in the ultramarine provinces.[28] In New Spain the desire for independence, though restrained, was not dead. Visions of its consummation without the terrible disorder which had hitherto marked the revolution began to present themselves, and a radical change in public opinion was taking place. The troops, the ecclesiastics, government officials, property owners, and other influential classes were no longer disposed to aid in putting down the revolt that seemed impending. Even the Spaniards were not animated by the same

resented by suplentes chosen in the same manner as those to the córtes of 1810, namely, Miguel Ramos Arizpe and José Mariano Michelena, both of whom had been active coöperators of the late revolution, the former in Valencia and the latter in Coruña. Arizpe had been confined since 1814 in the Carthusian convent near Valencia, whence he had been removed by Gen. Elío, for his connection with that revolution, to a more rigorous prison for trial; but the revolution having triumphed, on the 10th of March Arizpe was released, and was instrumental in saving Elío from being torn to pieces by the infuriated populace. The other members were José M. Couto, Manuel Cortazar, Francisco Fagoaga, José M. Montoya, and Juan de Dios Cañedo. With the exception of the last named, those suplentes, like the others of the Spanish ultramarine provinces, took part only in such discussions as interested their own party, which was the *exaltado*, or radical. Only suplentes represented America in the córtes of 1820. They urged the law of Sept. 27th for a complete forgetfulness of the past in the American provinces, whether wholly or partly pacified, to such inhabitants as should have recognized and sworn to support the constitution; all political prisoners were to receive unconditional amnesty. The same deputies, the most active of them being Arizpe, in a printed letter of Jan. 22, 1821, to the minister of war, called for the removal from office of viceroys Pezuela and Apodaca, generals Morillo, Cruz, and all other military officers who had distinguished themselves in the insurrection, for which reason they were represented as hostile to the constitutional system. The same deputies brought their influence to bear in favor of Juan O'Donojú's appointment to succeed Apodaca. *Arizpe, Idea Gen. sobre conducta*, 10–20; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 23, 33–5.

[28] Among the measures adopted by the ministers, with the forced sanction of the king and the approval of the córtes, were many involving radical changes, including religious reformation, namely, suppression of the Jesuits, abolition of ecclesiastical fueros, sequestration of church property, etc.

sentiments.[29] A general conspiracy against the government was soon inaugurated, agents being scattered throughout the provinces to make proselytes. The chief authority was derided; the government ridiculed and attacked on all sides by the press, at public meetings, and by corporations claiming powers which by law they did not possess. The example presented at the capital was readily followed in the provinces, and erelong the impression prevailed that before the end of the year another revolution would break out, headed by one or more of the pardoned leaders, or promoted by the clergy under the wing of the bishop of Puebla, who was strongly opposed to the new principles. Some even conjectured that the United States would revolutionize the country if the Floridas were not at once surrendered under the treaty of February, 1819. Such being the bent of the public mind, Odoardo, the fiscal of the real audiencia, recommended the temporary suspension of the constitutional system, and proposed that the country should be ruled under the laws of the Indies by a viceroy clothed with absolute powers. But it is easy to perceive that the remedy suggested was impracticable, when the universal tendency was to independence, the only difference of opinion being as to the best mode of effecting it.

Prior to the promulgation of the constitution, conferences were held at the rooms of Doctor Matías Monteagudo,[30] in the oratory of San Felipe Neri, and attended by men of high official and social standing,

[29] Alaman furnishes copious extracts from the important report made by the fiscal of the audiencia on the 24th of Oct. 1820, to the supreme government in Madrid, confirming the facts as stated in the text. The fiscal, José Hipólito Odoardo, was a man of extensive information, and had long resided in Mexico. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 42-9.

[30] A canon of the metropolitan church, who played a prominent part in the deposal of Viceroy Iturrigaray, and thereby won a high standing among the Spaniards. Alaman says that he obtained particulars of these meetings from the fiscal Odoardo, which were afterward confirmed by Licentiate Zozaya, who was Iturbide's attorney in some personal matters, and had many conversations with him on public affairs. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 50.

who detested the principles advanced in the Spanish córtes on religious matters, and were resolved to oppose the establishment of the constitution in Mexico. Among them were the regente Bataller, the high ecclesiastics, the ex-inquisitor Tirado, and several other Spaniards who disliked for their own private reasons a constitutional regime. But in order to carry out their plans a military leader of repute on whom they could rely was needed, and they bethought themselves of Colonel Agustin de Iturbide as the right man for their purpose.

I have in former chapters laid before the reader the brilliant services of this officer in the field,[31] and his recall to Mexico in 1816 to meet charges brought of illegal proceedings in securing wealth. Iturbide's relations with Monteagudo began at that time, and it was said that, affecting piety, he joined in the religious practices of the congregation of San Felipe Neri for the purpose of winning the doctor's good-will and consequent influence in his favor with Bataller, then auditor de guerra, and as such Iturbide's judge. Be this as it may, he was acquitted,[32] but was not restored to his command, nor was he again called into active service till 1820. The government, however, gave him the profitable lease of an hacienda near Chalco, formerly in charge of the society of Jesus. Iturbide was at this time in the prime of life. Handsome in person, elegant in mien, and attractive in manners and speech, he soon became a favorite in society. During his retirement he surrendered himself to the

[31] Iturbide's reputation is marred by many acts of cruelty and other offences of which he was accused by public opinion; some of the cruelties ascribed to him are indeed too horrible for belief, and as they have not been fully authenticated, it is to be hoped that the accusations were not founded on fact. The details appear in *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 245–6, 260–1, 386; *Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex.*, MS., v. 13; *Id., Garza Vindicado*, 6; *Ward's Mex.*, i. 265. Beltrami says that his horrible acts shocked both Llano and Calleja. *Mex.*, ii. 21.

[32] The inquiry into his conduct was stifled; in fact, the malversations he was accused of extended more or less to the whole army, which showed a disposition to make common cause with him. *Ward's Mex.*, i. 265–6; *Arroniz, Biog. Mex.*, i. 200.

dissipations of the capital, which caused serious dissension in his family, resulting in frequent ebullitions of his imperious temper. He had already squandered most of his ill-gotten fortune before the constitution was promulgated in Mexico; and his impoverished condition was the very one which might be expected to influence a man of his character to accept proposals that offered him an opportunity of winning rank, honors, glory, and wealth.[83] Overtures were therefore made to him; and in order to further his own projects, he pretended to enter into the plans of the malecontent party, and offered his services to the viceroy, who at this time was himself inclined to ignore the constitution, and contemplated maintaining the form of government as established by the laws of the Indies. Iturbide was aware that the object for which he was wanted was impracticable; but his aim was to secure a command, and to give the first impulse to a revolution which he hoped afterward to control as suited himself. The plan came to naught, however, through Apodaca being obliged to proclaim the constitution; but Iturbide did not fail to perceive that the very promulgation of the new system made a revolution inevitable, and accordingly formed his plans to direct it.

Clandestine meetings of different political parties were held in numerous places, and a great variety of opinions was expressed. The Spaniards mostly favored the constitutional system, or a modified form of it adapted to the conditions of the country. Among the Mexicans more diversified views prevailed; and though all wished for independence, they were divided both as to the mode of securing it and the form of government to be adopted. With regard to the first point, the extermination of the Spaniards, their expulsion from the country, and the more moderate pro-

[83] It is said that Iturbide had been in favor of his country's independence, but was opposed to the plans of the insurgents whom he fought with so much vigor. He made his ideas known to Filisola, then a captain and later a general of the Mexican army, as well as to his lawyer, Zozaya. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 56–7.

posal that they should be only excluded from public office were severally advocated as means of attaining it. As to the form of government, absolute monarchy, a limited monarchy with the Spanish constitution, or with one expressly framed for Mexico, a federal republic, and a central republic were the various systems discussed, each of which found supporters. Iturbide from the first manifested his repugnance to democracy in any form, and his preference for a moderate monarchy. His first intention was to make himself master of the capital;[34] but it was finally concluded by his party that it would be safer to begin operations in the provinces, with the capital as the objective point. Accordingly he applied to the viceroy for a military command, and was appointed to succeed Colonel Armijo as comandante general in the south.[35] On this occasion he had a long private conference with Apodaca, but what was said has never transpired. All that the public knew was that Iturbide was going south to extinguish the last embers of rebellion, with instructions, delivered verbally, to induce if possible Guerrero to accept the indulto. Having asked for the Celaya regiment, of which he was colonel, he started for his post, provided with short notes for Parrés, Echávarri, Anastasio Bustamante, Roman of Teloloapan, and Arce of the plains of Apam.

The plan formed was, that the deputies then about to leave for Spain should constitute themselves into a national independent congress at Vera Cruz, while Iturbide simultaneously proclaimed independence in the south. With this understanding, Iturbide had started for Cuernavaca, and the deputies Gomez Pedraza, Molinos del Campo, and Gonzalez Angulo for Puebla; but nothing was accomplished by them or

[34] Details of his plan are given in *Pedraza, Manif.*, 7–8.

[35] Armijo had repeatedly asked to be relieved. Iturbide's appointment was made on the 9th of Nov., and he left for the south on the 16th. *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, i. 1; *Mex. Bosquejo Rev.*, 45–6.

their colleagues, and becoming alarmed, the deputies, to the number of thirty-seven, finally embarked.[36]

The command given Iturbide was not the most suitable for carrying out his purposes, and he even accepted it with some reluctance.[37] It comprised the region extending from the districts of Tasco and Iguala to the coast, and was divided from one end to the other by the river Mescala, which separated the Goleta range, occupied by Ascensio Alquisiras as a subordinate of Guerrero, from the Sierra Madre on the south, where Guerrero had established his headquarters, in the vicinity of Ajuchitlan and the Coronilla Mountains.

Iturbide endeavored to prevail on the viceroy to place at his command the largest possible force and pecuniary means; and his correspondence is replete with flattering promises and assurances of devotion, couched in phraseology, however, carrying a double meaning.[38] The call for an increased force was apparently well grounded. The troops hitherto serving

[36] The deputies wanted independence provided it dropped from heaven. At one time they thought of joining Iturbide, but were deterred by the fear that the viceroy might be alarmed and frustrate Iturbide's plans. They accordingly embarked for Cuba. *Pedraza, Manif.*, 9–10. In this connection Alaman's biographer says that Alaman and other deputies were informed in Jan. 1821, by one of their number, Juan Gomez Navarrete, of Iturbide's plan for independence, and asked not to embark, but to meet in congress at the opportune time. There being good reason, however, to fear the government had now suspicions, they departed on the 13th of February. Even those who had no intention of going to Spain did so, but tarried at Habana to await coming events. *Alaman, Apuntes Biog.*, 12–13; *Id., Hist. Méj.*, v. 87–9; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 403–4; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 285–7.

[37] On account of the insalubrity of the climate. In 1811 he had been twice at the point of death from disease in the tierra caliente. The viceroy verbally promised to relieve him soon. Prior to his departure, doubtless with the view of better concealing his intent, he addressed a petition through the viceroy to the king for promotion to a brigadiership, and in a private note to Secretary Badillo asked his good offices with the viceroy to forward his wishes. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 389–90. Alaman declares that he saw the note in Badillo's possession. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 68.

[38] In a letter of Nov. 19, 1820, he pledges himself to embody in his future statements only such facts as behooved an honorable man, declaring at the same time that his purpose was to restore order and to operate to the viceroy's glory by bringing peace to the whole country. He assures Apodaca that after striking the blow he has planned, the troops may go back to their respective stations, and 'if in the mean time the capital (which God forfend) should demand attention,' he would rush to its succor, as well as to any other place that might need it. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 93–4.

under Armijo were scattered in detachments stationed at long distances from one another, and could ill withstand the continual attacks of the insurgents. Guerrero's forces, which numbered about 2,000 men well armed and disciplined, were in the heart of the district, and the rough nature of the country enabled him not only to stand successfully on the defensive, but at times to strike heavy blows.[39]

Iturbide established his headquarters in Teloloapan, the most central point in the district. On the arrival of the Celaya regiment, without waste of time he drew aside Francisco Quintanilla, captain of the third company, apprised him of his scheme, and asked if he could rely on his support and that of his brother officers. Quintanilla could hardly believe his ears; but his commander that same afternoon placed in his hands for perusal the famous plan that was proclaimed some weeks later in Iguala, and correspondence with residents of the highest standing in the capital. The signatures were convincing, and the captain unhesitatingly assured Iturbide that he might safely count on the regiment, then 517 strong.

Continuing his correspondence with the viceroy, Iturbide kept asking for more troops and money, while repeating his assurances of loyalty.[40] As far as lay in his power, Apodaca acceded to Iturbide's requests; and his disposition to do so gave rise afterward to a supposition that he was also in accord with the revolutionary plan then being concocted, an idea apparently corroborated by the ill success of the subsequent

[39] His army of the south well deserved the name. It was as efficient as that of the royalists, and its prestige was great. The coast of Acapulco, and a large portion of the provinces of Valladolid and Guadalajara, were its field of action. *Id.*, 92.

[40] In a letter of Dec. 10th from Teloloapan, using remarks open to suspicion, he speaks of the expediency of applying 10,000 or 12,000 to the furtherance of his plan, as it would save one year's operations, and perhaps 250,000 or 300,000 pesos. In another of Jan. 1, 1821, he says that the bishop of Guadalajara had lent him, 'de persona á persona,' 25,000 pesos, borrowed on interest upon his own estates. On the 15th of Dec. the treasury officials of Mexico were directed to place 12,000 pesos in Cuernavaca, subject to Iturbide's order. Two large remittances of war material were also sent him. *Id.*, 95–6.

military operations. But facts all tend to prove that the viceroy had no suspicion of Iturbide's real purpose. Apodaca was a faithful subject of Fernando, and his loyalty would not permit a project to detach Mexico from the Spanish crown.[41]

Iturbide's force on the 21st of December amounted to 2,479 men,[42] scattered throughout his district; and on the 22d he started from Teloloapan for the purpose of concentrating them, with the double object of assuming the offensive against the insurgents and placing himself in a position to effect the meditated revolution which, according to the plans formed, was to take place in March following. Dispositions were at once made to open the campaign. The troops were brought together and formed into strong divisions, and active operations opened. But sanguine as had been Iturbide's expectations of immediate success, a series of reverses followed. Both he and his officers were signally discomfited, both by Guerrero and Ascensio,[43] and the plan which he had formed of confining the former in the sierra lying between the

[41] Liceaga says that Apodaca's nobleness of character made him an easy dupe, and he could not suspect in others a perfidy he was himself incapable of. And yet he leans to the belief that he was in accord with Iturbide. *Adic. y Rectific.*, 396, 414, 420. The viceroy has been accused by some of having, together with the enemies of constitutional government, employed Iturbide to upset the new system and restore the old one. *Ward's Mex.*, i. 262. It was even asserted that King Fernando had a hand in the plan; and in proof of it a letter to that effect was published as coming from the king, which has been subsequently pronounced apocryphal. Apodaca himself afterward contradicted the whole story. His son, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, vindicated his memory from the aspersions thrown upon it by a writer named Rivero, Nov. 1847, in *El Español* of Madrid, which led to a correspondence between them.

[42] According to his report to the viceroy. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 396.

[43] On the 27th of Dec. Lieut-col Berdejo was defeated near Chichihualco at the Cueva del Diablo, and on the 28th Iturbide himself was routed by Ascensio near San Martin de los Lubianos. In his report of the 31st he made things appear as well as possible; but the fact is, that he met with a very serious setback. On the 20th of Jan. 1821, Lieut-col Moya suffered severely at Guerrero's hands, the grenadiers of the south being cut to pieces, and his line of communication interrupted by the occupation of Sapatepec by Guerrero. Iturbide's irritation at this disaster was great, and his report to the viceroy was exceedingly unfavorable to Moya, whom he also addressed in a very acrimonious despatch. Again, on Jan. 25th, Lieut-col Torres was attacked near San Pablo. *Id.*, 397–400; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 97–9. The fact that the official reports do not appear in the government gazette is proof of the seriousness of these defeats.

coast and the Mescala, and the latter to the cerro de la Goleta, and then destroying them in turn, proved abortive. In view of this stubborn resistance, Iturbide, who feared that a protracted struggle would frustrate his own project, opened communications with Guerrero, with the object of inducing that chief to aid him in his scheme. He had previously entered into some negotiations with Guerrero, to whom most favorable offers were made if he would place himself and his force under the Spanish government;[44] but the independent leader scornfully refused to accept proposals which were tantamount to the offer of a pardon so repeatedly rejected by him.[45]

Iturbide's real object had been to open secret relations with Guerrero, and he did not allow this rebuff to discourage him. On the 4th of February he again wrote, inviting him to a personal interview at or near Chilpancingo, and apprising him verbally of his design by the mouth of a trusty messenger. Half an hour's conversation, he said, would bring them to an understanding. But instances of royalist perfidy were too numerous, and Guerrero would not trust him; he, however, sent Colonel José Figueroa to arrange the terms proposed by Iturbide, which were consummated. They were to the effect that Guerrero with all his forces should aid the former in carrying out his project. This most important point gained, Iturbide continued to deal out in liberal doses his duplicity.

[44] He addressed Guerrero on the [illegible] of Jan., and promised that he should be [illegible] means for his support. He [illegible] that the deputies to Spain would [illegible] and that the king or some member [illegible] this did not come to pass, [illegible] with his sword and [illegible] The [illegible] correspondence may be found [illegible] 1-8; *Perez*, [illegible] *Bustamante*, [illegible] *Leg. Fund.*, 1-4; [illegible]

[45] [illegible] 2[illegible] writer one, and the authorship [illegible] and acted in the [illegible] 4 [illegible] Figueroa [illegible] California, filling the [illegible] general.

He informed the viceroy that Guerrero had placed himself with 1,200 armed men under the viceroy's government, on the condition of their not being regarded as pardoned insurgents, and had furthermore pledged himself to induce Ascensio, Montesdeoca, and Guzman to do likewise. The whole number of men thus placed at his disposal would be 3,500.[46]

Iturbide had meantime adopted other measures for the success of his enterprise in Nueva Galicia, Michoacan, Guanajuato, and elsewhere.[47] Two factors were still wanting, namely, a printing-press and money. The former was supplied by securing a press at Puebla owned by Joaquin Furlong. To meet the latter necessity, Iturbide brought his diplomatic powers into play. The conducta for Acapulco had been detained in the capital owing to its risk of capture, but Iturbide could now answer for its safety and offered to convey it to the port. Accordingly it was despatched with the consent of the agents of the Manilla merchants, who forwarded therewith the proceeds of their last received Asiatic goods, amounting to 525,000 pesos, which Iturbide of course appropriated.[48]

All was now prepared, and with no further delay, on the 24th of February, 1821, Iturbide, who was at Iguala,[49] issued a printed proclamation to the inhabitants of New Spain, setting forth the necessity of independence, and informing them that he had designed and framed a plan for the formation of national

[46] Despatch of Feb. 18, 1821. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 187–8; *Mex. Bosquejo Revol.*, 65.

[47] Captain Diaz de la Madrid went to arrange matters with Negrete, who though a Spaniard had liberal ideas, and was convinced that the Spanish dominions in America could no longer be held as colonies. Captain Quintanilla was commissioned to make the necessary arrangements with Quintanar, Barragan, and Parrés in Valladolid, and with Bustamante and Cortazar in the Bajío of Guanajuato. In due time he also obtained the assent of Lieut-col Torres. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 402.

[48] The agents, being friends of Iturbide, were supposed to have been aware of his intention. *Id.*, 408–9, 416. On the 24th of Feb. he wrote them to the effect that he had detained the funds, but that if the viceroy acceded to a certain proposal made him that very day, they would be forwarded to their destination. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 107.

[49] Where he had detained the conducta.



tendered him the presidency of the future junta gubernativa, enclosing a list of proposed members.[52] Letters were also addressed to the archbishop and others in Mexico. Whether or not Apodaca was implicated in Iturbide's project, as soon as he heard of the publication of the plan de Iguala, he took steps to oppose it, and issued a proclamation to the people warning them against revolutionary schemes, and advising them to pay no heed to papers intended to support them.[53] He also concentrated a force at the hacienda of San Antonio, nine miles south of Mexico, for the protection of the capital; made preparations for the organization of an army of 4,000 or 5,000 men, to be called Ejército del Sur, the command of which was given to General Liñan; and reappointed Armijo to the command in the south.[54] Nor were measures of policy neglected. A general pardon was proclaimed to all officers and men who should abandon Iturbide's standard.[55] His family was prevailed on to urge him to desist from his purpose, while at the same time he was proclaimed an outlaw, which was an act foreign to the constitution now in force.

[52] They were: Miguel de Bataller for vice-president, Dr Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, conde de la Cortina, Juan B. Lobo, Dr Matías Monteagudo, Oidor Isidro Yañez, José María Fagoaga, Juan José Espinosa de los Monteros, Juan Francisco Azcárate, Dr Rafael Suarez Pereda, Suplentes—Francisco Sanchez de Tagle, Oidor Ramon Osés, Juan José Pastor Morales, and Col Ignacio Aguirrevengoa. Among them were seven Spaniards. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 118–26; *Mex. Bosquejo Revol.*, 66–71, 104–9; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 442.

[53] Proclamation of March 3d, seconded the same day by the ayuntamiento of Mexico. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 224–8.

[54] *Gàz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 234–6, 241–4.

[55] Edict of March 8th; letter to Liñan of the 13th; proclamation of the 14th. *Id.*, 242, 265–7.

CHAPTER XXX.

TRIUMPH OF THE REVOLUTION.

1821.

DISCOURAGING PROSPECTS—INDEPENDENCE PROCLAIMED AT GUANAJUATO—VALLADOLID CAPITULATES—THE PROVINCIAS INTERNAS REVOLUTIONIZED—ITURBIDE AT QUERÉTARO—APODACA'S DEPOSAL—HIS CONDUCT DISCUSSED—HIS SUCCESSOR—BRAVO JOINS THE REVOLUTIONISTS—OPERATIONS IN PUEBLA AND VERA CRUZ—SANTA ANNA REPULSED AT VERA CRUZ—VICTORIA'S REAPPEARANCE—ITURBIDE ENTERS PUEBLA—ARRIVAL OF O'DONOJÚ—HIS ANTECEDENTS—TREATY OF CÓRDOBA—NOVELLA HESITATES TO RECOGNIZE O'DONOJÚ—ITURBIDE ENTERS THE CAPITAL—END OF THE REVOLUTION.

THE events immediately succeeding Iturbide's defection were not favorable to his aims; the viceroy, on the other hand, received from all sides expressions of loyalty. Even the troops that had seconded the movement did not show the resolution needed for such an enterprise; desertions daily occurred, owing to the influence of the masonic order, which had taken a decided stand in favor of the constitutional system, and the ejército trigarante was soon reduced to less than one half of its original number. Iturbide, fearing that he might be attacked by an overwhelming force, abandoned Iguala, and placing the money of the Manila conducta under a strong guard on the Barrabás hill, went on the 12th of March to Teloloapan, continually losing men by desertion. His position became perilous, and had Liñan marched in force against him, as the viceroy wished, the revolted army would have been compelled to disperse and Iturbide have been driven to seek safety with Guerrero on the

other side of the Mescala. The revolution would indeed have been smothered at the start. But Liñan failed to obey the viceroy's orders, alleging various reasons.[1] As it was, Guerrero was allowed to join Iturbide at Teloloapan without interruption.[2]

The two chiefs soon came to an understanding as to the plans of the campaign. Guerrero, with his subordinates Ascensio, Juan del Cármen, and others, was to keep the government's attention diverted, while Iturbide, who had decided to change his base of operations, proceeded to the bajío of Guanajuato.[3] Taking with him the money at Barrabás hill, he marched by way of Tlachapa and Cutzamala toward Zitácuaro, and thence to the bajío through Acámbaro and Salvatierra. This movement, which was certainly a wise one on the part of Iturbide, ought to have been foreseen and prevented by the government. As soon as the news reached Guanajuato that he was on his march thither, the independence was at once proclaimed in several localities by influential officers of the royal army,[4] and on March 25th Anastasio Bustamante, who had immediately espoused the cause, entered the capital of the province amidst the plau-

[1] One of them may have been well founded; namely, that not much reliance could be placed on the loyalty of the troops.

[2] At this time Guerrero was 39 years of age. His complexion was very dark and his hair long, black, coarse, and curly. In his early life he followed the occupation of a muleteer. According to his baptismal registry he was born in Tixtla, in August 1782; his parents being Juan Pedro Guerrero and María Guadalupe Saldaña, Indian tillers of the soil. *Zamacois, Hist. Méj.*, x. 668–9.

[3] Before Iturbide departed for the bajío he addressed a communication to the viceroy, reporting all that had occurred, placing his own conduct in the best possible light, and assuring him that the sentiment of independence prevailed throughout the country; he also sent addresses to the king and to the córtes to the same effect. Whether those documents reached their destination is not known; at any rate, they received no consideration. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 447–8; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 129–34.

[4] Cortazar at Amoles, March 16th, and at Salvatierra on the 17th. Pénjamo and other immediate places followed the example on the 18th. Anastasio Bustamante proclaimed at Pantoja the 19th. Celaya was immediately captured; and the comandante general Antonio Linares, who refused to join the revolution, was given a safe conduct to Mexico. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 448–9; *Mex. Doc. Relativos*, etc., no. 1; *Cos, Estadíst. Silao*, in *Mex. Soc. Geog. Boletin*, 2d ep., iv. 746; *Noticioso Gen.*, 1821, ap. 23–4; *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 53, 62–3; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 340–2; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 151–60.

dits of the people, the three guaranties of the plan of Iguala—religion, independence, and union—being enthusiastically proclaimed.[5] Under these favorable circumstances Iturbide advanced uninterruptedly to the city of Guanajuato, which he entered about the middle of April.

Bustamante's defection completely changed the aspect of the revolution. It increased the independent forces by about 6,000 men, and gave it all the resources of the province of Guanajuato, still one of the wealthiest in New Spain. The viceroy to no purpose tried to awaken in these troops their former loyalty. Proclamations were no longer of avail.[6] The army, composed mostly of creoles, as the reader is aware, was no longer imbued with the sentiments which for so long had kept it faithful to the oppressor's cause. A multitude of insurgents who had received the benefit of the pardon had, during the last two years, associated with the troops, and these learned, at last, that they alone had prevented the achievement of their country's freedom years ago, and that it was to them that she still looked for aid. The example of Guanajuato was speedily followed elsewhere; the resistance opposed to the triumphant progress of the revolution was insignificant and for the most part a mere show—terminated without active hostility. At Valladolid, before which city Iturbide appeared on the 12th of May, the comandante Quintanar, after spending a week in negotiations and protesting that his honor would not allow him to listen to any proposals for the capitulation of the city, adopted the self-deceptive course of deserting to the enemy on the 19th. This he did to reconcile his tender conscience—for he was in favor of independence—with his notions of honor as a royalist officer. On the following day the

[5] One of the first acts was to remove from the alhóndiga the heads of Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and Jimenez, and give them Christian burial with the utmost solemnity.

[6] They appear in the *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 325-6, 347-9, 395-6, 435. Promotion and decorations were offered to Bustamante, and rejected.

garrison, reduced by desertion to 600 men, capitulated, and was allowed to depart to Tacubaya,[7] and Iturbide in triumph entered the place of his birth on May 22d. Previously to his occupation of Valladolid he had an interview with Cruz, in the hope of inducing him to join in his plans. The conference was arranged by Negrete; and although Iturbide did not fully gain his object, he succeeded in the essential point, being assured that Cruz would remain inactive; and relying on Negrete's coöperation, he now was certain that Nueva Galicia and the internal provinces would not need his individual attention.[8]

On the return of Cruz to Guadalajara things for a brief interval remained quiet. Although many officers of the garrison were anxious to join the revolution at once, both Iturbide and Negrete considered the time hardly ripe, as Cruz had at his command the force under Hermenegildo Revueltas. On the 13th of June, however, it was known in the city that the troops at San Pedro had taken the oath to support the plan of Iguala; whereupon Laris took possession of the artillery and munitions of war, the garrison proclaimed the independence, and Cruz' authority was set aside. On the 16th Negrete entered the town, and the oath was solemnly taken on the 23d. The whole of Nueva Galicia followed the example, except San Blas, and that port was soon made to submit. Cruz proceeded to Zacatecas with Revueltas' force, whence, with the royalist authorities and public funds, he pushed on to Durango, where he arrived on the 4th of July. Many of his troops deserted on the way and returned to Zacatecas, which proclaimed the independence forthwith.[9] Negrete now went in

[7] A part of the Nueva España regiment remained behind. The deserters were organized into a battalion called the 'Union.' *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 468–73; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 154–8; *Id., Suplem. to Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 220–1; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 201–7.

[8] The interview took place on the 8th of May. See *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 150–3; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 455–7; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 159–64.

[9] Namely, on the 4th of July. Negrete wrote Iturbide July 6th that the desertion of royalist troops had been general. All the facts connected with

pursuit of Cruz, arriving in front of Durango on the 4th of August. Peace negotiations having failed, hostilities began, and for three weeks a brisk fire was maintained on both sides.[10] On the 31st of August, however, the town displayed a white flag, and on the 3d of September a capitulation was signed, by which Cruz and the expeditionary troops were granted the honors of war, and permitted to depart for Vera Cruz, to embark for Spain. The besiegers took possession of the city on the 6th of September, and the recognition of the plan of Iguala throughout Nueva Vizcaya immediately followed. The eastern provincias internas had meanwhile also yielded to the popular feeling. Arredondo in vain tried to suppress manifestations hostile to the government. The independence was proclaimed on the 1st of July, and being deposed from his command, he embarked at Tampico for Habana.

Meantime Iturbide had marched from Valladolid against Querétaro. The possession of this city as a centre of operations was equally important to the royalists and independents, and the viceroy was already concentrating troops at San Juan del Rio for its support. His design was, however, frustrated by the rapid movements of Joaquin Parrés, Colonel Bustamante, and Quintanar, who compelled Colonel Novoa, the comandante of San Juan del Rio, to capitulate on the 7th of June.[11] Other operations conducive to

the affairs of Jalisco and Zacatecas appear in *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 460–2; *Mex., Doc. Relativos*, no. 2; *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 80–2; *Gac. de Guad.*, 1821, June 27th to Dec. 22d, passim; *Negrete, Observ. Carta*, 10–13; *Gac. de Guad.*, 1821, June 30th, in *Vallejo, Col. Doc.*, i. no. 1, 1; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 272; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 207–15.

[10] Negrete was struck in the mouth by a bullet, which knocked out three upper teeth and a piece of the bone, and two lower teeth. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 462–3.

[11] That same day Iturbide was in peril of losing his life or liberty near Querétaro. On passing Arroyohondo, 400 royalists attacked him when he had with him only 40 chasseurs and 80 horsemen, his army being three leagues behind. Thirty of his men who were in advance, commanded by Captain Mariano Paredes, fought so desperately that they drove the enemy back with a loss of 45 men. Iturbide rewarded their bravery with a medal having on it the legend '30 contra 400.' This action was ever after known as that of the 30 against 400. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 162–3; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 475–6.

the capture of Querétaro quickly followed. A force of more than 1,000 men sent to its relief under the command of Concha was intercepted and returned to the capital; Bracho and San Julian, who were escorting a conducta from Durango with 800 of the expeditionary troops, were compelled to lay down their arms on the 22d; and the city was surrounded by the concentrated forces of Iturbide, amounting to 10,000 men. The position of the comandante Luaces was hopeless, and on the 28th of June he surrendered.[12]

While these events were occurring in the interior, mutiny broke out in the capital. The discontent of the expeditionary forces grew apace as reports of the uninterrupted march of the revolution followed each other in quick succession. Apodaca's lukewarm efforts to suppress it were regarded with suspicion, and it was resolved to depose him. At a meeting of the masonic order the conspirators decided to carry their design into effect on the night of July 5th, and preparations were made in the several barracks with well-guarded secrecy. On the eventful evening Apodaca was holding a council of war, and among the officers present were the major-generals Liñan and Novella, and Brigadier Espinosa. About ten o'clock a body of troops entered the palace while others surrounded it,[13] and their leaders, of whom Colonel Francisco Buceli was chief, presenting themselves before the viceroy, informed him that the discontent of the forces and their distrust in his loyalty had become so great that it was decided to remove him from power and

[12] Under terms of capitulation granting the honors of war to the besieged, who bound themselves not to serve against Mexican independence, and to embark for Habana at the earliest possible day. Meanwhile they were allowed to remain in Celaya. *Mex. Bosquejo Rev.*, 99–102; *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 74–80; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 164–78, 261; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 217–34; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 237–9, 435, 526–8, 615; *Gac. de Guad.*, 1821, June 27, July 4, 7; *Lic aga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 474–83.

[13] In number from 800 to 1,000 men belonging to the regiments Órdenes militares, Castilla, and Infante Don Cárlos. The marine regiment that had been Apodaca's guard of the palace, was in the mutiny. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.* v., 263–8.

install one of the sub-inspectors in his place, designating Liñan. The viceroy with much dignity asserted his loyalty, and claimed that he was free from blame in the matter of the losses sustained.[14]

Liñan, and also Novella, refused to accept commands thus mutinously offered to them; but the troops were obdurate, and threatened to make Buceli viceroy. In fact, Apodaca's life was in danger if he did not comply, and Novella, to avert greater evils, assumed the responsibility. Apodaca saw the uselessness of resistance, but when Buceli laid before him for his signature a paper in which his resignation was attributed to ill health, he tore it in pieces, declining to subscribe to such a lie.[15] He then wrote out his resignation with his own hand, stating that he freely and voluntarily surrendered to Novella the civil and military commands, at the respectful request of the officers of the expeditionary forces, on condition of his person and family being safely conducted to Vera Cruz.[16] On the followed morning he retired with his family to the villa de Guadalupe, but on the approach of the independents he returned to the city and resided in the Franciscan convent of San Fernando until an opportunity was afforded him to depart for Spain.

[14] The loss of the internal provinces he attributed to Cruz' inaction; the surrender of Valladolid had been entirely unexpected by him in view of the assurances he had received from Quintanar; as to Querétaro, he had done all he could to aid it, ordering Castillo's and Concha's forces to march there; in regard to Puebla, which was then in danger, Brigadier Llano had repeatedly said that he was not in need of more troops. Moreover, Concha had not marched to the support of Puebla because he had no confidence in his men. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 249–50.

[15] He indignantly added, that under the existing circumstances, it was grateful to give up the command, as it afforded him a silver bridge to cross out of so many difficulties, but he would not leave it dishonorably. *Id.*, 351.

[16] During the preliminaries Liñan had used harsh language to the officers, and challenged them 'uno á uno ó como quisiesen, tratándolos como merecian.' The soldiers repaid Apodaca's constant benefits with ingratitude. It is said that four days before, Buceli represented to Apodaca that he had lost 3,000 pesos from the funds of his regiment, and was in great distress. The viceroy relieved him from the predicament by lending him that sum without asking for security. His surprise was great on seeing Buceli at the head of the mutineers. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 265; *Id., Garza Vindicado*, 7; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 709; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 248–52.

Apodaca's rule lasted nearly five years, and may be divided into three epochs. During the first, namely, from September 1816 to Mina's arrival, his policy was so wise that within a few months he succeeded in restoring peace, a result the more remarkable from the fact that he could have no perfect knowledge of the men he had to rely on or of the resources at his command. By the possession of a high order of talent, quick insight, and a most extraordinary activity and energy, all of which he brought into play, admirable results were obtained. The insurgents were everywhere defeated and their strongholds taken. Still more worthy of admiration, in a royalist point of view, was his conduct during the second epoch, in connection with Mina's invasion. The operations of that campaign were marked by vigor and activity. The blows struck by the royalist troops were decisive, and after Mina's destruction, the work of eliminating from the revolution any elements still in the field was a comparatively easy one. Indeed, the revolution was almost dead in the middle part of 1820. The third epoch presents a strong contrast with the preceding ones. It was one of inaction and apathy in military affairs, at the very time when the utmost energy was demanded by the newly developed circumstances. In the cases of Mina and Iturbide, both of whom had independence in view, the viceroy's course was exactly opposite. In the former it was one of relentless war, and when the leader was secured death was at once awarded him; whereas toward the latter he displayed a conciliatory spirit and a want of polemical action, which looked much like intentional neglect. So marked a difference in his line of conduct laid him open to the suspicion that he had become faithless to his trust; a suspicion strengthened by the fact that he regarded the constitutional regime as extremely prejudicial to the country, while it was an undeniable fact that no change could be effected so long as Mexico remained an appendage of Spain.

It is not believed, however, that Apodaca directly or insidiously promoted Mexico's independence; but the fact stands that he did little or nothing to prevent its accomplishment by Iturbide; and indeed, he can hardly be blamed. Circumstances had changed; the men he had before at his call had been carried away by the feeling that the daughter should assume a position equal to the mother in the family of nations. The harsh opinion formed by those who tried to dishonor him had no weight with his sovereign. In September of 1822 he returned to Spain and was placed *en cuartel*, or waiting orders, in which situation he remained till called to the discharge of several high offices of trust, and to be otherwise honored.[17] The conde del Venadito died at the age of eighty-one, full of honors, on the 11th of January, 1835. By his marriage he had seven children.

The conde del Venadito's successor in Mexico by virtue of this military emeute, Francisco Novella, Azábal, Perez y Sicardo, was a mariscal de campo of the Spanish army, sub-inspector and comandante general of the artillery corps in New Spain, decorated with the cross of honor of Talavera, and was a knight of the military order of San Hermenegildo.[18] He officially communicated to the several authorities his accession to the viceregal office, the diputacion provincial being the only one which for a while refused to recognize him, but which finally, to avert anarchy, yielded, and administered to him the oath of office. He then published an address to the people, explaining the situation, and another to the soldiers. In

[17] In March 1824 he was made commandant-general of naval engineers; Nov. 25, 1825, viceroy of Navarre; next month the grand cross of the order of Isabel la Católica was conferred on him. The same year, Dec. 29th, he was appointed a member of the royal council. Dec. 1, 1829, he received the grand cross of the order of Cárlos III. May 1, 1830, he became captain-general or admiral of the navy, and director-general of the same, holding this last-named office till 1834, when it was suppressed, and he was chosen a *prócer* in the córtes of the kingdom. *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i. 258.

[18] All these names and honors headed his edicts at that time. *Dispos. Var.*, iii. 47.

the former he made known that he had appointed a mixed board of civilians and military officers to aid him in devising means to establish uniformity of opinion in defence of Spanish rights.[19] But whatever his wishes might be, his only recourse was to pursue the same policy as his predecessor. The audiencia had declined to administer the oath, on the ground that under the new order of things it was no longer a royal council. Several of the most distinguished military officers, such as colonels Llano and Luna, threw up their commands on various pretexts, and others, who were not at the capital when the change took place, expressed their disapproval. These circumstances tended to augment the confusion and the difficulties that the government was laboring under. Novella called the former governor of Tlascala, Estévan Gonzalez del Campillo, to be military governor of Mexico, and himself superintended the work on the fortifications that were being erected for the defence of the capital.

Since his release from prison, January 1821, Nicolás Bravo had been leading a retired life at Cuautla, where he was visited by Antonio de Mier, Iturbide's agent, inviting him to join in the meditated movement. An interview between Bravo and Iturbide at Iguala followed, which resulted in the former approving the plan and accepting a colonel's commission. Bravo, raising a considerable force, went to Izúcar and Atlixco. Being joined by Osorno and other chiefs of the plains of Apam, he established his headquarters at Huejotzinco. About the middle of April Tlascala fell into his hands. There he obtained twelve pieces of artillery, besides being joined by a number of the royalist garrison. He next went to Huamantla, and spread the revolution throughout the valleys.[20]

[19] The two documents appear in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 715–18; *Gac. de Guad.*, 1821, July 25, 28.

[20] Details of his movements are given in Hevia's and Concha's reports, em-

Meantime occurrences of no less importance had been taking place in Vera Cruz, where the promulgation of the constitution had caused great agitation. The news of Iturbide's revolt, and of the adoption of the plan of Iguala, caused the utmost sensation both among the people at large and the troops. A portion of the latter proclaimed the plan on the 13th of March at La Banderilla, a short distance from the port, and marched against Perote, hoping to take it by surprise. Though the project failed, the revolted force under Iruela was joined by the Dragones de España from Jalapa and other bodies. Great enthusiasm was now manifested in favor of independence. The chief command was tendered to and accepted by Lieutenant-colonel José Joaquin de Herrera, who had served with distinction under Armijo in the south, and had retired from the service after the fall of Jaujilla.[21] The revolution having at the same time spread toward the villas, Governor Dávila of Vera Cruz reenforced Orizaba and Córdoba. To the former place Santa Anna, then a brevet captain, was sent with some infantry and lancers. On the 29th of March he drove off an insurgent party; but Herrera having arrived the same day, he accepted the plan of Iguala.[22] The occupation of Córdoba by Herrera on April 1st followed. Santa Anna now started for the coast, where he had influence, and captured the town of Alvarado, whose garrison abandoned the comandante Juan Topete.[23] Meantime Herrera stationed himself in the province of Puebla, cutting off any assistance that might be sent to the city.

Brigadier Llano, commanding at Puebla, despatched

bracing the period from Jan. to May, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 303-5, 327-9, 378-80, 396.

[21] His force was now of 680 infantry and 60 dragoons. Iturbide on March 28th approved the names those troops assumed, namely, Granaderos imperiales, and Dragones de América. Herrera and Iruela were by him commissioned as lieutenant-colonels.

[22] Notwithstanding which he took the lieut-colonelcy given him by the viceroy. Subsequently Iturbide made him a colonel.

[23] Santa Anna treated him courteously, giving him a passport for Vera Cruz.

a large force under Lieutenant-colonel Zarzosa, to recover the villas of Córdoba and Orizaba, where the government had 60,000 bales of tobacco, but two thirds of his troops deserted to the enemy.[24] Herrera was now joined at Tepeaca by Bravo, against whom the viceroy had sent Hevia with a strong division. Here they were attacked by Hevia, and after a severe engagement, in which the loss on both sides was serious, Herrera abandoned Tepeaca, and followed by Hevia, retreated through San Andrés Chalchicomula on April 29th[25] to Orizaba and Córdoba, while Bravo went to the plains of Apam and occupied Zacatlan. Hevia, in attempting to capture Córdoba, lost his life, and the assailants, on the arrival of reënforcements to the besieged under Santa Anna, and a body of deserters from Jalapa, beat a hasty retreat to Puebla.[26] Santa Anna entered Jalapa almost without opposition on the 29th of May, thereby obtaining a valuable supply of arms and ammunition.[27]

Perote was also for a time in great danger of capture, but was relieved by Samaniego on the 11th of June, notwithstanding Santa Anna's efforts to prevent him.[28] The latter's next step was to attack Vera Cruz, the only other place in the province still held by the government. Previous to his march from Jalapa he issued a grandiloquent proclamation,[29] which, though little understood by the troops, greatly animated them.

[24] Hevia's last rep. in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 489-90. Among the prominent officers who joined Herrera were two sons of the conde de la Cadena, a son of the marqués de Sierra Nevada, and Lieut-col Miota.

[25] Herrera's report in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 192-4; Hevia's in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 419-25; *Diec. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, x. 536.

[26] A diary of the operations was published in Jalapa by Isassi, which was copied by *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 194-9; *Id., Supl.* to *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 213-18; *Castillo y Luna's Rep.*, in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 555-68; *Mex. Bosquejo Revol.*, 94; *Orizava, Ocurr.*, 149-55.

[27] Several cannon and upwards of 1,000 muskets. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 199-200.

[28] Viña's rep. in *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 617, 727-30.

[29] Drawn up by C. M. Bustamante, who had joined him. It was a unique document, in which the idea was for the first time advanced that Mexico was the heir of the rights and grievances of Montezuma's subjects, and her soldiers were called upon to avenge the Mexican eagle, which was trampled under foot three centuries ago on the plains of Otumba. *Cuad. Hist.*, v. 200-1.

On the 2d of July he assaulted the town, and sustained so serious a repulse that he retreated to Córdoba, where in his mortification he fulminated a vow of destruction against Vera Cruz. We will there leave him for the present, to take up Bravo's operations.

This chief, after the disaster at Tepeaca, had moved from Zacatlan against Tulancingo, whence Concha, who had been sent to the support of Querétaro, precipitately fled. At Tulancingo Bravo was joined by Guadalupe Victoria, who had emerged from his concealment in the mountains of Vera Cruz, and had issued a proclamation at Santa Fé on the 20th of April, exhorting his countrymen to maintain union and constancy in support of the new movement.[30] His appeal was responded to with alacrity, old insurgents rallied round him, and he soon induced the greater portion of the province to declare for independence. Bravo now joined Herrera and laid siege to Puebla. The attempts on the part of the viceroy to relieve the beleaguered city were feeble and ineffective. Concha, though sent with a large force, after executing a number of ridiculous movements,[31] returned to the capital, and on the 17th of July Llano, who refused to surrender the city to any other than the chief of the revolution, agreed to an armistice. Meantime Iturbide, after the capture of Querétaro, had moved forward against Mexico, entering Cuernavaca on the 23d of June. Thence he turned his course to Puebla, and on his arrival at Cholula, Llano capitulated.[32] Itur-

[30] Bustamante supplies a copy of his proclamation. *Cuad. Hist.*, v. 184–5. Ward relates that the news of Iturbide's declaration was conveyed to Victoria by two faithful Indians, who had been the last to leave him. They employed six weeks in their search for him, and when at last Victoria discovered himself to one of them, the Indian was so 'terrified at seeing a phantom covered with hair, emaciated, and clothed only with a cotton wrapper, advancing upon him with a sword in his hand,' that he took to flight. It was only on hearing himself called repeatedly by his name that he recovered his composure sufficiently to recognize his old general. *Ward's Mex.*, i. 231–4.

[31] In derision, the nickname of 'la trajinera' was given him; a term applied to the canoes which trafficked between the villages on the margins of the lakes near the capital. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 254.

[32] The terms of the capitulation were agreed upon by colonels Horbegoso and

bide entered the city on the 2d of August, and was received with the greatest enthusiasm. On the 5th the declaration of national independence was solemnly proclaimed, Bishop Perez delivering a discourse which filled Iturbide's soul with ambitious projects. The utmost uniformity of ideas existed between the two, and from this time the bishop's influence with the chief was conspicuously manifest. Frequent conferences were held by them, and the bishop has been regarded by many as having inspired Iturbide with the idea of turning the plan of Iguala to his own advantage.[33]

The fall of Puebla was complemented by the occupation of Oajaca, which occurred simultaneously. None of the royalist commanders in that province offered any serious resistance to revolutionary movements; and the independent commander, Antonio Leon, having entered the city of Oajaca on the 30th of July, the independence was speedily proclaimed throughout the territory.[34] In the Costa Chica the independents sustained some reverses. Acapulco, where the plan of Iguala had been proclaimed February 27th, was restored to obedience on the 15th of March,[35] and on the 3d of June Ascensio, having failed in an attack on Tetecala the previous day, was slain at a place called

Samaniego for Llano, and Cortazar and the conde de San Pedro del Alamo for Iturbide. The garrison was to go out with military honors, and such officers and men as wished to join the trigarante army were to be at liberty to do so; the rest to retire to Coatepec, to be afterward transferred to Habana at the expense of the Mexican nation. Samaniego persuaded the Mexicans who wanted to follow the fate of the Spaniards to join their country's cause. Vivanco retired to his wife's hacienda near Tezcuco. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 209–15; *Id., Supl.* to *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 236–7; *Gac. de Guad.*, 1821, Aug. 11, 58–9; *Rivera, Hist. Jalapa*, ii. 184–6; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 254–61.

[33] Some expressions in the bishop's discourse conduced to that end. From this time all Iturbide's operations seemed to aim at securing the throne for himself, in spite of the obstacles that he had himself placed in the plan of Iguala. *Perez, Discurso*, in *Pap. Var.*, cxxiv. no. 5½.

[34] Details of the campaign appear in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 215–22; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 261–6; *Orizava, Ocurr.*, 161. Celso Iruela was sent by Iturbide as governor of Oajaca; he proved a despot, and finally had to leave the province ignominiously. *Carriedo, Estudios Hist.*, ii. 29, 37.

[35] The arrival of the frigates *Prueba* and *Venganza*, and their coöperation with Marquez y Donallo's lieutenant, Rionda, brought on the restoration. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 257–8, 301, 319–23, 409–12; *Noticioso Gen.*, 1821, March 28, 30.

Milpillas in an engagement with Húber, who was coming to the support of Tetecala.[36] Nevertheless, the whole territory was soon lost to the royalist government, Acapulco, isolated and unsupported, being its only possession left on the southern seaboard.

Iturbide after taking possession of Puebla despatched his forces to lay siege to Mexico, in cooperation with troops which were on the march from Querétaro. When on the point of proceeding thither himself, news reached him of the arrival at the port of Vera Cruz, July 30th, of Juan O'Donojú, who had been appointed by the Spanish government to be the gefe superior político and captain-general of New Spain.[37] O'Donojú was received at Vera Cruz with the high honors due his rank, and as the road to the capital was intercepted, he at once assumed his official authority, the legal oath being administered to him by Governor Dávila.

Lieutenant-general O'Donojú, knight grand cross of the orders of Cárlos III. and San Hermenegildo, was of Irish extraction, as his name though somewhat changed indicates.[38] He had been captain-general of Andalusia, and had even held the highest position the nation could bestow below the throne.[39] His record had been that of a truly patriotic Spaniard and irreproachable soldier, and in political principles a lover of liberty.[40] It is understood that he was of high degree in the masonic fraternity. His appointment to Mexico has been attributed to the influence of the Mex-

[36] Húber sent his head to Armijo at Cuernavaca, where it was exposed to public view. This patriot's memory has never been honored by the Mexican government. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 195–7.

[37] He sailed from Cádiz the 30th of May, on the *Asia*, a ship of the line, and his long voyage was because the *Asia* had to convoy a considerable number of merchantmen, and to touch at Puerto Cabello. To Vera Cruz she escorted eleven vessels. *Id.*, v. 266; *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 841–2, 859; *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 9.

[38] He has also been supposed to have been of Irish nativity. *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 499.

[39] According to his first proclamation. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 859–62; *Gac. de Madrid*, in *Semanario Polit.*, i. 103.

[40] For which he was once imprisoned and tortured, bearing the evidence of it in his hands.

ican deputies, especially Arizpe. Hence the supposition on the part of some that he had come to accomplish the country's independence, but every step he took after his arrival at Vera Cruz tended to show that he had brought with him no special plan, and that he awaited the resolutions of the Spanish córtes. O'Donojú has been called a traitor for serving his country as faithfully as circumstances permitted. He saw at once how absurd it would be to attempt to uphold a lost cause, as did many in Mexico and Dávila in Vera Cruz, when no assistance could be expected from the supreme government that hardly had means to sustain itself. He therefore resolved, now that Mexico was irremediably lost to Spain, to secure for the reigning family of his country the throne about to be erected in the new nation, and to preserve the friendly relations between the two peoples. In his proclamation on the 3d of August at Vera Cruz,[41] he tried, however, to induce them to await the action of the córtes, assuring them that the desired autonomy would be conceded. To the military he spoke in a different tone, thanking them for their loyal service to the government in their defence of the city against outside aggression, and ending with the hope that friendship between the antagonistic bands, after the aggressors had been reduced and undeceived, would be restored, and the past forgotten.[42] Being confined within the walls, and unable to advance a single step without coming in contact with the independents,[43] O'Donojú opened relations with Santa Anna, and made friendly overtures to Iturbide,[44] who granted

[41] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 859–62; *Gac. de Guad.*, 1821, Aug. 25, 73–4; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 223–5.

[42] His words were: 'Tengo esperanzas de que *reducidos* y desengañados dentro de poco, volveremos á ser todos amigos,' etc. *Id.*, 225–6.

[43] The position was a painful one for the besieged; yellow fever was raging at the port, and in a few days carried off seven of O'Donojú's suite, and a nephew and niece, who died within two and a half hours of one another and were buried the same afternoon. Another niece was at death's door when he left the city on the 19th. One hundred soldiers and sailors of those who came with him had also perished. *Id.*, 227.

[44] In two letters, one official and one private; in the former Iturbide was

him permission to advance as far as Córdoba for the purpose of holding a conference with him, and despatched the conde de San Pedro del Álamo and Juan Ceballos, a son of the marqués de Guardiola, to receive and entertain General O'Donojú there. Meantime Iturbide went to the vicinity of Mexico, and established his headquarters at the hacienda of Zoquiapa, near Tezcuco, whence he apprised Novella of O'Donojú's arrival. Novella, however, resolved to effect no change in affairs till the new ruler should reach the capital.

After adopting some necessary military measures, Iturbide proceeded to Córdoba, which place he reached on the 23d of August. General O'Donojú arrived the same day, having been escorted by Santa Anna with every mark of respect as far as Jalapa. The chief paid a friendly visit to the general and his wife that same evening, and on the following day official conferences were held.[45] Iturbide proposed that by a treaty the plan of Iguala should be adopted as the only means to secure the lives and property of Spaniards residing in the country, and the Mexican throne to the house of Bourbon. O'Donojú assented, and in his sovereign's name recognized the independence of Mexico, and agreed to surrender the city of Mexico to the army of the three guaranties. This celebrated treaty consisted of seventeen articles, which confirmed the plan of Iguala with a slight difference in the third article. I give in a note an epitome of the instrument.[46]

addressed as 'gefe superior del ejército imperial de las Tres Garantías,' and in the latter was called a friend whose esteem he wished to merit. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 228–31; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 269; *Lic-aga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 489.

[45] Iturbide said: 'Granting the good faith and harmony with which we conduct ourselves in this matter, I suppose it will be easy for us to undo this knot without parting it.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 231.

[46] Art. 1. This America shall be recognized as a sovereign independent nation, called the Mexican Empire. 2. The government of the empire shall be a moderate constitutional monarchy. 3. The oath prescribed in art. 4 of the plan being previously taken, the following shall be called to reign over the Mexican empire. In the first place Fernando VII., Catholic king of Spain; by his renunciation or non-admission, his brother Cárlos; for the same rea-

Novella, on being informed by O'Donojú on the 25th of this arrangement, held a council of war, and it was resolved to continue the policy of adopting no resolution till O'Donojú should come to Mexico, and this was communicated to him in letter of the 31st.[47] Dávila, the governor of Vera Cruz, also refused to obey the captain-general's order, and being determined to defend himself at all hazard, abandoned the city, and retired to San Juan de Ulúa. In the capital, as the independents were coming up in large

sons, next after him, his other brother Francisco de Paula; next Cárlos Luis, a prince of Spain, former heir of Etruria and now of Lucca; and in case of his renouncing or not accepting, then such person as the imperial córtes may designate. 4. The emperor shall reside in Mexico, as the capital of the empire. 5. Gen. O'Donojú shall appoint two commissioners provisionally to make this arrangement known to the court of Spain, pending the formal tender of the crown by the imperial córtes. 6. A sufficiently numerous junta shall be constituted, composed of members prominent for their virtues, offices, fortunes, representation, and character. 7. The junta shall be entitled 'junta provisional gubernativa.' 8. Gen. O'Donojú shall be one of the members. 9. The junta shall elect a president chosen from among its members. 10. The junta's first act shall apprise the public of its installation, objects, and such other things as it may deem expedient. 11. The junta, after choosing its president, shall elect a regency of three persons to constitute the executive, and govern in the monarch's name till he shall assume the sceptre. 12. The junta shall rule according to existing laws, not clashing with the plan de Iguala, till the córtes form the national constitution. 13. The regencia shall convoke the córtes, in conformity with art. 24th of the plan. 14. The executive shall reside in the regency; the legislative in the córtes, and, till the latter are installed, in the junta provisional gubernativa acting in concert with the regency. 15. Under the new order of things, Europeans in Mexico may continue to be such, or become Mexicans, remain in the country, or go away as they may choose. The same privilege is granted Mexicans residing in Spain. 16. The above privilege shall not be accorded to civil or military employés, or to officers notoriously hostile to Mexican independence. Such must leave the country within the time the regency may designate, taking away their goods on payment of the regular export dues. 17. O'Donojú promises to induce the expeditionary forces to leave the country without further bloodshed. *Gaz. Imp. Mex.*, i. 85–9; *Mex. Derecho Intern.*, 1st pt., 384–96; *Gac. de Guad.*, 1821, Sept. 12, 97–100; *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 9–13; *Wilcocks' Despatch* in *Annals of Cong.*, 1821–2, 2099–2114; *Niles' Reg.*, xxi. 64, 80, 96; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 273–9; *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, ii. 62–6; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 232–4; *Id., Garza Vindicado*, 8–9; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 491–2. On the 31st of Aug. O'Donojú from Córdoba wrote the Spanish government, detailing the situation and the reasons that forced him to adopt the course he had taken. *Monitor Ultramarino*, 28–35; *Niles' Reg.*, xxii. 7–8.

[47] Liñan deemed it important to know first what were O'Donojú's powers; nothing could be resolved, as he had signed 'esos papeles,' meaning the treaty of Córdoba, within a region occupied by the enemy. Colonel Sociats could not see that O'Donojú had any special authority to sign away what he called the 'legítima dependencia de España.' He was for fighting till death. The whole correspondence, both official and private, may be seen in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 241–55.

mation to the inhabitants of the capital, calling on them to receive with open arms the ejército trigarante, which would assuredly complete the task it had undertaken of making Mexico a free and independent nation.[50] O'Donojú now hastened to Mexico, having in his correspondence with Novella finally assumed a threatening tone on account of his refusal to recognize his legitimate authority. The result was that Novella held a conference with O'Donojú, and expressing himself satisfied with the latter's powers as captain-general and gefe superior político, surrendered the command.[51]

O'Donojú, being now recognized as the chief royal authority, went with Iturbide to Tacubaya, where he received the congratulations of the civil, military, and ecclesiastical authorities. The only question which remained to be settled was the removal of the royalist troops from the capital. It was finally arranged that without any form of capitulation, and simply by virtue of O'Donojú's orders as captain-general, they should march out, and be quartered in Tezcuco and Toluca till opportunity offered for their embarkation; and that the trigarante forces should occupy the positions evacuated by them.

The plan was carried into effect on the morning of the 23d of September, and the same day the grenadiers, under Colonel José Joaquin de Herrera, occupied the fortress and palace of Chapultepec.[52] These arrangements being completed, Iturbide and the ejército trigarante, on the 27th of September, entered the capital in triumph. The chief, mounted on a black charger, was surrounded by his aides and

[50] *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 1003–4; *Doc.* in *Pinart Col.*, MS., i. no. 69.

[51] Till O'Donojú's entry in the capital Liñan held the military command, and Ramon Gutierrez del Mazo, whom O'Donojú had appointed on the 15th of September intendente, the civil rule. *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 976–7; *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 509; *Navarro, Itúrbide*, 110–16; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 292–312.

[52] The neighboring forest became thronged with people from the city without interference from the independents. Other positions were evacuated the same day by the royalists. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, v. 324.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Her [illegible] strife and [illegible] was won for her by aid [illegible] without [illegible] In the [illegible] of voices [illegible] reward he openly [illegible] private life with

[illegible] que unicamente deben [illegible] como abertas á [illegible] V. E. [illegible] de su [illegible] representa.' *Alaman, Hist.* [illegible]

[illegible] exercised in the nation's name [illegible] from Rome. [illegible] the day were deaf- [illegible] xxi. 244; [illegible] *Fund.*, 13; *Alaman, Hist.* [illegible]

the loving remembrance of the people on whom he had bestowed freedom.[55] But the flame of ambition was burning in his heart.[56] A project had been formed to proclaim him emperor that very day,[57] and visions of a sceptre were already flashing on his thoughts. But he knew that the time was not yet ripe.

[55] See his address of the same day, in which, after exhorting them to lay aside all animosity of race, and proclaim union and close friendship, he concludes with these words: 'Concededme solo vuestra sumision á las leyes, dejad que vuelva al seno de mi tierna y amada familia, y de tiempo en tiempo haced una memoria de vuestro amigo.' *Gaz. de Mex.*, 1821, xii. 1019–20; *Niles' Reg.*, xxi. 274; *Mex. Doc. Relativos*, no. 3.

[56] The words of Abad y Queipo, writing to the viceroy in 1813 in reference to Iturbide, were prophetic: 'That young man is full of ambition, and it would not be strange if in the course of time he should be the very one to effect the independence of his country.' *Arrangoiz, Méj.*, i. 234.

[57] See the account given in *Méj. Bosquejo Rev.*, 113–15.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE SOVEREIGN PROVISIONAL JUNTA.

1821-1822.

INSTALLATION OF THE JUNTA—APPOINTMENT OF A REGENCY—ITS CABINET—O'DONOJÚ'S DEATH—ITURBIDE'S REWARDS—ARMY PROMOTIONS—SURRENDER OF PEROTE, ACAPULCO, AND VERA CRUZ—MURDER OF COLONEL CONCHA—FLIGHT OF EUROPEANS—THE PRESS—POLITICAL FACTIONS—MEASURES FOR CONVOKING CONGRESS—ITURBIDE'S INTERFERENCE—CONSPIRACY—ITS FAILURE—CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY—THE REVENUE—THE MINING INDUSTRY—A FORCED LOAN AND ARBITRARY MEASURES—REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY—UNION OF CENTRAL AMERICA WITH THE EMPIRE—MEASURES FOR ITS REPRESENTATION—REFLECTIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE JUNTA.

AT half-past eight on the following morning the nominees selected by Iturbide for the formation of the junta provisional gubernativa, which was to be invested with the legislative power, assembled in the principal hall of the palace, O'Donojú being present. Iturbide briefly laid before them an outline of the principal matters to which they would have to give their attention, expressed his own obedience to their direction, and offered his services and those of the army for the maintenance of their authority. He then pronounced the junta formally installed, and the members thereupon proceeded to the cathedral, where the form of oath which had been agreed upon was administered, each individual swearing faithfully to observe the plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba, and honorably discharge the duties he had been called upon to perform. The junta then withdrew to the chapter-hall and proceeded to appoint a president,

Iturbide being unanimously elected. The te deum having been chanted, the junta adjourned until evening.

The first act of the junta when it reassembled was to issue the declaration of independence, by which Mexico was declared to be a sovereign nation, independent of Spain, with which it would maintain for the future no other union than that of friendship, on terms to be prescribed by treaty. Friendly relations with other powers would also be established. The act was signed by thirty-six members, the signature of Iturbide being first on the list.[1] The next proceeding was the nomination of a regency as representative of the absent monarch, and constituting the executive power. It consisted of five members.[2]

Those elected were: Iturbide, president; O'Donojú; Doctor Manuel de la Bárcena, governor of the bish-

[1] The signatures are as follows: Agustin de Iturbide, Antonio obispo de la Puebla, Juan O'Donojú, Manuel de la Bárcena, Matías Monteagudo, José Yañez, Lic. Juan Francisco de Azcárate, Juan José Espinosa de los Monteros, José Maria Fagoaga, José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, El marqués de Salvatierra, El conde de Casa de Heras Soto, Juan Bautista Lobo, Francisco Manuel Sanchez de Tagle, Antonio de Gama y Córdoba, José Manuel Sartorio, Manuel Velazquez de Leon, Manuel Montes Argüelles, Manuel de la Sota Riva, El marqués de San Juan de Rayas, José Ignacio García Illueca, José María de Bustamante, José Maria Cervantes y Telasco, Juan Cervantes y Padilla, José Manuel Velazquez de la Cadena, Juan de Horbegoso, Nicolás Campero, El conde de Jala y de Regla, José María de Echevers y Valdivielso, Manuel Martinez Mansilla, Juan Bautista Raz y Guzman, José María de Jáuregui, José Rafael Suarez Pereda, Anastasio Bustamante, Isidro Ignacio de Icaza; Juan José Espinosa de los Monteros, vocal srio. Two copies of this act were engrossed, one for the government and the other for the junta, the latter of which is preserved in the sessions-hall of the chamber of deputies. In this copy the signature of O'Donojú does not appear, as he was prostrated with sickness, the space where his name ought to be signed being left in blank. In the printed copies which were published it was, however, inserted, as he had signed the draft. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 52–5; *Mex. Col. Leyes Fund.*, 13–14; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, 3d pt., 493–4; *Voz. de Mex.*, Set. 27, 1881; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, iv. ap. 26–30. The other engrossed copy was sold by a faithless official to a virtuoso. Alaman, while minister for foreign affairs, learned that it was in France, and offered a large sum of money for it, but to no purpose. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 338.

[2] Although by the treaty of Córdoba it was stipulated that the regency should be composed of only three members, Iturbide and O'Donojú afterward agreed that five would be a more desirable number. Their opinion was opposed by Fagoaga and the bishop of Puebla, both of whom maintained that the smaller number would transact business more expeditiously, the latter exclaiming: 'Ojalá! que solo fuese uno el regente, y que tuviese dos colegas ò asociados como consultores.' *Id.*, v. 338–9.

earnest desire to save the country from further bloodshed. It is true that the position in which he found himself on his arrival as viceroy was such as to preclude any other system of political action. Indeed, he had no alternative but to return to Spain, and thereby compromise the advantages which the Mexicans were still inclined to concede to the Spanish government. He recognized the importance at so critical a point in affairs of securing not only the lives and property of Spaniards in New Spain, but the right of the house of Bourbon to the Mexican throne. He was, moreover, of liberal principles, and, not blind to the justice of the colony's cause, had the courage not to shirk grave responsibility by unmanly departure; nor can he by so doing ever be regarded as having betrayed the interests of Spain. O'Donojú was circumspect, and bore a reputation for exacting strict obedience to orders. At a later date, vague and unjustifiable imputations against Iturbide relative to the cause of O'Donojú's death were rumored. Although his demise removed from the former's course the possibility of future opposition, no credence whatever can be given to such malicious reports. In recognition of the services rendered by his conciliatory line of action, the junta decreed a yearly pension of $12,000 to O'Donojú's widow,[7] and recorded that positions should be given with preference to such members of his household as might wish to remain in the service of New Spain.

The election of a new member to fill the vacancy caused by O'Donojú's death fell upon the bishop of Puebla; and to supply his place as president of the junta Archbishop Fonte was appointed to that position. Fonte was, however, of too cautious and unambitious a nature to accept a distinction which entailed a compromised course of action; he therefore declined the honor on the plea of failing health, and Doctor José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer was elected in his stead.[8]

[7] As long as she resided in New Spain. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 51–2.
[8] *Disposic. Varias*, ii. f. 52–3.

On the 12th the junta,[9] in proof of the nation's gratitude to Iturbide, appointed him a yearly salary of $120,000, having previously conferred upon him the rank of generalissimo of the army and high admiral.[10] The title also of 'His most serene highness' was bestowed upon him,[11] and to his father, José Joaquin, were granted the honors and salary pertaining to a member of the regency.

While his own aggrandizement was thus secured, Iturbide naturally took care that the army should meet with a corresponding recognition of its services, and, as generalissimo, laid before the regency a list of promotions which he considered desirable. The regency approved his proposal and decreed the appointments without hesitation.[12] At his suggestion, also, two medals were struck off and distributed to the army; but as a distinction in merit was observed by the difference of metals, and the colors of the ribbons with which they were worn,[13] a jealousy was

[9] It now styled itself La soberana junta provisional gubernativa del Imperio Mexicano. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 71.

[10] 'Generalísimo de las Armas del Imperio de mar y tierra.' His salary was to date from the 24th of February, the day on which he proclaimed the plan of Iguala. With becoming modesty, Iturbide, in tendering his thanks, disclaimed all title to the salary corresponding to the period from that date to the 28th of September, amounting to $71,000, and resigned it for the benefit of the army. The regency ordered this act to be published, in order that the empire might have additional proof of the 'elevated patriotism and sublime virtues of its liberator.' *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 71–4. Somewhat later the sum of $1,000,000 was granted him, and 20 leagues square of the government lands in Texas. Owing to the course of events, these grants were never carried into effect.

[11] 'Pero en los escritos que se le dirijan se omitirá la antefirma para conservar esta distincion á la regencia.' *Dublan* and *Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 560. He was consequently addressed in official documents 'Serenísimo señor.'

[12] Pedro Celestino Negrete was made lieut-gen.; Anastasio Bustamante, Luis Quintanar, Vicente Guerrero, Manuel de la Sotarriva, and Domingo Estanislao de Luaces, maj.-generals; Melchor Álvarez, José Antonio Andrade, Marqués de Vivanco, and Manuel Maria Torres Valdivia, full brigadiers; Nicolás Bravo, José Joaquin de Herrera, José Antonio Echávarri, Miguel Barragan, Joaquin Parrés, and Juan Horbegoso, brevet brigadiers; and Luis Cortazar, Agustin Bustillos, the conde de San Pedro del Álamo, and Epitacio Sanchez, colonels. Promotions of subalterns and lower grade officers were to be effected later on the recommendation of the superior chiefs. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 93–7; *Empleos Milit.*

[13] The design represented two worlds disunited, the chain with which they had been previously joined being broken. The medal bore the legend, Orbem ab orbe solvit. One medal was bestowed upon those who had adopted the plan of Iguala during the period from March 2d to June 15th, the other

provoked which produced bad results. For the purpose of securing the tranquillity of the country, and the mutual support of the political and military powers, Iturbide on the 17th divided the country into five captain-generalcies, which he placed under the directions of Anastasio Bustamante, Pedro Celestino Negrete, Manuel Sotarriva, Domingo Estanislao Luaces, and Vicente Guerrero.[14]

The dissolution of the viceregal government was followed by the surrender of the few remaining places which had held out to the last. The only exception was the castle of San Juan de Ulúa, which by the end of October was Spain's solitary possession in the country. On the 9th of that month the fortress of Perote was surrendered by Captain Patricio Tejedor, the officer in command, to Santa Anna, who occupied the town the same day; and on the 15th the governor of Acapulco capitulated, the independent commander Isidoro Montesdeoca taking possession on the 16th. At Vera Cruz the climax in affairs had wrought a change in the opinions of the consulado and ayuntamiento, and those corporations were no longer eager to oppose the battalions of the independents as they had been a few months before.[15] Aware that a Spanish force had been ordered to the port, the consulado addressed a letter to the ayuntamiento on October 6th, setting forth the impossibility of successful resistance, and the destruction and disasters which would follow if hostilities were persisted in. The ayunta-

to those who had done likewise after the latter date to Sept. 2d. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 96; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 20.

[14] The provinces under the command of these captain-generals were respectively: the provincias internas of the Oriente and Occidente; Nueva Galicia, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí; Mexico, Querétaro, Valladolid, and Guanajuato; Vera Cruz, Puebla, Oajaca, and Tabasco; and the jurisdictions of Tlapa, Chilapa, Tixtla, Ajuchitlan, Ometepec, Tecpan, Jamiltepec, and Teposcolula. These latter districts were segregated from the captain-generalcies of Mexico and Puebla, and conferred upon Guerrero in consideration of his services. *Gac. de Guad.*, 31st Oct. 1821, sup. ii.

[15] In June they had united in sending to Spain a petition for assistance. Orders had consequently been given for the light battalion of Cataluña stationed at Habana to embark at once with 100 artillerymen for Vera Cruz. The consulado of Cádiz informed the corporation at Vera Cruz of these dispositions by letter of August 14th. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 341-2.

miento was, therefore, importuned to obtain from General Dávila an assurance that his future course would be so regulated as not to expose the lives and property of the inhabitants to danger.[16] Dávila, however, paid no attention to the representations made to him, and in pursuance of his previous plan retired on the night of the 26th with the few troops he had to the castle, taking with him the heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores, as well as the funds in the treasury, amounting to $90,000. At the same time he authorized the ayuntamiento to treat with Santa Anna, who was now approaching. The ayuntamiento at once appointed Colonel Manuel Rincon governor ad interim to arrange for the capitulation of the town. Santa Anna entered Vera Cruz on the 27th, and on the same day the ayuntamiento passed an act recognizing the independence.[17] Rincon was retained in his position as governor. A few days previous to this event Iturbide had received the gratifying news that the Yucatan peninsula had declared for independence, the oath having been taken in Mérida on the 15th of September.

As yet the oath had not been administered to the ayuntamiento, tribunals, and corporations of the city of Mexico, and the 27th of October having been appointed for the occasion, the ceremony took place with unusual solemnity. The form of oath exacted not only observance of the plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba, but also the recognition of the soberana junta and obedience to its decrees.[18] The same cere-

[16] For copy of the consulado's representation, see *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 145-55.

[17] *Id.*, i. 126-7. Santa Anna seems to have been somewhat outreached by Dávila. According to a despatch of his to Iturbide, dated Oct. 18th, he held a conference on that day in Vera Cruz with Dávila, who assured him that he would capitulate. So confident was Santa Anna that he writes: 'Aseguro á V. E. que dentro de ocho ó diez dias tremolará el pabellon Mexicano en la plaza y castillo de Veracruz.' *Id.*, 92.

[18] I copy the form verbatim from the bando published on the 13th: '¿Reconoceis la Soberanía de este Imperio representada por su Junta provisional gubernativa? ¿Jurais obedecer sus decretos, observar las garantías proclamadas en Iguala por el Ejército del Imperio Mexicano con su primer Gefe, los tratados celebrados en la Villa de Córdoba y desempeñar fielmente vuestro en-

mony was ordered to be observed within one month from that date in all cities and towns where the oath had not yet been taken.

Thus far Iturbide's plans were crowned with success, and the separation from Spain was accomplished. Under the new order of affairs but few Europeans continued in public office, even such as the government was anxious to retain declining to serve under the changed regime. Notable among those who left the country was Bataller, the regent of the audiencia, to whom Iturbide in vain expressed his earnest desire that he would remain. Despite, moreover, the encouragement given to Spaniards to reside in New Spain by the 15th article of the treaty of Córdoba, they began to emigrate in great numbers, influenced, perhaps, more by dread of private vengeance than disgust at the independence. Their fears, indeed, had been acutely aroused by the murder of Manuel de la Concha on October 5th, while endeavoring to make his way out of the country. Concha had made himself an object of fierce hatred by his ruthless execution of prisoners,[19] and his death was determined upon. When the army of Las Tres Garantías entered the capital he hastily departed for Vera Cruz. At Jalapa Santa Anna warned him that he had received information that his life was in danger, and supplied him with a small escort. Concha, however, believed that he could escape by disguising himself, and at dawn on the 5th left Jalapa in the dress of the common people. His precaution was useless. He was killed at a short distance outside the town.[20] The ef-

cargo en servicio de la Nacion? Si así lo hiciereis Dios os ayude, y si no os lo demande.' *Id.*, i. 102.

[19] He kept a register of the numbers he put to death, which he called his 'becerro de muerte.' Four years previous to his death, at the execution of some unfortunate captives at Huamantla, he produced this dreadful record, and the number then amounted to more than 1,800! See note in *Santa Anna, Muerte del Señor Concha.*

[20] His murderers escaped, despite the efforts made to arrest them. This gave rise to the suspicion that the authorities had no particular wish to apprehend them.

fect of this assassination upon the resident Spaniards was startling, and the number of departures increased.

Portions of the press, too, which now enjoyed full liberty, added to the alarm, certain writers making it their aim to keep alive the old enmity against the European interlopers, and impugning the guaranty of the plan of Iguala. To arrest this dangerous influence, the regency, by decree of October 22d, pronounced all authors of such malignant teachings guilty of treason against the nation, and subject to corresponding punishment.[21] The edict had little effect. The guaranties of the plan of Iguala and of the treaty of Córdoba were still attacked, and on the 11th of December a sheet appeared,[22] in which the author, Francisco Lagranda, exhorted the Spaniards to sell their property and leave the country, as the detestation in which they were held was so great that even Iturbide could not protect them, however willing he might be. The alarm created by this publication amounted to a panic, and extraordinary efforts to counteract the effect were made by the government. The departure of the mail was postponed till the following day, in order that the condemnation of the sheet might be simultaneous with its circulation in the country, and that the reiterated assurance on the part of the junta and regency of their determination to sustain the security of the lives and property of Europeans might be promulgated. Lagranda was arrested and condemned to six years' imprisonment, with the loss of his rights as a citizen, and an act was passed reforming the law regarding the liberty of the press.[23] But this decisive action failed

[21] *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 172-3.

[22] Entitled [illegible] *de las Garantías. Id.*, i. 341.

[23] Consult *Id.*, i. 340-1, 341-8, 377-80. In the decree passed December 20th the junta defined clearly the fundamental bases of the constitution, to write against or assume which was declared illegal. Owing to the arduous duties of the alcaldes in the capital, particularly with respect to their decisions relative to abuses of the liberty of the press, their number was increased to six. In Mexico City, and every other capital town where there were more than two printing-presses, two fiscals were to be appointed whose duty it would be to examine all publications before issued, and denounce such as contained infringements of the law to the alcaldes. Lagranda was fortu-

to restore confidence. So great was the number of Spaniards who requested their passports that Iturbide on the 15th laid a motion before the junta that the 15th article of the treaty of Córdoba, which granted Europeans full liberty of retiring with their fortunes from the country, should be suspended for ninety days; and on the 9th of January, 1822, it was decreed that no more passports should be issued until the congress which was to be convened passed its decision on the matter. Thus the Spaniards were deprived of the option of returning to Spain, and of the right even to withdraw their capital. Yet still the press succeeded in aggravating animosity against them. During this period it not only made the guaranty of the union the mark for its shafts, but also the form of government, the pomp displayed by which, under the circumstances of a scanty treasury, was ridiculed and many of its provisions censured.[24] The party

nate enough to escape with only a few months' imprisonment, being allowed the benefit of the indulto general granted when congress was installed in March following. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 512.

[24] At this time Bustamante published a weekly periodical, styled *La Abispa de Chilpancingo*, a few copies of which exist in the library of Madrid. He dedicated it to the memory of Morelos, and each number in particular to some insurgent chief. This was sufficient to gain for him the enmity of Iturbide, and when in the fifth issue he held up to ridicule the impecuniosity of the imperial government, he was arrested and imprisoned. His confinement, however, only lasted a few hours. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 407–8. During this year he also published his *Galería de Príncipes Mexicanos, Tultecas y Aculhuas*, compiled from some manuscripts of Boturini Benaducci, and began to issue his *Cuadro Histórico de la Revolucion Mexicana*, as I find a notice of these works on page 100 of the *Gaceta Imperial de México*, tom. i. The periodicals published in the capital were at first limited to the last-named gazette, which was the government organ, and *El Noticioso General*, which expressed the opinions of no political party, but was confined to the publication of decrees of the junta, resolutions of the government, and news from Spain. On the 5th of Dec., however, the *Gaceta del Sol* made its appearance. This was an important political organ established by the masonic order. The arrival of O'Donojú had given a great impulse to this society, the persons who had accompanied him having joined existing lodges and established others. One of these latter was named 'la logia del Sol,' and to it the periodical of the same name owes its origin. It was edited by Manuel Codorníu, a physician who had accompanied O'Donojú from Spain. The object of it was to sustain the plan of Iguala, to propagate the liberal principles which were gaining ground in Spain, to exclude the clergy from intervention in the education of the young, and to foment the Lancastrian system of schools, one of which was established in the capital, also under the name 'del Sol.' From this time the influence of the masonic orders waxed strong, and soon became a political power in the land.

spirit, also, which was being developed, now began to be publicly exhibited, and two opposite factions were respectively represented by writers who advocated a republican form of government on the one side, and the elevation of Iturbide to the imperial throne on the other.

The action of the generalissimo had not given that general satisfaction which was necessary to secure harmony between the two great parties that had for so long a time opposed each other. He had almost ignored the services of the military chiefs who had fought under the insurgent banners, and with the exception of Guerrero, Bravo, and a few others, the names of revolutionary leaders were not found on the list of recipients of rewards and promotions. Arrogating to himself the credit of the consummation of independence, he left entirely out of sight the merits of those who had previously striven so hard to attain it, and instead of displaying an impartial appreciation alike of royalists and insurgents—denominations which indeed had virtually ceased to exist when the two sides coalesced as independents—his marked preference for the former caused just offence to the latter.[25] The ill feeling thus early created soon assumed a practical form.

First among the important duties of the junta was the formation of a plan for the assembling of the national congress; and in this matter Iturbide must use all his cunning to further the ambitious views he secretly cherished. The system to be pursued in conducting the elections was, according to the treaty of Córdoba, that of the Spanish constitution; but this would not secure such a congress as the generalissimo hoped to see established. He wished it to be as subservient to himself as he had found the members

[25] This was particularly observable in Iturbide's anxiety to retain Spaniards in office. In his memorial, written at Leghorn in Sept. 1823, he says: 'Todos los europeos que quisieron seguir la suerte del pais, conservaron los empleos que obtenian, y fueron ascendidos sucsesivamente á aquellos á que tenian derecho por sus servicios y méritos.' *Carrera, Mil. y Pol.*, 13.

of the regency. If it could be composed mainly of representatives not gifted with remarkable intelligence, and at the same well packed with more sagacious adherents of his own, his aim would be wellnigh accomplished. Accordingly, before the junta had read the form of convocation which had been drawn up by the commission appointed for that purpose, the regency urged it not to come to any resolution before it had heard certain suggestions which would shortly be laid before it. This led to long deliberations as to whether the junta could make any change in the mode of convoking congress as laid down in the Spanish constitution without infringing the treaty of Córdoba and plan of Iguala; but it finally passed a resolution that it had that power. On the 6th of November, therefore, the regency suggested that the future congress should be divided into two chambers, the one composed of deputies elected by the ecclesiastics and the military respectively, a procurator for the ayuntamiento of each city, and an attorney for each audiencia; the second chamber, from which the above classes were to be excluded, to consist of representatives chosen by the people at the rate of one for every 50,000 inhabitants.[26] The proposal was approved by the junta, and as Iturbide mainly relied upon the army and clergy, he thereby secured to his interests at least one half of the future congress. But this was not all: on the 8th he laid before the junta a plan for the election designed by himself, the basis of which was that each profession and class should be represented by deputies chosen by itself.[27] This caused

[26] *Noticioso General*, 14th Nov. 1821, 2–4.

[27] The number of deputies to be elected by each class was not to be decided by the number which composed it, but by its importance and intelligence. Iturbide proposed that the congress should be composed of 120 numbers thus apportioned: of the ecclesiastics, 18 representatives; of the agricultural, mining, artisan, and commercial classes, 10 each; of the army and navy, 9; of the officials in the government departments and in that of justice, 24; of the professional faculties, 18; of titled noblemen, 2; and of the common people, 9. In the election of most of these deputies the popular vote was left out of the question, the ecclesiastical chapters, military staff-officers, the consulados, the master artisans, university faculties, colleges of lawyers,

further discussion. A commission, nominated by Iturbide himself, was appointed to examine and report on his plan, and on the 17th the junta, which had been assisted by the regency in its deliberations, arrived at its decision. The result was that Iturbide's plan was adopted in all the main points. It was made obligatory in those provinces which sent up four or more deputies that three of these, but no more, should be respectively a church man, a military officer, and a magistrate or lawyer.

It was also made compulsory that the agricultural, mining, commercial, and artisan classes should be represented; the provinces in which these pursuits respectively predominated were designated and the number of corresponding deputies to be elected assigned. The total number of representatives was fixed at 162.[28] During these proceedings Iturbide was very humble and unassuming in his protestations to the public. Neither his colleagues in the regency, his military comrades, nor himself, he proclaimed, were other than devoted subjects of the sovereign people.[29] The public weal was the loadstar of his aspirations, and he would withdraw to the retirement of private life if such were his country's wish. Nevertheless, no one was deceived by these asseverations.

and so forth being the electors. *Id.*, 12th Nov. 1821, 3–4. No more arbitrary plan could well be designed.

[28] *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 217–30. The apportionment was as follows: The intendencias—Mexico, including Querétaro, 28; Guadalajara, 17; Puebla, Oajaca, and Valladolid, each 14; Vera Cruz, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí, 7 each; Mérida, 11; Zacatecas, 4; Tlascala, 1. The provincias internas de Oriente—Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, Coahuila, and Texas, each 1. The provincias internas de Occidente—Durango, 23; Arizpe, 8; New Mexico, 1; Upper and Lower California, each 1. *Id.*, 231.

[29] See his proclamation in *Még. Bosquejo Rev.*, 130–3. This work, issued under the nom de plume 'Un Verdadero Americano,' was published in Philadelphia in 1822, and attributed to Rocafuerte. The writer was of strong republican tendencies and a denouncer of Iturbide; he states that he left Mexico and retired to the United States in order that he might not be a witness of the tyranny with which he saw his country was going to be oppressed. His book contains a valuable selection of proclamations, government papers, and discourses of the time, which the author deemed it necessary thus to preserve while they still existed, since it would be easy for the supreme power to collect and destroy such disgraceful documents, and thereby hide the traces of the path pursued in the attainment of the most shameless ambitious aspirations.

No one was blind to the fact that a blow had been struck at the liberty of the people in their sovereign right to select their representatives without restriction. It was generally understood that the limitation of the number of ecclesiastical, military, and juristic representatives, and their exclusion from the second chamber, were intended to deprive congress of the intelligence which particularly belonged to those classes owing to their superior education. Moreover, the declaration by the junta that the congress should be divided into two chambers was an assumption of a faculty outside its attributes. That a provisional junta should dictate constitutional laws to a future constituent assembly was ridiculous. But Iturbide expected to be made the president whenever the two chambers deliberated together, since obviously neither of the respective presidents could preside on such occasions.[30]

The consequence of this policy was, as might be expected, conspiracy. Such an arbitrary plan should not be carried into effect without an effort being made to prevent it. A plot was formed, the object of which was to secure the untrammelled liberty of election and the establishment of a republic. The conspirators were men already eminent, and among them were Guadalupe Victoria, Nicolás Bravo, the brigadier Miguel Barragan, Juan Morales, president of the supreme court of justice,[31] the padres Carbajal and Jimenez, Captain Borja, and other officers. Secret meetings were held at the house of Miguel Dominguez—with whom the reader is already acquainted as former corregidor of Querétaro—and it was decided to address a representation to Iturbide; if this failed to obtain redress, then his person was to be seized,

[30] Iturbide's remarks on the plan, written while an exile at Leghorn, cannot be read without a smile at the coolness with which its faults are charged to the junta. 'La convocatoria,' he says, 'era defectuosisima, pero con todos sus defectos fue aprobada, y yo no podia mas que conocer el mal y sentirlo.' *Carrera, Mil. y Pol.*, 19–20.

[31] Morales was editor of a paper styled *El Hombre libre*. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 24.

and a manifesto published setting forth the reason. The liberal ideas of Negrete being well known, a communication was sent to him at Guadalajara, but he despatched the letter to Iturbide, who took his measures accordingly.[32]

On the night of the 26th of November, with great display of military force, seventeen of the principal conspirators were arrested, among whom were those already mentioned. When the night's work became known Iturbide was surprised at the murmurings which arose. His act inspired a fear that he would not be disinclined to reëstablish the ancient form of despotism. The adherents of the prisoners were numerous. Rigorous proceedings against them would hardly be safe, and most of them were liberated shortly afterward. Victoria and Morales, however, were treated with more severity, the latter not being released till the congress issued its decree of amnesty, and the former only avoiding similar durance by escaping from his dungeon.[33]

In comparing the condition of New Spain after eleven years of strife with that at the commencement of the century, the contrast presents a striking retrogression. The revenue had been reduced so low as to be quite inadequate to cover the extravagant expenditure of the new government, which recklessly decreed large incomes and salaries, while

[32] This is the account of the discovery as given by Alaman. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 410. The author of *Méj. Bosquejo Rev.*, 135, charges other persons, including Ramon Rayon, with divulging the plot. 'Ellos—i. e., the conspirators—deberan estar muy agradecidos á D. Ramon Rayon, al teniente D. Juan Garcia, y á otros viles denunciantes que...la frustraron revelándola á Iturbide.'

[33] Bustamante was chosen by Victoria as his advocate. This writer states that his escape was effected by Doctor Codorníu—the editor of *El Sol*—Manuel Carrasco, and Juan de Echarte, all of whom were Spaniards. *Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 24. Bravo was released by order of Iturbide dated Dec. 19th, no proof of conspiracy being found against him. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 349–50. Alluding to this affair in his autobiographical sketch published in 1828, he says: 'Yo creí de mi deber en circunstancias tan críticas dar algunos pasos para secundar el espíritu público, y el fruto de mi tentativa fué una prision.' *Manifiesto*, 9.

at the same time it diminished its small resources by reductions in the import duties, excise, and other imposts in order to make popular the independence. A new tariff was formed reducing all import duties to the single one of 25 per centum ad valorem, and the alcabala to 8 per centum.[84] The tax on pulque was lowered from $3.12½ the mule-load to 4½ reales; so that the proceeds at the capital, which in 1810 had amounted to $283,336, only reached $87,591 in 1822. The productiveness of the tobacco monopoly was grievously affected by heavy debts owed to the growers of the plant, who, when funds were wanting wherewith to pay them, sold their tobacco to contraband dealers and immensely lessened the government sales.[85] Commerce experienced a violent convulsion. Free-trade was opened to all nations; and as commercial relations with Spain were closed, and those with foreign countries were not yet established by treaties, trade was reduced to the lowest ebb, with corresponding loss to the treasury. Nor did it assume any importance until revived by the settlement of foreign merchants in the country. The possession of the fortress of Ulúa by the Spaniards was also an additional cause of decrease in revenue. Vessels which arrived at the port of Vera Cruz paid customs to the governor of the fort, and their cargoes were smuggled ashore, payment of the Mexican duties being evaded. All industries had fallen into decay, lamentably so that of mining. Rich mines had been abandoned, machinery and reduction works destroyed, and the funds employed an-

[84] The prohibitions were removed from nearly all articles of foreign importation. The tariff was formed on a liberal plan, but serious mistakes were made. One of the few prohibited articles was raw cotton, while cotton goods, woollen cloths and stuffs, ready-made clothing, sugar, and all kinds of eatables were allowed to be imported. Such regulations affected the industries of the country, especially the manufacture of cotton goods, which was temporarily ruined. A copy of the tariff is supplied by Dublan and Lozano, who have inserted it in their *Leg. Mex.*, i. 567–87, on account of its historical interest as being the first Mexican tariff.

[85] In order to improve the condition of this branch of the revenue, Iturbide was authorized to raise a loan of $1,500,000, for which he applied to the cathedral chapters, with but little success. *Decreto* de 2 de Enero, 1822.

nually by the vicerегal government for the exchange of amalgam into coin had ceased to be supplied, which caused a great depreciation in the price obtained for it. At the same time the imposts on this industry were not only fully sustained, but exemptions on certain articles which had been granted for the purpose of promoting it had been removed. In its ruin it dragged down with it all other industries in mining districts, agriculture and mechanical crafts suffering in proportion. To remedy the evil, a commission was appointed to devise measures of relief.[36] This proposed the exemption of quicksilver from all duties, whether it was imported or extracted in the country, and that gunpowder should be supplied to mining operators at prime cost.

These and other liberal relaxations were decreed by the junta on the 22d of November,[37] and the resolution submitted to the regency, which, in view of the loss of at least $600,000 annually that the measure would entail on the treasury, urged that it should be modified. The junta accordingly again discussed the question on the 8th of February following; but convinced of the necessity of the measure, and persuaded that the inconvenience caused the government would be only temporary, confirmed its previous decree, which was published on the 18th. The scarcity of funds prevailed throughout the country, and the provinces, instead of being able to contribute to the general treasury, were compelled to appeal for subsidies. Yet in the face of these circumstances the new government, as I have said, was anything but economical. The grants to Iturbide, O'Donojú's widow, and others were heavy items; and the cost of ceremonial displays and celebrations of public rejoicing, though these

[36] Composed of Fagoaga, Brigadier Horbegoso, and José María Bustamante. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 440–1.

[37] *Dublan* and *Lozano, Leg. Mex.*, i. 563–4. Azcárate even proposed that the industry should be freed from every kind of impost for six years. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 191. His motion was not adopted on account of the great loss to the revenue.

were not out of place, was lavish; while the pay-roll, arrears, and clothing of the army called for large sums. In the emergency, the negotiation of a loan was the only means of relief; but how to effect it was the difficulty. The junta was well aware of the repugnance with which forced loans were regarded, and of the unfavorable impression and injury to its credit which would be created if it resorted to such a measure. It therefore endeavored to effect its object by an appeal to the corporations and wealthy individuals for voluntary subscriptions to the amount of $300,000, the monthly deficit. The call, however, was not responded to with that enthusiasm which contributors had shown little more than a decade before. The sum of $277,067 was all that was raised, and the junta felt compelled to employ the compulsory system in order to cover the monthly deficit. Its previous fears were now verified, and in the collection of the quotas assigned to individuals all kinds of difficulties were incurred, many persons even submitting to imprisonment in preference to paying their contingent. This led to measures still more arbitrary. In February an individual fine of $1,000 was imposed upon those who did not pay their quotas on the appointed date; and as coin was being noticeably withdrawn from circulation, the regency passed an order forbidding the custom-houses to issue the necessary papers for the exportation of money from any town. But this measure paralyzed internal trade and foreign commerce; and the junta modified it by allowing internal remittances to be made, but so trammelled the concession with red-tape regulations as to the destinations and employment of such funds, and by the imposition of 15 per centum deposits as security against shipments of money out of the country, that dissatisfaction was great; the idea, moreover, being conveyed that the aim was to exact this percentage as a duty on all Spanish capital that might be withdrawn in future. Though internal trade was thus somewhat relieved,

foreign commerce was not benefited, and the government had to yield to the incessant representations made to it. On the 16th of February, therefore, it decreed that money might be shipped abroad, but only for commercial purposes and with the cognizance and permission of the regency. All these measures were in distinct violation of article 15 of the treaty of Córdoba.

A full statement of the income and expenses of the treasury for the first four months of the independence was published in January 1822. From the official sheets it appears that the total receipts amounted to $1,274,695 and the expenditures to $1,272,458, leaving a balance of $2,237,[38] with which to commence the coming year.

After the occupation of the capital, it was found necessary to reorganize the army, no little disorder having been the consequence of the change in affairs. Officers' badges had been changed, and the devices of the banners altered; some regiments retained their old names, while others adopted new ones; desertion had greatly thinned the ranks, and arms were surreptitiously carried away; discipline was relaxed, numbers abandoned the active service for other employments, and confusion generally prevailed. On the 7th of November the generalissimo issued orders for the

[38] Thus exhibited:

	Receipts.	
From ordinary sources	$966,724	
Donations	30,904	
Voluntary loan	277,067	
		$1,274,695

	Expenditures.	
Infantry	$333,107	
Cavalry	408,669	
Army arrears	230,937	
Freight for army	19,325	
Iturbide's salary	108,462	
Government departments	150,005	
Cuerpos facultativos	21,953	
		1,272,458
Balance		$2,237

Gac. Imp. Mex., i. 452–3.

thorough reorganization of the military forces. Seven regiments of infantry, designated by numerical order, were formed out of the troops then in the city, the old names by which the different corps had been distinguished being suppressed; an eighth regiment was formed in Vera Cruz, and provision made for the formation of the troops in Nueva Galicia and other provinces into five more regiments, making the number thirteen in all.[39] The cavalry was divided into eleven regiments, also designated by numbers. The new system, however, caused great disgust; the old names were cherished by the troops with veneration as records of military glory, and the offence taken at their suppression was marked by increased desertion. By the end of the year the number of officers of all grades and that of the soldiers were ridiculously disproportionate.[40]

When the junta had concluded what it considered its most important duties, it occupied itself in affairs of little moment, many of which did not belong to the province of legislative power. Much time was frittered away in attention to such matters as the election of female prelates of nunneries, the appointments of provincials of regular orders, and questions bearing upon university regulations. Lengthy discussions, too, were held on affairs of real gravity, without any definite result being attained. Its neglect, moreover, of others was highly blamable. It is inconceivable that it should have taken no effective steps to establish friendly relations with foreign powers. Almost its first duty ought to have been to ap-

[39] *Mex. Notic. Hist. Inf.*, 3 et seq. The imperial grenadiers formed a separate battalion, which was the only one which preserved its name.

[40] By referring to the official army lists published in the *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 432, 436, 452, I find from the reviews held in Oct., Nov., and Dec., that the numbers of the forces, including non-commissioned officers, were respectively 16,447, 12,226, and 11,469. Of this latter number 3,161 were sergeants, corporals, and musicians, reducing the privates to 8,308. These were commanded by 1,802 officers, from the grade of col to that of sub-lieut. The proportion, therefore, of soldiers to officers of all grades was less than two to one.

prise the Spanish government and all foreign nations of the establishment of the new empire. All it did, however, was to pass a resolution for the appointment of four envoys to be sent respectively to South America, the United States, England, and Rome; while with regard to Spain, which ought to have met with the first consideration, a similar disposition was withheld, and reserved for the future action of the congress.[41] Thus the Spanish government was not even officially informed that the crown of the Mexican empire was held in reserve for Fernando if he chose to accept it.[42]

During the last few weeks of its existence, the junta was occupied in making preparations for the ceremonials to be observed at the installation of the congress on the 24th of February. Meantime the elections had taken place,[43] and the deputies were arriving at the capital. Events, however, had occurred in Central America which affected the composition of the national assembly. That country had declared its independence in September, and for several months had been divided in opinion on the question of union with the Mexican empire. The claims of different provinces to the right of individual independence were asserted with such heat as to lead to an outbreak of hostilities.

[41] *Actas de la junta*, 7th Feb. 1822.

[42] Spain was far from disinclined at first to recognize at once the independence of Mexico. A paragraph of a letter from one of the deputies to the Spanish córtes was published in the *Gac. Imp. Mex.* of Nov. 20, 1821, pp. 186–7; and the writer distinctly states the readiness of Spain to arrive at an amicable agreement without the further employment of force. But the base of the colony's independence would have to be the security of the property and persons of Europeans: 'Salvo esto, el derramamiento de sangre y el anuncio siquiera de un gobierno libre, el Congreso español se aviene á todo, y protejerá dignamente la Independencia. No hay ya ambicion de tesoros ni de mandar á 2 mil leguas.' The imperial government, however, acted on this essential point in a way directly hostile to the Spaniards by depriving them of the rights conceded to them by the treaty of Córdoba.

[43] The 24th of Dec. had been appointed as the day for the popular election of the members of the new ayuntamientos of the towns. Each ayuntamiento then selected one of its number as district elector. On the 14th of Jan. 1822, all the electors of each district met at the chief town and appointed the provincial elector, who in union with the other provincial electors similarly chosen appointed the deputies to congress on the 28th. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, i. 223–4.

Moreover, the provinces themselves were divided into factions, and anarchy for a time prevailed. At the instance of certain towns in Guatemala, a considerable force, under the command of the brigadier Vicente Filisola, had been sent by Iturbide in November to maintain order. In the midst of the confusion a communication, addressed by Iturbide on the 19th of October to Gainza, the captain-general of Guatemala, and setting forth the advantages of annexation, was printed and circulated in all towns, and an order issued for the popular vote to be everywhere taken on the matter. On the 5th of January the votes were counted, resulting in an immense majority in favor of immediate union with Mexico.[44] When this fact became known to the imperial government, it was necessary to provide for the representation of Central America in the congress, and as the proximity of the installation would not admit of the formally elected deputies arriving in time to be present at it, the government adopted the plan of appointing forty substitutes, natives of Central America, resident in New Spain, to represent those provinces. These were to resign their seats to the deputies as they arrived.

The provisional junta, now about to give place to the national congress, during the five months of its existence had committed many glaring errors. In the first place it had assumed prerogatives which did not belong to it, and its appropriation of the title 'soberana junta,' and that of 'your majesty,' by which it was ceremoniously addressed, was nothing less than a usurpation. No sooner was it installed than it arrogated to itself faculties more extensive than those enjoyed by the Spanish córtes. While its duties were clearly limited to the appointment of a regency, the convocation of congress as speedily as possible, and to the regulation of such matters only as admitted of no delay, it at once launched itself upon a comprehensive course

[44] *Rev. Cent. Amer.*, 3–11.

of legislation. With unnecessary haste it decreed an immense salary for Iturbide, and what was worse, elevated him to such high rank as to give him ascendency over the regency, and render the authority which he attained incompatible with that of any government. It changed the customs tariff, and made important alterations in the excise, matters which should have been deferred to the action of the congress. It violated the treaty of Córdoba, and wasted time on matters outside its province, instead of confining itself to the prompt despatch of important business. Moreover, its acquiescence to Iturbide, who was the proposer of all important acts decreed by it, signally marked the fundamental error it committed in his elevation—an error which entailed its own subserviency to him and consequent weakness. Nevertheless, it must not be considered that these mistakes were entirely the fault of the individuals who composed the junta. They proceeded rather from the political opinions which began to prevail after the installment of the córtes at Cádiz. The assumption by the junta of congressional powers was in keeping with the principles that had been practised in Spain, and in view of the inexperience of the members and their little political knowledge, it is not to be wondered that the junta mistook the object for which it was established, and imitated the precedents presented in Spain.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE FIRST CONGRESS AND FIRST EMPEROR.

1822.

THE INSTALLATION—TAKING THE OATH UNDER PRESSURE—THE FIRST MISUNDERSTANDING—POLITICAL PARTIES—MEASURES FOR RELIEF OF THE TREASURY—DISAGREEMENTS ON THE ARMY QUESTION—A COUNTER-REVOLUTION—GENERAL DÁVILA'S ACTION—ITURBIDE AND CONGRESS AT OPEN WAR—PROGRESS OF REPUBLICANISM—ITURBIDE PROCLAIMED EMPEROR BY A POPULAR EMEUTE—A STORMY CONGRESSIONAL SESSION—AGUSTIN I. RECOGNIZED—JOY IN THE PROVINCES—THE IMPERIAL FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD—DIFFICULTIES OF THE TREASURY—THE COUNCIL OF STATE—THE CORONATION.

DURING the elections Iturbide had not remained idle. His agents had been everywhere active in their endeavors to secure the appointment of representatives who would support his views. They had only been partially successful, however; the liberals had shown equal energy in their labors, and a large number of truly patriotic and enlightened men had been elected. Though the congress would not be so favorably composed as he had intended, the generalissimo had still a resource left by which he hoped to cramp the proceedings of the opposing party—namely, intimidation. A display of military force would effect this, and under such circumstances a form of oath could be exacted that would fetter free action. He was determined that the nation's representatives should not decide for it its form of government. They should be compelled to swear to observe the plan of Iguala. It was a monstrous insult to the dignity of a nation, the liberty of which he had so

lately proclaimed, to prescribe its government, and impose law upon the assembly appointed to frame its constitution. Shortly before the inauguration Iturbide, under the pretext of being able to attend to his duties with less interruption, withdrew to Chapultepec, which, as the reader will recollect, had been converted by Viceroy Galvez into a fortification.[1] Thither and to Tacubaya he also withdrew a great portion of the troops with supplies of ammunition and funds, secretly prepared to use force if necessary.

At daybreak on the 24th of February, salvos of artillery announced to the inhabitants of the capital that the first Mexican congress was about to be installed. No effort had been spared by the junta to render the occasion as brilliant as possible, and captivate the people with an exhibition of unprecedented rejoicing. The streets were carpeted, and gay with garlands, flags, and colored drapery, and the procession, by which the members were conducted to the cathedral, was imposing and magnificent. Preceded by the regency and junta, and accompanied by a splendid military escort, it marched to bands of music through long files of troops dressed in their brightest uniforms. To the ordinary spectator the sight was grand, and the unwonted display a befitting honor to the chosen ones of the nation. But the martial glitter was painful to the eyes and thoughts of many of the deputies, and they were not deceived as to its significance.[2] Opposition was useless, however, and the objectionable oath was taken, the representatives trusting to time and opportunity to correct matters.[3]

[1] *Hist. Mex.*, iii. 396–7, this series.

[2] 'Los diputados tuvieron que ceder á la fuerza; jurar el plan de Iguala y tratado de Córdoba el dia de su instalacion.' *Még. Bosquejo Rev.*, 139–40. Bustamante asserts that the troops were provided with ball-cartridges, and that their officers had received instructions of a very decisive nature: 'La numerosa escolta...y tropa tendida en la carrera, iba municionada con treinta cartuchos embalados, y á sus gefes se les habian dado órdenes muy reservadas y terribles para obrar al menor movimiento.' *Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 30. For a description of the procession and ceremonies, see *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 1–5.

[3] The oath administered was: To defend and maintain the catholic, apos-

When the ceremony was over and the congress had assembled in the hall appointed for its sessions, Iturbide delivered a congratulatory address, in which he took the opportunity of parading his own services while expressing his humility and unpretentiousness. He assured the congress that tranquillity prevailed throughout the land, notwithstanding the agitation which a few turbulent spirits endeavored to exçite by medium of the press; that dangers, nevertheless, threatened to disturb the even current—but only threatened; the congress would know how to consolidate the bonds of union. Other speeches followed, and when the junta and regency had retired the assembly commenced its duties. José Hipólito Odoardo was elected president and Tagle vice-president. Manuel Argüelles and Cárlos Bustamante were appointed secretaries, and resolution passed that the congress had been legitimately installed.[4] It then declared that the national sovereignty resided in itself as the constituent congress, and in order that the three powers should not be united, delegated the executive to the regency and the judicial to the existing tribunals. A commission was also sent to inform the provisional junta that its functions had ceased, and to cite the regency to appear before congress for the purpose of taking the necessary oath. When the members of the latter presented themselves an incident occurred significant of future antagonism. Iturbide, to whom had been

tolic, Roman religion; to guard religiously the independence of the Mexican nation; and to form a political constitution based on the plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba, establishing the absolute separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, so that they could never be united in one person or corporation. *Id.*, ii. 4.

[4] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist*, vi. 40. An interrogation composed of six questions was put to the assembly by the president. These were as follows: Was the congress legitimately installed? Did the sovereignty essentially reside in the Mexican people? Was the Roman Catholic religion to be that of the state to the exclusion of all others? Was a moderate constitutional monarchy adopted as the form of government? Would this monarchy be denominated the Mexican Empire? Were the offers of the throne to the princes of the houses of Bourbon recognized? *Id.*, 41-2. These questions gave rise to warm discussions, but the republican party was not yet strong enough to display opposition, and they were all answered in the affirmative.

conceded the presidential seat whenever he attended the sessions of the junta, whether by inadvertency or design, seated himself in the chair in the centre, leaving that on its left to be occupied by the president of the congress.[5] The breach of etiquette might have been passed over in silence but for the jealous interference of Pablo Obregon, a deputy for the province of Mexico, and decidedly hostile to Iturbide. With more spirit than caution, he emphatically claimed observance of conventional rules. The disagreeable mishap was adjusted by the condescension of Odoardo; Iturbide retained the seat,[6] and the oath was duly taken; but none the less was the germ of discord sown. Thus terminated the first session of the first congress of independent Mexico. The two following days were devoted to public festivities, and to the reception of the tribunals and corporations which hastened to offer their felicitations on the auspicious event.

On the 27th, congress commenced its more serious labors. Its members were almost immediately divided into three distinct parties, namely: the Bourbonists, who rigidly sustained in all its articles the plan of Iguala, and wished to erect a constitutional monarchy with a prince of the house of Bourbon as king; the Iturbidists, who likewise adopted the plan of Iguala, with the exception that they desired to place Iturbide on the throne; and the republicans, who ignored the

[5] The other four members of the regency occupied seats on the right and left of these chairs. Bustamante, who was seated near by, states that Alcocer was the cause of Iturbide's taking the first seat. 'Iturbide á quien guiaba Alcocer osciló sobre el que debería tomar: pero este le dijo con voz regañona que todos oimos este, este, y le indicó con la mano el principal.' *Id.*, vi. 44. This question of etiquette had already been discussed and decided, the right-hand seat being assigned to the president of congress, and that on the left to the president of the regency. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 50-1. The reverse positions would virtually have ceded to Iturbide the right to preside whenever the two powers deliberated together.

[6] Alaman incorrectly states that Iturbide vacated the seat in silence and took the other one. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 496. The author of *Még. Bosquejo Rev.*, 153-4, says that no change was then made, but the mistake was rectified in future; and such is the inference from Bustamante's account: 'Salióse del paso por la moderacion del presidente Odoardo.' *Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 44.

right of the army to impose any such plan upon the nation, and wished to establish a federal republic.[7] At first the republican party had little power to further its own views, and many of its members lent support to the Bourbonists as the only means of defeating Iturbide, whose assumption of the crown they considered a more immediate danger than the possible acceptance of it by Fernando, or a prince of his house. They argued that during the interval that must elapse before the latter possibility could be realized, a liberal constitution would be formed, which would fetter the faculties of the monarch, and in case of no Spanish prince accepting the offer, the views of the people would meanwhile become enlightened, and a more general inclination to a republican form of government have been developed. Even if Iturbide eventually mounted the throne, his power would be more restricted than if he attained that elevation under the present circumstances. To the Bourbonists the Iturbidists also attached themselves, with the view of promoting their own private schemes. Thus the former party was at first strongly predominant. As a party, however, the Bourbonists soon ceased to exist. The Spanish córtes, by decree of February 13th, declared the treaty of Córdoba illegal, null, and void in so far as the Spanish government and its subjects were concerned. This decision broke up the Bourbonist faction. Its republican element joined the ranks of the republican party, while the monarchists, who would have a king under any circumstances, and still secretly hoped to see some prince of royal blood on the throne, cast their lot with the Iturbidists. Henceforward the struggle was confined to these two parties, and the contest soon became violent.[8]

[7] The principal supporters of the Bourbonists' principles were: Fagoaga, Tagle, Odoardo, Horbegoso, Paz, and others; the republicans were represented by Lombardo, Echarte, Vaca y Ortiz, Anaya, Tarazo, and Cárlos Bustamante. The three parties were respectively supported by the press. Conspicuous among the publications which upheld Iturbide was the *Pensador Mexicano*, written by José Joaquin Fernandez de Lizardi.

[8] *Martinez, Sinop. Hist. Rev. Mex.*, 78–88.

[illegible] He had [illegible] addressed a [illegible] congress. This [illegible] a few days [illegible] congress for the purpose [illegible] was further [illegible] army. [illegible] he remarked [illegible] in arms, and [illegible] the generals were [illegible] This was evidently de[illegible] feeling on the part of the military against the members. Moreover, Iturbide had [illegible] his want of sympathy [illegible] leaders, and drawn a broad line [illegible] between the insurrection inaugurated by [illegible] successful revolution. He would have [illegible] the first heroes of independence from any share in the nation's gratitude. The congress [illegible] and the 16th of September was appointed as a day to be observed among the national festivals, whereby additional offence was taken.[11]

But the question of most urgent importance, and that which at once placed the congress and Iturbide in direct antagonism, was the condition of the treas-

[9] His words were: "En cuanto a mí yo aguardo con impaciencia el venturoso [illegible] Congreso nacional, logre presentarme como simple [illegible] santuario de la patria, para entregar el sagrado deposito que se ha [illegible]." *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 45.

[10] The one on the left of the president, which the congress insisted that he should occupy, though his party used every effort to obtain the higher one for him.

[11] *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 59.

ury. The monthly deficit had hitherto been covered by extraordinary resources, but such means were exhausted, and measures for permanent relief had to be adopted. In order to alleviate the strain, the congress reduced all civil and military salaries.[12] This afforded Iturbide an opportunity of further fault-finding: he considered that the measure was more prejudicial to the army officers than to those holding civil positions. On the 18th of March his representations to the regency relative to the pay of the troops were read before congress. They set forth that desertion had reached a serious extent owing to want of funds, and begged for $450,000 monthly in order to meet the pay-roll of the forces in the capital. It naturally occurred to the party opposed to Iturbide that so large an army, and especially its presence in the capital, was unnecessary, and Brigadier Herrera, deputy for Vera Cruz, asked the minister of war to explain why the greater portion of the troops was retained in the city when they could be supported at less cost in the provinces. This question was a direct attack upon Iturbide, whose main hopes were centred in the army. The regency was forthwith requested to inform the congress of what number of troops it would be desirable that the standard army should consist. Iturbide thereupon held a council with his generals, and the figure was placed at 35,900, besides the reëstablishment of the provincial militia and formation of civic companies. But congress disallowed an estimate thus arrived at, and passed a resolution that the regency should proceed according to rule in the matter, forming its estimate in conjunction with a council of the ministers, and not of generals. Long and angry discussions followed, involving also the question of pay,[13] and marked by irritating recriminations.

[12] It decreed that the highest salary should not be more than 6,000 pesos, and that a discount on a descending scale from 20 per cent to 8 per cent should be imposed on all salaries from 6,000 pesos to $900. The only exceptions were the stipends paid to Iturbide, his father, and O'Donojú's widow. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 125.

[13] *Sesion del Congreso*, 22 de Marzo.

But the assembly was not going to be led by the ears, as had been the junta, and maintained its resolution. Thus within a month hostilities commenced, the regency charging the congress with neglect in attending to the urgent needs of the treasury, with the design of destroying "the most meritorious part of the community"—namely, the army—and the congress accusing the regency of wasteful expenditure, and of failure to put in execution the measures adopted for temporary relief.[14] Indeed, the congress was hard tried, and whether it resorted for relief to the church and religious orders, to the temporalities of the Jesuits, or to the reëstablishment of abolished duties, its measures were more or less generally unpopular, and met with opposition.

The want of union was not without result, and General Dávila believed that the restoration of the Spanish power might still be effected by a counter-revolution. Owing to the want of transports, many of the Spanish forces which had capitulated had not yet left the country, but were stationed at different places,[15] waiting for opportunities to depart. These troops, having been allowed to retain their arms, had already shown symptoms of the disgust which they felt at the termination of the war, and at having to retire ingloriously from a land which had been kept in subjection for three centuries by their forefathers.

[14] By decree of March 11th the congress had left it to the regency to employ such means as its faculties allowed, until a regular system of finance could be adopted. It moreover ordered that the amounts which had been collected of the loan of $1,500,000, which Iturbide had been authorized by the junta to raise, should be applied to the support of the troops. *Decreto del Congreso*, 16 de Marzo, 1822. By the same decree the government was authorized to sell property of the extinguished Jesuit society, but only in case the above means failed to meet the emergency. This measure met with much opposition. The extinction of this society was one of the causes which had led to the insurrection of 1810, and it was generally hoped that its restoration would be effected by the independence. A large number of ecclesiastical and civil corporations in 1821 had petitioned the junta to reëstablish the order. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. ap. doc. 17.

[15] There were 1,163 soldiers with 186 officers at Jalapa, and 1,400 more at Toluca, Cuautitlan, Tezcuco, and Cuernavaca. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 62.

They could ill restrain their contempt for the race that had triumphed at last, and in January, owing to disturbances which had occurred in Toluca, Iturbide gave orders to disarm them. They were in no mood, however, to submit to such a humiliation, and assumed so threatening an attitude that at the instance of General Liñan, who had been sent to carry out the order, they were allowed to retain their arms. The first division was at once marched to Vera Cruz for embarkation, and quiet prevailed for a time. But Dávila, observing the disappointment caused to many by the yet uncertain result of the late revolution, and the strong party antagonism that had been developed, communicated to the officers of the Spanish troops his project of exciting a counter-revolution; and during March secret meetings were held in a cell of the Franciscan convent at Tezcuco. Iturbide was, perhaps, not ignorant of what was being meditated; and it was even believed by some that he encouraged and fomented the movement to further his own schemes.[16]

Be this as it may, an outbreak directed against the independence of the country would enhance his own importance, prove the necessity of keeping on foot a large standing army, and afford him an opportunity of attacking those Spanish members of the congress who were opposed to him. When the dissension between Iturbide and the assembly became serious Dávila hoped to win back the former to his allegiance to Spain. On the 23d of March he addressed a letter to Iturbide, representing to him the impossibility of his system being successful on account of the opposition of many members of the congress, and unfolding his own plan, invited him to aid in its consummation, while promising him in the name of the king not only forgetfulness of the past, but also recompense for his services. Iturbide received this

[16] 'Segun el dictámen de hombres políticos, él mismo lo promovió por medio de sus agentes, con objeto de sorprender el congreso y proclamarse emperador el dia 3 del propio abril.' *Még. Bosquejo Rev.*, 146. See also *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 72-3.

letter on the 2d of April, and on the same day Colonel Buceli, who was temporarily in command of the regiment of Órdenes, placed it under arms and marched from Tezcuco to Xuchi, expecting to unite there with the battalion of Castile stationed at Cuernavaca, thence proceed to Vera Cruz, according to instructions received from Dávila, and there initiate an uprising. The troops of Castile, however, failed to unite with him, and their commander, moreover, apprised Iturbide of the movement, who immediately gave orders to Anastasio Bustamante to march in pursuit. On the following morning Bustamante attacked Buceli's force, which, disheartened at the failure of the combination, after a slight show of resistance, surrendered at discretion; the troops were conducted as prisoners to the capital. A similar attempt was made by four companies of the Zaragoza regiment stationed at Nopalucan, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Galindo; but after some trifling skirmishes they were opposed by overwhelming numbers and disarmed. Thus terminated this feeble effort; and the most brilliant troops ever sent by Spain to the colony suffered the humiliation of defeat in an enterprise the most insignificant.[17]

Meantime Iturbide brought matters to a climax between himself and the congress, by a course of action as offensive as it was weak. The assembly had closed its sessions during the holy week; but on April 3d the deputies were hastily summoned by the president, who informed them that Iturbide wished to communicate to them matters of vital importance to the nation. This announcement was no sooner heard than it was objected

[17] The remaining forces took no active part in the affair, but were embarked without further trouble. The prisoners were submitted to trial, but as the capitulation of the Spanish garrison in the capital had never been formally celebrated, proceedings were not pressed. They were eventually included in the general pardon extended to prisoners by Iturbide after being proclaimed emperor, and sent to Spain, those of them who wished to remain in the country being allowed to do so. For fuller particulars about this attempt, consult *Id.*, vi. 61–71, the official documents in *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, of April 1822; *Unda, Extraord. de Ahora*, f. 1.

to. Congress, they said, could not assemble to meet Iturbide personally, and he must be accompanied by the regency; but before this decision could be conveyed to him he suddenly presented himself, and was informed of the regulation by word of mouth. He thereupon stated that the affair was most urgent, and that, being a purely military one, the regency had no information of it. Nevertheless, the congress adhered to its resolution, and suspended its session until the members of the regency presented themselves. When the session was continued, the regent Yañez stated that he was unaware of the reason why they had been summoned, and that having observed considerable excitement of the public, he was greatly surprised that the regency had not been informed of the cause. Whereupon Iturbide, losing himself, turned to Yañez, and holding out some papers, hotly exclaimed: "You know nothing; the fact is, there are traitors both in the regency and the congress, as these documents will prove." Yañez with equal heat replied: "As for traitors, it is you who are the traitor."[18] Matters might have proceeded to further lengths but for the interference of the president. Iturbide's grave charge caused great agitation, and for a time confusion prevailed. Presently the regency retired, and the assembly proceeded to examine the papers produced by Iturbide. Nothing was found in them to implicate any of the members, Dávila's letter being the only one from which the vaguest inference could be drawn; in fact, the only suspicion aroused pointed to Iturbide himself as having held correspondence with an enemy.[19]

When the contents of the papers were known,

[18] '¿Como es eso de traidores?...Si U. no lo fuese, que se me corte esta cabeza.' *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 75.

[19] This was proved on the face of the letter. Dávila says: 'Mi querido amigo y señor mio. No sorprenderá á V. el objeto de esta si recuerda el quo ha tenido varias quo V. me ha dirigido.' *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 146. Iturbide had been in correspondence, without any instructions from the government, with Dávila, demanding the surrender of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa. Iturbide replied on April 7th. Both letters were published at his request. *Id.*, ii. 145–52.

indignant murmurings of reprobation at his conduct were heard on all sides. "By what authority," it was demanded, "had Iturbide held communications with Dávila without the knowledge or consent of congress?" And when Odoardo replied with the ominous words, "Cæsar has passed the Rubicon," the excitement for a time was uncontrollable. When quiet was restored, a commission was sent to Iturbide, requesting him to supply other documents in support of his accusation, as those produced failed to inculpate any individual members. Whereupon he returned to the hall and designated by name eleven of the deputies, among whom were the president Horbegoso,[20] Fagoaga, Odoardo, Echarte, and Lombardo. All those denounced were held in high esteem by the congress, and their accusation was heard with angry resentment, which was not mollified by Iturbide once more repeating the oft-told narration of his services, and the thread-bare profession of his disinterestedness. Truly, it was a contemptible part he was playing. When he had retired, it was only through the cooler representations of Fagoaga that the vote was not passed declaring him a traitor. Meantime the public agitation was intense, while the members were in momentary expectation that Iturbide would dissolve the congress by force.[21] On the following day congress, in secret session, occupied itself with the accusation made by Iturbide, and unanimously passed a vote to the effect that the deputies accused by the generalissimo had not merited any want of confidence, but, on the contrary, the assembly was fully satisfied with their conduct. This declaration was publicly announced. Thus Iturbide was beaten at all points. His scheme to enhance his own importance had only placed him in a humiliating position, while the frivolousness of his charge against the deputies greatly diminished his popularity. As for

[20] Horbegoso had succeeded Odoardo as monthly president.

[21] Bustamante, displaying no little self-esteem, states that he 'exhorted his colleagues tranquilly to await their death in their seats.' *Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 77.

the congress, its hostility toward him was now openly expressed. By decree of the 11th of April, the regency was reorganized, the bishop of Puebla, Manuel de la Bárcena, and Velazquez de Leon, who were too evidently subservient to Iturbide, being removed from their positions, and their places supplied by the conde de Casa de Heras Soto, Doctor Miguel Valentin, and Nicolás Bravo, in whom the congress placed the utmost confidence. Yañez was retained in his seat for the reason of Iturbide's known enmity to him.[22]

While Iturbide and the congress was thus fencing at each other, the republican party was daily gaining strength. The decision of the Spanish córtes declaring the treaty of Córdoba null was already known, and adherence to the plan of Iguala was no longer objected to in smothered whispers. Members of congress raised their voice against it; a portion of the press sustained similar views, and the army was becoming infected with republican principles. On the 6th of May an address from the 11th cavalry regiment, setting forth that it had complied with the observance of taking the oath of obedience to congress, was read in open session. The regiment, however, took this opportunity of informing the assembly that Mexico held monarchs in abhorrence, and that it would follow the example of the republics of South America in constituting its government.[23] This was startling language, and Alcocer interrupted the reading by moving that the remainder of the address should not be read. But the republicans were prepared; with the contents of the documents they were well acquainted, and the galleries were packed with

[22] *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 166–7. This session lasted till after four o'clock in the morning, and was not closed until the new members of the regency had presented themselves and taken the oath.

[23] 'La America del Septentrion detesta á los monarcas porque los conoce, y que fiel imitadora de las repúblicas... que forman hoy la América del sur, al hacerse libres del yuyo estrangero, seguirá tambien su egemplo en constituirse.' *Még. Bosquejo Rev.*, 289. It was generally believed that Bravo, who was colonel of the regiment, lent his consent to these expressions, though he did not sign the document. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 587.

supporters. Alcocer's motion was received with murmurs of disapprobation, and when the vote which was taken on the matter decided that the reading should be continued, the result was greeted with vociferous applause.

Both Iturbide and his party were well aware that his popularity was on the wane.[24] The congress, moreover, was adopting measures which aimed directly at curtailing his power. After long and angry discussion, it had decreed that the standing army should be reduced to twenty thousand; and was now about to introduce into the regulations for the regency which were being drawn up, an article by virtue of which no member of the executive could hold military command. This decided matters.[25] If his schemes were to be successful, immediate action must be taken. As yet the greater portion of the army could be relied upon; the clergy generally would support any plan suppressive of the liberal principles which threatened their own interests; and of the populace Iturbide was the acknowledged favorite. Open force, however, could not be thought of; such a course would be actual usurpation. So intrigue was employed; and measures were concerted for a combined military and popular acclamation. To effect this, recourse was had to the non-commissioned officers. On the night of the 18th of May, Pio Marcha, a sergeant of the 1st-infantry regiment, which was quartered in the old convent of San Hipólito, called the troops to

[24] The masons were bitter enemies of Iturbide and would have resorted to assassination. Zavala narrates that at a meeting of one of the lodges, at which more than one hundred members were present, he heard a colonel offer to do the deed: 'Si faltaban puñales para libertarse del tirano ofrecia su brazo vengador á la patria.' *Rev. Mex.*, i. 108. On another occasion his assassination was actually resolved upon. Iturbide was duly informed of the danger, and warded it off by making the resolution of the lodge a subject of conversation. The intention was thus quickly known throughout the city. Colonel Antonio Valero, who had arrived with O'Donojú, had presided at the meeting, and as he was promoted at the time to the rank of brigadier, it was believed that he had divulged the secret. He was obliged to return to Spain to escape the vengeance of the order. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 589–90.

[25] *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 83–92; *Iturbide, Carrera Mil. y Pol.*, 26.

arms, and sallying forth raised the cry of "Viva Agustin I.!"

Similar proceedings occurred at the other barracks, while agents were busily engaged in rousing the city wards. The soldiery was soon joined by dense crowds of the populace, and immense multitudes surged from all points to the residence of the generalissimo, and with deafening shouts proclaimed him emperor. Of course Iturbide was overwhelmed with the unexpected demonstration.[26] Several times he addressed the crowd from his balcony, affecting inexpressible surprise, and protesting his unwillingness to accept the crown held out to him. Moreover, he sent for the members of the regency, the generals of the army, certain deputies, and other persons of consideration, whose advice he knew would suit his dissembled aspirations, and besought them to give him their counsel. They urged him to yield to the general wish, and with well feigned reluctance he returned to the balcony and bowed his acquiescence to the popular will. During the remainder of the night the wildest commotion prevailed. Volleys of musketry reverberated through the streets; the artillery was dragged out and fired as fast as gunners could load the pieces; the church towers were invaded, and the peal of bells mingled with the whiz of rockets as they shot forth from all parts of the capital; while the night was made bright with bonfires and illuminations. But the joy was not universal. Those who were opposed to the pretensions of Iturbide remained shut up in their houses in fear and trembling; for they knew not what violence might not be resorted to in such a tumult. Terror and exultation alike signalized the acclamation of Iturbide as emperor.[27] Meantime he continued to

[26] He thus describes his sensation: 'Viva Agustin I. fue el grito universal que me asombró, siendo la primera vez de mi vida que esperimenté esta clase de sensacion.' *Ib.*

[27] The account of Iturbide's elevation to the throne and coronation is derived mainly from *Mex. Col. Leyes, Fund.*, 15–34; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 92–183; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, i. 127–37; *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 591–604,

play his part: a short proclamation was issued by him, representing that it rested with the nation to confirm or disallow the step taken by the army and the people of the capital, whom he exhorted at the same time not to give way to the excitement of passion, but peaceably await the decision of the nation's representatives. Moreover, the generals and principal officers addressed a communication to the congress, informing it of the event, and begging it to deliberate on the momentous question.

On the following morning at seven o'clock congress assembled in extraordinary session. A number of the members were absent, among whom were Fagoaga, Odoardo, Tagle,[28] Cárlos Bustamante, and many others. At first the assembly attempted to discuss the matter with closed doors; but this was impossible. The uproar of the crowds outside was deafening and menacing, and in the emergency the congress invited Iturbide to attend the session, in the hope that through his influence the tumult would be allayed, and freedom of deliberation in some degree secured. At first he properly enough demurred at being present at a discussion of which he was himself the subject; but finally yielding to the advice of the ministers, he proceeded to the house, his carriage being drawn by the excited populace. The people immediately crowded into the galleries and hall with clamorous acclamations of "Viva Agustin I.!" The proceedings which followed were incessantly and violently interrupted by the impatient multitude. All opposition to an immediate decision met with obstreperous shouts of disapprobation. In vain the boldest proposed to await the verdict of the provinces; their voices were drowned in the furious uproar raised, and they sat down with the threatening cry of "Coronation or death!" ringing in

624–39; *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 305–572, passim; and *Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific.*, 583–92.

[28] The author of *Még. Bosquejo Rev.*, 228, asserts that Iturbide privately advised these three members and another one to take measures for their safety, as he could not answer for their lives if they appeared in public.

their ears. Three several times Iturbide addressed the turbulent audience, but his words failed to allay the tempest he had so dexterously aroused. Thus under coercion and menace the deputies cast their votes. Only eighty-two members voted, sixty-seven of whom pronounced Iturbide emperor, against fifteen noes. The decision was not a valid one, since the law required that 102 should be present to constitute a legitimate session;[29] but it satisfied the frenzied crowd. As soon as the result was known the president resigned his seat to the elected emperor.

Thus Iturbide triumphed at last. But it was a triumph without dignity or the lustre of greatness. It was a triumph won by trickery, through the medium of rough soldiery and the hoarse cries of a rabble. Yet it cannot be said that his elevation was unacceptable to the nation. The dilatory proceedings, first of the provisional junta and then of the congress, had exhausted the patience of the people. Nine months had been frittered away in adjusting imposing ceremonies, in trifling discussions, and in wrangling, while the vital affairs of the empire—the formation of a constitution and the organization of the different branches of government with their powers clearly defined—were neglected. Discontent and indignation were the consequences, and the nation was ready for a change. Nor was it unnatural that the people should look for aid to him who had been their liberator.

[29] There is much discrepancy on this point and as to the actual number of members present. The Spanish constitution required that half and one more of the total number of representatives should be present. As the number of Mexican representatives was 162 and that of the Central American ones 40, the requisite number would properly be 102. Iturbide, however, attempts to show that only 20 of the latter had legitimate seats, and states that 94 members were present, thus constituting a legal session. He moreover asserts that 92 votes were cast, making the number of ayes 77 instead of 67. *Carrera, Mil. y Pol.*, 30, 35. Bustamante also considered that 92 was the number necessary, and correctly gives 82 as that of the voters—*Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 95—as is proved by the book of congressional acts. *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 34. The author of *Még. Bosquejo Rev.*, 253–4, is also so far correct, but is altogether at sea on the other point. There is no doubt that more than 90 members were present, but at least ten avoided voting. It remains to add that in the account given in the *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii., 316, it is asserted that Iturbide was proclaimed 'por unanimidad de votos.'

It may be that in the provinces the masses, represented by ayuntamientos and provincial governments presided over by military chiefs whose interests were centred in Iturbide, had little voice in the matter, and witnessed the change with indifference. But, since they were to have a king, it was well that he should be of their own country and blood. When, therefore, the news sped through Mexico, it was received with joy, and the provinces hastened to felicitate Iturbide and do homage to him as their emperor; while in many cities the effigies of the Spanish monarchs were pulled down.

The effect on the defeated political parties was different. Many of the monarchists who had lingered in the hope of still seeing the plan of Iguala carried out left the country[30] in disgust, and the republicans, though crushed for the time and void of plan, were none the less hostile to Iturbide, silently watching for an opportunity of dethroning him. Thus the Bourbonists disappeared from the political arena, and the contest was confined to the Iturbidists and republicans.

As for congress, it resigned itself to the situation, and at first showed a conciliatory disposition. Avoiding any allusion to the pressure which had been put upon it, it decreed that the formal proclamation of Iturbide's elevation should be published, and appointed the 21st as the day on which he should take the oath which it prescribed. Accordingly Agustin, 'emperor of Mexico by divine providence and appointment by the congress of the nation's representatives,' swore to observe and cause to be observed the constitution which the said congress should form, and all

[30] The restriction on migration from Mexico had been removed by decree of March 22d. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 121–2. Among those who left were Odoardo and the archbishop, Pedro Fonte. The prelate was wanting both in energy of character and courage. He secretly was opposed to the independence, and avoided taking any active part in public affairs. When Iturbide was proclaimed emperor he withdrew from the capital under pretence of visiting the dioceses, and directing his course toward the coast, embarked at Tuxpan for Habana. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 600.

orders and decrees issued by it; never to alienate or convey away any portion of the territory of the empire, and to respect the political freedom of the nation and the personal liberty of the inhabitants. The oath taken, the emperor addressed a brief discourse to the congress and nation at large, concluding with these words: "If, Mexicans, I do not secure the happiness of the country; if at any time I forget my duties, let my sovereignty cease." At the moment no shadow dimmed the brightness of the prospect. Congratulations flowed in from every side. Santa Anna, Guerrero, and a host of others sent in their protestations of joy at his election to the throne,[31] and the offer of their lives in his service. Verily, the throne seemed firm beneath him and the sceptre secure in his grasp. Nor was the congress slack in honoring him. The monarchy was decreed hereditary, and the succession secured to his eldest son, on whom was conferred the title of prince imperial. His family was made royal, his sons and daughters being styled Mexican princes and princesses, and his father entitled the prince of the union. The 19th of May was added to the list of national festivals, and his bust ordered to be stamped on the coinage.[32] Moreover, the imperial household was formed on a basis befitting the dignity of royalty. A high steward and king's almoner were appointed; a master of the horse and equerries; a captain of the imperial guard and aids; chaplains and physicians; gentlemen of the bed-chamber and pages; and all officers attached to a monarch's court. The 21st of July was appointed for the coronation of his majesty.

Iturbide's vanity was highly gratified by this outward show of royalty, and he imitated the stately splendor of the European courts. I must admit,

[31] See the letters of Guerrero and Santa Anna in *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 375–6, 410–11.

[32] The legend on the face read: 'Augustinus Dei Providentiâ.' On the reverse was a crowned eagle, and on the circumference the words: 'Mexici primus imperator constitutionalis.' *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 447–50.

however, that to the Mexicans, unaccustomed to home-made princes, his display was somewhat ridiculous. The simple but sterling pageantry of the viceroys seemed to have given place to the glitter of theatrical tinsel. In the exhausted condition of the treasury, the expense, too, was not a welcome burden, and the disaffected soon murmured. Indeed, the pecuniary difficulties of the government were most serious, and threatened to culminate in disturbances.[33] Recourse to arbitrary measures was the only possible means of present relief, and the emperor suspended the permission to ship money out of the country, immense sums having been withdrawn since the decree of March 22d, which removed the previous restriction.[34] To meet the urgency of the moment, it was even proposed by the revenue commissioners that the money which had been conveyed to Vera Cruz by the last conducta, amounting to $1,500,000, should be appropriated by the government. This measure was not adopted, but in face of the unsuccessful efforts that had been made to raise a voluntary loan, the congress, after long debates, felt compelled to pass a decree on June 11th, authorizing the government to exact a forced contribution of 600,000 pesos from the consulados of Mexico, Puebla, Guadalajara, and Vera Cruz, to be raised from the wealthy citizens and the ecclesiastical and secular corporations.[35] For the formation of his government, the emperor had appointed a council of state, composed of thirteen members selected from thirty-one nominees proposed by the congress. Among the counsellors were Negrete, Nicolás Bravo, Almansa, counsel of state under the Spanish government, Velazquez de Leon, and Bárcena, governor of the mitre of Valladolid.[36]

[33] On June 2d a meditated attack by a portion of the soldiery on the Parian for the purpose of sacking it was only frustrated by the military precautions taken by Iturbide. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 617.

[34] *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 121–2.

[35] *Mex. Col. Decretos sobre Con.*, 55–6.

[36] The other members were Pedro del Paso y Troncoso, a merchant of Vera Cruz; Gonzalez de Cosio, arch-deacon of Durango; Florencio del Cas-

As the 21st of July approached, elaborate preparations were made for the coronation of the emperor and his consort. The commissioners appointed to draw up the regulations and formalities to be observed at the ceremony had handed in to congress the result of their labors more than a month before.[37] In the impecunious condition of the treasury, it was impossible to manufacture crowns and the other insignia of royalty appropriately magnificent. But display must not be wanting, so jewels and gems were borrowed, and though the national pawn-shop refused to lend its diamonds and pearls,[38] the regalia were bright and glittering with fictitious splendor. When the eventful day arrived the city was gay with many colors, as from balconies and windows fluttered banners and streamers and pennons; while the walls were decked with floral wreaths and devices in fresh evergreens, and flags waved from church-towers and turrets. The congress met at eight o'clock, and two deputations, each composed of twenty-four members, proceeded to the provisional palace to escort the emperor and empress to the cathedral. Here on two raised daises, one lower than the other, thrones had been erected, to the right and left of which were seats for the 'venerable' sire, and the princes and princesses of this mushroom monarchy. The procession which accompanied the royal presence along the carpeted streets was as imposing as inexperience, by the aid of imitation,[39] could make it. There were masters at arms and ushers, pages and maids of honor in gorgeous attire, and a master of the ceremonies with his suite of

tillo, canon of Oajaca; Tomás Salgado; Nicolás Olaez, relator de la audiencia; Rafael Perez Maldonado, secretary of the treasury; Mariano Robles; and Demetrio Moreno, canon of Puebla. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 433–4.

[37] *Proyecto del ceremonial*, in *Id.*, ii. 459–69, 533–9; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. 163–74.

[38] Couto, the director of the Monte Pio, refused to let the jewelry pledged in that establishment be used on the occasion. His later persecution is attributed to this denial. *Alaman. Hist. Méj.*, v. 624.

[39] 'Los trajes adecuados á la dignidad imperial, se imitaron de las estampas que pudieron haberse de la coronacion de Napoleon, y una modista francesa, que se decia baronesa, se encargó de hacerlos.' *Ib.*

attendants. On velvet cushions were borne the royal apparel with which the imperial couple were about to array themselves, and the signet-ring, and the sceptre, and the patchwork crowns. At the entrance of the cathedral two obsequious bishops[40] received the emperor and empress and administered to them the holy-water. Then they were conducted to the lower thrones and the ceremonies commenced. The regalia were placed on the altar and high-mass celebrated, during which Iturbide and his spouse were consecrated with sacred oil, and assumed the royal robes. The regalia having been blessed, Mangino, the president of the congress, now placed the diadem on Iturbide's head, who then performed with his own hands the act of coronation of the empress. Thereupon they ascended the thrones on the higher dais. At the conclusion of the service the officiating bishop in loud voice exclaimed, "Vivat Imperator in æternum!" and the people replied, "Long live the emperor and empress."

It is said that the bauble tottered when first placed upon Iturbide's brow. "Do not let it fall," said Mangino, ironically. "It shall not fall; I have it safe," replied the emperor.

[40] The coronation ceremonies were not performed by the archbishop, who had previously left Mexico, but by the bishops of Guadalajara, Puebla, Durango, and Oajaca.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

DETHRONEMENT AND DEATH OF ITURBIDE.

1822–1824.

INAUGURATION OF THE ORDER OF GUADALUPE—PADRE MIER—SHORT-LIVED HARMONY—ARREST OF DEPUTIES—ITURBIDE ATTEMPTS TO REORGANIZE CONGRESS—HIS PREPOSTEROUS CLAIMS—HE DISSOLVES THE ASSEMBLY—A JUNTA INSTITUYENTE ESTABLISHED—APPROPRIATION OF SPANIARDS' MONEY—AFFAIRS AT VERA CRUZ—SANTA ANNA IN DISGRACE—ITURBIDE VISITS JALAPA—SANTA ANNA REVOLTS—REPUBLICANISM PROCLAIMED—PROGRESS OF THE INSURRECTION—REVERSES—INFLUENCE OF THE MASONIC ORDER—CHANGE OF TACTICS—PLAN OF CASA MATA—ITURBIDE'S CONCILIATORY ACTION—CONGRESS REINSTALLED—THE EMPEROR ABDICATES—HIS DEPARTURE FROM MEXICO—HIS RETURN AND DEATH.

WHEN the ceremony was over, and the bishop of Puebla had delivered a sermon fulsomely flattering to the new monarch, and directly contradictory to his previous pastorals in eulogy of Fernando, Iturbide was conducted to the palace,[1] where largess was scattered to the assembled crowds. Festivities in celebration of the great event were kept up for three days. But pomp and solemnities, rich banquets and merry-making, could not clothe with majesty the soldier. The high-born looked upon their emperor as an upstart, and the others regarded him in no wise as a royal personage. By all, the high-sounding titles of his family and court were pronounced with a supercilious smile.

The display at the coronation was supplemented on the 13th of August by the pompous inauguration of the order of Guadalupe. This order had been created

[1] He had hitherto occupied the house of Moncada as his temporary palace.

some months before by the junta provisional[2] as a means of rewarding the meritorious, not only in the military, but in all other careers, and shortly before the coronation the statutes were approved by congress and the appointments made.[3] But the ceremony only supplied Iturbide's opponents with an additional subject for ridicule.

The harmony between the congress and the emperor was of short duration. Iturbide's impatience of restraint and claims to prerogatives soon made it evident that no balance of power could be maintained. The right of appointing the members of the supreme court of justice became a matter of dispute between the executive and legislative powers, and in it one of Iturbide's bitterest enemies took part.

Padre Servando Mier had returned from exile, and taken his seat in congress on the 15th of July as deputy for the province of Monterey. This extraordinary personage, whose travels, persecution, and sufferings, no less than his political writings, had gained for him notoriety, had escaped from Habana after his expulsion thither on the collapse of Mina's expedition, and had sought an asylum in the United States. As soon as he heard that independence had been proclaimed in Mexico, he once more turned his face to the land of his birth. But his usual misfortune still attended him, and on his arrival at Vera Cruz he was detained as a prisoner by Dávila, and confined in the fortress of Ulúa. Having been elected

[2] By decrees of Oct. 13, Dec. 7, 1821, and Feb. 20, 1822. The order received its name from the virgin of Guadalupe, regarded as the patroness of the nation. It was composed of 50 grand crosses, 100 knights, and as many supernumeraries or companions of the order as the grand master, who was the emperor, might consider it convenient to appoint. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 452–3.

[3] A full list of the members of the order was published July 25, 1822. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 549–54. Among the grand crosses, besides the princes of the imperial family, appear the names of the bishops of Guadalajara, Puebla, and Oajaca; the archbishop of Guatemala and the bishop of Nicaragua; of the generals, Negrete, Bustamante, Quintanar, Luaces, Guerrero, García Conde, Vivanco, and O'Donojú, 'considerado como vivo para perpetuar su buena memoria.' Bravo, Lobato, Borja, Sanchez, and Ramon Rayon were among the knights. To Ignacio Ramon no degree was given.

a deputy to congress, the assembly made strenuous efforts to obtain his release, but it was not until after Iturbide had been proclaimed emperor that Dávila liberated him. If, as was suspected, the Spanish governor's motive in releasing him was to let loose a dragon of mischief to confound the empire, he succeeded. An uncompromising republican, he had hardly set foot on shore when he began to inveigh against monarchy; and on presenting himself before Iturbide, he manifested his contempt for royalty by omitting all titles of majesty in addressing him.[4] Witticism, irony, and ridicule were likewise brought into play. The coronation was a farce; the inauguration of the order of Guadalupe was a performance of mummers, and its members were nicknamed accordingly;[5] he burlesqued the government, satirized the emperor, and published a forcible essay in recommendation of a republican form of government.

Matters soon reached a climax. The republicans and masonic order were hard at work; the political organs *El Sol*—advocating monarchy with a European prince on the throne—and *El Hombre Libre*—sustaining republicanism—were suppressed. Nevertheless, seditious sheets were scattered broadcast. French works promulgating the social principles of Rousseau were published in Spanish. Preached against by the clergy, and burned in the plazas, they were printed again. Early in August the germ of a republican conspiracy was discovered in Michoacan and nipped. Not discouraged, the faction planned a bolder move, which was to effect a revolution near the capital, declare that the congress had been deprived of its freedom of action in the election of Iturbide, remove the assembly to Tezcuco, and pro-

[4] 'En boca de Mier, la consagracion no era mas que la aplicacion del medicamento conocido con el nombre de "vinagre de los cuatro ladrones."' *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 644–5.

[5] 'Huehuenches, apodo que quedó á los individuos de aquella Orden.' Huehuenches is derived from the Mexican word 'Yeuetlacatl,' meaning 'old man,' and the diminutive 'tzin,' pronounced by the Spaniards 'che.' It therefore meant 'little old men.' *Ib.*

claim a republican government. In this conspiracy many military officers and not a few of the members of congress were implicated. The government, however, was informed of the plot by Captain Luciano Velazquez, engaged in the suppression of highwaymen on the Puebla road. Iturbide thereupon took the high-handed course of arresting, on the 26th and 27th of August, fifteen of the deputies,[6] among whom was Padre Mier, who once more found himself inside of prison walls. Other arrests were also made, and his passport was sent to Santa María, the minister of the republic of Colombia, who had been a prominent promoter of the design.[7] The indignation of the congress was great; its rights had been infringed, and it demanded the liberation of the imprisoned members, while asserting its right to try them. The government refused, and the irritation thereby engendered was great. Friends of the emperor even took part with the accused; Gomez Farías, the proposer of Iturbide's elevation to the throne, moved that congress should address a manifesto to the nation and dissolve itself.

It was finally resolved that for the present the national assembly would remain silent, and await the course of events. Meanwhile the prisoners were rigorously prosecuted. But the evidence was of little legal weight; an attempt at conspiracy was proved, but it was difficult to fasten it upon individuals.[8]

[6] They were: Lombardo, Echenique, Fagoaga, Carrasco, Obregon, Mier, Anaya, Tarrazo, Echarte, Valle, Mayorga, Herrera, Zebadúa, Sanchez de Tagle, and Cárlos Bustamante. *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 93. Valle, Mayorga, and Zebadúa were deputies from Guatemala.

[7] The republic of Colombia had been recognized by decree of congress on April 29th. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 251–2. Santa María had arrived as minister plenipotentiary in March preceding. *Ortega, Mem. Relac. Diplom. Mex.*, 3–13. His passport was sent him on the 18th of October.

[8] According to the fiscal Francisco de Paula Álvarez, who was commissioned to draw up the proceedings, 'contre la plupart des individus arrêtés, on ne peut prouver aucun crime; mais il y a des apparences suffisantes pour justifier leur détention comme personnes suspectes.' *Iturbide, Mémoires Autographes*, 169. This work was first published in London by J. Quin, and translated into French in 1824 by J. T. Parisot, the translator of the letters of Junius. It contains the manifesto addressed to the Mexicans by Iturbide when in exile at Leghorn, and a number of official documents, among which

Nevertheless, the accused were detained in custody. Their republican proclivities were too well known to allow their release. A few, however, were liberated at the end of the year, more as an act of grace at Christmas than as an admission of their innocence.[9] The only demonstration of revolt occurred in Nuevo Santander, headed by Brigadier Felipe de la Garza, who sent in a representation to Iturbide signed by the ayuntamiento of Soto la Marina, the electors, military and other officers, protesting against the encroachment on the sovereignty of the nation, and demanding the release of the deputies.[10] But the movement was a mere flash, no other provinces responding. Brigadier Fernandez, comandante of San Luis Potosí, was despatched against the disaffected district, and Garza having implored pardon, the affair ended.[11]

After the imprisonment of the deputies the congress became more openly defiant, and united in self-defence hitherto opposing parties. The question of right to appoint the supreme tribunal of justice was claimed with continued firmness. A proposal made by the government for the establishment of military courts in the city of Mexico and the provincial capitals, in order to expedite the administration of justice, was resolutely rejected, and the undisguised antagonism of the two powers made it evident that they could not long exist side by side. Iturbide, therefore, determined to reform the congress. On September 25th the deputy Lorenzo de Zavala, after classifying

is the report of the fiscal Álvarez on the proceedings instituted against the accused.

[9] Among those who still remained in custody was Padre Mier, who found means even in prison of continuing his attacks on Iturbide. Bustamante has preserved some satirical stanzas written at this time. *Hist. Iturbide*, 23–5, 32; for fuller particulars, consult *Id.*, 5–23, 57–62; *Cuad. Hist.*, vi. carta 4ª, 41–93, vii. 6–9, 60–63; *Farias, Minist. Respons.; Mex. El oficio que la comision del sob. Cong. presentó á S. M.; Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 93.

[10] See copy of the document and details in *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. carta 5ª, 95–100; and *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 218.

[11] Garza went to Mexico, and was kindly received by Iturbide, who even restored his command to him. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 655; *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 859–60.

the proceedings of the assembly as illegal, on the ground that it had not been divided into two chambers in conformity with the provisions of the convocating act, and demonstrating that the provinces were not equally represented with regard to population, moved that the number of deputies should be reduced and measures adopted for the formation of the second chamber.[12] The sensation thereby created was great, especially as the proposal had come from a deputy; and the motion met with corresponding disapprobation. But the government now took the matter in hand. On the 17th of October Iturbide held a junta, attended by the council of state, the generals resident in the capital, and over forty deputies either favorable to his views or indifferent. The discussions were lengthy, and resulted in a commission being sent on the following day to the congress, proposing on the part of the government that the number of deputies should be reduced to seventy. Of course the proposal was rejected; but the congress, by way of adjustment of differences, proposed that the Spanish constitution should be provisionally observed, by which concession the emperor would be entitled to the veto and the right to elect the members of the supreme tribunal of justice. This only opened the way to further demands. Iturbide thereupon made the preposterous claim that his power of veto should extend to any article of the constitution which was being framed, and that he should be authorized to raise and organize a police force. At the same time he insisted upon the reduction of the number of deputies. Even the strongest conservatives were disgusted. Congress hesitated no longer, but rejected the emperor's demands one and all, and Iturbide cut short contention by dissolving the assembly on the 31st with an armed force.[13]

[12] *Zavala, Proyecto de Reforma del Congreso*, Mexico, 1822, pp. 8.

[13] Brigadier Luis Cortazar was charged with the delivery of the imperial order for the dissolution. If it was not obeyed within ten minutes after being read, he was instructed to inform congress that force would be used; and if in

To preserve at least a shadow of the legislative power, Iturbide established a junta, which he styled 'instituyente,' composed of forty-five members selected from the deputies of the dissolved congress. The installation took place on the 2d of November,[14] Castañiza, the bishop of Durango, being elected president. In such an assembly, the tool of course of the emperor, was vested the legislative power until the meeting of a new congress, for the convocation of which regulations were to be formed by it without delay. But the business most urgent was to find some means of raising money. Nor did the junta nacional instituyente waste time, but on the 5th passed a decree ordering a forced loan of $2,800,000.[15] As the collection, besides being attended with trouble, would be a slow process, and as there was then lying at Perote and Jalapa nearly $1,300,000[16] belonging for the most part to Spaniards who had left the country or were on the point of departure—money awaiting safe conduct to Vera Cruz for shipment to Spain—Iturbide seized it and applied it to government purposes,[17] a proceeding which brought down upon him much censure, and alienated the good-will of many.

ten minutes after this intimation congress still remained in session, Cortazar was to dissolve it 'militarmente.' *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund*, 93-4. Iturbide entered into an explanation of his reasons for taking this step, and the statement of charges against the congress which appeared in the preamble to the decree dissolving it was amplified and published by the government under the title: *Indicacion del origen de los extravios del Congreso Mexicano, que han motivado su disolucion.* The accusations were to the effect that the assembly was influenced by Spanish intrigues of the party opposed to independence; that it consequently neglected its work on important matters—the formation of the constitution, the organization of the revenue department, and the proper establishment of the judicial tribunals—and wasted its time in trifling or irrelevant discussions; that it moreover arrogated to itself prerogatives belonging to the sovereign. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 944–7, 953–6, 962–3, 985–8.

[14] *Disposic. Varias*, ii. f. 76; *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. carta 5ª, 116–25; *Id., Hist. Iturbide*, 23 et seq. A list of the names of the members, Iturbide's opening address, and the basis of the organization of the junta are supplied in *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 94–103.

[15] *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 950–1. Alaman states that this was the first decree of the junta. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 668.

[16] At Perote $740,200, and $557,000 at Jalapa, in all $1,297,200. *Id.*, v. 669–70; *Medina, Mem. Sec. Estado*, 1823; *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 100.

[17] He tries to defend his action by asserting that the late congress had authorized him to lay hands on any existing funds, and that he had been pri-

While these events were occupying the capital, affairs of no less moment were going on in Vera Cruz. Santa Anna's arbitrary proceedings were exciting comment. There was insubordination in his ranks, and defalcations in the regimental chest.[18] Luaces, the captain general of the provinces of Puebla, Vera Cruz, and Oajaca, had retired on account of failing health,[19] and the brigadier José Antonio Echávarri was appointed to succeed him. It appears that Santa Anna had informed the government that he was devising a scheme to obtain possession of Fort Ulúa, and Echávarri was ordered to march from Jalapa to Vera Cruz, where he arrived on the 25th of October. Dávila had been relieved[20] by Brigadier Francisco Lemaur, and Santa Anna conceived the plan of gaining possession of the fort by surprising it under cover of a feigned surrender of Vera Cruz to the new commander.[21] He therefore made overtures to Lemaur, and it was arranged between them that the Spaniards should take possession of the fortifications on the night of the 26th of October. Echávarri, informed on his arrival by Santa Anna of the scheme now ripe for execution, gave his consent to it. Leaving the final dispositions to the management of Santa Anna, and accompanied only by Pedro Velez, Colonel Gregorio Arana, and a guard of about a dozen

vately informed by certain deputies that the congress had these particular funds in view. *Iturbide, Manifiesto*, 56–8.

[18] Iturbide says: 'Unidas las repetidas quejas que tenia contra Santa Anna del anterior capitan general, de la deputacion provincial, del consulado, de muchos vecinos en particular, como del teniente coronel del cuerpo que mandaba, y de varios oficiales...me ví en la necesidad de separarlo del mando.' *Id.*, 49. See also *Álvarez, Santa-Anna hasta 1822*, 7.

[19] He died shortly after at Tehuacan. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 669.

[20] He returned to Spain, and was rewarded for his loyalty by being appointed governor of the real alcázar de Sevilla, one of the best appointments in the kingdom, and which he retained till his death. *Id.*, v. 671.

[21] Santa Anna had been previously frustrated in an attempt to bribe the garrison of the fortress of Ulúa. His present plan was that Lemaur should send, on the night of Oct. 26th, detachments to take possession of the fortifications of Vera Cruz, which were to be surrendered without resistance. The Spaniards were then to be overpowered, and Mexican troops, dressed in the uniforms taken from them, were to proceed to Fort Ulúa in the launches on which the Spaniards had arrived, and under cover of the darkness and disguise gain possession of it. *Bustamante, Cuad. Hist.*, vi. carta 5ª, 107–13.

men, he went at midnight, according to arrangements, to the intrenchments of Concepcion, there to receive the decoyed Spaniards, while Santa Anna awaited another detachment at the bulwark of Santiago.

From some cause, however, the force which ought to have been provided by Santa Anna had not arrived, and Echávarri found only the ordinary picket on the fortifications. But the Spaniards had already landed, and were entering the outer works. Echávarri's position was thus a very perilous one. The Spaniards pressed forward and a contest ensued. Velez was wounded by a pistol-shot, and three soldiers were bayoneted. Nothing saved Echávarri from death or capture but the careless procedure of the Spaniards, who had only sent forward a small portion of their force; observing which, Echávarri bravely charged and drove back the assailants. This had the effect of causing their comrades who were coming up to retire and take up a position behind the outer stockade. Meantime Santa Anna's aid, Castrillon, who had conducted the negotiations, and had come in the Spanish launch, provided for his own safety. Abandoning his dupes, he ran down the beach to the pier and reported to Lieutenant Eleuterio Mendez, in command of the cavalry picket of twenty-five dragoons stationed there, that Echávarri was either killed or taken prisoner, whereupon that officer went in all haste to the assistance of his superior. The Spaniards were then driven from their position and took to their boats. At the Santiago fortification the action, there more hotly contested, terminated with a similar result.[22] Though a victory was thus gained by the Mexicans, Santa Anna's project of surprising Ulúa failed. But the affair was pregnant with disaster to Iturbide, as we shall presently see.

[22] Echávarri, in his report of Oct. 27th, states that the loss to the Spaniards was over 100 in killed, wounded, drowned, strayed, and prisoners. Among the latter were a captain and two subalterns. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 905–6.

In a confidential despatch to the emperor, Echávarri expressed his suspicion that Santa Anna, enraged at not having been promoted to the captain-generalcy, had treacherously planned his death or capture, by purposely neglecting to order up the troops which ought to have been stationed in the works of Concepcion.[23] So grave a charge, in view of previous complaints, required serious attention, and Iturbide decided to remove Santa Anna from his position as comandante general of Vera Cruz. Caution, however, was necessary, and to avoid possible mischief, the emperor deemed it prudent to manage the matter in person. With the ostensible object of taking measures for the reduction of Fort Ulúa, he therefore made a visit to Jalapa, leaving Mexico on the 10th of November. The journey was made in great state, and at Puebla he was received with demonstrations of joy. At Jalapa, however, the Spanish element predominated, and his late seizure of private funds had not gained him affection. His reception was so cold, and the want of hospitality to his suite so obvious, as to bring out the remark that at Jalapa Spain began.[24]

When Santa Anna met the emperor at Jalapa according to instructions, he was informed that his services were required in the capital, and that he would have to accompany him on his return thither. In answer to the pleas of private business and want of money, Iturbide handed him five hundred pesos, and allowed him a few days to arrange his affairs and hand over his command to Brigadier Mariano Diez de Bonilla, who had been appointed to succeed him.

[23] Iturbide states that Santa Anna really did plot to accomplish Echávarri's death. *Manifiesto*, 49. Bustamante, writing in August 1832, takes the same view, *Cuad. Hist.*, vi. carta 5ª, 114; but in September 1833 says: 'En mi concepto no fué otro sino un deseo ó proyecto mal combinado para apoderarse de Ulúa.' *Hist. Iturbide*, 30. Alaman declines to pass an opinion in the matter, and confining himself to the narration of the facts, leaves it to the reader to form his own judgment. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 674, 676.

[24] 'Iturbide repetia—Desde aquí comienza *España*.' *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 34.

So well had the emperor dissembled, that up to this time Santa Anna apparently had no suspicion that Iturbide intended to call him to account. The announcement to Santa Anna of his removal from the command in Vera Cruz was made in terms of highest compliment;[25] and when Iturbide departed for the capital on the 1st of December, he embraced him and said: "I await you in Mexico, Santa Anna, to make your fortune for you."[26] It was, perhaps, a little overdone by Iturbide, and Santa Anna was as clever a dissembler as he. Further than this, he was secretly warned that his ruin was meditated.[27] Therefore, with every appearance of undisturbed confidence, with every mark of subservient respect,[28] he attended Iturbide for a short distance on his journey, but returned with hatred in his heart to Jalapa, and in a few hours was on his way to Vera Cruz. He arrived at the port on the following day, and putting himself at the head of the 8th infantry regiment, of which he was colonel, proclaimed in the name of the nation a republican government, declaring that the three guaranties of the plan of Iguala would be inviolably observed.[29]

[25] 'En los terminos mas honorificos que pudo inventar el sagaz y avisado emperador.' *Santana, Manifiesto á sus conciudadanos*, 8.

[26] *Id.*, 9.

[27] Santa Anna says that he would have been deceived by Iturbide's manner 'si un confidente de Mexico no me avisara con oportunidad "que mi perdicion estaba decretada."' *Id.*, 8.

[28] Francisco de Paula Álvarez, Iturbide's secretary, in reply to a letter of Santa Anna addressed Dec. 6th to Iturbide, setting forth the reasons which urged him to revolt, says: 'Vd sabe que yo sé de la manera que habló siempre al Emperador, temblando y adulando, ofreciendose á servicios de un lacayo, indignos de un gefe.' *Santa-Anna hasta 1822*, 7. This communication was written at Puebla in Dec. 1822, and was printed and published at Guadalajara the same month. In 1844 it was again published just before Santa Anna's fall in that year. It is an intensely stinging diatribe, exposing in scathing language all the worst traits of Santa Anna's character, his conduct from boyhood, and his motives. In invective it can hardly be matched, and in future revolutions it was always made use of as a means of vilifying him.

[29] *Santana, Proclamas*, 2 Dic^re^ 1822; *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 1041. On the 6th he addressed to Iturbide the letter mentioned in the previous note. After reminding him of the excess of his zeal in his service, which had become 'odious to his fellow-citizens, who thought him servile and a flatterer,' and professing unalterable affection, he says: 'I have felt myself under the necessity of separating myself from your command, because your absolute government is about to fill with incalculable evils our beloved country... The provinces, the towns, the

The movement was received in Vera Cruz enthusiastically; Alvarado and other neighboring towns joined in the revolt, and the knell of the empire had sounded.

Great preparations had been made in the capital for the return of the emperor, where it was thought that he was all this time triumphing over the Spaniards. Moreover, an imperial prince had been born,[30] and the celebration of the auspicious event awaited the arrival of the august parent.[31] But Iturbide was in no humor for baby bell-ringings and baptisms. At Puebla he had received intelligence of Santa Anna's revolt, and though he pretended to make light of it, was none the less conscious of its serious significance. He hurried his departure from the town,[32] and unexpectedly entered the capital by night, December 13th.[33] Measures were at once taken to suppress the revolt. Santa Anna was declared a traitor,

people, cry aloud for their freedom; they say that you have broken your oaths of Iguala and Córdoba; have trampled upon the laws;...have unjustly persecuted members of congress, banishing some, imprisoning others, so as to reduce it to what is called a junta constituyente, composed of a few of your favorites. ...They cry out, too, in consternation against the seizure of the convoy of money in Jalapa, convinced that under your government the sacred right of property will never be respected. Finally, they understand that there are neither means nor wealth sufficient in this America to support a throne with all the ostentation and dignity an emperor requires.' He then hopes that Iturbide will take measures to renounce the crown, and concludes with the ominous words: 'Do not expose your valuable life to the terrible catastrophe which your flatterers have prepared for you.' *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 51–3; *Niles' Reg.*, xxiii. 344. Santa Anna states in his *Manifiesto á sus Conciudadanos*, 7, that he formed the design of liberating his country when the deputies were imprisoned. 'Yo juré en el silencio de la aciaga noche del 26 de Agosto, volver por el honor de la nacion esclavizada.' He was in Mexico at the time, and to carry out his project, sought with urgency the command of the province of Vera Cruz, which was conferred on him. *Ib.*

[30] On Nov. 30th. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 1013–14, 1016–17; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 38–43. For an account of the preparations made to receive Iturbide, see *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, i. 153.

[31] The name given to the prince was Felipe Andrés María de Guadalupe. *Ib.* The safe deliverance of the empress was made the occasion for several military promotions. Alejo García Conde and Sotarriva were made lieutenant-generals; Armijo, Torres, Barragan, Lobato, and some others were raised to full brigadiers. *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, ii. 1138.

[32] The oath of allegiance was celebrated at Puebla, on the occasion of his return, and he did not wait for the completion of the customary festivities.

[33] 'A noche á los nueve, inesperadamente, entró sin novedad á esta Capital S. M. I. de regreso de Xalapa.' *Id.*, 1064.

and deprived of his military rank; pardon was offered to those of his followers who returned to their allegiance within a specified time; the governor of the archiepiscopal mitre was asked to fulminate excommunication against all who declared for republicanism;[34] the press was brought into action, and every epithet that could attach odium to Santa Anna made use of; and brigadiers Cortazar and Lobato were despatched from the capital against the insurgents, while other troops were moved from Puebla, and the imperial grenadiers stationed at Jalapa were advanced to Plan del Rio.

Meantime Santa Anna had published in Vera Cruz a plan of the revolution,[35] and joined by Guadalupe Victoria, who now sallied from his place of concealment, was organizing an army which he styled El Ejército Libertador. The revolution spread rapidly, and at first success attended the movement. Cortazar and Lobato were compelled temporarily to retire before insurgent bands near Córdoba, and Santa Anna surprised and captured the whole force of grenadiers at Plan del Rio, incorporating the soldiers in his ranks. Elated with this success, he marched against Jalapa, his force consisting of the 8th infantry regiment and a body of cavalry, and two guns. At dawn of December 21st he attacked the town, but sustained a crushing defeat. The grenadiers lately incorporated into the regiment went over to the enemy; the whole of his infantry was either killed or captured, and he fled from the place at full speed,

[34] This occasioned the circulation of a stinging invective in verse, attributed to Padre Mier. The first stanza is as follows:

Diz que pretendia el tirano
Que una escomunicacion saliera,
En que *ipso facto* incurriera
Todo hombre republicano.
¿Y por qué crimen? Es llano,
Porque de su magestad
Se opone con la libertad
A la infausta monarquía:
¿Puede darse mas impia
Herética pravedad?

The remaining, to the number of five, are in similar strain. *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 54–6; *Alaman Hist. Méj.*, v. 692.

[35] A copy of it is supplied by Bustamante. *Hist. Iturbide*, 64–71.

attended only by eight dragoons.[36] Never was disaster more complete. Santa Anna, on arriving at Puente del Rey, where Victoria was stationed, gave way to despair. Deeming all lost, he proposed to embark with him for the United States on board a vessel he had provided for such an emergency. But the stout old leader was of better metal. "Go and put Vera Cruz in a state of defence," he said; "you can set sail when they show you my head."[37]

The impulse given at Vera Cruz acted like leaven on the prevailing discontent. Guerrero and Bravo secretly left the city on January 5th, proceeded to Chilapa, and there commenced to revolutionize the south, adopting the plan of Vera Cruz, a copy of which had been sent to them by Santa Anna.[38] Armijo was immediately despatched against them, and an engagement took place on the height of Almolonga, near Chilapa, where Guerrero and Bravo had posted themselves. The action was disastrous to the revolutionists. Guerrero was shot through the lungs, and his men believing him killed abandoned the field in disorder, despite Bravo's efforts to arrest them. He himself was borne away by the stream of fugitives. Had he been able to rally his men, the day might have been won, a similar panic having pervaded the imperial ranks on the fall of Brigadier Epitacio Sanchez, who was struck through the head by a bullet as he led them to the charge. As it was, Armijo entered Chilapa the same day; Bravo retired with a remnant of his force to Putla; Guerrero was supposed to be dead, and the revolt in this portion of the empire was considered as ended.

[36] 'La division de Santa Ana que se componia de ochocientos á novecientos hombres ha sido completam^te disipada y solo se asegura que emprendió su fuga con ocho Drag^es.' *Dominguez, Parte Oficial Defensa Jal.*, MS., f. 5. This manuscript of the official report to Brigadier José María Calderon, comandante general of Jalapa, by Colonel Juan Dominguez, gives a detailed account of the occurrence.

[37] Zavala states that Victoria himself narrated this circumstance to him. *Rev. Mex.*, i. 157.

[38] Padre Mier also effected his escape, but was recaptured through infor-

And the revolution everywhere seemed to be at its last gasp. A movement of the negroes in Costa Chica had been suppressed; Alvarado and other towns on the gulf coast which had proclaimed for republicanism had submitted to Cortazar and Lobato; Victoria was held in check at Puente del Rey; and Santa Anna was confined in Vera Cruz, which was now invested by Cortazar, Lobato, and Echávarri, who, after having escorted Iturbide as far as Perote, took up a position at the Casa Mata.[39]

In Echávarri the emperor placed the utmost reliance. Although a Spaniard, he had been treated with marked favor. He had been rapidly promoted from the rank of captain of a provincial corps in an obscure and remote district to that of captain-general of the provinces of Puebla, Vera Cruz, and Oajaca; had been made a knight of the order of Guadalupe, and had been admitted into the closest confidence. But influence was brought to bear upon Echávarri which Iturbide had not considered, and the action of the former bore a striking resemblance to the procedure of the latter when placed in a similar position of trust by Apodaca. While the emperor was daily expecting to hear that the final blow at rebellion had been struck by the capture of Vera Cruz, the masons, who were determined to overthrow him, were secretly intriguing with his generals. The political principles of this order had lately been greatly modified by the influence of members who had been deputies to the Spanish córtes, and who on their return to Mexico had placed themselves at its head. While in Spain, these members, conspicuous among whom were Michelena and Ramos Arizpe, had strenuously opposed the offer of the crown to a Spanish prince. Indeed, the establishment of a Bourbon on the throne was no longer regarded as practicable.

mation given by a woman, and confined in a dungeon of the Inquisition. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 698.

[39] A magazine where gunpowder was stored; hence its name. It was situated about half a league to the south of the town.

Iturbide, on the other hand, had disgusted most of the monarchists who had lent their aid on his assumption of the crown, and the order, monarchical in its principles at first, was ready to receive with favor the idea of a central republic with the reins of government under its own control. Under all circumstances, the existing condition of affairs could not last. The republican party was hourly gaining strength; the monarchists, not to be left behind in the race for power, preferred to change their tactics. By the Spaniards the author of the plan of Iguala was hated; and for all parties no form of government could be much worse than the present absolutism. Iturbide's downfall was, therefore, darkly foreshadowed, while he alone seemed blind to the fact. Though he must have been aware that the masonic lodges were largely composed of military officers who had sworn to uphold the plan of Iguala—which he was trampling underfoot—it seems never to have entered his mind that from that quarter would come a fatal blow. Yet it was so. The influence in the lodges over the military members was preponderating. Cortazar and Lobato belonged to the society; Moran, the comandante general of Puebla, and Negrete in Mexico were in accord with its leading members; and Echávarri had been lately admitted into it. Hence his inactivity before Vera Cruz,[40] and hence the proclamation of the famous plan of Casa Mata[41] on the 1st of February.

On that day a junta of the military chiefs was held and the act signed by them unanimously, as well as by representatives of the ranks. By it the army pledged itself to reëstablish and support the national

[40] Iturbide says: 'El general Echávarri y el brigadier Cortazar... pudieron tomar la plaza de Veracruz sin resistencia;' and adds: 'Aunque la apatía de Echávarri habria sido bastante motivo para desconfiar de su probidad, no lo fué para mí, porque tenia formado de ella el mejor concepto.' *Manifiesto*, 51–2. Alaman, however, maintains that the capture of Vera Cruz was not so easy a matter as Iturbide supposed, and that Echávarri was not provided with men and means sufficient to accomplish it. *Hist. Méj.*, v. 707–8.

[41] So called from the place where it was signed.

representative assembly,[42] while it disclaimed all intention of making any attempt against the person of the emperor. But the designers of it were well aware of the ultimate result to which it would lead. The aspect of the revolution, it is true, was changed, but its intrinsic character was the same, and its object the same. The republican leaders could feel very confident that in the new congress their own party would dominate, and its action, unlike that of the extinguished assembly, would now be supported by the army. Santa Anna, whose position otherwise was really critical, readily waived his demand for a republican government, and on February 2d the ayuntamiento and military forces of Vera Cruz accepted the plan, renouncing the idea of reëstablishing the dissolved congress. The revolution in its new robe was rapidly triumphant. On the 14th the plan was proclaimed at Puebla by the provincial deputation, supported by the ayuntamiento and the marqués de Vivanco. At San Luis Potosí and Guadalajara the imperial commanders were forced to give way to the popular feelings in order to avoid an uprising. Armijo proclaimed the plan at Cuernavaca, Barragan in Querétaro, and Otero in Guanajuato. Bravo had recovered from his disaster, entered the city of Oajaca on the

[42] The Plan de Casa Mata consisted of eleven articles, of which I give a synopsis. Art. 1. As the sovereignty resides in the nation, congress shall be installed as soon as possible. Art. 2. The plan for its convocation shall be based on the same principles which governed in the election of the first congress. Art. 3. The provinces can reëlect such deputies as had shown themselves worthy of public esteem by their liberal ideas, and substitute others in the place of those who had not corresponded to the confidence extended to them. Art. 4. The congress shall reside in whatever city or town it may deem most convenient. Art. 5. The army will sustain the national representation and all its fundamental decisions. Art. 6. Military officers and troops not ready to sacrifice themselves for their country's good can depart whithersoever they may wish. Art. 7. A commission shall place a copy of this act in the hands of the emperor. Art. 8. Another commission, provided with a similar copy, shall propose the plan to the governor and municipality of Vera Cruz for their acceptance or rejection. Art. 9. The same proposal shall be made to forces at Puente del Rey, Jalapa, Córdoba, and Orizaba. Art. 10. Pending the answer of the government, the provincial deputation of Vera Cruz, with its own assent, shall exercise the administrative functions. Art. 11. The army shall make no attempt against the person of the emperor, but shall not disband until by disposition of the sovereign congress, whose deliberations it shall support. *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 113–4; *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, i. 164–5.

9th, and there installed a governing junta;[43] and by the beginning of March[44] all that was left to Iturbide of his empire was within sight from his palace windows.

When the news of Echávarri's defection became known in the capital, consternation reigned. In the ranks of the Iturbidists, the emperor alone bore a bold front. At an extraordinary session of the junta instituyente, on February 9th, he said that if it was intended to coerce him by means of the army, he would prove that the arm which had achieved the country's independence was not yet broken; still he took no energetic step. On the contrary, a commission, one of the members being Negrete, was despatched to treat with the leaders of the movement, who were advancing rapidly toward the capital. At Jalapa, Echávarri formed a military junta, in which even the rank and file of the different corps were represented. This assembly was to meet whenever occasion required, Echávarri being appointed president and Calderon vice-president. A permanent executive council, composed of five members,[45] was also established.

On the 17th the commission sent by the government arrived at Jalapa, but in the conferences which followed no adjustment was arrived at; and the commissioners, with the exception of Negrete, who remained in Puebla and soon after espoused the popular cause, returned to report their failure. The army of liberators then advanced to Puebla, where Echávarri resigned the command in order to counteract the procla-

[43] Bravo on his march toward Oajaca received intelligence of the plan of Casa Mata, but does not appear to have agreed with it. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 713–14.

[44] Durango proclaimed on the 5th and 6th of March, the comandante Gaspar de Ochoa and the garrison swearing to support the plan, and the provincial deputation resolving to coöperate with the southern provinces. *Pinart's Col.*, print i. no. 79, 80; *Id.*, MS., i. no. 89. Chihuahua immediately followed the example, under the encouragement of the comandante Colonel Maynez. *Ib.*

[45] The brigadiers Miñon and Gual, and the colonels Juan Codallos, Iberri, and Puyade. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 714–15.

mations and manifestoes of Iturbide, who attributed the revolution to Spanish intrigue, and asserted that Echávarri was in communication with commissioners of that government residing in Fort Ulúa. But Echávarri's fidelity was never doubted, and his resignation was strenuously opposed. He firmly maintained his point, however, and the marqués de Vivanco was appointed in his stead. Whether it was that Iturbide was really anxious to avoid bloodshed, as some writers are inclined to believe, or that he recognized that a struggle would be hopeless, he made no effort to appeal to arms.[46] The fact is, that it was now too late. Desertion of the troops in the capital was unprecedented. It was not confined to the clandestine departure of individuals, or even squads of soldiery. Whole corps formed in line, and openly marched away with colors flying and bands of music. His proclamations and exhortations to fidelity had no effect.[47] On the night of the 23d the troops remaining of the 9th and 11th infantry regiments sallied from their barracks, released the prisoners confined in the Inquisition—among whom was Padre Mier—proclaimed one of the liberated captives, Colonel Eulogio Villa Urrutia, their chief, and raising the cry of liberty and republicanism, marched to Toluca.[48] Next day the 4th cavalry regiment deserted in like manner, and in the evening the mounted grenadiers of the imperial guard followed.

Iturbide had stationed himself with some troops at Iztapaluca on the Puebla road in order to prevent

[46] When he first heard of Echávarri's defection he resolved to take the field in person, but changed his mind through the advice of the council of state. *Ib.* He recognized his mistake later, and says in his *Manifiesto*, 53: 'La falta que creo cometí en mi gobierno fué no tomar el mando de ejército, desde que debí conocer la defeccion de Echávarri, me alucinó la demasiada confianza.' But he did not suppose that at Vera Cruz the besiegers and besieged were working in accord.

[47] See his proclamation of Feb. 11th, in *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, 1823, i. 80.

[48] Bustamante states that Mier lost one of his shoes in the confusion, and was conveyed away in a carriage. As the troops passed the emperor's residence near Tacubaya, they shouted, 'Viva la libertad y la república,' 'que causó mucha agitacion en la familia imperial.' *Hist. Iturbide*, 93–4.

communication between the capital and the insurgent army, and in the hope of effecting a peaceable reconciliation. But a conciliatory line of action in no way tended to avert the catastrophe. He consented to the immediate convocation of a new congress;[49] a dividing line between the troops was agreed upon; and a stipulation made that both sides should await the inauguration of the national assembly without further action and abide by its decision. But these arrangements were little conducive to Iturbide's advantage, nor even carefully adhered to, emissaries being despatched all over the country advocating the new movement. Moreover, the revolutionists were in no haste; their cause was making rapid headway, and a little delay was actual gain to them, while to Iturbide they foresaw that it would be fatal. The falling emperor also fully recognized this; he saw the mistake he had made in not having taken measures to assemble congress at the earliest possible date, when it might still have been largely composed of adherents of his own; and several times he expressed his desire for a personal interview with the chiefs, in the hope of settling matters. But they would hold no conference with him.[50] To await the slow work of assembling a congress would be certain defeat, for its composition would be mainly of members hostile to him. Two courses remained: either to reinstall the dissolved congress, or lay aside his imperial title, and, adopting the plan of Casa Mata, place himself at the head of the revolution, as invited to do.[51] The latter

[49] The convocatoria had already been drawn up at the beginning of the preceding December, and was now to be put in circulation. *Iturbide, Manifesto*, 55. A draft of a constitution had also been prepared, *Mex. Proyecto Constitucion*, 40, as also one for the provisional regulation of the government during the mean time. *Mex. Proyecto Reyl. Polit.*, p. 34.

[50] He says that they were ashamed to meet him: 'El delito les retraia, y los confundia su ingratitud.' *Iturbide, Manifiesto*, 60.

[51] He was invited to do this by many of the principal leaders, among whom he mentions the names of Negrete, Vivanco, and Cortazar. He remarks that if ambition had been his aim, by accepting this proposal and retaining the command, time would have afforded him a thousand opportunities of exercising it to his own pleasure. *Id.*, 65.

plan would have been the safer, but his pride revolted against taking the step,[52] and he adopted the former, in which he was supported by the wishes of the provincial deputation of Mexico, the suggestions of his commissioners, and the advice of the council of state.[53] Accordingly, on the 4th of March the emperor issued a decree ordering the members of the dissolved congress to reassemble, and on the 7th it again opened its sessions, although the deputies present numbered only fifty-eight, some being released from prison the evening before.[54] When he addressed the assembly, explaining his motives and expressing his desire to concur with the general wish, he was listened to with coldness and lack of sympathy.

The first difficulties which presented themselves were as to the faculties and legitimacy of the congress. The number of deputies, although increased by a few others, still fell short of that prescribed by the law, and as most of the provinces had declared for the plan of Casa Mata, which called for a new congress, it was doubtful whether the old one would be recognized. Its position was still further complicated by the tumultuous state into which the capital was thrown, and which threatened to interfere with the freedom of its deliberations. Iturbide had withdrawn from Iztapaluca, and had returned to the capital with the purpose of retiring to Tacubaya. On his departure on the 10th the dregs of the populace became dangerously demonstrative in his favor, loudly cheering and drawing his carriage through the streets, while menacing the congress. This caused the members much alarm for their safety, and on their representation to the ministers, General Andrade, in whom they had little confidence, was re-

[52] 'Pero los negocios me eran odiosos, pesado el cargo, y finalmente era contraponerme á la cabeza de aquel partido.' Such are the reasons he assigns for his refusal, disclaiming at the same time personal ambition. *Ib.*

[53] *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, 1823, i. 135 et seq.

[54] *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 105.

moved from the military command, and Brigadier Gomez Pedraza appointed in his place.

All now depended on the decision of the revolutionary junta at Puebla, which, having assembled on the 14th, resolved that it could not recognize the congress until assured that its liberty was not interfered with; at the same time it was decided to advance against Mexico. On the following day the army began its march, but commissioners from the congress who had been sent to treat with the leaders being met a short distance from the town, a second meeting was held, at which, after a long discussion, the following resolution was adopted: The ejército libertador and the junta will recognize as legitimate the old congress, which had been illegally dissolved, when the competent number of deputies is complete, and will obey it as soon as it enjoys absolute freedom in regard to its labors.

When this decision was known to Iturbide, he gave up the struggle. The coldness of his reception when congress was reinstalled; the rejection of a proposal made by him that his own and the revolutionary forces should respectively retire to positions fifty leagues distant from the capital, and that a regency should be appointed to which he would delegate the executive power; and the threatening movement from Puebla —all were too palpably significant of the intention to overthrow him. But he could still make a show of having at heart the welfare of his country, and he determined to retire for its good. On the night of March 19th congress was assembled in extraordinary session, and Iturbide's abdication, written by his own hand, was read to the chamber by Navarrete, the minister of justice. Since the congress, he said, had been recognized by the junta at Puebla and by the troops that had declared for the plan of Casa Mata, he laid down the crown which at first he had accepted with the greatest unwillingness, and then only to prove his self-sacrifice and devotion to his country.

He would have taken this step sooner had there been a recognized national representation. In order that his presence might not be the pretext for further trouble, he would cheerfully expatriate himself, and make his abode in some foreign land, whither he would be ready to depart in ten or fifteen days. He only requested that the nation would pay the private debts which he had incurred in view of his not having availed himself of the income assigned him out of consideration for the necessities of the troops and public officials. On the following day a more amplified form of abdication was presented to the congress.[58]

But the congress was in a dilemma. It could pass no decision on the matter until a competent number of deputies was united. At the same time the revolutionary forces were occupying positions in the immediate vicinity of the capital. It therefore proposed that the leaders should consent to a conference with Iturbide. They had, however, no stomach for such an interview; it would be far from agreeable for them to meet face to face the sovereign whom they had first created and then deserted. Moreover, they still feared the magic influence of his presence over many of them. They consequently not only persistently refused to listen to such a proposal, but demanded that the emperor should betake himself either to Tulancingo, Jalapa, Córdoba, or Orizaba—they would give him the choice—and there abide pending the decision of the congress. This slight roused Iturbide's indignation, and caused no little apprehension in the capital that hostilities would finally break out. Indeed, there was imminent danger of such action between the imperial troops at Tacubaya and those of Bravo, who had arrived from Oajaca, and had stationed himself at Tlalpam. In the general alarm the congress invited Vivanco to occupy the

[58] Full particulars with copies of documents relative to events connected with Iturbide's resignation will be found in *Id.*, 95–117. Bustamante had been released from prison, and had resumed his seat in congress.

capital, and Gomez Pedraza on the 26th obtained an agreement from the chiefs by which they bound themselves to recognize Iturbide in such character as should be given him by the congress. Other terms of the convention were to the effect that Iturbide should retire to Tulancingo, which he did three days afterward escorted by Bravo,[56] and that Pedraza should surrender the command of the capital to the chief appointed to occupy it. The ejército libertador entered the city the same day.

By the occupation of the capital by the revolutionary forces the difficulties which had impeded congressional action were removed. The deputies who had escaped from prison in the previous month arrived with the army; those members who had hitherto feared to attend the session now took their seats, and on the 29th, 103 members being present, congress could declare itself a legitimate national assembly. During the following week it was occupied in the formation of a new government. The functions of the existing executive were declared to have ceased, and a provisional government, composed of three members, was created, Bravo, Victoria, and Negrete being elected. During the absence of the two former José Mariano Michelena and José Miguel Dominguez were appointed to act as their substitutes.

On April 7th congress gave its attention to the question of Iturbide's abdication. The opinion of the commission which had been appointed to report on the matter was that Iturbide's elevation having been effected by violence and compulsion was null, and that his abdication should not be accepted, as that would imply his right to the crown; that he should be conveyed to Italy, and a yearly income of $25,000 be assigned to him. The discussion was con-

[56] Iturbide requested that Bravo should command his escort. *Id.*, 120. Alaman remarks that this choice reflected the highest honor on Bravo: 'No hay en la vida de Bravo nada que le sea tan honroso, como esta eleccion que hizo Iturbide para confiar á su honor y probidad su propia persona y familia, cuando todos lo habian faltado.' *Hist. Mej.*, v. 744.

ducted with considerable heat. By many these decisions were considered too lenient, and they would have brought the fallen emperor to trial. Padre Mier, supported by other deputies, regarded the allowance proposed as excessive, and insinuated that Iturbide would take away with him large sums of money. Nevertheless the opinion was approved by a large majority in all its points, and on the 8th the congress passed a decree to that effect.[57] As a final blow to monarchy in Mexico, by a separate decree of the same date the plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba were pronounced null, in so far as the offers of the crown and the form of government prescribed in them were concerned, and the right of the nation to establish its government was declared free from all compromise.[58]

Iturbide had left Tacubaya, March 30th, for Tulancingo. A portion of his own troops accompanied him, and their faithfulness was unfortunately displayed by frequent affrays with the soldiers of the escort under Bravo. The result of this was that Bravo received instructions from the government to disarm Iturbide's men and dismiss them from service.[59] Henceforth Iturbide was treated with severity. The demonstrations which had occurred at Tulancingo

[57] It was as follows: 1. The coronation of D. Agustin de Iturbide being the work of violence and void of right, there is no occasion to discuss his abdication of the crown. 2. Consequently the hereditary succession and the titles emanating from the coronation are declared null; and all acts of the government from May 19th to March 29th are illegal, remaining subject to the revision of the existing government for approval or revocation. 3. The executive power shall take measures for the speedy departure of D. Agustin de Iturbide from the territory of the nation. 4. This shall take place at one of the ports of the Mexican Gulf, a neutral vessel being chartered at the state's expense to convey him and his family to such place as he may designate. 5. During his life $25,000 annually are assigned to D. Agustin de Iturbide, payable in this capital, on the condition that he establish his residence at some point in Italy. After his death his family shall enjoy a pension of $8,000, under the rules established for pensions of the montepío militar. *Mex. Col. Ley. Fund.*, 115; *Mex. Col. Ley. Ord. y Dec.*, ii. 91-2.

[58] *Zavala, Rev. Mex.*, i. 182.

[59] By order of April 5th. On the 2d and 3d broils had occurred at Tulancingo, on the latter day a corporal of Iturbide's troops being killed and two soldiers wounded. This caused unpleasant passages between him and Bravo, who informed congress of the trouble. On the 9th, 102 of Iturbide's men were dismissed. *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 140–3.

were attributed to intrigue, and during the rest of his journey he was regarded as a political prisoner by Bravo, who was ordered to hasten his departure from the country. Nor was Iturbide's life altogether safe. Spies of the masons followed him unremittingly, and, to their shame be it said, plotted his assassination. Bravo was, however, timely informed of the design, and his precautions prevented its accomplishment.[60] On the 20th of April the dethroned emperor left Tulancingo, and was conveyed to Vera Cruz, which he reached May 9th, without having had many of the ordinary comforts of life during the journey. On his arrival at the coast he was not allowed to enter the town, but had to camp at the mouth of the Antigua, under guard, till the ship *Rawlins*[61] bore him from the shores of Mexico on the morning of the 11th.

Iturbide was accompanied by his wife and eight children, his chaplain José Antonio Lopez, Fray Ignacio Treviño, José Ramon Malo, and his secretary, Francisco Álvarez. The voyage to Italy, though prosperous, was long and tedious, the vessel not being allowed to touch at any intermediate port.[62] On ar-

[60] One of Iturbide's companions who followed him throughout in his exile was José R. Malo, who in 1869 published a narrative of Iturbide's journey to the port, his voyage to Italy, and of all subsequent events to the day of his death. Its title is *Apuntes Históricos sobre el Destierro, Vuelta al Territorio Mexicano y Muerte del Libertador D. Agustin de Iturbide.* On pp. 11, 14–15, Malo makes mention of the attempts to assassinate Iturbide, and the measures taken by Vicente Villada, colonel of the escort, to prevent it. He also states —pp. 17–18—that Iturbide narrowly escaped being poisoned on board by drinking of some bitters which had been supplied him by Padre Marchena, a Dominican and a mason, who according to Alaman—*Hist. Méj.*, v. 790—had been sent by the order to dog his steps. Marchena followed Iturbide to Leghorn in another vessel with the intention of taking his life. This gentle priest was afterward murdered in a cellar in Mexico by the brothers of a secret society which he had formed for the purpose of assassinating certain persons. A list of the intended victims was found on his person, one of whom was the prior of his own convent, a brother-in-law of Bravo. *Malo, ut sup.*

[61] The *Rawlins*, Captain Quelch, was an armed English merchantman of 400 tons and carrying 12 guns. She was chartered by the government for the sum of $15,550. The vessel was convoyed for some distance by an English man-of-war. *Alaman, Hist. Méj.*, v. 751, 754; *Malo, Apunt. Hist.*, 15–16; *Bustamante, Hist. Iturbide*, 147; *Gac. Imp. Mex.*, 1823, i, 241–2. Before embarking Iturbide had an interview with Victoria, to whom he presented a watch as a token of remembrance. His parting with Bravo was less cordial.

[62] During the voyage Iturbide entered into an explanation to Malo relative to the expression in his report of the battle at Salvatierra—see pp. 515–16, this

riving at Leghorn on August 2d, the *Rawlins* was quarantined for a month, and it was not till September 2d that the exiled family were domiciled in their new home.[63] Here Iturbide wrote his Manifiesto á la Nacion Mexicana.[64]

vol.—wherein it is stated that 350 excommunicated wretches had gone to the infernal regions. His explanation was that, being prostrated with sickness he had signed the despatch, which was drawn up by his chaplain Padre Gallegos, without reading it. When it appeared in print he was powerless to contradict the heartless expression, as it was his own fault through not having revised the original. *Malo, Apunt. Hist.*, 18–20.

[63] Iturbide rented the Villa Guevara, belonging to the princess Pauline Bonaparte. *Id.*, 23. Mariano Torrente, author of the *Historia de la Revolucion Hispano-Americana*, who had lately been deprived by Fernando of his office as Spanish consul in that port, offered his services to Iturbide with every assurance of friendship. His intentions, however, are doubtful. In his history he has shown himself very unfavorable to Iturbide.

[64] He was unable to publish it in Tuscany, and it was first printed in London by his friend Quin. This manifesto has been translated into English, French, and German, and supplemented by a number of documents, among which are several letters of Iturbide, and editors' notes, and has reappeared at different dates under various titles. I have already noticed the French edition in note 8 of this chapter. In 1827 it was published in Mexico by Pablo Villavicencio, under the title, *Carrera Militar y Política de Don Agustin de Iturbide.* This editor adds a political treatise of his own, *Manifiesto del Payo del Rosario*, pp. 16, largely taken up in discussing the principles of the masonic lodges. In conclusion he says: 'Aborrecí á Iturbide mientras persiguió mortalmente á los primeros patriotas...lo amé mucho cuando en Iguala rompió el nudo gordiano:...le volví á aborrecer desde el momento de su proclamacion hasta su caida á la cual contribuí.' In the same year was published in Mexico *Breve Diseño Crítico de la Emancipacion y Libertad de la Nacion Mexicana*, containing the manifesto, annotations on the notes, numerous documents, and General Garza's account of Iturbide's execution. And lastly, in 1871 the edition of 1827 was republished under the title, *Manifiesto del general D. Agustin de Iturbide, Libertador de Mexico*, by the editors of *La Voz de Mexico.* The publishers state that some portions of the previous issue had been omitted by them, inasmuch as they displayed an angry feeling oppugnant to the present age. This does not refer to Iturbide's manifesto, of which nothing is left out. For the same reason the annotations—contra-notas—would also have been omitted had it not been that their annexation to the manifesto rendered it unadvisable. With regard to the manifesto itself, which has been frequently quoted in this and preceding chapters under one or other of the above titles, it is a review by Iturbide of the events connected with his rise and fall, and a vindication of his conduct. After giving a brief sketch of his life up to the time of his proclamation of the plan of Iguala, he then stands on the defense of his political intentions and action relative to his acceptance of the crown. He denounces the assertion that he aspired to such position, and insists that he was compelled to mount the throne in obedience to the wishes of the people, that throughout the short period of his reign he was actuated solely by patriotic motives. He describes the general condition of Mexico as he found it when placed at the head—the exhausted condition of the treasury, the state of abandonment into which the judicial administration had fallen, and the difficulties under which the government labored. He then gives his attention to the discord between himself and congress, charging the latter with incompetence, and discusses the insurrection that terminated in the plan of Casa Mata and his own abdication. He more-

His residence in Italy, however, was of short duration. Influenced by news from Mexico, or, as he asserts, discovering that its independence was threatened by an alliance of the Latin powers of Europe for the recovery of the Americas, he resolved to leave a country where his freedom of action would be restricted, and on the 30th of November embarked with his two eldest sons for London. Forced by stress of weather to return, he decided to make the journey overland to Ostend. Avoiding France, he travelled through Switzerland, Germany, Prussia, and Holland, suffering somewhat from the cold, and embarked at Ostend December 31st, arriving in London the following day.[65] In April he was joined by his wife and children. The hand of fate now beckoned him to his doom. On February 13th he had addressed a note to the new constituent congress of Mexico, which had been installed at the beginning of November 1823, assigning as the reason of his departure from Italy the intrigues of Spain against Mexico, and offering his services for the good of his country, while declaring that his only object was its welfare.[66] But the government was thoroughly informed about him; his movements had been closely watched. Secret agents of the government had reported them; spies of the masonic order had followed his track, and his intentions were well known. On the 28th of April congress passed a decree declaring him an outlaw and an enemy of the state, if, under any pretext, he should place foot on Mexican soil, and caused copies of it to be circulated.

Without waiting for an answer to his note, and unaware of the above decree, on May 11th he sailed

over repudiates the charge that he had enriched himself from the public funds.

[65] Malo states that they took passage on a small steamer, the first which plied the straits. *Apunt. Hist.*, 27.

[66] Copies of his note are supplied in *Iturbide, Manifiesto*, 128–30, and in the other editions mentioned in note 64 of this chapter. An English translation is given in *Benedi's Narrative of the Last Moments of the Life of Don Agustin de Iturbide*, published in New York, 1825.

from Southampton on board the brig *Spring*,[67] accompanied by his wife and two younger sons, padres Lopez and Treviño, Malo, and Beneski, a Pole, who had served under Iturbide in Mexico and now followed him as his aide-de-camp. On the 14th of July the vessel came to anchor off the bar at Soto la Marina.

The Mexican liberator's days were now numbered and few in count. Beneski was sent ashore to gain information about the later occurrences in Mexico, and presented himself to Garza, who was still comandante at Soto la Marina. Provided with a letter from Padre Treviño, he represented himself as having come with a companion as the agent of commercial houses in London, to propose to the government a plan for the establishment of an English colony, and having received permission to land, and a written answer to Treviño's communication, he returned on board.[68] Beneski's report of his reception by Garza was so favorable that on the following day Iturbide landed with the intention of visiting him in person. He was accompanied only by Beneski, and arrived a little before sunset at the

[67] Commanded by Jacob Quelch, the same captain who had conveyed Iturbide to Leghorn. *Malo, Apunt. Hist.*, 35. Before his departure he addressed a letter to the English minister, Canning, which is somewhat in contradiction to that sent to the congress. He therein states that he went with the object of consolidating a government which would render his country happy, and that he had received frequent invitations to return to Mexico. 'He sido llamado de diversos puntos repetidamente, y no puedo hacerme sordo por mas tiempo.' At the same time he asserts that he does not go to seek an empire. One of his first cares would be to promote friendly relations with Great Britain. *Manifiesto*, 136–7.

[68] Beneski in his narrative—pp. 4–7—states that at the interview Garza expressed great regard for Iturbide, and assured him that if the ex-emperor should ever return to Mexico he might rely upon his assistance; that in 15 days he could place himself at the head of 2,000 cavalry, with ten pieces of ordnance, and that every confidence could be reposed in the troops. He further states that Garza gave him a letter for Iturbide—whom he supposed to be in London—imploring him 'to hasten from London to save Mexico, his country, from ruin and devastation.' The statement with regard to the letter is disproved by the evidence of Padre Treviño and Malo, *Bustamante, Garza Vindicado*, 74–5, and the latter only makes mention in his narrative of the one to Treviño. He conjectures, however, that Garza, suspecting who was on board, hoodwinked Beneski by protestations of adherence to Iturbide, and thus obtained the secret from him. Nevertheless, the note to Treviño expressed both the wishes and offers of Garza as told by Beneski, and Bustamante's vindication of Garza is virtually without point. *Apunt. Hist.*, 37–8.

rancho de los Arroyos, about six leagues from the sea, where they put up for the night. But Iturbide had been recognized as he went ashore, and the officer in command of the detachment at the point of Pescadería sent soldiers in pursuit of the strangers, who were disturbed in their sleep and placed under arrest after midnight. In the afternoon of the following day Garza, who had been informed of the occurrence, arrived with his escort. His meeting with Iturbide was most cordial, and he manifested his joy at seeing him. In friendly converse they journeyed together, and Iturbide now learned for the first time that he had been proscribed by the congress.[69] But he doubted not Garza's professions and promises to aid him. From Soto la Marina, where they arrived at ten o'clock at night, he wrote to Padre Lopez, instructing him to follow him there with his wife and companions. On the following morning, however, Garza's aide-de-camp appeared and told him to prepare for death, as both of them were to be shot at three o'clock that afternoon. Iturbide received the information with composure. "Tell General Garza," he said, "that I am ready to die, and only request three days to prepare to leave this world as a christian." He also requested that Beneski's life might be spared.

Nevertheless, Garza was unwilling to shoulder all the responsibility of a political murder. To put a man to death by virtue of a decree the existence of which he knew not of till he had made himself liable to the penalty would be an inhuman act, and the general would have washed his hands of the matter if he could have done so. I believe, too, that he really wished to save Iturbide's life.[70] Be his feelings what

[69] Garza had made no mention of this fact in his letter to Treviño; hence Malo infers that his intention was to entrap Iturbide. *Apunt. Hist.*, 40. Garza states that he informed Iturbide while on their journey that death would be his fate. *Iturbide, Manifiesto*, 176.

[70] Indeed, Garza's proceedings are inexplicable, as the sequel shows. I can only suppose that private instructions had been issued to the military authorities at the ports to use all means to secure Iturbide's person if he should

they might, he determined to refer the case to the state congress of Tamaulipas, and that afternoon started with his prisoners for Padilla, where it was holding its sessions. Still more incomprehensible is his action on the journey. On the morning of the 18th, he resigned the command of the whole escort, consisting of 130 cavalrymen, to Iturbide, stating in the presence of all that he did so because he was convinced of his good intentions, and that until the congress had passed its decision he would not regard him as a criminal. He then took leave of Iturbide, stating that he was going to return to Soto la Marina.[71] The doomed man, now light of heart, hastened by forced marches to Padilla, which place he reached at sunrise on the 19th. In no way did he attempt to abuse the confidence reposed in him. Halting his forces outside the town, he awaited the permission of the congress to enter. This was, however, denied him, and Garza, who had followed his steps, now rejoined him and placed him again under arrest.

The congress of Tamaulipas had been immediately informed by Garza of Iturbide's arrest when he landed, and on the 18th had passed the sentence of death upon him after a long discussion. It now again assembled in extraordinary session, and Garza pleaded in person in his behalf, laying stress upon the fact that Iturbide had landed in ignorance of the decree which proscribed him. But his efforts were vain. The assembly confirmed its previous sentence, and with unseemly haste instructed Garza to carry it forthwith into execution.[72] Shortly after two o'clock Iturbide was informed that he had to die, and that

appear, and execute him immediately. The government afterward reprimanded Garza for not having acted with more promptness in the matter. See the despatch of Teran, the minister of war, in *Id.*, 185–6.

[71] Garza excuses his conduct by stating to the government that his design was to put Iturbide's real intentions to the test; that he had perfect confidence in the troops and officers, to whom he had given secret orders. *Id.*, 179–80.

[72] See the records of the sessions supplied by Alaman. *Hist. Méj.*, v. ap. doc. no. 24, and Garza's report in *Iturbide, Manifiesto*, 182.

the hour of six in the evening was appointed for his execution. His serenity of mind was undisturbed; he only repeated his former request that three days might be allowed him for religious preparation.[73]

But even this short respite was denied him, and at the set of sun he was led forth. With unfaltering step he walked to the place of execution, and in a voice without a tremor he addressed a few parting words to the troops. "Mexicans," he said, "in this last moment of my life I recommend to you the love of your country, and the observance of our holy religion. I die for having come to aid you; and depart happy because I die among you. I die with honor, not as a traitor. That stain will not attach to my children and their descendants. Preserve order, and be obedient to your commanders. From the bottom of my heart, I forgive all my enemies." When the officer approached to bandage his eyes he objected, saying that it was not necessary, but being told that the form must be observed, he bound his handkerchief over them with his own hand. Then he knelt, and the platoon fired, killing him instantly. On the following morning his remains were buried in the old roofless church of Padilla, where they remained till 1838, when they were removed, by decree of congress, and interred with solemn obsequies in the cathedral of Mexico on the 24th of October.[74]

[73] He had previously written, on the 17th, a representation to the sovereign congress, appealing against his proscription. He now concluded it, and says: 'No pedí por la conservacion de la vida que ofrecí tantas veces á mi patria...mi súplica se redujo á que se me concediesen tres dias para disponer mi conciencia, que por disgracia no es tan libre en mi vida privada, como en la pública.' *Id.*, 165–6.

[74] For an account of these ceremonies, see *Pacheco, Descrip. Iturb.; Bustamante, Gabinete Mex.*, i. 84–93; *Arrillaga, Recop.*, 1838, 292, 395–9. Iturbide's family were detained under arrest at Soto la Marina till September, when they were banished the country and went to the United States. *Mex. Col. Ley. Ord. y Dec.*, iii. 60. A pension, however, of $8,000 a year was granted his widow. *Dublan* and *Lozano Leg. Mex.*, ii. 449. By decree of February 27, 1835, the sentence of banishment was revoked, and his widow and children were permitted to enter the republic. *Id.*, iii. 25. In after years Iturbide's services in accomplishing independence were recognized. In 1833 the title of Liberator was bestowed upon him. *Mex. Leg. Mcj.*, Aug.–Dec., 1853, 356–57; and in 1855 the anniversary of his death

At the time of his death Iturbide was nearly forty-one years of age. His career is before the reader, and his character may be drawn from it. Ambitious and designing, he possessed a winning influence most remarkable. Plausible and persuasive, he could cloak his aspirations with false patriotism, and while harboring designs the most selfish, put on a semblance of candor that carried conviction of honesty and purity of purpose. Thus it was that when independence had been achieved he came to be lauded by a large party as the savior of the nation, properly to be chosen its rebuilder. But his ability as a statesman was of no high order. He was wholly unable to cement the disintegrated elements of the community, which might have been reconstructed by a greater mind; and when by force of impudence and scheming, based on a brilliant military record, he had raised himself to the throne, he lacked the skill to hold his place. Selfish ambition outran his craftiness, and blinded his judgment. He failed to see that the same military leaders whom he had elevated with injustice to others would be the first to make their peace with the indignant nation when he alienated it by trampling under foot its sovereign rights; his blind confidence in the army was the secondary cause of his fall. Nevertheless, his execution was an unjust proceeding, and it can be excused only by the belief that civil war might ever be stirred so long as he remained alive. He still possessed numerous adherents, and to believe in his pretensions of patriotism would have been weakness.

With regard to the achievement of independence, more credit has been given to Iturbide than he deserves. Fighting first for monarchy, he would have so continued to the end had not personal interests influenced him. He was a great man only in a superficial way, though brilliant. He knew not the meaning of pure patriotism. His name is not to be mentioned

was declared a public holiday. *Mex. Col. Ley. Ord.*, Jan.–Aug., 1855, viii. 309–10.

beside those of Hidalgo, Morelos, and Bravo. Independence as finally achieved was the work not of an individual. Iturbide would have failed at the outset had not circumstances combined to aid him. When he proclaimed the plan of Iguala, he would inevitably have been crushed had Liñan obeyed the viceroy's orders. But he was left unmolested. Military chiefs in every part of the country then took up the work, and in all the principal provincial capitals independence was consummated without his presence. Apodaca's inactivity made the rest easy, and finally O'Donojú's liberalism opened to him the gates of Mexico. But it must be admitted that spasms of political sagacity were displayed by Iturbide, and that he acted with consummate skill and sound judgment on occasions. He knew well the public mind, and seized upon the right moment to arouse its feelings. Thus it was that his elevation was rapid and almost bloodless.

With a brief summary, I close this volume on the Mexican revolution. It was the transition period from political and intellectual despotism into the elemental conditions of a free nation. The evils afflicting the colonial existence were what might be expected from relations between a jealous and exacting mother country and a rich dependency, aggravated by opposing interests and geographic position, such as exclusive control of desirable offices, due to partiality and suspicion of loyalty; oppressive restrictions of trade and industries, due to selfishness and greed; and irritating class distinctions, due partly to the comparatively inferior rank of emigrants to that at least of the men sent to govern them. But these abuses and wrongs had here attained a far greater extent under Spanish pride and narrow-mindedness than in the English colonies, owing to the admixture of settlers with the aborigines, and the growth of a new race, which under the oppressive subordination of

centuries had come to be regarded as hostile and inferior, the great mass of the people being for that matter looked upon as conquered, in reality or by sympathy.

And so the seed of discontent grew till ripe for a revolution that awaited only an impulse beyond innate love for liberty. The impulse can be traced more immediately to the example set by the northern United States, which, fostered greatly by the works of French writers during the century, reacted upon Europe, notably in France itself, where the movement failed through its excesses. Spain also felt the reaction, and gave her colonies practical lessons in dispelling the glamour of royalty, showing how to depose rulers, and in its struggle with France placing New Spain in a position to discover her own strength in manifold resources. The Gallic invasion accordingly precipitated the revolution.

Its aim was lofty, for Hidalgo already declared for independence, as revealed in the war-cry, Death to the Spaniards! and as understood from the long-mooted point that New Spain was not only a colony, but a conquered country. And herein lay a powerful means for bringing the masses to his aid. To Morelos it was given, although too late, to impart a definite form to Hidalgo's idea. In the constitution of 1814 he declared for a republic of the extreme type, with three powers, and a triple executive duly subordinated to a sovereign congress. While liberation and equality were elements alluring enough, they did not suffice with all, and others were needed at least to sustain the fickle ardor of these fiery children of the south. Visions of a glorious past had to be conjured up before the trampled Indians, and bitterness had to be roused into hatred and thirst for vengeance, the whole made practical by hopes of spoils, which were licensed on the plausible ground that Spanish riches had been wrung from the aboriginal owners of the soil. These baser allurements, dictated by necessity, reacted on the cause, however; but as

nations are composed of high and low, good and bad, so their common aim, be it never so lofty, must even partake of the different ingredients.

The people of New Spain were more pliable and long-suffering than their northern neighbors, but lacked their self-control and adhesion to principle, and fell more readily into extremes, allowing mind and heart to be obscured by passion. Hence a war stamped by relentless and bloody retaliation on both sides, due alternately to passion and weakness. The royalists were at first impelled by a sense of self-preservation, which acted on the belief early instilled that strong measures were required to impress rebels; subsequently they were roused by the bandit-like raids of the guerrillas. Policy should have urged them to imitate oftener the magnanimous example set by men like Bravo and Mina. We have long ceased to wonder at the absence of any considerable mollifying influence of religion where men's passions are aroused.

This calls up a peculiar feature of the struggle in the prominent part played by the church. Both sides professed to be its champion, using it now as a cloak, anon as enginery, and stirring to move into vindictive activity a contest rife with hate and fanaticism. Although the upper clergy were essentially for the royalists, yet they finally turned the scale by which the revolutionists triumphed. If the price paid for the alliance was in later times to prove costly, it must also be remembered that the common fanaticism, however bloody, served as a bond which prevented an additional and probably more horrible war of races.

Several of the foremost leaders, too, were priests. Men who longed to give vent on the battle-field to feelings pent beneath the robe, to liberate suppressed ambition and patriotic instincts, found every encouragement to assume the lead, through their influence as guides and rulers over devoted flocks which respected them for their character and acquirements, and felt impressed by their directing minds. Their

training unfortunately had not fitted them for the field, but this failing was found as well in most of the other leaders, whose only claim to the distinction lay in a positive character or social precedence. It was a priest who started the revolution, a quiet good-hearted provincial cura; a man lacking military skill and definite plans, but self-sacrificing and resolute, who could choose soldiers like Allende for aids; a man standing between the mediæval past and the material future, for he was both a philosophizing dreamer and a dabbler in science and improvements—one whom we would expect to conceive lofty ideas and enterprises. Again, it was a priest, in Morelos, who, imbued with military genius and noble unselfishness, with the confidence won by a self-made condition, and with a practical mind, gave shape to the conception, organizing the revolution, giving it a real army, a representative congress, and finally a constitution with avowed independence—a fit man to carry out a great project, aided by chieftains like Matamoros and Galeana, and using legislators like Ignacio Rayon. The next grade of leaders exhibits a wide range of representative characters. Villagran and Rosains are conspicuous for reckless and unscrupulous pursuit of selfish purposes; Osorno figures as a successful cavalry leader and raider; Teran is a precocious, immature hero, Mina a dashing soldier; Bravo shines for his magnanimity, and Victoria for his tenacious loyalty to the cause; while Guerrero stands forward as an able successor to Morelos, one whose stanch purpose and self-denying patriotism sustain a flickering revolution. Iturbide is typical rather of the following period as soldier and schemer, brilliant yet selfish, who fox-like watches the opportunity to seize the bone of contention. As a rule, they are a self-willed class, rising frequently to heroic spheres, but unsustained, and falling repeatedly into moral and military errors. The royalist officers appear in comparison as professionals against amateurs, who with methodic precision, studied tactics, and strict

discipline carry out the plans of the viceroy, in whom is absorbed the credit for their achievements.

This applies even more to the rank and file on both sides, which are merged wholly in the leaders. The active royalist troops are entirely or mainly trained soldiers, often veterans of long standing with a large proportion fresh from peninsular battle-fields; while their opponents, as a rule, are undisciplined and uncontrolled recruits, who seek to supply the lack of skill and means with devotion and daring, or with numbers. Yet both parties are essentially brethren, the one enrolled for a noble purpose, the other enlisted by interests or compulsion to fratricidal war. The revolutionists are mainly composed of mestizos, the new-sprung race, ambitious and intelligent; of restless though uneven energy; with keen sense of its rights and wrongs, and with aspirations roused by mingled Spanish pride and aboriginal claims. The long-suffering Indian looks upon the issue with less eagerness. The assumption that the gain will be mainly absorbed by others counteracts greatly every inducement, even the traditions of a gilded past and the hopes of a roseate future, and draws him often back to a passive indifference, combined with a secret desire to behold the extermination of two objectionable rival races. The creoles waver frequently between a sense of injustice suffered and a class prejudice, which on one side binds them to the domineering Spaniards; between a longing for control and a timid fear for imperilled wealth. Their objection to fighting in a motley crowd renders them comparatively passive, except under compulsion, such as serving under royalist authorities as rural guard. Many prefer to manifest their revolutionary sympathies in contributions and intrigues.

Hidalgo sets out with a mere rabble, imposing in number, but easily vanquished. Morelos seeks to remedy the defeat by discipline and the organization of an army; and the result is a success which gains

for the revolution control of all the vast south, and assists to dispute the royalist sway in the central provinces, reducing the enemy to narrow straits. The latter are roused, and to the rescue comes Calleja, not alone a great soldier, but one who knows the country and the people. He avails himself of their mistakes and jealousies, and defeats them in detail. Errors like Hidalgo's vacillation, Morelos' long-drawn siege of Acapulco and indecision before Valladolid, and Mina's delay in the north cost dear; yet the achievements of the great men are mainly checked or ruined by discord, by the selfish aspiration or insubordinate action of a host of independent chieftains. Royalists also suffer from Venegas' lack of ability, from growing carelessness or lack of energy on the part of Calleja and Apodaca, and from the prevalence of greedy speculation which sacrifices the whole of Spanish interests to individual ends. This saves the revolution more than once from threatened suppression, and many a time it might be revived with hearty coöperation, as when Mina comes; but some leaders are suspicious, others jealous, the rest afraid or indifferent. Since its strength is broken with the fall of Morelos, the movement resolves itself into a guerrilla warfare, which sinks only too often into mere raids under men intent on personal control, and enrichment from tolls, levies, and spoils. Their followers become contaminated and demoralized, less willing than ever to submit to discipline and plans. They prefer desultory skirmishes to harassing operations, surprises to battles; insist on using horses where infantry alone can win, and ignore the lessons taught by experience. Against such a spirit the efforts of a few loyal men cannot prevail. They must humor their adherents to exist at all; great achievements are out of the question.

The scene of action shifts with the turn of fortune, centring along mountain ranges with ready access to fertile valleys and rich trade routes. Indeed, the

revolution is confined mainly to the central provinces and the busy highways, rather than to remote districts with their less turbulent and ambitious settlers, who in the north cluster round presidios for shelter against the wild Indians.

Finally, at the lowest ebb in the war, a liberal and anti-clerical sentiment, under the mask of freemasonry, makes a step against absolutism in Spain, and wrings concessions from a faithless king. In Mexico the effect is startling. While the revolutionists fail to appreciate the boon gained, it rouses the only elements hostile to them, a powerful church threatened in its privileges, and an army rendered discontented by precept and grievances, and now seduced by promises and clerical influence. To gain their end, they join issue with the former; Guerrero disinterestedly yields his own plans, and hopes for the prospect of immediate partial relief, and when the capricious soldiers begin to desert Iturbide, he remains true and assists to save the tottering movement. The waiting revolutionists, strengthened by a period of repose, fall into line. They recognize the brilliant qualities of Iturbide, as a soldier round whom to unite the discordant elements.

The new and now leading faction naturally objected to a republic, and many deemed a moderate monarchy a safer stepping-stone from a three-century despotism to independence. At any rate, this was the only promising plan for the moment, one held forth already by Rayon, the masses being propitiated with freedom and presumed equality, while the conservative Spaniards, the aspiring creoles, and a church jealous of its privileges were each appeased. Soon the last link of bondage to Europe was cast aside, in substituting a native ruler for a foreign prince, the idea of an empire flattering a court-loving capital, and to some extent the dreaming Indians. Unfortunately for himself, Iturbide was a soldier rather than a diplo-

mate and legislator, and sought to rule the people as he had his regiments. Disregarding tact, he blundered into despotism. None had forgotten his past career, his cruel warfare against the revolution, and his greed as a governor, the Spaniards also disliking him as an ambitious creole. The newly risen party availed themselves of royalist errors and weakness to step in and secure the fruit of a ten years' struggle; but the old leaders who had yielded before the rush of their success stood resolved on their course. They would use that party in their turn, snatch back the prize, and carry out the great project momentarily interrupted.

The diversity of races with different feelings and interests, fostered by geographic distribution and separate guerrilla wars, inclined the people naturally to a republic, one of federal form, for which the despotism of Iturbide gave fresh zest. This diversity stamped also the political attitude, seldom bold and strong in policy, but procrastinating yet impetuous, suspicious and vacillating, and with a tendency to cover ulterior designs by plausible projects and methods in consonance with the secretive aboriginal trait and the Spanish regard for form. Hidalgo and Rayon used the mask of Fernando to propitiate a large class; Mina did the same with the constitution of 1812; and so the dissimulation varied in relations with different sections and leaders. Morelos made a frank avowal of purpose, but it came inopportunely. Iturbide took a middle course, although still disguised; but his was rather a coup-d'état.

Those who like Alaman give undue prominence to the revolution of 1821 overlook that it was based essentially on the feelings and hopes of the people, wrought to a culminating point by their long efforts. The moment was ripe—independence was inevitable, as Iturbide admitted—and so made by his predecessors in the field. Without that preparatory work, the

movement of 1821 could not have been successfully attempted. It would have collapsed at once, as shown by Iturbide's critical position when the reaction set in with sweeping desertion, and as proved by the rapid and almost bloodless triumph achieved, owing to the active and passive coöperation of the people, the guerrillas, the rural guards, the militia. Nay, more: the army which gave the second and decisive impulse to the tottering movement at Iguala was that of Guanajuato and Michoacan under Bustamante and other creoles, composed to a great extent of pardoned insurgents, who had not failed to spread their ideas, and to a greater extent of native militia wholly in sympathy with the former, and awaiting only an opportunity and a leader. The opportunity was offered in the military errors and neglect of the viceregal government. While Iturbide may justly claim to have presented a plan and leader round whom to rally the different elements all lying prepared, his party is to be regarded properly as only one of the ingredients in the leavening mass, which infuses the necessary stimulant for perfecting it. And if we look at the ultimate results we behold the movement of 1821 a mere brief episode, fading into an impracticable scheme, setting a bad example, and giving the main impulse to the bitter party spirit that for decades involves the country in all the horrors of fratricidal war. The movement of 1810, on the other hand, reasserts itself almost at once overwhelmingly, and is practically carried out under the old leaders, who regain prominence and retain it for their party, with brief exceptional intervals.

And so Mexico becomes again her own mistress, after a probationary course of three centuries under stringent colonial régime. Born of oppression, baptized in blood and rapine, often the tool of selfishness and other base passions, the revolution achieves in almost bloodless coup-d'état one aim—political in-

dependence. The struggle is fraught with bitter lessons drawn from lack of more general self-sacrifice to the common good, involving greater discipline, restraint, and above all harmony; for it is discord, with neglect of sustained action, that forms the bane. In the United States a similar war was maintained for seven years by a far smaller population, with less means, against greater odds, and this in more regular campaign, not in desultory guerrilla warfare. This proportionately greater achievement was due simply to unity, subordination, and persevering adherence to the cause, with application of lessons taught by experience, for the Mexicans fought with equal bravery and eagerness. And similar devotion to principle won liberation for the Dutch and independence for the Swiss; the former from Spanish tyranny, the latter from the Austrian yoke. The movement in Switzerland bears certain resemblance to the Mexican, in causes drawn from semi-conquest and accumulating under oppressive rule, and in method, which resolves itself greatly into guerrilla operations round mountain fastnesses, with active participation of religious elements. The United States issued from the war deeply exhausted and in debt, while Mexico had recovered herself before the final blow was struck; but in the former country the one struggle ended all, while here much remained to be achieved, in political, social, and intellectual emancipation. Mexicans had yet to learn that strict adherence to principle, with self-control, guided by an educated and unchained mind, and bound by harmony, can alone bring true liberty.

The most important work on the war of independence is that of Lúcas Alaman, entitled *Historia de Méjico desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su Independencia en el año 1808 hasta la época presente*. Méjico, 1849–1852, large 8vo, 5 vols. The history of the revolution is preceded by a lengthy review of the policy and institutions under Spanish rule, and the causes of the war, and is followed by Iturbide's campaign, rule, and downfall. Then the establishment of the republic is more briefly described, the first decade of its existence occupying only 100 pages. The last 100 pages are devoted to a general review of the political, industrial, and social outcome of the revolution, a consideration of the aspect of the republic, and suggestions for needed reforms in various branches of government. At the end of each

volume is a valuable appendix containing corrective, supplementary, and statistical information, and supplying copies of a large number of most important official and other documents. A copious index of contents is also given, while plans of routes, towns, and forts, and portraits and autographs of noted men, add to the value of the text. Alaman had watched the progress of the revolution, had personally known Hidalgo and other later leaders, and was therefore able to judge of the value of the histories presented. The blind hero-worship of the Mexican accounts, and the bitter tirades of the Spanish versions, had equally disgusted him. His aim was to write an impartial history, but perceiving how strongly partisanship prevailed, particularly among Mexicans, he dreaded the denunciation which he feared his statements would draw upon him, and proposed to defer the publication of his version till after his death; finding, however, that public sentiments were changing somewhat, he yielded to the solicitations of friends, and ventured to begin issuing the work in 1849. His main authority for the period from 1814 to 1820, when he was travelling in Europe, is Dr Arechederreta's minute diary of events with comments. He moreover claims to have made the general archives his chief source, and to have kept before him all extant books, newspapers, and manuscripts obtainable. The very careful and not scanty notes bear him out herein, and his exactness and conscientiousness are shown by the notes in the appendices, wherein he is constantly correcting statements not in accord with later researches or with reliable information from friends, critics, and even opponents. Alaman's long public career, after 1821, when he figured as deputy to the córtes, has afforded him ample opportunity to gather material and knowledge for his work, and has developed the ability so evident in its pages. The work does not appear to have met with the wide reception—abroad, at least—that it deserves, nor with the severe attacks that might have been expected from its independent tone. Alaman claims above all to have been impartial and exact, and declares in his 4th volume that his invitation to critics has not brought forward any refutations of facts stated, beyond the trifling corrections added in the appendices. He also claims that he does not intrude his observations on current events—preface, i. p. v—in order to leave the reader's judgment free; but this rule he fails to observe. Often he who fancies himself the most free from prejudice is the most prejudiced. Alaman has a contempt for the Indian and mixed races by whom and for whom the rebellion was chiefly carried out, and he consequently shows his objection also to many of those among the 'pure Spaniards' of Spain or America—whom he otherwise upholds as of his own prouder race—who aided the rebellion. He even goes so far as to misconstrue the motives of Hidalgo and other leaders, even when facts presented by himself tend to purify them. He takes every opportunity, while accrediting the royalists with every virtue, to exhibit the rebels as inhuman robbers, and to deprive the early insurgent leaders of any credit in the revolution. All the merit of it he gives to Iturbide, to the regular army, and to Spaniards born in Spain. For the latter he strains his points of argument into divers contradictions of himself. Yet he does not favor Spain or subjection to Spain; nor does he altogether exempt royalists or pure Spaniards from blame. In short, he struggles to appear impartial, despite his failings. Though Alaman's meaning is occasionally obscure, this is of rare occurrence, and his style is clear and unaffected, free from flowery fancies, poetical ecstasy, and sentimental gush. It is well adapted to his subject, and his descriptions of events are often graphic, as for instance the capture of Guanajuato by Hidalgo. Occasionally he indulges in strokes of fine-pointed satire. He owns to the use of Americanisms, but claims that Mexico has a right to introduce new words. iv. p. viii. The promised bibliography of his authorities is not given. Indeed, Alaman appears to have tired of his labors—to judge partly from the disproportion in the narrative—and hurried the work, by contracting it toward the end. The title-page, which calls it a history 'to our present day,' is therefore wrong. It is a pity that he found no time or inclination to continue the

history of Mexico from 1830, during a period in which he played so conspicuous a part.

Lúcas Ignacio Alaman was born in the city of Guanajuato, October 18, 1792. On his mother's side he was lineally descended from Pedro de Busto, who in 1475 proclaimed Queen Isabel in Ocaña, and from Francisco Matías de Busto y Moya, first marquis of San Clemente and viscount of Duarte. His father, Juan Vicente Alaman, was a native of Ochagavia, in the valley of Salazar in Navarre, and married María Ignacia Escalada, the widow of Gabriel de Arechederreta. Alaman's mother by her first marriage had a son, Juan Bautista, who became knight of the order of Cárlos III., and canon of Mexico; it is the manuscript diary of this half-brother, kept at Mexico from 1811 to 1820, that constitutes Alaman's main authority in his history of the events during that period. He received his early education in the school of Belen at Guanajuato, and afterward studied mathematics and other branches in the college of La Purísima Concepcion, one of his instructors being the unfortunate Rafael Dávila, who was shot by order of Calleja in November 1810. The study of mining next occupied his attention, to which he devoted himself with an assiduity characteristic of all that he did. In 1808 he was in the city of Mexico, when Iturrigaray was deposed, and in 1810 witnessed the terrible events which occurred in Guanajuato. In December of the same year he removed with his mother to Mexico, his father having died three years before. Here he continued his studies, including in the course foreign languages, physical sciences, mineralogy, chemistry, and botany, until 1814, when he left for Spain. He remained abroad until 1820, travelling over nearly the whole of Europe, and completing his education with unwearied application. Italy, Switzerland, France, England and Scotland, Germany, Prussia and Saxony, Holland and Hanover were all visited. At Paris he pursued his study of natural science under Biot, of botany with Decandolle, and chemistry under Thenard; and at Freyberg, where he resided for some time, he increased his knowledge of mining. On his return to his native country he was elected deputy to the Spanish córtes for the province of Guanajuato, and embarked with the deputies who hastily left Mexico on the eve of Iturbide's revolution. From this time his career was a public one, and pertains to the history of his country. Alaman died June 2, 1853, after an illness of only a few days. On May 26th he was attacked with inflammation of the lungs, which assumed a fatal form on the 29th. He left a wife, Doña Narcisa García Castrillo, whom he married in 1823, and six children, five of whom were sons. Alaman was of somewhat diminutive stature, and possessed little physical strength. His determination, however, moral energy, and ceaseless perseverance rendered him capable of undergoing great exertion, and supplied him with an exhaustless fund of endurance. His forehead was broad and smooth, his eyes keen and piercing, and his complexion so fair that it would betoken him to belong to a northern race. He was highly gifted, speaking English, French, and Italian fluently, besides possessing considerable knowledge of the German language. He was a member of numerous scientific institutions and literary societies in Europe and the United States. His talent was of high order, and he cultivated it with exemplary industry. Though holding high office under the republic, he not unfrequently displays in his history monarchical tendencies. Tornel states that during his travels in Europe Alaman became imbued with the idea that a monarchical form of government was the most perfect. *Breve Reseña Hist.*, 25–6. Alaman, on the contrary, assures us that his experience in Europe had made a republican of him, *Hist. Méj.*, v. 807; he was, however, opposed to democratic tendencies. Zavala speaks of him as cunning, reserved, avaricious, and ever ready to avoid danger: a man who made few or no friends. *Rev. Mex.*, i. 342–3. Consult *Alaman, Apuntes Biog.*, pp. 56; *Id., Notic. Biog.*, pp. 59; *Arroniz, Biog. Mex.*, 21–30; *Montes de Oca, Orac. Fúneb.; Robinson's Mex. Rev.*, 268–70, 281; *Bustamante, Voz de la Patria*, ii. 8; *Id., Hist. Iturbide*, 150.

Alaman's history was preceded by his *Disertaciones sobre la Historia de la Rep. Mex., desde la conquista hasta la independencia.* Mex. 1844, 1849. 3 vols.

These dissertations were really introductory to the history, and originated in a resolution of the Ateneo society, of which Alaman was a member, that its associates should give public lectures. They were published in the periodical of the Ateneo, and as this record seemed too ephemeral to Alaman, he revised and enlarged them for this special issue. The 1st volume narrates pretty thoroughly the events of the conquest of Mexico and later occurrences down to 1535; vol. ii. is devoted to the biography of Cortés, his family and descendants, and to a history of the development of the city of Mexico, with an account of the religious progress of the country. The 3d volume is wholly given to Spanish history, and contains an appendix of 100 pages, supplying a list of the viceroys, with the principal events connected with their administrations. Considerable research into rare documents and archives was made in obtaining the material for this work, as is proved in the appendices. Alaman excuses the lengthy history of Spain on the ground that no true and impartial version existed—iii. 385—and he considered his account worthy of Spaniards' attention, and also thought it needful for the proper understanding of Mexican history. In the preface to vol. iii. he outlines his *Historia de Méjico*, and reports its progress to date.

José María Luis Mora, Méjico y sus Revoluciones, Paris, 1836, 3 vols., i., iii., iv., the 2d not having been published. This author was born in Chamacuero in Guanajuato, October 1794, studied theology, and was ordained a presbyter in 1819. Somewhat later he established himself in Paris, where, in 1847, he was appointed minister plenipotentiary for Mexico in London. He died suddenly in Paris in July of the following year, at the age of fifty-four. Mora began to collect material for his work in 1828, and commenced to write it in 1830. His first volume treats of modern Mexico, that is, its character as a nation and country at the time when he wrote; vol. iii. takes up the conquest and the colonial period down to 1810; and vol. iv. the war of independence from its beginning under Hidalgo to 1812 inclusive. His history adds little, as far as information goes, to that supplied by previous writers. It is naturally tinted with his own ideas, which without being profound display intelligence. His groupings are good, his speculations are practical, and a broad human nature seems to speak throughout his work. He never quotes, but in his preface states the authorities upon which he mainly relied for his information. His remarks on them exhibit his desire to be impartial. He supplies several interesting documents, and his biographical matter, without being abundant, is clear and concise. This author's account of Hidalgo's epoch seems hurried and incomplete, while his relation of the Morelos period, as far as it extends, is full. His estimate of Hidalgo is one of disapproval rather than appreciation. Morelos he admires. He has a radical dislike of both the church and military as state powers. His sympathies are with the insurrection, the more so, probably, since his brother fought and died in its cause. His literary style is simple and good, though somewhat commonplace. Mora was the author of various other works, conspicuous among which is his *Obras Sueltas*, Paris, 1837, 2 vols. Volume i. contains a political review of events in Mexico from 1820 to 1837 and a collection of Bishop Queipo's writings on the subject of the sequestration of church property for the benefit of the treasury; also a dissertation on finance and the public debt, foreign and internal. The political review treats of the different factions and administrations, philosophically discussed, reforms in the army and church systems being advocated, especially the suppression of ecclesiastical civil jurisdiction. Vol. ii. is a collection of his articles published in the *Semanario Político y Literario*, and the *Observador de la República Mejicana*, probably written between 1826 and 1830. These articles are mostly of a political character, and treat of secret societies, liberty of the press, education, expulsion of the Spaniards from Mexico, reforms in the constitution, the suppression of military tribunals, the prerogative of mercy in remission of capital punishment, laws respecting citizenship, and other questions—in all of which discussions the author displays his strong liberal views.

The authorities from which the history of Iturbide's revolution, reign, and

death has been derived are very numerous, as will be recognized by the following list. Perhaps the most important one is the *Historia del emperador D. Agustin de Iturbide*....Mexico, 1846, by Cárlos Bustamante. This work, though strongly tinctured with the usual farrago noticeable in Bustamante's writings, is very valuable for the great number of documents it contains, and from the fact that the author, being a member of the congress, was a participator in many of the leading events. His versions, however, must be received with caution. Bustamante is not an unprejudiced writer, and not unfrequently makes out his case and colors it to suit his own views. I cannot accept his assertion that Beneski reported to Iturbide before he landed that he had been proscribed, and that the latter 'rushed with his eyes open into the abyss of destruction.' With regard to the execution of the ex-emperor, the author remarks: 'The government, no less than the congress, has been accused of cruelty and injustice, and Garza of both as well as of ingratitude.' p. 261. Bustamante holds all parties blameless. The safety of the people, he argues, is the supreme law, and with Iturbide present the public peace could not have been preserved. Garza, he maintains, could not have acted otherwise without sacrificing himself, and the only fault he finds with him is for having temporarily placed Iturbide in command of the escort.

Cárlos Navarro y Rodriguez, Iturbide. Madrid, 1869, pp. 237. This author, a Spaniard and constituent deputy of the Spanish córtes, supplies us with the history of Iturbide's career and events in Mexico that resulted from the time of his defection till his death. Navarro draws largely upon Alaman for his historical material, but his views are taken from a Spanish standpoint. Every act of Iturbide was wrong, and every misfortune which happened to the country or to individuals who took part in the events is attributed mainly to the separation from Spain, which country he describes as a good mother, who would have been a powerful support against the encroachment of the United States. Next to this grievous error was the mistake committed by not establishing a monarchy with a European prince on the throne and European support. Navarro writes well, and utters many bitter truths, but he is an inveterate monarchist and far from impartial.

José Joaquin Pesado, El libertador de México D. Agustin de Iturbide. Mexico, 1872, pp. 79. This work is a historical sketch of Iturbide's life, the greater portion of it being devoted to the period commencing with the declaration of the plan of Iguala, and terminating with the liberator's death. The author considers that the charges of excesses committed by Iturbide while in command at Guanajuato were exaggerated, and regards the action of the government in removing him from his command as an indication of the little confidence placed by royalists in Mexican officers serving in the government ranks. Pesado inclines to believe that Iturbide while in retirement reflected on the question of independence and meditated its achievement. He does not, however, attempt to screen his ambition and failings. Contrary to the supposition of Malo, he believes that Beneski carefully concealed from Garza the fact that Iturbide had arrived on the coast, and while giving the comandante full credit for his final efforts to save Iturbide, condemns his execution as repugnant to the principles of justice and reason.

José Ramon Pacheco, Descripcion de la solemnidad fúnebre con que se honraron las cenizas del Héroe de Iguala, Don Agustin de Iturbide. Mexico, 1849, pp. 66. A description of the obsequies celebrated in honor of Iturbide on the occasion of removing his remains from Padilla to the cathedral of Mexico in 1838. This account was written by order of the government, and President Herrera afterward caused it to be published. Pacheco denounces the execution of Iturbide as an act of party vengeance and by no means expressive of the will of the nation. He repudiates the idea that Iturbide had any personal object in returning to Mexico, maintaining that his only motive was to aid in the salvation of the nation's independence which the author believes was really threatened by the projects of the Holy Alliance. Pacheco finds no excuse for Garza's proceedings in the matter, charging him with ingratitude and treachery. To the account of the exhumation of Itur-

Max., 16–28; *Conder's Mex. and Guat.*, 126–9; *Cavo, Tres Siglos*, iv. 166–274; *La Cruz*, v. 633–4, vii. 548; *Haefkens, Cent. Am.*, 47–55; *Wappäus, Mex. und Cent. Am.*, 88, 127; *Carriedo, Estud. Oaj.*, ii. 29, 37; *Chevalier, Mex.*, 366–88; *Id., Expéd. Mex.*, 8–15, 40–3; *Cuevas, Porvenir Mex.*, 7–257, 292–315; *Id., El Imperio*, 6–7; *Herrera, Memoria; Carta de un Ex-diputado; Chateaubriand, Congrés de Vér.*, ii. 244–464; *Bazancourt, Mex.*, 70–80; *Notas, Vocabul. Geog.; Fossey, Mex.*, 146–52, 413–14, 504; *Hittell's Hist. Cult.*, 267–8; *Beaufoy's Mex. Illust.*, 90–102; *Clamores de un Ciud.; Cedulario*, MS., iv. 24, 34, 234–9; *Hall's Voy.*, 196–313; *Id., Extracts Journal*, ii. 186–221; *Flores, Oracion Cív.; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex.*, 161–4; *Kollenkamp, Unabhaengigkeitskampf*, 258–60, 308–42, 430–52; *Jesuitas en Mex.*, 34; *Kennedy's Texas*, i. 302–7, 365–75; *Domenech, Hist. Mex.*, ii. 31–70, 101–8, 325–6; *Duvernois, Franzoes. Intervent.*, 22–9; *Dufey, Résumé*, i. 8, ii. 235–48; *Disposic. Var.*, ii. 35–77, iii. 100–14, v. 4; *Dicc. Univ. Hist. Geog.*, i. 49–50, 255–8, 748–9, app. 155, iv. 192–3, 837–51, viii. 667–84, 741–2, ix. 271–7, 479–80, 595, 608, 700, 810, 848–9, x. passim; *Censor Mex.*, no. 2, 1–7; *Cuatro Palabritas; Cuestion del Dia; Willie, Not. Hac. Públ.*, 7–26; *Democratic Rev.*, i. 485; *Isabel, Relacion; Iturbide, Carrera Mil. y Pol.*, passim; *Id., Manif.; Id., Breve Manif.; Id., Plan*, 1–4; *Id., Carta al Pensador; Id., Cartas de los Gen.; Id., Catástrofe; Id., Breve Diseño*, passim; *Id., Mém. Autog.; Wilson's Mex. and Its Relig.*, 74–5; *Bravo, Manif.*, 1–27; *Brocklehurst's Mex.*, 21; *Juarros, Guat.*, i. 344; *Incitat. de un Mex.*, 1–14; *Himno Cív.; Hunt's Merch. Mag.*, xlv. 607; *Holley's Texas*, 311–18; *Kollonitz, Court of Mex.*, 254–8; *Labarrieta, Informe; Lafond, Voy. autour du Monde*, i. 267–82; *Ilustrac. Mex.*, ii. 534–7, iv. 276–98; *Lacunza, Discursos Hist.*, no. xxxvii. 537–61; *Lyon's Jour.*, ii. 45–8, 91; *Larenaudière, Mex. et Guat.*, 189, 196; *Lempriere's Notes in Mex.*, 425–6; *Semanario Polít.*, i. 128, 159–61, 171–4, ii. 238–9, 264; *Derecho Intern. Mex.*, passim; *Liberal á Baj. Escritores*, 67–8; *Lizardi, Contestacion; Id., El Pensador Mex.; Lancaster Jones, Oracion Cív.; Löwenstern, Le Mexique*, 79–83, 291–5; *Llegada á Toluca; Santana, Proc. Impavid.; Id., Manifiesto; Id., Defensa; Indic. Orig. Extraord. Cong.; Lozada, Cuestion Mex.*, 34–8; *Loreto, Miss. Rec.* 74–5; *Suarez y Navarro, Hist. Méj.*, 1–59, 263, 377–579; *Salvador, Diario Ofic.*, 1875; *Empleos Mil. Regencia; Exhort. al Pueblo Mex.; El Español*, March 23, 1853; *Escalera y Llano, Mex. Hist. Descript.*, 15, 17–18, 20–8; *Dávila, Exposic.; Id., El Toro*, 339–402, 469–85; *Id., Manos Besan Hombres; Id., La Verdad Amarga*, 269–338; *Electores, Lista; El Americano*, no. 1; *El Mercurio Ultramarino*, 82–116; *Entrada Pública; Liceo Mex.*, i. 84–91, 177–84; *El Tiempo*, 1834, 345; *Derechos y Oblig.; Diar. de Avisos*, Jan. 12, 1860; *Dictámen sobre Juram; Diario del Imp.*, 1866, 275–6; *Dubois, Le Mex.*, 112; *Manif. al Mundo; Manif. Junta Provis.; Impugn. Junta Provis.; Exámen Imparc. Junta Provis.; Manif. al Públ.; Marquez y Donallo, Proclama; Mazo, Aviso; Martinez, Sinóp. Hist. Revol. Mex.*, i. 39–40, 70, 104–6, 207–8; *Perez Martinez, Discurso; Manero, Doc. Interes.*, 7–12; *Prov. Intern., Real Orden.; Gob. Polit. N. Esp.; Mayer's MSS.; Id., Mex. Azt.*, i. 297–303; *Müller, Reisen in Mex.*, iii. 283–311; *Mazariegos, Mem. Hist. Chiapas*, 60–71; *Niles' S. Am. and Mex.*, i. 158–87; *N. Am. Misc.*, ii. 257–66; *Méj., Bosquejo Liger*, passim; *Medina, Discurso Patr.; Mex., Cuestion Monarq.*, 18–19; *Mex., Informe Com. Pesq.*, 1874, 1–59; *Mex. Col. Leyes*, 1848, i. 645–7; 1854, vii. 179–81; *Mex., Col. Dec. y Ord.*, 152; *Miscel. de Com.*, Jan. 6, 1821; *Mosquito Tulan.; Mex., Dict. Com. Convoc.*, 1–2, 6–9; *Mex., Exposic. sobre Condic.*, 236–44; *Mex., Reflex. sobre Independ.*, 11–12; *Mex., Proclama del Virey; Gallo, Hombres Ilust.*, iii. 293–494, iv. 173–220, 251–81, 297–412; *Gilliam's Travels*, 393–455; *Gleeson's Hist. Cath. Church*, i. 22, ii. 205–6; *Foote's Texas*, i. 82–102; *Gregory's Hist. Mex.*, 42–4, 64–5; *Guthrie's Univ. Geog.*, i. 393; *García, Habit. Puebla; Dos Años en Mex.*, pp. i.–iv.; *Gonzalez, Hist. de Aguasc.*, 94–5; *Mosaico Mex.*, ii. 120, 196–7, 344, vi. 337–48; *Museo Mex.*, ii. 138–40, 231–6, iv. 555–61; *Moya, Indicac.; Monumentos Domin. Esp.*, MS., 111; *Mex., Diario Cong. Constit.*, ii. 498–502; *Not. Ciud. Mex.*, 291–4; *Vallejo, Col. Doc. Mex.; Mex., Doc. Relat.; Noriega y Guerra, S. T. de Mier; Novella, Nuevo Virey*, 1–3; *Nouv. Annales Voy.*, xiii. 232–4; *Iturbide, Mejicanos; Id., Proclama; Id., Primer Gefe; Id., Poblanos*

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